More bad legal analysis

Posted 28 June 2004 by

↗ The current version of this post is on the live site: https://pandasthumb.org/archives/2004/06/more-bad-legal.html

A new article in the Wake Forest Law Review provides a shoddy legal which is, alas, all too common in the religion context. Beginning with a deeply flawed understanding of the roles of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, the article ends up making foolish statements about creationism in the classroom.

Patrick M. Garry, Inequality Among Equals: Disparities in The Judicial Treatment of Free Speech And Religious Exercise Claims 39 Wake Forest L. Rev. 361 (2004), argues that courts tend to pay too much attention to freedom of speech, as opposed to other freedoms, and that they ought not to do this. Now, broadly speaking, this is true.

In the past seventy years, courts created a "double standard" by which so-called "fundamental" rights (speech, press, and so forth) are given far more protection than supposedly non-fundamental rights, like the ownership and use of property, or the right to earn a living, which receive almost no legal protection at all. As Justices Scalia and Thomas have correctly noted, this "unquestionably involves policymaking rather than neutral legal analysis." United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 41 (1994) (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., concurring in judgment).

But that's not what Garry has in mind. He argues that "in connection with religious liberty. . . the courts have been far more inconsistent and far less protective." Garry, supra at 362. Then he lists some examples, and you see that he's already starting off on the wrong foot. For instance, he cites Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), as an example of the court turning its back on the freedom of religious exercise. But Doe--which held that a school district could not begin its football games with a student-led prayer--was not a free exercise case at all; it was an Establishment Clause case: the court held that the prayer violated the religious liberty of dissenting students not to be "psychologically coerced" into a prayer with which they disagreed. Although the majority of students, who voted to hold the prayer, may have believed that the Court's decision was insensitive to their religious freedom to hold a public prayer at the school's football games, the plaintiffs in the case saw it as vindicating their religious freedom. (I've said before that I think Doe was wrongly decided, because I don't buy the "psychological coercion" rationale. But if one grants that peer pressure can qualify as a form of coercion, then the Doe decision certainly was a victory for religious freedom.)

But Garry believes Doe and other cases indicate that

courts have applied the Establishment Clause, in a way that has often muted or negated religious liberty. . .. [F]ree speech issues are given a more favorable standard of review. Most governmental restrictions on speech are judged under a strict scrutiny standard, whereas many religious exercise issues receive a much lower standard of review. And though viewer or listener sensibilities are rarely considered in free speech cases, even when the speech is highly offensive, the reactions and impressions of objecting viewers and listeners are sometimes accorded a near veto-power in religious expression cases.
Supra at 363. It's hard to know where to begin with this. First, it is just not true that religious issues are given a "lower standard of review" at all. Garry cites Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), for this claim. Yet Smith simply holds that when it comes to a generally applicable law which is religiously neutral, a person's religion doesn't give him a free pass. In that case, a person argued that he should be allowed to ingest an illegal drug for religious purposes, and the Court held that, the anti-drug law was not targeted at his religion, and that the Free Exercise Clause didn't allow him to escape that law.

But in cases where the law does discriminate on the basis of religion, the Court employs the same strict scrutiny analysis that it employs in speech cases. The classic example of this is Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), in which the Court struck down an anti-butchering ordinance that was just a pretext for curtailing religious animal sacrifice. Hialeah came after Smith and shows that religiously discriminatory laws do receive strict scrutiny still. Yet Garry doesn't even cite the case. (He does, however, acknowledge in one parenthesis that Smith applies only "(as long. . .as the laws infringing on that conduct are neutral laws of general applicability)." Supra at 372.)

As for "listener sensibilities," these matter more in the religion cases because of the Establishment Clause. There is nothing analogous to it in the speech context. The Establishment Clause prohibits government from taking a position on an issue, so some Justices have held that audience perceptions are relevant to analyzing whether the government has violated this rule. The government is allowed to make statements on other issues, however--like, that smoking is bad, or that you should vote. Audience perceptions are therefore less relevant. See, e.g., National Endowment for The Arts v. Finley, 524 U. S. 569 (1998).

The flaws in his analysis then lead him to inaccuracies when discussing cases involving creationism. In a footnote, he writes

under the reasoning of Lee [v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)], public school instruction which offends a child's religious beliefs should constitute a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. And yet, in the school setting, the free speech-related doctrine of academic freedom takes precedence over the rights of religious exercise. If some nonreligious students are coerced by religious expressions of the type occurring in Lee or by the posting of the Ten Commandments, then it seems logical that religious students are coerced by some of the secular values they are taught in school (to the exclusion of religious ones). See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 589 (1987) (striking down Louisiana's "Balanced Treatment" statute which required that wherever evolution is taught scientific creationism also be taught as a competing theory of origins). In other words, the coercion theory of Lee should go both ways, including the protection against government engaging in secular indoctrination that undermines a believer's religious principles. . ..
Supra at 374 n. 85. Now, again, I agree that the "psychological coercion" argument embraced in Lee is wrong, and in part precisely because if mere personal offense constitutes coercion, then nobody can say anything. But that is not the only issue involved here.

First, the Establishment Clause prohibits government from putting its imprimatur on a religious view--it does not prohibit the government from putting its imprimatur on things other than religion. Schools may teach students that smoking is bad for them, even if that might offend parents who smoke--and even if it offends people who smoke for religious reasons, like the plaintiffs in the Smith case!

Second,* personal offense is relevant to Establishment Clause cases because such offense is often indicative that an establishment is occurring. But personal offense is irrelevant in cases involving, say, non-smoking, because the government is not prohibited from taking such a position. In the same way, personal offense is not relevant to cases involving evolution, because while government is prohibited from taking a position on religious issues, it is not prohibited from teaching the facts. And so long as government is in the teaching business (which I don't think it should be, but that's for another day) then it is, by definition, going to "indoctrinate," in the sense of teaching students facts they and their parents may find unpalatable. That's what teaching is. So, while it may seem "paradoxical[ ]," to Garry that "pro-religious speech can violate the Establishment Clause, but anti-religious speech, or speech that denigrates or belittles religious beliefs, does not violate the Free Exercise Clause," id. at 378--but it only seems that way to Garry because he misunderstands the issues involved.

This misunderstanding continues in another footnote, when Garry writes

In Lee v. Weisman, Justice Kennedy argued that the state may not use the coercive power of government to enforce a particular religious or antireligious orthodoxy. But since school attendance is mandatory, then the teaching of viewpoints antagonistic to religion, according to the reasoning of Lee, can rise to the level of government coercion and "an attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a religious [or antireligious] orthodoxy." 505 U.S. at 592. Furthermore, the forbidding of the teaching of creationism or Intelligent Design in public schools because "it lends support to a religion, while exclusively permitting or requiring the teaching of evolution, might be construed by a court as viewpoint discrimination." Francis J. Beckwith, Public Education, Religious Establishment, and the Challenge of Intelligent Design, 17 Notre Dame J.L., Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 461, 489 (2003).
Id. at 377 n. 99.

But, once again, the government is allowed to engage in viewpoint discrimination in most areas of life. All of teaching is "viewpoint discrimination" in some sense, since it prefers knowledge to ignorance, literacy over illiteracy, cooperation and peacefulness over bickering with one's classmates. We expect schools to engage in such discrimination. Government may teach students facts, such as that the world is round, that 2 + 2 = 4, that smoking causes cancer, and that the human species evolved through a process of non-random selection among randomly mutating genetic variables. The only time the Constitution prohibits government from engaging in viewpoint discrimination, is in basing benefits or burdens on religion. Now, it is certainly true that for some people, the fact of evolution runs counter to their religious views. But this is true of any number of facts that schools may teach students, and although it is certainly a problem--indeed, I believe an insoluble problem, if one grants the existence of public education--it does not mean that the Free Exercise or Establishment Clause prohibit government from teaching students evolution, or require the teaching of creationism.

For Garry,

[t]he more favorable judicial treatment of free speech claims (over free exercise claims) can also be seen in the area of school curriculum. Academic freedom, which is an offshoot of free speech, almost always takes precedence over free exercise rights. Take, for instance, the subject matter of evolution. When students who believe the biblical account of creation are required to treat evolution as true, they are in a sense being compelled to express views hostile to their faith.
Id. at 377. But, again, all government education necessarily does this. If Garry wishes to argue that all government education should be eradicated, that would be great--but he cannot argue that schools should be able to "in a sense" compel students to believe that smoking causes cancer, while simultaneously saying that the should not "in a sense" compel students to believe in the fact of evolution.

Garry misunderstands the issue of evolution education because he wants government to teach--just, not things he disagrees with. He attacks the Lee theory of psychological coercion (and rightly so) but at the same time, relies on it when arguing that schools violate the Establishment Clause by "coercing" students into believing in the fact of evolution. He doesn't seem to realize, among other things, that if the Lee case were overruled, his argument for "equal time" would evaporate with it. I get the sense that Garry's analysis suffers from a persecution complex that causes him to lash out at the courts for whatever reasons he can think of at the moment.

But to me, Garry's most upsetting error is his ignoring the difference between being forced to do something and being free to do something. He believes that Doe was wrongly decided because he thinks that free exercise of religion includes the right to compel or pressure others into a religious exercise. He criticizes the so-called "anti-accomodationist" position (that is, the position of Employment Division v. Smith, supra) because "[a]lthough the anti-accommodationists view their position as neutral, it is neutral only for those who believe that full religious practice can occur in the "private" realm.' Mark D. Rosen, Establishment, Expressivism, and Federalism, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 669, 676 (2003). But there are many who believe that a full religious life is possible only if one's religious beliefs infuse every aspect of one's life, both private and public." Id. at 365 n.26. But the Establishment Clause limits the degree to which public officials may allow their religious beliefs to infuse their public lives. It prohibits them, for instance, from compelling a person to support a religious view, even if the public official believes that his religious duty is to institute such compulsion.

In a famous speech, Abraham Lincoln said that there were essentially two kinds of people in the world: wolves and sheep. The sheep believed that "liberty" meant the right to live their lives free from interference, while the wolves believed that "liberty" meant the right to eat sheep with impunity. Clearly, he said, the wolf and the sheep are not agreed on a definition of the word liberty. In this case, Garry believes that freedom of religion includes the right to compel people to support religious views they disagree with, while I believe that religious freedom means the right to worship as you please--to, as a famous person once said, pray in your closet--without government bossing you around. Clearly we are not agreed upon a definition of free exercise.

*-Update: I meant to add, another and very compelling reason, for disestablishment is that one should not be compelled to pay for the support of religious views with which one disagrees. This goes beyond the "psychological coercion" rationale, because there is genuine coercion involved: having to pay your tax dollars to support evangelism. This goes beyond mere personal offense at seeing a state imprimatur on religious views, and this would be alone enough to justify the outcome in Aguillard.

119 Comments

Ric Frost · 29 June 2004

First some background: I am a Christian and a deacon in an evangelical church, but thanks mostly to places like this and talk.origins, I have abandoned my denomination's position on the origins question. As an insider, I thought I would offer my perspective.

First, I would agree with the author that the real issue here is government involvement in education. Those debating that issue 150 years ago warned of exactly the situation we are facing today. Education cannot be value-neutral. Unfortunately, Christians in the US seem to think it is the government's job to force everyone to act like Christians so we can go back to pretending we are a "Christian nation."

Second, there is deep paranoia in the Christian community. From arguments over "under God" in the pledge to the removal of manger scenes in front of city hall, there has arisen a deep sense that "they" are out to get "us". Feeding this is the fascination in evangelical Christianity with "end-times" events described in Revelation. Movies, books, websites, talk radio, etc. are flooded with talk of the "end times". Every news story is mined for indications that the end is near. The removal of prayer from schools and public events is seen as the pivotal event that has sent us sliding down the slope to Armageddon.

My view: First, if we assume that there is some "they" out there trying to get "us," my view is we have it coming. Compulsory education was created largely to indoctrinate Catholic children in Protestant Christianity. If the tables have turned against us, like many Christians at the time warned they would, then well...

Second, I'm perpetually confused as to why Christians assume that when they meet with opposition, they should look first to the government for redress. I've read the Gospels a number of times and have yet to find a time where Jesus appealed to Roman authority to enforce His right to free speech. Any Christian parent that doesn't like what is happening in the government schools has a simple choice: pull their kids out. This, of course, involves time, money, and effort on their part. In other words, they will be required to be Biblical parents instead of breeders.

Which leads into number three: this whining is really getting on my nerves. At no time in human history and at no place on earth have Christians had an easier time of it than right now in Western culture. I doubt any Christian could read, say, Fox's Book of Martyrs, and then claim Christians are being persecuted in the US.

So I guess my point, which I need to get to here real quick, is that whether Mr. Garry's legal analysis is correct or not is, from the Christian perspective, completely beside the point. We have been given a job (Matthew 28:19-20) that does not depend on judges or lawyers or politicians. If half the resources expended in researching and writing this book (and a few hundred like it) were focused on doing what God told Christians to do, the impact would make this discussion moot (see Acts 2:40-47).

Andrew · 29 June 2004

If there's an award for Most Reasonable Christian, I hereby nominate Ric Frost. Bravo.

RBH · 29 June 2004

I appreciate Ric Frost's Comment. In conversations with evangelicals in my community who proposed that IDNet's "Objective Origins Science Policy" be adopted by the local schools, I've learned that a significant source of the 'paranoia' is fear for their salvation, and more important, fear for their children's salvation. If one genuinely believes that so-called 'Darwinism' (a catch-all term typically referring to scientific explanations of everything from the Big Bang to evolutionary biology) is inherently and necessarily atheistic and metaphysically materialistic -- as many evangelicals do -- then to allow one's children to be exposed to it is to risk their immortal souls. What parent would do that without a fight?

RBH

FL · 29 June 2004

I am a Christian and a deacon in an evangelical church, but thanks mostly to places like this and talk.origins, I have abandoned my denomination’s position on the origins question.

Hmmm. First of all, I do appreciate the sincerity in which you made your comments, Ric. I'm not saying I agree with you, nope, but I do express appreciation. Not to distract from the topic thread, but it is the occasional unexpected comment like yours that causes me to pause for a moment. Anyway, I want to ask you this: Would you be willing to go ahead and say out loud what your denomination's specific position on the "origins question" is? I hope you'll agree to do so. For me, knowing what your specific denominational position is, would help me understand more clearly what you areand are not abandoning. FL

FL · 29 June 2004

I am a Christian and a deacon in an evangelical church, but thanks mostly to places like this and talk.origins, I have abandoned my denomination's position on the origins question.

Hmmm. First of all, I do appreciate the sincerity in which you made your comments, Ric. I'm not saying I agree with you, nope, but I do express appreciation. Not to distract from the topic thread, but it is the occasional unexpected comment like yours that causes me to pause for a moment. Anyway, I want to ask you this: Would you be willing to go ahead and say out loud what your denomination's specific position on the "origins question" is? I hope you'll agree to do so. For me, knowing what your specific denominational position is, would help me understand more clearly what you areand are not abandoning. FL

Andrew · 29 June 2004

Danger, Will Robinson! Insincerity alert, level 5.

I, for one, think that the specific information "FL" requested from Mr. Frost would be irrelevant to the discussion here, and I suggest that if the two of them care to debate theology and creationism that they take it to the Bathroom Wall.

Ric Frost · 29 June 2004

For me, knowing what your specific denominational position is, would help me understand more clearly what you areand are not abandoning.

— FL
Certainly. My denomination is fully in the YEC/Flood camp, meaning I'm a bit of a fish out of water right now. When my term is up as a deacon, my wife and I will be doing some serious reconsideration.

Ric Frost · 29 June 2004

For me, knowing what your specific denominational position is, would help me understand more clearly what you areand are not abandoning.

— FL
Certainly. My denomination is fully in the YEC/Flood camp, meaning I'm a bit of a fish out of water right now. When my term is up as a deacon, my wife and I will be doing some serious reconsideration.

I, for one, think that the specific information "FL" requested from Mr. Frost would be irrelevant to the discussion here, and I suggest that if the two of them care to debate theology and creationism that they take it to the Bathroom Wall.

— Andrew
Agreed. I offer the above as context for my initial comments only. I have no intention (nor the time) to turn this into a full-scale debate on theology.

Francis J. Beckwith · 29 June 2004

Tim writes:

In this case, Garry believes that freedom of religion includes the right to compel people to support religious views they disagree with, while I believe that religious freedom means the right to worship as you please---to, as a famous person once said, pray in your closet---without government bossing you around.

Interesting. So, are you suggesting that school vouchers are a good idea so that Christian parent, X, is not forced to pay through her taxes for a public education that teaches things which are inconsistent with her theological views (e.g., homosexuality is okay, let's say) as well as the private education she pays for out of pocket?

FL · 29 June 2004

Ummmm, I didn't say anything about debating anyone, Andrew. My question for Ric, and the reason for asking, were both quite specific. I honestly question why you even felt it necessary to jump in at all.

Did you not already nominate Ric for "Most Reasonable Christian"? If so, why did you not trust Ric's ability to reasonably answer the question for himself?

(I have to suggest, maybe you should stop worrying so much about others' sincerity level, and simply look to your own for a while.)

Ric, thank you again for your upfront answer. It ~does~ make a difference what kind of Christian "origins position" we're talking about, because there's obviously more than one to consider.
Thanks for narrowing it down, and thereby offering additional clarity to your previous comments.

If we were privately communicating by email or in person, I'd probably risk exploring an additional question:
whether or not you still believed in Genesis' specific historical claims (Adam and Eve, The Fall, Noah's Flood, etc. etc.) at least as a matter of biblical faith, despite evolutionists' historical claims to the contrary.

But in this forum, I am very much content to stop at this point, and thus I close with a simple "thank you again" for the comments and responses you have given.

FL :-)

Timothy Sandefur · 29 June 2004

Dr. Beckwith (who, despite the fact that he does not know me, rudely insists on using my first name) asks my views on school choice. I favor school choice, and helped write briefs to that effect in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), the case which upheld the constitutionality of school choice programs.

Unfortunatey, such programs are really only a help, not a solution, since all government education programs, including ones permitting parental choice as to what schools they should go to, will to some degree, take money from parents to support doctrines they find offensive. Indeed, all government inherently does that. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), the Court held that taxpayers lack standing to sue when they argue that expenditures of their tax dollars support programs they find offensive. The only exception to this no-standing rule is in the realm of the Establishment Clause. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). In other words, the only time you can enjoin the goverment from spending your money on something you find offensive is when it is spending the money on establishment.

This exception has some things going for it. As I've said, feelings of personal offense are relevant in the Establishment Clause context but not in others because the Establishment Clause is the only instance where government is explicitly prohibited from taking a position on a subject. But I'm not convinced that the government should be immune from suit for other illegal expenditures. Since this diverges widely from the point of my post, I'll simply refer curious readers to Prof. Epstein's excellent discussion of this point, Standing And Spending--The Role of Legal And Equitable Principles, 4 Chap. L. Rev. 1 (2001).

Barney Frank · 29 June 2004

Francis, just fyi:

Homosexuality is okay in the United States. Oh, and black people and white people are allowed to have sex with each other, too.

American taxpayers can not be burdened with ensuring that the obnoxious religious beliefs of its citizens are continually propogated, particularly when those beliefs are legally recognized as discriminatory in nature. Vouchers for private religious education which espouses bigotry mock the Establishment Clause as well as the Equal Protection Clause.

Ed Darrell · 29 June 2004

The trouble runs more deeply than I had feared.

1. While the growth of public schooling occurred during a period when there was a great influx of Catholics and there were Protestant/Catholic disputes, the Jeffersonian model was still the working model. Jefferson and Madison argued that a democratic republic is impossible without an educated populace from which to draw people to run the government, and to make decisions. Public education is a tool for democracy in America, not a tool against Catholics. The educational purposes of our public education system have always been more important than any religious indoctrination purpose. Theology has never been a great or significant topic for public schooling, while geography, writing, reading, math, history and science have been staples.

2. Because public schools are set up to provide good citizens, funding for public education is not a right given to any one student (exept in some states), but is instead an obligation of all citizens. Vouchers that take money from public education are based on the idea that education is a right to a transfer payment, and not an obligation of the payer of the tax. Litigation based on such fuzzy notions of how and why we have public education will only fuzz up the issues more.

3. Claiming Doe to be a free exercise case is bizarre. People keep forgetting the facts of the case. To get around the First Amendment issues, the local school district sponsored an election at the high school to determine whether prayers would be said. That selection being in favor of prayers, they sponsored an election to select a "chaplain" to pray. In the contest year, the daughter of the local Baptist minister won a landslide over a Mormon kid. (If your establishment violation radar is not all atingle, you need to get it adjusted.) Then, when Catholics and Mormons sued to stop the prayers, the district instead wrote out detailed rules for prayers. The prayers were to be said at a set time and place, etc., etc.

I've often noted a shorthand way to determine whether there is an establishment clause violation: There is a violation if any governmental entity tells one whether to pray, or when to pray, or where to pray, or how to pray, or what to pray for, or to whom or what to pray.

This case has no relationship to the teaching of evolution in science class.

4. It's troubling to see legal scholars citing Beckwith's error-prone analysis. I find it interesting, in the cited section, that Beckwith claims that learning about evolution, which is just gathering knowledge, is religiously offensive to some. Not even fundamentalist Christians in the U.S. are usually so bold as to admit they are pro-ignorance. That is the root of the noxious weed creationists have planted on our education and legal systems.

Michael Hopkins · 29 June 2004

We just had a post by a "Barney Frank" complete with email address that suggests that he really is in Congress and hense really is the Rep. Frank (D-Ma).

If it really was Rep. Frank then I apologize in advance. It must be hard to be famous and then have everyone doubt that you are who you say you are. Welcome to the Panda's Thumb and please feel free to invite all 434 of your fellow members of the House to read it.

Can someone in managment here check to see if this person is coming from a ISP that Rep. Frank might be using? Two hours after a comment on homosexuality appears in a reader's comment in a minor blog a reply comes from a congressman who is well known in regards to this issue! I suspect an impersonation which is a violation of policy here.

--
Anti-spam: replace "usenet" with "harlequin2"

Timothy Sandefur · 29 June 2004

Mr. Frank says that "[v]ouchers for private religious education which espouses bigotry mock the Establishment Clause as well as the Equal Protection Clause." I disagree. Public education inherently involves spending taxpayer money on the propagation of ideas which are offensive to some. It offends me greatly, for example, that my tax dollars are spent to teach California students certain leftist political doctrines. But personal offense is therefore not enough to "mock" the Equal Protection Clause.

It is true that the Establishment Clause is different---there, the state is prohibited from putting its imprimatur on religious doctrines. (It is not prohibited from putting its imprimatur on all espousing of bigotry, however. Racial bigotry, maybe,* but schools may teach students, for instance, that France sucks, even though that may not be true.) The reason, however, that school choice programs do not violate the Establishment Clause is that they do not put such an imprimatur on the religious doctrines taught at religious schools: parent exercise their own choices in where to send their children to school, which cuts off any potential signal of government endorsement. "[P]eople know that the government doesn't necessarily endorse private choices that people make with government funds, any more than it endorses cabbage by letting people use food stamps to buy the food of their choice, which may include cabbage. The government doesn't endorse Catholicism by helping GIs go to Notre Dame . . . ." Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 341, 357-358 (1999).

Mr. Darrell makes two points with which I disagree, although they are not really germane to my post. First, it is certainly true that the concept of public education is based on what he calls "the Jeffersonian model," that the success of republican government depends on an educated populace, and therefore that public schools are a "tool for democracy in America." But I don't think one can say that "[t]heology has never been a great or significant topic for public schooling, while geography, writing, reading, math, history and science have been staples." In fact, religious instruction was historically considered just as important as science, history, or math, in effecting the "tool for democracy." I personally disagree with that position, but that's the historical record. Indeed, one of the first public education laws in America was Massachusetts' "Old Deluder Satan Act," which declared that the "old deluder, Satan" profited by spreading ignorance, and therefore the state should create schools to prevent the moral destruction of Our Children. Again, not something to which I'm sympathetic, but them's the facts.

Second, Mr. Darrell says that "funding for public education is not a right given to any one student (exept in some states), but is instead an obligation of all citizens. Vouchers that take money from public education are based on the idea that education is a right to a transfer payment, and not an obligation of the payer of the tax." Now, I would think a tax is itself an obligation, for one thing, rather than a privilege for which one has to pay by going to a government school. For another, all of government is, inherently, wealth transfer. Public education is no exception. When a state declares that a student has a "right" to a taxpayer-funded education, as California has, it is saying that the student has a right to take money from other people to pay for his own education. I certainly do not agree with this, but, again, them's the facts. Once a state determines that a student has the right to force taxpayers to buy him an education, there is no reason it may not also decide to force taxpayers to buy him an education at the school of his parents' choosing---which is all that school choice programs do. In making such a decision, however, the state retains---and, as Justice Breyer pointed out in his Zelman dissent, has already exercised---the authority to regulate the schools at which the vouchers are spent.

Mr. Darrell sees education as a duty we owe to the state. This is deeply troubling for one who believes, as I do, in individual liberty, but I must concede that he has a point. As Hayek said,

The very magnitude of the power over men's minds that a highly centralized and government-dominated system of education places in the hands of the authorities ought to make one hesitate before accepting it too readily. Up to a point, the arguments that justify compulsory education also require that government should prescribe some of the content of this education. As we have already mentioned, there may be circumstances in which the case for authority's providing a common cultural background for all citizens becomes very strong. Yet we must remember that it is the provision of education by government which creates such problems as that of the segregation of Negroes in the United States---difficult problems of ethnic or religious minorities which are bound to arise where government takes control of the chief instruments of transmitting culture.

The Constitution of Liberty 379 (1960). See also Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams 78 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961) (1918) ("All State education is a sort of dynamo machine for polarizing the popular mind; for turning and holding its lines of force in the direction supposed to be most effective for state purposes.")

*-The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits badges and incidents of slavery, which, along with the Equal Protection Clause, might prohibit the state from endorsing racial bigotry in the same way that the Establishment Clause prohibits the state from endorsing a religious view. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 376 U.S. 650 (1964), rev'g Ex parte Hamilton, 275 Ala. 574 (1963).

Barney Frank · 29 June 2004

"Mister" Sandefur says

Mr. Frank says that "[v]ouchers for private religious education which espouses bigotry mock the Establishment Clause as well as the Equal Protection Clause. It offends me greatly, for example, that my tax dollars are spent to teach California students certain leftist political doctrines. But personal offense is therefore not enough to "mock" the Equal Protection Clause.

Ah, Mister Sandefur, but it's not your "personal offense" which is the Constitutional problem. It's the encouragement of discrimination. Do you believe that I would have no standing to bring an Equal Protection case against a tax-payer (voucher) funded teacher who home-schooled children in my school district that blacks were mentally and physiologically more primitive than whites? Or that they deserved to be treated or viewed differently from others because of who they are?Substitute women for blacks: What do you think? Substitute gays for blacks: what do you think? I know it's a bit OT but seriously: this isn't just taking my tax money to blow up Muslims on the other side of the planet. Nor is it a failure to teach the details of evolutionary theory. This is blatant encouragement of discrimination. I am not aware of a standing case that is directly on point here (although I am aware that equal protection cases are subject to the general principles re standing). I think at the very least such a case would get to the Supremes and it would be given serious consideration. I'd be sure to use the Hamilton case you cited as a backup, and I'd bootstrap the equal protection args in there. Somehow. ;) Note to Mr. Hopkins: I believe if I was the Mr. Frank you imagined I was, I would have a ".gov" address. I apologize to the PT community if anyone was misled by my tongue-in-cheek choice of ID. Why is it that Mister Sandefur's posts seem to bring out the cop in all of us? ;)

Bob Maurus · 29 June 2004

Came across "barney frank" on another chat/blog site (maybe evangelical outpost?) and decided he wasn't "the" Barney Frank

Timothy Sandefur · 29 June 2004

As Mr. Frank says, this has diverged from the topic. But I will respond to his points on my own weblog, Freespace.

*-Update:Here is my response.

Ed Darrell · 30 June 2004

Mr. Sanderfur urges the original Massachusetts act requiring villages and towns to educate kids as evidence of theological indoctrination. However, I think a fair reading of what that 1647 law actually says supports my point: It calls for the establishment of schools to teach kids to read, and it requires no theological education. The American consensus (prior to 1954, as best I can determine) was that ignorance was dangerous and close to a sin, if not a sin outright. Laws prior to the Constitution frequently cited promotion of good morals as a reason for the laws, but none that I can find call for education in theology (see the various Northwest Ordinances, for examples; after calling for religious freedom, they note that morality is important, and urge education as a precursor to morality -- they do not call for theological education). Instead, they call for education in reading. Few go so far as Jefferson did when he said it was essential to get the Bible out of the schools, and then urged teaching morality instead. I have not found evidence that theology was ever a major component of education in publicly-supported or government schools. Allegations that early schools were more theologically inclined were found lacking evidence for the school prayer cases in the 1960s. We need to be careful not to confuse occasional calls for a Bible verse or a prayer here and there for real theology study.

Consequently, arguments that are based on an assumption that we have a long history of favoring Christian ideas in all phases of curricula in public schools tend to lead us astray. Schools were not intended to indoctrinate kids in religion (especially in western Massachusetts in the 18th century, where Congregationalists faced the reality of diversity among Christians). Consequently, creationist/intelligent design claims that teaching science (such as evolution) in schools is intended to counter their faith are historically in error.

Second, I think it's important to understand that most kids have no legal right to a public education. That was part of the point I was trying to make on vouchers, and I think it affects the evolution discussions significantly. If kids have a right to an education, that right could easily find expression in a suit demanding that schools NOT teach creationism except in its errors. A right to education would be a right to correct information, not folderol. I think that creationists and other religisously-motivated people who start from the assumption that the state has a duty to educate their kids as they see fit, miss the point. Jefferson wanted to amend the Constitution to provide education rights, but that proposal never made it to paper. There is no federal right. States, like Texas, sometimes mention a duty of the state to provide schools, but I don't think any state has established a right to education for any citizen.

Education is not a right, nor is it a duty the kid to be educated owes anyone. The provision of education to preserve our republican democracy is a necessity, and therefore it is an obligation tax-paying citizens owe to the rest of our citizens. Because there is no right to education at stake, creationists don't have a right to avoid confrontation with the great ideas of western civilization. We're a diverse nation, and we can tolerate a great deal of ignorance among our fellow citizens -- but that does not require that we inculcate such ignorance, nor does it establish a right for people to be ignorant.

The minority of creationists is louder than Christian Scientists, but still a minority. What would be the effect of Christian Scientists claiming a right to have inserted into biology books all the arguments against germ theory? If creationists have a right to get anti-evolution materials inserted into courses to avoid offense to their religion, why wouldn't Christian Scientists have the same right against much of the rest of biology?

Perhaps if the fundamentalists started taking exception to the religious teachings of Pythagoras, and called for the Pythagorean Theorem to be deleted from math books, we might put the issue in its proper focus. Knowing an idea is not the same as endorsing it -- but ignorance is a serious problem. Avoiding ideas can be dangerous, and there is no duty the government has to protect delicate religious sensibilities from the facts of life.

Ignorance isn't a free speech right, and calls to protect ignorance under the guise of avoiding offense to religious sensibilities of religious minorities are not free exercise or free speech issues -- they are establishment issues, and so far the courts have dealt with them pretty well. There is no free speech or free exercise right to be ignorant, even ignorant of ideas one wishes didn't exist for whatever reason.

Timothy Sandefur · 30 June 2004

Mr. Darrell makes some interesting points with regard to teaching of Christianity in schools in early America, although I don't find it as easy to distinguish theology from religious morality education as he does.

However, he's not quite right to say that "most kids have no legal right to a public education." It's true as a philosophical matter that nobody has a right to an education, because educations are provided by others, and nobody has the right to compel another person to provide him with an education, any more than a person has the right to compel another person to provide him with a car or a television set or any other transfer of wealth. All coercive transfers of wealth are violations of rights. But as far as a "legal right" goes, many states, perhaps most states, have determined that such a right does exist. California's Supreme Court, for instance, has determined that a public education is a "fundamental right." See, e.g., Butt v. State of California, 4 Cal.4th 668, 686 (1992). The federal Supreme Court, fortunately, has determined otherwise as far as the Federal Constitution is concerned. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

Does this mean that "[a] right to education would be a right to correct information, not folderol"? Well, there have been lawsuits against the state arguing that the right to an education means the right to a quality education, and arguing that the state has violated this right by providing the poor quality public schools that California has. I don't know if these have been successful, but I don't believe so. Courts tend to defer to the Legislature's judgment, or the judgment of local school districts, as to how to fund and operate public schools. Nor do the courts intervene when it comes to poor quality teaching. Attempts to sue public school teachers for malpractice, for example, have not succeeded because Courts refuse to intervene to determine what constitutes a quality education. See, e.g., Brown v. Compton Unified Sch. Dist., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 171 (1998); see further Todd A. DeMitchell and Terri A. DeMitchell, Statutes And Standards: Has The Door to Educational Malpractice Been Opened?, 2003 B.Y.U. Educ. & L.J. 485. Once again, I disagree with this holding---I agree that if the state undertakes to educate, it ought to educate competently, but them's the breaks. I highly doubt a court would entertain a suit against a creationist teacher on the grounds that he is violating the right to a quality education---but hey, why not try?

Mr. Darrell's statement that "Education is not a right, nor is it a duty the kid to be educated owes anyone. The provision of education to preserve our republican democracy is a necessity, and therefore it is an obligation tax-paying citizens owe to the rest of our citizens"---makes no sense to me. I see no distinction between an unchosen "obligation" imposed on "tax-paying citizens" by "the rest of our citizens" and a "duty." And I think it's terrible to say that a person owes an obligation to the state to attend public schools in order to preserve the state. This is nothing less than a justification of government mind control, of which we ought to be extremely skeptical, if for no other reason, than because the public choice effect is unavoidable---such schools will be taken over by whatever political interest group is most adept at taking them over. As John Stuart Mill said, "A general state education is a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like one another and the mould in which it casts them is that which pleases the predominant power in the government, whether this be a monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or a majority of the existing generation, in proportion as it is efficient and successful and establishes a despotism over the mind, leading, by natural tendency, to one over the body." (quoted in Hayek, supra at 376. Even if it were not for the public choice effect, government education is inherently contrary to the spirit of skepticism and individual thought necessary to making good republican citizens. See Karl Popper, 1 The Open Society And Its Enemies 135 (5th ed. 1966).

Nor do I agree that "There is no free speech or free exercise right to be ignorant, even ignorant of ideas one wishes didn't exist for whatever reason." Actually, I think the right to be ignorant is an absolutely essential part of these rights. I have the right, and I exercise it every Sunday, to be ignorant of the alleged blessings of Episcopalianism, which are taught a block away. Now, one's right to be ignorant does not mean that he has the right to silence another person, but he certainly has the right to turn off his TV or choose not to read his junk mail. And parents do have the right to teach their children untrue things---troubling as this is to me. But that's what "free exercise" means.

Finally, I have never heard that "Jefferson wanted to amend the Constitution to provide education rights, but that proposal never made it to paper." I would be quite shocked if this were true. Could you provide me with more information on this, Mr. Darrell?

This conversation, too, has drifted, so I will post any further discussion at Freespace.

Ric Frost · 30 June 2004

At the risk of taking this further off track, I will try to bring it back on track (if that makes any sense whatsoever).

1. Whether or not the "Native Americans" of the mid-19th century were successful in using the bludgeon of compulsory education laws to combat the spread of Catholicism says nothing about their intent, which is clear from editorials and debates in the state capitals at the time.

2. My main point was, like the "Native Americans" of the mid-19th century (and likely many other times and places), Christians today are quick to call on government to stop people from doing things they don't like, whether it's homosexual marriage, inter-racial marriage, alchohol, tobacco, or teaching "evil-ution." Reliance on legal doctrines and judicial muscle to transform people rather than the life-changing power of the Gospel is, to put it bluntly, sin.

Timothy Sandefur · 30 June 2004

Although I am not a Christian, I absolutely agree with Deacon Frost's second point. I can't think of anything more obviously contrary to the actual teachings of Christ than the constant seeking of government aid, government protection, and government coercion.

Ed Darrell · 30 June 2004

I'm occupied trying to update my business law course, so my inability to communicate adequately may have an excuse. In any case I'm not making the necessary point to Mr. Sandefur. I apologize; I'll make one more run.

Mr. Sandefur says, "And I think it's terrible to say that a person owes an obligation to the state to attend public schools in order to preserve the state."

I agree, and that's not what I said. The obligation I'm talking about is the obligation of citizens (beyond the general ages of education, we may hope) to support schools. It is true that all states now have compulsory education laws, and like Jefferson I wonder whether a right to education wouldn't be a better path -- but when he structured a school system, Jefferson's plan offered the right only to read and do basic math to all; the top 10 percent in selected fields were those who would win further education.

I'm asking that we regard public education from the other end of the scope we've been using: Money spent on a kid's education is not a right the kid has, and the kid has no right to insist on a choice of how or where to spend that money; instead, money spent is an investment by the citizens who pay the money. Fittingly, in most of the more than 15,000 jurisdictions where local school boards rule education in America, the bulk of the money comes from property taxes. This system produces some unfortunate inequalities, such as those we struggle with here in Texas. But the simple fact remains that education is a duty of the citizen who pays for the next generation to learn, and not a right of the student, nor even necessarily a duty of the student to learn. Education is an obligation of the taxpaying citizen.

Yes, we may choose to be ignorant of the religious beliefs and persuasions of others; there are other things that it is crime not to know, which we expect kids in public schools (or any school) to get, such as basic rules of driving and some basic public health and safety rules. But this is the distinction: Anti-science, anti-evolution views are inherently religious, and therefore prevented by the establishment clauses of state and federal constitutions.

Finally, I don't have at my fingertips the passage in which Jefferson discussed his plans to put a right to education in federal law. It was in correspondence with Madison or Rush as I recall, and it was not outlined well enough to know what he may have had in mind. I should have it more accessible and will continue to look through my library. We do know he regarded education as the foundation of morality in a person, however, and that he worked to keep religion qua religion out of the curriculum of schools throughout his life. Looking quickly to see if I could find the passage, however, I did run into Jefferson's letter to the Philadelphia bookseller Nicholas Gouin Dufief, complaining of censorship of biology books (letter of April 19, 1814). The book in question was Sur la Creation du Monde, un Systeme d'Organization Primitive, authored by a fellow named de Becourt. The copy Jefferson ordered from Philadelphia was not delivered, appearing to have been intercepted by some local court in Pennsylvania as inappropriate for Christians to read. "I am really mortified to be told that, in the United States of America, a fact like this can become a subject of inquiry, and of criminal inquiry, too, as an offence against religion; that a question about a sale of a book can be carried before the civil magistrate. Is this then our freedom of religion? and are we to have a censor whose imprimatur shall say what books may be sold, and what we may buy? And who is thus to dogmatize religious opinions for our citizens? . . . It is an insult to our citizens to question whether they are rational beings or not, and blasphemy against religion to suppose it cannot stand the test of truth and reason. If M. de Becourt's book be false in facts, disprove them; if false in its reasoning, refute it. But for God's sake, let us freely hear both sides, if we choose. . ." This offers clues for where Jefferson would stand on a law such as that which snared John Scopes, or which angered Mr. Aquillard.

If creationists insist their faith and their children cannot stand the test of truth and reason, should we listen to them?

Great White Wonder · 30 June 2004

the brillian Ed Darrell said

If creationists insist their faith and their children cannot stand the test of truth and reason, should we listen to them?

Wow. In a damn nutshell. I vote: "no." Can someone put this question permanently in gold letters at the top of the Pandas Thumb home page?

Timothy Sandefur · 1 July 2004

My response to Mr. Darrell is here.

FL · 1 July 2004

Anti-science, anti-evolution views are inherently religious, and therefore prevented by the establishment clauses of state and federal constitutions.

A curious remark. Let me ask you something. Given the following 3-point ID hypothesis: 1. Specified complexity is well-defined and empirically detectable. 2. Undirected natural causes are incapable of explaining specified complexity. 3. Intelligent causation is the best explanation for specified complexity. ....please show me where any or all of Dembski's specific 3-point ID hypothesis is inherently religious, in and of itself. Thanks. ------------------- An (admittedly off topic) side question for Ric: Was Martin Luther King and other Christians wrong to pressure the government for the social changes they desired? They did NOT just rely on the "life changing power of the Gospel" (at least in terms of preaching and teaching alone). They also did a lot of public political action as well. Were they wrong? FL

Andrew · 1 July 2004

Duh. Point (3) is inherently religious. If Demsbski et al. were truly not making any assumptions about the identity of their designer, their hypothesis would be null on face.

"Any possible universe could be explained as the work of some sort of designer. Even a universe that is completely chaotic, without any laws or regularities at all, could be supposed to have been designed by an idiot." (Steven Weinberg, Skeptical Inquirer, Sept. 2001).

Since ID purports on face to distinguish between "completely random" and "non-random" instances of design, it necessarily imputes certain characteristics to the designer, and THAT is a religious exercise.

*sigh* whack one troll, and five take his place....

Frank Schmidt · 1 July 2004

FL conflates a couple of points, and misses others. So I'll take a shot at enlightening him, altho I fear he won't buy this. Notice that I used the word enlightenment; this was deliberate, because both science and American political theory are products of that period of history. The emphasis in both is on the use of reason and verifiable observation. So here goes:

.please show me where any or all of Dembski's specific 3-point ID hypothesis is inherently religious, in and of itself. Thanks.

Let's start with point 3:

3. Intelligent causation is the best explanation for specified complexity.

I commend to you Eliot Sober's excellent essay "How not to detect design" (available on both his website, and reprinted in Pennock's Intelligent Design and its Critics Here and elsewhere he points out that all judgements about design are made with a reference to known designers. So while we can scientifically infer the existence of designers for analogues of design processes we know (e.g., in anthropology) there is no independent evidence for a designer for Biology, because the process is unobserved. Evidence from revelation isn't scientifically allowable, because it can't be verified or modeled. So, notwithstanding the creationist screeds of Dembski's other writings, he is asking the wrong questions and barking up the wrong tree. Whether it's true or not, ID just isn't science, and won't be until there is a verifiable observation of it in action. Regarding the MLK mal mot. I am really getting tired of fundamentalists, most of whose churches were institutionally opposed to Dr. King while he was alive and working, invoking his memory as they mount their favorite theocratic hobbyhorse. King saw and used religion properly, as strength and motivation, not as a literal view of science and life. His motives were much more complex than simple religion (e.g., the influence of Gandhi and through him, Thoreau). Furthermore, what about the non-religious people in the Civil Rights movement, including political leftists? Does their involvement mean that we ought to adopt a socialist economy? The Civil Rights pioneers appealed to the nearly universal sense of justice in Americans, and were successful for that reason primarily.

Ed Darrell · 1 July 2004

FL sets a hypothesis, as a response to my note that anti-science in science classes is inherently a religious position:

A curious remark. Let me ask you something. Given the following 3-point ID hypothesis: 1. Specified complexity is well-defined and empirically detectable. 2. Undirected natural causes are incapable of explaining specified complexity. 3. Intelligent causation is the best explanation for specified complexity. . . . .please show me where any or all of Dembski's specific 3-point ID hypothesis is inherently religious, in and of itself. Thanks.

Were #1 true, and #2 were true, and #3 had not already been disproven by 5,000 years of animal husbandry, crop breeding and observation in nature, there would be no problem except for the fact that Dembski's 3-point ID hypothesis still doesn't seem to be able to distinguish between an object designed by an intelligence and an object designed by any other natural influence. Without any research to back up the claims, however, "belief" that Dembski has a case is based on faith alone. If there were firm evidence that Jesus walked on water -- photos, videos, footprints on the water -- teaching that Jesus walked on water would not be religion. Absent such evidence, it is faith. ID is no different. To ask that we accept "intelligent design" without hard evidence from the lab bench, or even a generalized theory that incorporates verifiable science, is to ask a leap of faith. Such requests are religious requests, not science.

Francis J. Beckwith · 1 July 2004

Dr. Beckwith (who, despite the fact that he does not know me, rudely insists on using my first name) asks my views on school choice. I favor school choice, and helped write briefs to that effect in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), the case which upheld the constitutionality of school choice programs.

I have never used your first name. I've always used my own, though in different variations: sometimes "Frank," "Frankie," "Francis," or "Francois." In high school I was called "Goat" during my sophomore year because of a permanent gone bad. As a result of an incredible blocked-shot against Western High School (Las Vegas) in 1978 (My 5'11" self pinned on the backboard an attempted dunk by the legendary Willie Hicks), I was called "Sudden 'Ank" or the "Hankmonster" for a while. Though I never used either name to introduce myself, others used them. In sum, I have never used your first name. Warmly, Frank

Great White Wonder · 1 July 2004

Frank

See 4368 where you referred to The Sandman by his given name: "Tim." Personally, I think this naming formality carries no weight in the blogosphere unless it's explicitly set forth as a "rule" by the blog owner.

Francis J. Beckwith · 1 July 2004

Frank Schmidt writes:

Regarding the MLK mal mot. I am really getting tired of fundamentalists, most of whose churches were institutionally opposed to Dr. King while he was alive and working, invoking his memory as they mount their favorite theocratic hobbyhorse. King saw and used religion properly, as strength and motivation, not as a literal view of science and life.

That's really unfair. I can only speak for myself, but I grew up in a fairly liberal home in which my parents had us watch Dr. King as well as the Kennedys during the mid 60s (I'm too young to fully remember JFK). I grew up respecting King and his work, and when I studied philosophy his influence was instrumental in my own work in natural law and political philosophy. I think we have to take King at face value and not read back into him either our liberal or conservative points of view. You're right, some conservatives jump on the King bandwagon when in fact they probably would have resisted him if they were alive at the time. On the other hand, many conservatives--such as Richard John Neuhaus, Charlton Heston, and others--marched with King. Their eventual move to the right was the result of the hostility of the secular left that took over their Democratic Party. Moreoever, there are secular liberals who read back into King their own procilivities, trying to play down the fact that he was a serious believer who believed in natural law, universal moral principles that were not merely "American" but applicable to everyone everywhere. In that sense, King rejected the fashionable relativism of our own age (found on the far left) as well as the rigid ethnocentrism that characterizes some on the far right. I think it's a testimony to King's greatness that everyone finds in him something inspiring. Reread "A Letter from a Birmingham Jail." Although it is a fine piece of applied philosophy, it is interesting who King relies on to make his case: Socrates, Jesus, Paul, Augustine, and Aquinas. He makes the case that the civil law in ths South that denied blacks full participation violated natural law, for it did not result from the consent of the governed. This is Lincolnian in its style. He appeals to our "ancient faith," as did Lincoln, but employs it to ground a distinctly modern principle, consent of the governed. It is brilliant and philosophically defensible. Take care, Frank

Francis J. Beckwith · 1 July 2004

I'm not sure what to think of this:

"Any possible universe could be explained as the work of some sort of designer. Even a universe that is completely chaotic, without any laws or regularities at all, could be supposed to have been designed by an idiot." (Steven Weinberg, Skeptical Inquirer, Sept. 2001).

But isn't the opposite true as well? Here's what I mean:

Any possible universe could be explained as the work of some sort of natural mechanism or mechanisms. Even a universe that appears completely designed, with laws or regularities that can be measured and put in the forms of complex mathematics, could be supposed to have been not designed by any mind whatsoever.

So, if both could be true, is Weinberg really saying anything at all? You guys are the experts. I'm just a philosopher with a graduate degree in law. What do I know? Frank

Francis J. Beckwith · 1 July 2004

Frank See 4368 where you referred to The Sandman by his given name: "Tim." Personally, I think this naming formality carries no weight in the blogosphere unless it's explicitly set forth as a "rule" by the blog owner.

I know what Mr. Sandefur was writing about. I just was engaging in a bit of playfulness in my reply. My wife is right, "Know your audience." Frank

Great White Wonder · 1 July 2004

I just was engaging in a bit of playfulness in my reply. My wife is right, "Know your audience."

I'm having some intense deja vu here. Just don't tell anyone to visit their library, Frank, and I think everything will be all right. ;)

Andrew · 2 July 2004

Dr. Beckwith asks:

-----
But isn't the opposite true as well? Here's what I mean:

Any possible universe could be explained as the work of some sort of natural mechanism or mechanisms. Even a universe that appears completely designed, with laws or regularities that can be measured and put in the forms of complex mathematics, could be supposed to have been not designed by any mind whatsoever.
-----

Um, so your argument is that we can detect neither randomness nor design? Isn't that an admission that ID is worthless? If so, we happily agree.

-----
You guys are the experts. I'm just a philosopher with a graduate degree in law. What do I know?
-----

Oddly enough, that's my exact background as well.

-Andrew

Francis J. Beckwith · 2 July 2004

Andrew writes:

Dr. Beckwith asks: But isn't the opposite true as well? Here's what I mean: Any possible universe could be explained as the work of some sort of natural mechanism or mechanisms. Even a universe that appears completely designed, with laws or regularities that can be measured and put in the forms of complex mathematics, could be supposed to have been not designed by any mind whatsoever. ------- Um, so your argument is that we can detect neither randomness nor design? Isn't that an admission that ID is worthless? If so, we happily agree.

I don't have an argument. It was a question by which I was asking for conceptual clarity. That's all.

Andrew · 2 July 2004

Okay, then I'll clarify. Weinberg's argument is that it is meaningless to postulate design without attributing specific characteristics to the designer.

I take your response to mean that perhaps it is similarly meaningless to postulate naturalistic processes without attributing specific characteristics to those processes.

If true, then one of two implications would follow. Either (1) this means that we can neither postulate naturalistic processes nor design -- which I'm okay with -- or (2) it means that, unlike IDists, scientists can actually attribute specific characteristics to naturalistic processes. I'm okay with that, too.

Chip Poirot · 2 July 2004

I read with interest both the analysis of the law and especially Ric's comments.

Firstly, I agreed in part and disagreed in part with the article. And it is an issue I struggle with on an intellectual level. As a college professor who occasionally teaches Cultural Anthropology (I'm an economist by training), I think that learning (correctly) the case for evolution is extremely important. Though i teach at a State Institution many of my students have evangelical/fundamentalist backgrounds. All I have to do is make reference to humans having foraged for over 100,000 years and I can see the walls go up. When I have to confront this issue as a college professor, I prefer to confront it head on-that is talk about the issues directly, honestly and openly. If that means discussing YEC or ID for a few minutes and indicating why i reject them as valid theories, then I'm willing to do that. I also find that it is helpful to indicate to students that they don't have to **believe** what I tell them, they just have to learn the material and understand why evolution is the only real viable research program and why it is important to understanding a number of debates in Cultural Anthropology and even to grasping the concept of culture.

Under some interpretations of the establishment clause, that much **might** be precluded in a high school science classroom. I say I wrestle with this because I can see many reasons to take such a rigid approach to the high school science classroom. Yet the reality is that presenting evolution is frightening to evangelical and fundamentalist students on many levels and that fear is an obstacle to effective teaching and learning.

Thus for a lot of reasons, I personally would prefer more emphasis on the "exercise" and "free speech" component of the 1st amenmdment and less on the establishment. Don't misunderstand me-I do not support any form of coerced public religious ceremony.

And so I wonder-why would this not be an effective, workable compromise. We won't give or require "equal" time but we could allow teachers and/or school districts to discuss the issues, including some of the assumptions and issues about what science is and is not.

I can see reasons why this might not work, but I can also see reasons why it could work, if implemented with great care.

steve · 2 July 2004

I agree, Andrew. What Weinberg was talking about was pretty clear.

We can tell this toaster was designed by intelligence without knowing the engineer, therefore we can tell the same about natural organisms, IDers say. But something's missing. You've seen engineers. You have a rough idea what their capabilities are. Most importantly, you start from a list in your head of known objects engineers have designed. You aren't really detecting some 'design' quality, you're detecting similarity to known objects with a certain specific relationship to a known intelligence.
When you know that a dishwasher, refrigerator, and microwave were designed by a guy, it's not hard to look at an oven and guess that it too was designed by a guy.
When you look at a kindergartner's picture of his mommy, and a picture of his daddy, it's not hard to look at a picture of a doggy and guess that it's his.
You can only do this when you have prior knowledge of the creator/created relationship. And even then, you might be wrong. Maybe the oven was designed by aliens. Maybe the picture was produced by a guy with Down's Syndrome. The ability to equate created with creator is a heuristic which only works when you have a good understanding of the creator, and examples of the created works, and some other criteria.
We don't have definite knowledge of a god. We don't have examples of worlds god created, vs worlds left to their own devices. And we have an alternate method for producing the supposedly 'designed' objects. So natual organisms don't even meet the criteria of the heuristic. And the heuristic's not even science.

How long will it take before IDers realize they're trying to promote a flawed heuristic to the status of science? And when they do realize it, and jump ship to the next god-proving scientific-sounding notion, will any of them realize they're in search of evidence to confirm their religious beliefs, a bass-ackward way to act?

Andrew · 2 July 2004

IDers could at least construct a valid inference if they would be up front about the identity of their Designer. Then, they could describe his attributes with specificity from scripture (I guess -- I'll leave that to the theologians), and go search for evidences of his creation.

FL · 2 July 2004

As always, some interesting comments... Francis Beckwith has already taken care of the side question regarding MLK and Christian involvement in the Civil Rights movement, imo. Having read MLK's "Letter from a Birmingham Jail" myself, Beckwith's comments again make much sense. (And while I cannot speak for the predominately black church I attend, I strongly suspect it would make sense to them too.) Anyway, on the question of the previously quoted 3-point ID hypothesis being "inherently religious" or not, some folks seem to be claiming that Point #3 is inherently religious: "Intelligent causation best explains specified complexity." Among those claimants, Frank Schmidt invokes Elliot Sober for backup:

I commend to you Elliot Sober's excellent essay "How not to detect design" (available on both his website and reprinted in Pennock's Intelligent Design Creationism and its Critics.) Here and elsewhere he points out that all judgments about design are made with reference to known designers. So while we can scientifically infer the existence of designers for analogues of design processes we know (e.g. in anthropology), there is no independent evidence for a designer for Biology, because the process is unobserved.

Now honestly, I don't think that shows that Point #3 is "inherently religious" at all. But it's still worthwhile to take Schmidt's advice and look at Sober's position. Is Sober correct or is he incorrect, concerning this matter? Since I have a copy of Pennock's book, I went back and looked at Sober's essay. And since I have a copy of Dembski's No Free Lunch and The Design Revolution, I looked at Dembski's responses to Sober's position. No way to get all the stuff from both of Dembski's books in here, but maybe the following extended snippet will be helpful:

The fact is that we infer design repeatedly and reliably without knowing characteristics of the designer or being able to assess what a designer is likely to do. Humeans in their weaker moments admit as much. Take Elliott Sober. Before he permits intelligent design into biology, he wants to know the characteristics of the designer, the independent evidence for the existence of and what sorts of biological systems we should expect from such a designer. According to Sober, if the design theorist cannot answer these questions, then intelligent design is untestable and therefore unfruitful for science. Yet in a footnote that deserves to be part of his main text, Sober admits, "To infer watchmaker from watch, you needn't know exactly what the watchmaker had in mind; indeed, you don't even have to know that the watch is a device for measuring time. Archaeologists sometimes unearth tools of unknown function, but still reasonably draw the inference that these things are, in fact, ~tools~." (Testability", 1999 presidential address to the American Philosophical Association.) Because he is wedded to the Humean inductive tradition, Sober views all our knowledge of the world as an extrapolation from past experience. Thus for design to be explanatory, it must fit our preconceptions, and if it does not, it must lack empirical justification. For Sober, to predict what a designer would do requires first looking to past experience and determining what designers in the past have actually done. And yet his comment about watchmakers and watches belies such a view, for he admits that we could know that watches were designed even if we knew nothing about watchmakers and that mysterious tools were designed even if we knew nothing about the toolmakers or or even the precise function of the tools. Within the Humean inductive tradition, designers are in the same boat as natural laws, with their explanatory power located in an extrapolation from past experience. To be sure, designers, like natural laws, can behave predictably. (Designers often institute policies that other designers then dutifully obey). Yet unlike natural, which are universal and uniform, designers are also innovators. Innovation, the emergence of true novelty, eschews predictability. It therefore follows that design cannot be subsumed within a Humean inductive framework. Designers are inventors. We cannot predict what an inventor would do short of becoming that inventor. But the problem goes deeper. Not only can't Humean induction tame the unpredictability inherent in design, but it can't account for how we recognize design in the first place. Sober, for instance, regards the design hypothesis for biology as fruitless and untestable because it fails to confer an ascertainable probability on biologically interesting propositions. But take a different example, say from archeology, in which a design hypothesis about certain aborigines predicts certain artifacts, say arrowheads. Such a design hypothesis would, on Sober's account, be testable and thus acceptable. But what sort of archeological background knowledge had to go into that design hypothesis to make it a successful predictor of arrowheads? At the very least, we would need past experience with arrowheads. But how did we recognize that the arrowheads in our past experience were designed? Did we see humans actually manufacture those arrowheads? If so, how did we recognize that these humans were acting deliberately as design agents and were not just randomly chipping away at random chunks of rock? (Carpentry and sculpting entail design, but whittling and chipping, though performed by intelligent agents, do not.) As is evident from this line of reasoning, the induction needed to recognize design can never get started. Our ability to recognize design must therefore arise independently of induction and thus, independently of a Humean inductive framework. This was precisely (Thomas) Reid's point, and in making it, he demolished once and for all Humean induction as applied to design... (Dembski, The Design Revolution, c2004 Intervarsity Press, pp 227-29.)

I apologize for being lengthy; I just wanted to make sure this was put on the table in regards to Sober's position as mentioned in Frank Schmidt's post. Now this isn't everything, of course. Both Sober and Dembski have had a lot to say (or read). But Sober never actually asserts Dembski's ID hypothesis is "inherently religious." (Or at least he doesn't in the "How Not To" article.) What Sober DOES claim, of course, is that it is "deeply flawed" and that neither evolutionists nor creationists should adopt Dembski's epistemological framework. So, even if there were NO problems with Sober's position whatsoever, I'd have to suggest that the "inherently religious" aspect that I asked to be shown, has not been shown yet, at least not by Sober. But as you've seen, there ARE indeed problems with Sober's position, which Dembski has explained in quite a bit of detail in NFL and TDR, so as Frank Schmidt indicated, it don't look like I'll be in any hurry to buy into Sober after all. Btw, if you want to see if ID is "inherently religious" in terms of the Constitution and the courts, there's no better place to go, imo, than Chapter Four of Francis Beckwith's book Law, Darwinism and Public Education. FL

Francis J. Beckwith · 2 July 2004

Helen Keller never saw an engineer. I guess for her there were no toasters. :-)

I hate to be picky, but technically none of us has actually seen an engineer. What you've seen is a body from whose actions you infer an engineer exists. Given the speed of light nobody has immediate apprehension of physical objects, let alone engineers. And besides that all you see are images of bodies and their actions from which you draw an inference to agency.

Here's a thought experiment that all this has inspired. Let's suppose that the world is populated with unconscious robots that are made by an engineer nobody in the world has ever seen. Suppose that you are the only real person in the world. In fact, the entire world was created as a ruse to make you think that there are billions of others. But alas, there are not. You are it, but you do not know, yet. Some of the robots are programmed to behave and act like what you've been taught are engineers. You own a toaster and you think you are warranted in believing that it was built by an agent who happens to be an engineer. But actually the toaster was built by a robot who is not an agent, but a pre-programmed automaton made to look like and act like he is an agent. Suppose, by accident, one of the robots trips and falls and he "cuts" himself and you begin to get suspicious given the wires and circuits you see under his "skin". Over a decade you come to the conclusion, after careful and detailed investigation, that you are the only conscious personal organism on earth. Would you be justified in inferring a robot-maker--a super,duper engineer--even if you have never seen one?

Frank Schmidt · 2 July 2004

FJB's argument is basically that it's impossible to rule out any solipsistic construction of the Universe. (Bertrand Russell once wrote that he got a letter from a lady who claimed she was a solipsist and wondered why there were no others :). It's irrelevant to the discussion, and to human action. We don't act as if there were no other minds, any more than if there were no gravity. We are discussing science here, no? This is one of the things that scientists find frustrating about philosophy,IDCists such as Beckwith and his ilk in particular. They have no data. Instead they construct arguments that can't be refuted but can't be tested scientifically either. Science is a data-driven process, and cannot succeed in the absence of data. So the question is, what is/are data? Data is defined as "factual information (as measurements or statistics) used as a basis for reasoning, discussion or calculation" in my version of Webster's. Note that calculation itself (see Dembski) or reasoning itself (see philosophers) are not data. And finally, in regard to my point about Martin Luther King, it's nice that he recognizes the problem,

You're right, some conservatives jump on the King bandwagon when in fact they probably would have resisted him if they were alive at the time.

To which I add, many of them were alive at the time, and did. Including Charlton Heston about the War, as I recall.

Timothy Sandefur · 2 July 2004

Chip Poirot writes

When I have to confront this issue as a college professor, I prefer to confront it head on---that is talk about the issues directly, honestly and openly. If that means discussing [Young-Earth Creationism] or ID for a few minutes and indicating why [ I] reject them as valid theories, then I'm willing to do that. I also find that it is helpful to indicate to students that they don't have to believe what I tell them, they just have to learn the material and understand why evolution is the only real viable research program and why it is important to understanding a number of debates in Cultural Anthropology and even to grasping the concept of culture. Under some interpretations of the establishment clause, that much might be precluded in a high school science classroom.

Not so---or at least, not under any correct understanding of the Establishment Clause. The Establishment Clause only prohibits the state from taking an official position on a religious issue which would amount to "an establishment of religion." It does not prohibit the state from teaching students the facts of science under any circumstances, and that is especially true where a teacher includes the sort of disclaimer that Prof. Poirot mentioned. (In fact, the disclaimer itself is much more troublesome as far as the Establishment Clause is concerned. See, e.g., Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Ed. v. Freiler, 185 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999) cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 2706 (2000).

It is true that "presenting evolution is frightening to evangelical and fundamentalist students on many levels...." I'm not very sensitive to this concern, because my reaction is "get over it." But I understand that this is the case, and that "get over it" isn't a helpful way of teaching---that's why I'm not a teacher.

Interestingly, Prof. Poirot says "I personally would prefer more emphasis on the 'exercise' and 'free speech' component of the 1st amendment and less on the establishment." I actually agree. Free exercise and free speech are more interesting because, among other things, they actually protect individual rights. Establishment may not protect individual rights---a discussion I and Jonathan Rowe have been having for a while now. Establishment Clause law is also more complicated and often more subjective than Free Exercise and Free Speech law. And in the age of the regulatory welfare state, that complication is even worse. It is practically impossible to consistently abide by the Establishment Clause today, because of the vast (and unconstitutional) extent to which government controls our lives. If the government were to operate within the scope that the Constitution actually conceives, we would have far fewer Establishment Clause problems to begin with, and we wouldn't have the problem with cases like Smith. I mean, the problem with Smith is that Christians think it's unfair that a law that, in effect, deprives them of religious freedom isn't unconstitutional so long as it was passed for some other neutral criterion. So, under Smith, as Garry correctly notes in his article, a law which prohibited all alcohol consumption could be enforced to shut down the Eucharist, and the Court would do nothing about that. That's a serious problem, I think. But it's a problem that ought to be handled by returning government to its Constitutional limits, not by coming up with ever-more-complicated First Amendment caselaw.

In short, there is no way to run a government education system that won't violate people's constitutional rights. But because we insist on having government education systems, we're stuck with it.

Great White Wonder · 2 July 2004

In short, there is no way to run a government education system that won't violate people's constitutional rights."

So, please refresh me: where does the constitutional "right" of parents to prevent their kids from learning science come from, Mister Sandefur? The "right" of adults to brainwash or otherwise control the facts their children are exposed to (particularly when the child can read) seems much more suspect to me than the desirability of a federally funded education system. It appears to me that, as time has passed in this country, the rights of young people have been continually eroded while the rights of parents to control their children's behavior and thoughts has grown. Oh, and Francis: I think in your scenario one rational conclusion is that I designed the robots, and the robot builders, and then I took a pill (which I also designed) which erased my memory, except for a few selective thoughts such as the memory of being taught what an engineer is and how to operate a toaster.

Ian Menzies · 2 July 2004

Absent all context, the three points

1. Specified complexity is well-defined and empirically detectable. 2. Undirected natural causes are incapable of explaining specified complexity. 3. Intelligent causation is the best explanation for specified complexity.

are not inherently religious in and of themselves. However, given that point 1 is not true (at least not as of yet), points 2 and 3 are either demonstrably false or meaningless depending on how one does choose to define SC, and there exists a virulent religiously-based anti-evolution movement, we can be reasonably certain that ID is religiously based. On the subject of arrowheads: while I am not an archeologist, I would guess that we first identified arrowheads and the like because they were associated with ancient human settlements and remains. Our knowlege of flint work may have also come from observing modern-day hunter-gatherers. I personally don't know for certain. However, I can all but guaruntee that no archeologist has ever picked up some random rock, calculated the probability of the various faces and edges being aligned in a given manner, and then shouted "this rock could not have come about by chance, it must be designed!"

Timothy Sandefur · 2 July 2004

Great White Wonder asks, "where does the constitutional "right" of parents to prevent their kids from learning science come from, Mister Sandefur?"

Parents have a natural right to raise their children. Courts have long recognized this, but the most famous cases on the subject are Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

In Pierce, the state of Oregon made it illegal for parents to send children to private schools. It did so on the grounds that the state should run education for children---for essentially the reasons Mr. Darrell cited in his earlier posts. The Court held---correctly, I believe---that this law

unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.

268 U.S. at 534-35. The Court cited its earlier decision in Meyer, which struck down a law prohibiting schools from teaching children the German language. (A law written during the anti-German hysteria of the first World War.) There, the Court held, again, correctly, that the

statute as construed and applied unreasonably infringes the liberty guaranteed to the plaintiff in error by the Fourteenth Amendment: "No state...shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law." While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men....

262 U.S. at 399-400. Although the Court agreed that "the state may do much, go very far, indeed, in order to imporve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally," it held that "the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected."

In order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the males at seven into barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and training to official guardians. Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great genius their ideas touching the relation between individual and state were wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any Legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people of a state without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution. The desire of the Legislature to foster a homogeneous people with American ideals prepared readily to understand current discussions of civic matters is easy to appreciate. Unfortunate experiences during the late war and aversion toward every character of truculent adversaries were certainly enough to quicken that aspiration. But the means adopted, we think, exceed the limitations upon the power of the state and conflict with rights assured to plaintiff in error. The interference is plain enough and no adequate reason therefor in time of peace and domestic tranquility has been shown.

262 U.S. at 401-02.

Also, in the recent case of Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), the Supreme Court struck down a Washington law which required parents to allow grandparents visitation rights, even if the parents didn't want to. The Court noted that"[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case---the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children---is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court." Id. at 65.

While we may disagree with the way fundamentalist parents raise their children, they do have, within limits, the right to do so, and to, as Wonder puts it, "brainwash or otherwise control the facts their children are exposed to...." If for no other reason, than because Wonder has that right also, and he would expect a fundamentalist to respect his right to raise his child as he chooses.

Again, that right has limits---parents can't deny their children medical care for religious reasons, for instance, and can't refuse to educate children. But when it comes to teaching---or not teaching---parents have significant, and legitimate control.

steve · 2 July 2004

Andrew says: "IDers could at least construct a valid inference if they would be up front about the identity of their Designer. Then, they could describe his attributes with specificity from scripture" Exactly, they could do that. they do it all the time. It's theology, it's philsophy. But they want to call it science.

Great White Wonder · 2 July 2004

Yes, I do remember reading those cases in my Family Law class some years ago. Oy. Nasty stuff.

Honestly, I think the dicta in those cases stinks to high heaven, although I don't disagree with the results necessarily. What we end up with is a tyranny of the parents.

I can discern no difference between a parent refusing to educate his child and a parent educating his child that "God hates guys" or that ID creationism is "science." And neither can the Supremes.

I also disagree with you that I have the Constitutional right to brainwash my child. I have every right to believe anything I want to believe. But I do not believe that the Constitution grants me the right to teach children --any children-- that blacks, women and/or gays are less-than-human or otherwise worthy of discrimination. It's criminal. Or at the very least, it should be criminal and a law prohibiting such instruction would surely not be held unconstitutional.

Likewise, I think a law prohibiting the teaching of creationism to children as a FACT would also be constitutional. If it's taught to children as a religious belief or practice (in a church, for example), no problem. But in a school (even a private school)?

I say: ban it.

Great White Wonder · 2 July 2004

Oh, I really do appreciate the helpful citing, Tim. It'd take me an hour to do that properly! I need two more heads and a four more hands, then I could really make some hay. ;)

Great White Wonder · 2 July 2004

And here's some relevant news, hot off the press:

http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/07/01/lesbian.custody.ap/index.html

Timothy Sandefur · 2 July 2004

Great White Wonder goes, I think, beyond reason to say that the natural right of a parent to raise a child is "[n]asty," and "stinks to high heaven...."

There are many reasons to oppose the state taking a monopoly of education. I've mentioned some of them in this thread---state control over the mind is a very bad thing, and if preventing it means opening the way for some dogmatists, that's fine. There is perhaps no place where the public choice problem could have more dangerous repercussions than in giving the state a total monopoly on education. Such a thing has been met with disastrous results every time it has been tried. Of course it's bad for a parent to teach a child untrue things, or try to shut off a child's mind from encountering new and different ideas. But if you arrogate to yourself the right to tell a fundamentalist to raise his child, then you are giving him a license to tell you how to raise your child. And that's a serious problem, since there are more of them than there are of you.

In any case, if parents have no right to educate their own children, then where do they get the right to educate someone else's child? If Wonder has no right to direct the teaching of his child, then where does Wonder get off telling his legislator to create a school to teach my child? As Jefferson said, "Sometimes it is said that man can not be trusted with the government of himself. Can he, then, be trusted with the government of others? Or have we found angels in the forms of kings to govern him?" Where does Wonder imagine that he'll find perfectly dispassionate educational experts capable of never being influenced by fundamentalist parents, or any other parents with whom Wonder disagrees, who can run a school that teaches only true things?

But in any case, neither Wonder nor anyone else has no right to force someone to educate his child---it is simply none of your business. Now, the child might have such a right---since it is clearly the child's business. And the state might legitimately intervene on the child's behalf. Indeed, it already does so, in the form of truancy laws. The state draws lines around a parent's authority to ensure that the parent's authority does not become a license for what Wonder calls "a tyranny of the parents." We don't let parents refuse medical treatment, such as blood transfusions, for example, even though their objections are religiously based. But there are serious problems with stretching this too far. For one thing, if faced with the choice between tyranny of parents and tyranny of the state, I would prefer the former. In that case, at least we know that responsible people, like Wonder, will teach their children to think for themselves. We don't have that guarantee at all in the latter case.

Now, Wonder says "I can discern no difference between a parent refusing to educate his child and a parent educating his child that 'God hates g[a]ys' or that ID creationism is 'science.' And neither can the Supremes." That's not true. There is a difference. In the former case, the parent is refusing to educate a child, and in the latter, the parent is teaching untrue things. That's a difference, and that's enough for the law in many states. The Court has even upheld a parent's right to refuse to send a child to school beyond a certain grade level, on religious grounds. See further Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Wonder may "disagree with [the Supreme Court] that I have the Constitutional right to brainwash my child," but the alternative is fraught with serious dangers---not the least of which is that there is no clear line between "brainwashing" and "teaching." Teaching is brainwashing. To coin a phrase, I educate, you lobby, they propagandize.

Yet Wonder says "I do not believe that the Constitution grants me the right to teach children---any children---that blacks, women and/or gays are less-than-human or otherwise worthy of discrimination. It's criminal. Or at the very least, it should be criminal and a law prohibiting such instruction would surely not be held unconstitutional."

My god, this is a truly shocking statement. The First Amendment says "no law...abridging the freedom of speech." The Court has repeatedly said that this encompasses the right to teach students---a right which may be limited by school boards, but which nevertheless is protected under the term "academic freedom." In the middle of the 20th century there were a series of cases involving universities which sought to punish communists for teaching communism in their classrooms. Now, communism is at least as evil as racism or anti-homosexual bigotry---actually, far worse. Yet the Court rightly held that teachers have academic freedom to teach what they view as true, and that the state may not punish these teachers. We ought not to embrace the notion that the state may criminalize the teaching of any doctrine, no matter how hateful or untrue.

I'm sorry, folks, but creationists have rights too!

"The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government." Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. "The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools." The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative selection."

Keyishian v. Board of Regents of University of State of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 602-03 (1967).

No, public schools may not teach creationism, but private schools may. And parents may. If you don't like it, the proper thing to do is to teach more evolution, not to silence your enemies. See further 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 498 (1996) (plurality op.) ("Justice Brandeis wrote, in explaining his objection to a prohibition of political speech, that 'the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repression.'") And if the parent blocks you from doing so, and puts his child in a private school, and orders you not to speak to the child, then you must respect the parent's right to do so---until the child comes of age. Then, by all means, go right on teaching the former child evolution.

Great WhiteWonder · 2 July 2004

There's loads of red meat for me in there, TS. I think twice as much as you intended. ;) We both know that Freedom of Speech has limits and we are both aware that children are treated very differently from adults in this country.

We ought not to embrace the notion that the state may criminalize the teaching of any doctrine, no matter how hateful or untrue.

My freeper detector just went off. Perhaps I need to adjust it. Just fyi, I was talking about teaching doctrines to *children* of course. And my attention, of course, if focused on education which receives Federal Funding (but I'll go further, what the heck).

communism is at least as evil as racism or anti-homosexual bigotry---actually, far worse.

Oops, there it goes again! Sure, creationists have rights. Adult creationists can do whatever they want. I even support the right of gay adult creationists to marry (which I think falls as naturally as can be right out of the holding of the Meyer case you cited above). But a right to indoctrinate children to believe *anything*?? In the context of an educational setting? Nope. There is no constitutional right to mess with young brains that way. If so, we wouldn't have all these laws "protecting" children from "obscene" or "violent" material (gee, and who are the people behind those laws, I wonder???) "then you must respect the parent's right to do so---until the child comes of age" And that "age" seems to be getting higher all the time, depending on what the "evil" is that we are protecting the child from. You're not old enough to drink, but you're old enough to die. Your old enough to reproduce, but you're not old enough to see a woman's nipples (or maybe, you're too old). This is what I mean by nasty and stinky laws. It's the worst sort of legislated morality. I'm not talking about humanities education and whether Mark Twain is better than Maya Angelou or whatever. I'm talking about 2+2 = 4. I'm talking about human beings evolved from our ancestors, who weren't human. Is it brainwashing to teach a five year old that 2+2=4? No, it's not. Is it brainwashing to teach a five year old that they are going to go to hell if the accept what all those deluded scientists say about evolution? Yeah. I think it is. I'm shooting from the hip here, as you can probably tell. I'm ready to step away from the car at any time. ;)

Andrew · 2 July 2004

Once again, Dr. Beckwith leads with misdirection.

I pointed out that his last comment (an attempt to turn Weinberg's argument on its head) meant either that:

1) Neither design nor naturalistic processes are empirically detectable; or

2) That scientists (unlike IDers) are willing to ascribe positive elements to naturalistic processes, which makes naturalism uniquely a valid inference.

Which is it?

Chip Poirot · 2 July 2004

A response to Tim in 4441:

Thanks for your very thoughtful comments and the references to the case law. Fortunately, I don't teach in public high schools and hence am pretty much free in my own teaching to not worry about it.

I have read, in different places, varied interpretations of what the law does and does not allow high school teachers to do. My understanding is that the local district first and foremost really has the right to define the curriculum. So the First Amendment rights of the teacher (as opposed to the student) in a high school or elementary context is very limited (of course, this might vary depending on the school's tenure code). The First Amendment rights and responsibilities and restrictions, apply primarily to the school district and to the teacher as an employee of the district. This of course limits the ability of teachers to go off on a frolick of their own and substitute ID or Creationism for the required high school curriculum. It also limits the right of history teachers to discuss openly and critically the fact that Martin Luther threw feces at the devil-unless the school district OK's bringing this controversial material into the classroom.

I actually think that the establishment clause and its precedents are vague enough and broad enough, that schools probably deal with the issue much as they and other employers deal with sexual harassment-that is-poorly. The temptation is to avoid controversy and statements that even might land the school in court, or worse yet, result in a principal having to meet with disgruntled parents.

I think this results in evolution actually being avoided in many instances-or if it is taught, it is taught poorly and rushed through as a mandatory part of the curriculum-rather than fully integrated as a core, unifying concept of biology.

So we have this weird paradox of evolution being poorly taught and poorly understood, and yet school districts scared to death to say the R word at all, even when the R word is on the table as in a history class that covers the Reformation. Though the example is a little irrelevant (though not entirely) I experience this myself in a freshman survey of the Social Sciences class when the text I was using reduced the Protestant Reformation to "Martin Luther was a free thinking monk whose ideas spread through Europe like wildfire". This statement, it seems to me, is as offensive and absured to secular agnostics like myself as it would be to devout Lutherans! And yet that is the level I see the rigid line of disestablishment leading to along with the imprimatur of not offending anyone when a textbook is published.

So, while the law may allow more than people actually think it does, the reality is that the law has unintended consequences.

So, I stand by what I said-I'd like to see courts move away from disestablishment and back towards free expression and free speech.

Timothy Sandefur · 2 July 2004

I'm not sure what a "freeper detector" is, but in any case, even if Wonder thinks communism is not evil, I do. So which one of us has the right to control the education of Wonder's children vis-a-vis communism? Him, or me? I think it's not only evil, but factually untrue---I think, for instance, that, as Mises pointed out, the price computation problem makes communism economically impossible. So do I have the right to criminalize Wonder's teaching of his children with regard to communism? Or do I instead have to try to convince people that communism is wrong---while simultaneously respecting Wonder's right to teach his children what he thinks is right---including if Wonder tells his children to stay away from me? Wonder says that "Freedom of Speech has limits...." Yes it does, but this is emphatically not one of them. You have the right to teach anything you want, including to children. If you don't, then freedom of speech means nothing.

Now, Wonder thinks things are different when he's "teaching doctrines to children of course." I don't understand why this difference is relevant. It is relevant in the Establishment Clause context, yes, but only to a limited degree, since the state is prohibited from embracing religion even in front of adults. But a teacher has a right to teach children, even teaching children things that Wonder disagrees with. The only exception to this of which I am aware is in the Establishment Clause context.

(Wonder also adds, "my attention, of course, i focused on education which receives Federal Funding...." I don't remember him saying so, but in this context the issue might be different. The federal government has the authority to limit what its grants are spent on. So the federal government may give federal dollars to schools on the condition that...such-and-such. That's fine. Whether that violates the First Amendment or not is an issue of serious contention, but the Court favors federal authority. See, e.g., United States v. American Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003)).

Wonder writes, "Sure, creationists have rights. Adult creationists can do whatever they want.... But a right to indoctrinate children to believe anything?? In the context of an educational setting? Nope. There is no constitutional right to mess with young brains that way. If so, we wouldn't have all these laws 'protecting' children from 'obscene' or 'violent' material (gee, and who are the people behind those laws, I wonder???)"

First, the question is not whether the Constitution "contains" a right to "mess with young brains." The Constitution is a limitation on liberty, not a grant of it. So the question ought to be whether the Constitution permits Wonder to interfere with my right to freedom of speech, even if I use that right to "mess with young brains." The answer is, in most cases, no.

Second, if there is no right to "mess with young brains," then where does Wonder get the right to mess with the young brain of a fundamentalist's child? He is claiming the right to teach evolution to the child of a person who does not want the child to learn this. Where does Wonder get such a right, if he himself says no such right exists?

Third, laws which "protect" children from "obscene and violent material" are routinely struck down by the courts because such laws frequently interfere with a person's right to "mess with young [and old] brains." For example in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002), the Court struck down a law prohibiting "virtual child porn." The Court noted that such a law could prohibit a production of Romeo and Juliet.

Now, the courts do allow some laws which "protect[ ] children from 'obscene' or 'violent' material," but only in extremely narrow circumstances---in fact, only in circumstances where the law is not going to block a person from messing with young brains. You see what I mean? The First Amendment certainly does protect the right to "mess with brains"---that is, in fact, the entire purpose of the First Amendment. And yes, that includes children's brains. It includes Wonder's right to mess with his child's brain, a fundamentalist's right to mess with his child's brain, and their rights to mess with the brains of each other and of each other's children (so long, in the latter case, that the parents have no objection.)

Wonder asks,"Is it brainwashing to teach a five year old that 2+2=4? No, it's not. Is it brainwashing to teach a five year old that they are going to go to hell if the accept what all those deluded scientists say about evolution? Yeah. I think it is." That's certainly fine, but of course, a fundamentalist will see things quite differently, and, most importantly, has the right to see things differently. Brainwashing is one of those words that means pretty much what a person wants it to mean---sort of like "judicial activism" or "God" or "market failure." Here's a dictionary definition: "Intensive, forcible indoctrination, usually political or religious, aimed at destroying a person's basic convictions and attitudes and replacing them with an alternative set of fixed beliefs." Now, if that doesn't describe government schooling, I don't know what does. I remember what it was like to go to high school (it was only ten years ago). I showed up---against my will, so it was "forcible"---and had to attend hour after hour, day after day, of classes involving in many cases political issues, such as in my civics class. I was taught that the American Constitution was written for white men and only for white men and that America was a nasty horrible place of slavery and capitalist exploitation. These things challenged my basic convictions---I was a conservative in those days---and these things were certainly aimed at replacing my convictions with an alternative set of fixed beliefs. Indeed, believers in government schooling, such as Mr. Darrell, believe that the entire purpose of government schooling is "democratic" indoctrination---to teach people to be good citizens. Fine enough, but that is indistinguishable from "brainwashing." It may be indoctrination you agree with, but it's still indoctrination.

And what is the antidote to indoctrination? More indoctrination. As I learned more, I discovered that my teachers were often right about things. I saw that my conservative views were wrong about many things, and I changed my mind.

Listen---there is nobody on earth less sympathetic to creationists than I am. I will fight them in every way I can. If they try to teach my child (should I ever have one) creationism, I will hale their asses into court the instant I can. If they try to spend tax dollars to propagate their pernicious nonsense, I will fight them. When they publish silly articles like the one I discussed in this original post, I will argue against them. I will hector and ridicule and propagandize as much as I can against them. But we who believe in evolution and fear the scientific illiteracy that creationists propagate---we must not allow our zeal to lead us into trampling the rights of those who disagree with us. We must respect their rights to raise their children, to teach them their beliefs, and to spread their own doctrines as they please. The Constitution applies to the lunatic, the communist, the racist, the homophobe, the Democrat, the Keynesian, the Krishna and the Ku Kluxer just as much as it applies to you and me. It's an important thought to keep in mind for Fourth of July weekend.

Chip Poirot writes "[f]ortunately, I don't teach in public high schools and hence am pretty much free in my own teaching to not worry about it." Good for you, Professor! We need more like you. And I agree with all his points. I especially agree with his statement that "while the law may allow more than people actually think it does, the reality is that the law has unintended consequences." That is a very important point. One of the worst things is that school districts get terrible legal advice. As a result, they just shy away from religion completely, much more than they are actually required to do, and there are three results: first, it harms education, because children ought to learn about religion, to some degree; second, it often ends up violating the free exercise rights of a child, as when a district prohibits the child from praying or something; third, it leads fundamentalists into a sense that they are a legally persecuted minority. They really like that. It is a big boon to them politically, to portray themselves as being picked on.

Until next time---have a good holiday.

Chip Poirot · 2 July 2004

A response to Tim in 4441:

Thanks for your very thoughtful comments and the references to the case law. Fortunately, I don't teach in public high schools and hence am pretty much free in my own teaching to not worry about it.

I have read, in different places, varied interpretations of what the law does and does not allow high school teachers to do. My understanding is that the local district first and foremost really has the right to define the curriculum. So the First Amendment rights of the teacher (as opposed to the student) in a high school or elementary context is very limited (of course, this might vary depending on the school's tenure code). The First Amendment rights and responsibilities and restrictions, apply primarily to the school district and to the teacher as an employee of the district. This of course limits the ability of teachers to go off on a frolick of their own and substitute ID or Creationism for the required high school curriculum. It also limits the right of history teachers to discuss openly and critically the fact that Martin Luther threw feces at the devil-unless the school district OK's bringing this controversial material into the classroom.

I actually think that the establishment clause and its precedents are vague enough and broad enough, that schools probably deal with the issue much as they and other employers deal with sexual harassment-that is-poorly. The temptation is to avoid controversy and statements that even might land the school in court, or worse yet, result in a principal having to meet with disgruntled parents.

I think this results in evolution actually being avoided in many instances-or if it is taught, it is taught poorly and rushed through as a mandatory part of the curriculum-rather than fully integrated as a core, unifying concept of biology.

So we have this weird paradox of evolution being poorly taught and poorly understood, and yet school districts scared to death to say the R word at all, even when the R word is on the table as in a history class that covers the Reformation. Though the example is a little irrelevant (though not entirely) I experience this myself in a freshman survey of the Social Sciences class when the text I was using reduced the Protestant Reformation to "Martin Luther was a free thinking monk whose ideas spread through Europe like wildfire". This statement, it seems to me, is as offensive and absured to secular agnostics like myself as it would be to devout Lutherans! And yet that is the level I see the rigid line of disestablishment leading to along with the imprimatur of not offending anyone when a textbook is published.

So, while the law may allow more than people actually think it does, the reality is that the law has unintended consequences.

So, I stand by what I said-I'd like to see courts move away from disestablishment and back towards free expression and free speech.

Francis J. Beckwith · 2 July 2004

The other Frank writes:

FJB's argument is basically that it's impossible to rule out any solipsistic construction of the Universe. (Bertrand Russell once wrote that he got a letter from a lady who claimed she was a solipsist and wondered why there were no others :).

I'm not arguing anything. I'm offering a story in order to accentuate some conceptual issues. It's called a "thought experiment" or "an analogy." And it's not solipsistic, since the world is real, the robots are real, and the only agent in the world is real. It's just raising the question of whether a lone agent in such a world would have warrant in inferring a robot-maker if he had never seen a robot-maker or knows anything about the robot-maker other than that the robot-maker has the power and knowledge and materials to construct a world full of robots that appear to be real agents. The other Frank writes:

It's irrelevant to the discussion, and to human action. We don't act as if there were no other minds, any more than if there were no gravity.

Saying it is not relevant does not make it so. Sure, we don't act as if there were no other minds. But how in fact do we know that there are other minds since we don't have direct access to other minds? Is it by analogy--i.e., I know I have a mind and thus I infer that others that appear like me have a mind--or is it by inference--i.e., X acts in such and such a way that appears mind-like? Maybe it's neither. BTW, I am not a defender of ID. Never have been. Read me carefully. I do think the ID arguments are better than most of you guys think. But I don't have a horse in this race. My interest has been largely jurisrpudential. Clearly, I have argued that teaching ID in public schools would not violate the establishment clause. However, as I state in my book, the policy question--whether it should be taught--is a different question, one that I do not explore. Nevertheless, since the publication of my book I have gone on record saying that ID should not be taught in public school biology classes until its proponents can amass a larger body of peer-reviewed literature in that discipline. In fact, I said as much in March 2003 during a lecture I gave on law, Darwinism and public education at Princeton University. Sorry to disappoint. No more stereo-typOs, okay? Hee hee! Frank

Russell · 2 July 2004

Francis Beckwith said

... ID should not be taught in public school biology classes until its proponents can amass a larger body of peer-reviewed literature in that discipline.

I think we can all agree on that.

I am not a defender of ID. Never have been. Read me carefully. I do think the ID arguments are better than most of you guys think.

Their legal arguments or their scientific arguments?

Francis J. Beckwith · 2 July 2004

The other Frank writes:

FJB's argument is basically that it's impossible to rule out any solipsistic construction of the Universe. (Bertrand Russell once wrote that he got a letter from a lady who claimed she was a solipsist and wondered why there were no others :).

I'm not arguing anything. I'm offering a story in order to accentuate some conceptual issues. It's called a "thought experiment" or "an analogy." And it's not solipsistic, since the world is real, the robots are real, and the only agent in the world is real. It's just raising the question of whether a lone agent in such a world would have warrant in inferring a robot-maker if he had never seen a robot-maker or knows anything about the robot-maker other than that the robot-maker has the power and knowledge and materials to construct a world full of robots that appear to be real agents. The other Frank writes:

It's irrelevant to the discussion, and to human action. We don't act as if there were no other minds, any more than if there were no gravity.

Saying it is not relevant does not make it so. Sure, we don't act as if there were no other minds. But how in fact do we know that there are other minds since we don't have direct access to other minds? Is it by analogy--i.e., I know I have a mind and thus I infer that others that appear like me have a mind--or is it by inference--i.e., X acts in such and such a way that appears mind-like? Maybe it's neither. BTW, I am not a defender of ID. Never have been. Read me carefully. I do think the ID arguments are better than most of you guys think. But I don't have a horse in this race. My interest has been largely jurisrpudential. Clearly, I have argued that teaching ID in public schools would not violate the establishment clause. However, as I state in my book, the policy question--whether it should be taught--is a different question, one that I do not explore. Nevertheless, since the publication of my book I have gone on record saying that ID should not be taught in public school biology classes until its proponents can amass a larger body of peer-reviewed literature in that discipline. In fact, I said as much in March 2003 during a lecture I gave on law, Darwinism and public education at Princeton University. Sorry to disappoint. No more stereo-typOs, okay? Hee hee! Frank

Francis J. Beckwith · 2 July 2004

Oops! Sorry for the double post. I'm not a scientist like you really smart guys. Dumb philosopher.

Frank

Joe McFaul · 2 July 2004

One problem with the "religiously neutral" description of ID above is Ian's point--it's absent all context:

"1. Specified complexity is well-defined and empirically detectable.

2. Undirected natural causes are incapable of explaining specified complexity.

3. Intelligent causation is the best explanation for specified complexity."

Mr. Beckith concedes that numbers 1 and 2 are missing because there is insuffient evidence to bring the subject up. If #1 and #2 are both absent then #3 is not the result of logic--it's faith.

Also, when these matters are presented in court, the context is there. At the trial level, (I'm a trial attorney) courts routinely see matters set up for soemthing they are not. "Sales" which are actually "loans." Securities transactions disguised as joint ventures. Ponzi schemes disgised to look like investments. Extortions designed to look like donations. In short, sham transactions are frequently the suject of litigation.

"ID" has all the indicia of being a sham. It's main backer is a shadowy organization suggesting vaguely that there's a conspiracy against it. The main proponents argue, not on scientific grounds, but on moral grounds. Its main proponents claim to be theologians and their theological writings are better written and more scholarly than their scientific ones. They are cagey when asked to identify the designer. Their arguments are negative arguments against evolution not postive ones setting out a fully developered theory or at least one with fruitful areas of research. There is no evidence of an active research and experimental program. They do not evauate and address evidence which contradicts their own theory. They refuse to address alternate degigner theories like Raelian, Marconian or Mormon theology, all of which have far more explanatory power and are MORE complete theories (once the supernatural is admitted)than the proposed bare bones ID theory.

In context, a trial court would percieve the bare bones ID theory to be just another sham like all the others I've described above and hold that its just another religious view disguised as a scientific theory attempting to back door into the clasroom.

Francis J. Beckwith · 2 July 2004

Its main proponents claim to be theologians and their theological writings are better written and more scholarly than their scientific ones.

Maybe I'm reading you wrong, but are you suggesting that courts apply a religious test to individuals as a means by which to dismiss their policy proposals? Should courts apply that test to legislators themselves, and thus limit their legislative powers based on a "religious test."? I apologize if I am not reading you right.

Francis J. Beckwith · 2 July 2004

Will There Be a Panda's Thumb Party?

I know this is off topic, but I think it would be really cool to meet some of you guys. Have you thought about having a "Panda's Thumb" Party?

Just a thought.

Frank

Ed Darrell · 3 July 2004

Amazing. Dr. Beckwith said:

BTW, I am not a defender of ID. Never have been. Read me carefully. I do think the ID arguments are better than most of you guys think. But I don't have a horse in this race. My interest has been largely jurisrpudential. Clearly, I have argued that teaching ID in public schools would not violate the establishment clause. However, as I state in my book, the policy question---whether it should be taught---is a different question, one that I do not explore. Nevertheless, since the publication of my book I have gone on record saying that ID should not be taught in public school biology classes until its proponents can amass a larger body of peer-reviewed literature in that discipline. In fact, I said as much in March 2003 during a lecture I gave on law, Darwinism and public education at Princeton University.

As a policy matter, anything that amasses a significant body of peer-reviewed literature and which has most of that body indicating that the stuff works well on the bench and in the field, can be taught as fact to kids in science classes in public schools. This applied to the Steady State theory of the universe's origin (and still does, so long as one teaches the disproofs), and it applies to cold fusion, and it would apply such lesser-established ideas as astrology, flat-Earth, homeopathy, and coffee colonics and "healing Q-rays." What distinguishes "intelligent design" from any of these others? Steady State and cold fusion have much more research data backing them; intelligent design's lab bench results are on a par with astrology, perhaps somewhat less considering the history of astrology. If Dr. Beckwith feels no moral twinge at advocating, before serious policy arms of governmental entities, that ID might be teachable (albeit with the qualifications he lists above), should he not also tell the whole truth about astrology and coffee colonics? Discovery Institute pays no homage, monetary or titular, to advocates of coffee colonics. Is there a connection? No churches pin their hopes on cold fusion or any of the others. Dr. Beckwith's book, however, does not note that ID does not meet his test. May we expect an erratum note from the publisher? I feel one is due. When Joe McFaul explains above that the nearest thing ID can offer to hard, lab bench evidence is theological opinion, Dr. Beckwith says with felicitous deadpan:

Maybe I'm reading you wrong, but are you suggesting that courts apply a religious test to individuals as a means by which to dismiss their policy proposals? Should courts apply that test to legislators themselves, and thus limit their legislative powers based on a "religious test."? I apologize if I am not reading you right.

Several of us have explained before: One test of whether something is science is whether one can find someone who could qualify as an expert witness under the rules of any state, or under federal jurisdiction. This is a well-established, well-honored test that does admit for testifying more than a few who can skate around the truth; however, it does not admit any advocates of ID. No, it's not the theology that should be tested. It's the complete lack of scientific backing that should be exposed. The lack of scientific backing in the expert-witness rules exposes frauds and charlatans, regardless their faith or lack of it. We shouldn't substitute faith for science in science issues, especially when it comes to preparing our next generation of scientists, policy makers, administrators, citizens and parents. Dr. Beckwith's actions have supported exactly that substitution, despite his disclaimer above. No, the Establishment Clause would not support the teaching of ID. That's the answer to the question. Dr. Beckwith appears to recognize why, but his answer is phrased differently, and I think misleadingly, as 'Yes, if . . .' The difficulty is that members of boards of education took Dr. Beckwith seriously.

Russell · 3 July 2004

Ed Darrell:
"One test of whether something is science is whether one can find someone who could qualify as an expert witness under the rules of any state, or under federal jurisdiction.... it does not admit any advocates of ID."

What are the rules or procedures that would prevent the qualification of Behe, for instance, as an expert witness? (Don't get me wrong - I hope to The Designer there are such rules or procedures. I just want to know what they are)

David Wilson · 3 July 2004

Absent all context, the three points "1. Specified complexity is well-defined and empirically detectable. 2. Undirected natural causes are incapable of explaining specified complexity. 3. Intelligent causation is the best explanation for specified complexity." are not inherently religious in and of themselves.

— Ian Menzies
The problem with this is that one has to share some common context with the person making the three points to even understand the meanings of the words being used, let alone to try and grasp why on earth he or she thinks the argument makes any sense. In fact, the argument is a slightly weaker, but otherwise barely disguised, version of the fifth of Thomas Aquinas's five ways of proving the existence of God. For Aquinas's "action towards ends", modern ID advocates have substituted specified complexity or irreducible complexity, and for his "whatever lacks knowledge" they have substituted "undirected natural causes". Of course, the good St Thomas concludes his version of the third point by giving the name "God" to the being supposedly responsible for the intelligent causation referred to therein. Modern ID advocates, however, almost always seem to avoid doing this.

Francis J. Beckwith · 4 July 2004

It's my wedding anniversary this week and we'll be traveling soon. (Pictures of me and my lovely wife, Frankie, can be found on my website if you want to see the happy couple: http;//francisbeckwith.com). So, I'm going to make this quick, and I will not return for awhile. I don't disagree with Ed that bad ideas should not be taught as good ideas in public schools. I think there is a miscommunication on what each of us means by ID. This is why I was careful to say biology journals rather than all academic journals. If you read chapter 3 of my book, you will notice that presentation of ID includes (1) critiques on demarcation theories, (2) conceptual problems with methodological naturalism, and (3) several types of ID including fine-tuning arguments. You may disagree with me on this, but I see the ID movement as consisting of several overlapping strands of thought, some of which includes direct critiques of Darwinian mechanisms, but some of which does not. I have met, for example, two scientists sympathetic and intrigued by the philosophical critiques of materialism offered by folks like Dallas Willard and J. P. Moreland but unmoved by Behe's stuff. I've also met some folks who like the fine-tuning arguments but couldn't care less about biology or philosophy of science. Ed writes:

One test of whether something is science is whether one can find someone who could qualify as an expert witness under the rules of any state, or under federal jurisdiction.  This is a well-established, well-honored test that does admit for testifying more than a few who can skate around the truth; however, it does not admit any advocates of ID.

But what if the question is "what is science?" Since that is not a question of science but a question about the nature of science, it is a philosophical question. Who gets to be your expert witness in a case in which that is a question? Philosophers of science who have published in peer-reviewed journal?. Well, that could include ID advocates J. P. Moreland, William Lane Craig, Rob Koons, and Robin Collins. And because philosophy of science is a branch of epistemology, perhaps Dallas Willard and Alvin Plantinga can testify as well. Or maybe Michael Rea, who has written the highly-acclaimed book World Without Design (Oxford). Or how about Del Ratzsch, a critic of Dembski's filter, who has written a book making a strong case against the necessity of methodological naturalism: Nature Science and Design (SUNY Press)? As I said, the biology peer-reviewed work is thin, and does not justify including ID in that discipline's science classes. But what about the peer-reviewed work that challenges a materialist view of science? I'm thinking out loud here. But my point is that this stuff is not as cut and dry as you think. I think you would see this as well if you didn't jealously guard the ID you don't believe in. :-) Later dudes. Frank

Francis J. Beckwith · 4 July 2004

It's my wedding anniversary this week and we'll be traveling soon. (Pictures of me and my lovely wife, Frankie, can be found on my website if you want to see the happy couple: http;//francisbeckwith.com). So, I'm going to make this quick, and I will not return for awhile. I don't disagree with Ed that bad ideas should not be taught as good ideas in public schools. I think there is a miscommunication on what each of us means by ID. This is why I was careful to say biology journals rather than all academic journals. If you read chapter 3 of my book, you will notice that presentation of ID includes (1) critiques on demarcation theories, (2) conceptual problems with methodological naturalism, and (3) several types of ID including fine-tuning arguments. You may disagree with me on this, but I see the ID movement as consisting of several overlapping strands of thought, some of which includes direct critiques of Darwinian mechanisms, but some of which does not. I have met, for example, two scientists sympathetic and intrigued by the philosophical critiques of materialism offered by folks like Dallas Willard and J. P. Moreland but unmoved by Behe's stuff. I've also met some folks who like the fine-tuning arguments but couldn't care less about biology or philosophy of science. Ed writes:

One test of whether something is science is whether one can find someone who could qualify as an expert witness under the rules of any state, or under federal jurisdiction.  This is a well-established, well-honored test that does admit for testifying more than a few who can skate around the truth; however, it does not admit any advocates of ID.

But what if the question is "what is science?" Since that is not a question of science but a question about the nature of science, it is a philosophical question. Who gets to be your expert witness in a case in which that is a question? Philosophers of science who have published in peer-reviewed journal?. Well, that could include ID advocates J. P. Moreland, William Lane Craig, Rob Koons, and Robin Collins. And because philosophy of science is a branch of epistemology, perhaps Dallas Willard and Alvin Plantinga can testify as well. Or maybe Michael Rea, who has written the highly-acclaimed book World Without Design (Oxford). Or how about Del Ratzsch, a critic of Dembski's filter, who has written a book making a strong case against the necessity of methodological naturalism: Nature Science and Design (SUNY Press)? As I said, the biology peer-reviewed work is thin, and does not justify including ID in that discipline's science classes. But what about the peer-reviewed work that challenges a materialist view of science? I'm thinking out loud here. But my point is that this stuff is not as cut and dry as you think. I think you would see this as well if you didn't jealously guard the ID you don't believe in. :-) Later dudes. Frank

RBH · 4 July 2004

This is off the legal topic, but in 4438 FL quoted Dembski as writing

The fact is that we infer design repeatedly and reliably without knowing characteristics of the designer or being able to assess what a designer is likely to do.

That struck me on first reading (when I read first NFL) as complete glop, and rereading it, it's still complete glop. I've hung around the world for more than 60 years, and I can't think of a single instance in which that's true. Not one. Can anyone think of "repeated and reliable" design inferences that are made in the absence of knowledge of characteristics of the designers or what they're likely to do? Anyone at all? FL? Got any examples of "repeated and reliable" design inferences absent knowledge about designers? RBH

Francis J. Beckwith · 4 July 2004

I promised myself that while on vacation I would not look at that Panda's Thumb. But I peeked. RBH wrote the following. I think it's a good collection of important questions, some of which I've thought about myself. I will republish what he said and give my own ruminations, for that they're worth. RBH writes:

Can anyone think of "repeated and reliable" design inferences that are made in the absence of knowledge of characteristics of the designers or what they're likely to do?  Anyone at all?  FL?  Got any examples of "repeated and reliable" design inferences absent knowledge about designers?

Here are my thoughts. It depends what one means by "knowledge about designers." For any design inference relies on background knowledge about designers qua designers if one does not have direct knowledge of the designer one is postulating to account for the entity in question. So, in a sense, no design inference, even one that attempts to account for the universe by postulating an omnipotent mind is without some knowledge of the designer one is inferring, even if the knowledge is modest in what it affirms. But if you are suggesting that a design inference cannot be legitimately made unless one can offer an exhaustive list of the characteristics of the designer--e.g., he's 5'11", can make a mean Margarita, and has a scar three inches below his right nipple--then no design inference can be made at all. After all, there are artifacts that have been discoverd for which we have no clue why they were made or who made them. But it would not follow from that ignorance that it would be illegitimate for any of us to say that they were designed. On the other hand, you are correct that a design inference must entail some characteristics of the designer, which at minimum should include being an agent capable of actualizing the entity in question. Maybe I'm missing something in your question. I'm not Dembski and I'm not pretending to defend his point of view. I'm just trying to make a few suggestions that may illuminate this discussion. Happy 4th. Frank

Steve · 5 July 2004

The fact is that we infer design repeatedly and reliably without knowing characteristics of the designer or being able to assess what a designer is likely to do.

Good point, RBH. I mentioned something like this last week w/t/t examples of engineers and kindergarteners. The design inference we make occasionally is a pretty feeble heuristic, requires prior knowledge, can't rule out algorithms, and breaks easily. Believing it's a fit competitor to evolution is a faith-based belief.

Russell · 5 July 2004

Francis Beckwith:

It depends what one means by "knowledge about designers." ....if you are suggesting that a design inference cannot be legitimately made unless one can offer an exhaustive list of the characteristics of the designer ...then no design inference can be made at all.

Francis, Francis, Francis... You're on vacation. Stop with the lawyerly prestidigitation for just a few days. The discussion of what the meaning of 'is' is, is one that can wait.

FL · 5 July 2004

After all, there are artifacts that have been discovered for which we have no clue why they were made or who made them. But it would not follow from that ignorance that it would be illegitimate for any of us to say that they were designed.

I think this would address your question, RBH. (I would also perhaps mention Orgel and Crick's "alien spacecraft panspermia" prebiotic evolution hypothesis, which IS at least accepted as 'scientific' by evolutionists, as a possible additional example relative to your question.) FL FL

Russell · 5 July 2004

[quoting FJB]After all, there are artifacts that have been discovered for which we have no clue why they were made or who made them. But it would not follow from that ignorance that it would be illegitimate for any of us to say that they were designed. [/FJB] I think this would address your question, RBH

— FL, in his usual cryptic way,
To which I would add, "Your point being...?", and remind him that the very word artifact implies that we've already settled who made it, for the purposes of this discussion.

FL · 5 July 2004

RBH asked "Can anyone think of repeated and reliable design inferences that are made in the absence of knowledge of characteristics of the designer or what they're likely to do?" Beckwith's response included the part I quoted above.

Can one knock out Beckwith's response merely by turning to the dictionary, focusing on the word "artifact", and then arguing that given the dictionary defintion, we presumably know that the unknown designers alluded to by Beckwith were "human" anyway?

I do not think so.

Why? Because there also exist some general examples where the designer(s) cannot be automatically presumed to be human at all.

As I mentioned already, there's evolutionists Orgel and Crick's 1973 hypothesis about alien spacecraft panspermia. Their "design inference" is still on the table.

Another example, imo, would likely be the SETI program, where again we simply don't know the characteristics of the extraterrestrials sending the intelligently- crafted radio signals, nor assess what they are likely to do, yet we
humans spend millions of dollars on this program because we can scientifically distinguish and identify an intelligently-caused or designed radio signal, versus all the naturally occurring radio noises of the stars, planets, galaxies, etc.

We have no prior knowledge about the characteristics of the folks Way Out There, but we humans are confident, via science, that we can still make a reliable and repeatable design inference, at least enough to say "this particular radio signal could have come only from an intelligent cause, not mere undirected natural causes" if such occasion should arise.

So no, I don't think a Merriam-Webster online dictionary is sufficient to eliminate what Beckwith and Dembski have said here. Nor do I think that what Dembski said was "glop", to use RBH's term. I think they've got something to consider there.

FL

Russell · 5 July 2004

RBH asked for ...any examples of "repeated and reliable" design inferences absent knowledge about designers? (emphasis mine) Despite much lawyerly bloviating by FJB, we're still waiting. He didn't offer any examples, so there's not much of a response to "knock down". Orgel & Crick? No. They're speculating, exercising imagination, having fun. There are no "repeated & reliable design inferences" there. SETI? Once they find the first signal from extra-terrestrials, and then the second one from a second group of extra-terrestrials, we can call it "repeated". I'm not sure when it will qualify as "reliable". FL:

So no, I don't think a Merriam-Webster online dictionary is sufficient to eliminate what Beckwith and Dembski have said here. Nor do I think that what Dembski said was "glop", to use RBH's term. I think they've got something to consider there.

What have they said that's not eliminated? What are those examples of repeated and reliable design inferences that apply to anything other than "artifacts"? (In which case, as Merriam-Webster tried to tell you, we DO know something about the characteristics of the designers)

Clare Leonard · 5 July 2004

Can someone please tell me where I can access the Wake Forest Law Review article by Garry? The Wake Forest Law Review website has not yet posted the article. Thanks.

Joe McFaul · 6 July 2004

"Maybe I'm reading you wrong, but are you suggesting that courts apply a religious test to individuals as a means by which to dismiss their policy proposals? Should courts apply that test to legislators themselves, and thus limit their legislative powers based on a "religious test."? I apologize if I am not reading you right."

[Sorry, don't know how to do the cool quote block]

No, I didn't explain myself very well. What I was attempting to say is that in court, many (perhaps most) cases involve something which is represented as one thing by one side and another by the other side. A silly but typical example would be a lawsuit for repayment of a $100,000 loan to a company. The defendant claims that the "loan" is really an unenforceable gambling debt. Plaintiff has a promissory note for $100,000 signed by the defendant. Defendant points our that plaintiff's "business" is olive oil importing, but in fact no olive oil importing invoices can be found, in fact, most of plaintiff's business income appears to be the collection of notes. Oh, and the last name of the president of plaintiff business is "Corleone." No single piece of evidence is sufficient for the defendant but when you put them all together it leads to a reasonable conclusion that defendant will win in court and he better have his life insurance paid up. If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck it doesn't matter what you call it. Again, you have to ask, "if there's nothing behind this ID idea--no scientific studies, no peer review, no results--why is it being pushed?" I don't think that's a rhetorical question, and one possible answer is "the fundamentalist religious beliefs of the proponents."

So, when Philip Johnson makes the same arguments as famous creationist lawyers Wendell Bird and William Jennings Bryan, and Dembski and Behe make the same arguments as admitted creationists (Cambrian explosion, 2nd law of thermodynamics, etc.) and can't distinguish ID from Old Earth Creationism---they're quacking like creationists and I do think their religious affiliations and publications can be used to determine if they are really advocating a scientific theory, so that it's worth the effort to further investigate, or if they are fobbing off a sham which is simply repackaged creationism. Right now it's quacking real loud.

I don't care about legislators because their motives are always subject to public scrutiny, they are responsible to their electorate, and it's best to presume the worst. If they get too coy, there's a polling booth remedy.

Francis J. Beckwith · 6 July 2004

I do think their religious affiliations and publications can be used to determine if they are really advocating a scientific theory, so that it's worth the effort to further investigate, or if they are fobbing off a sham which is simply repackaged creationism. Right now it's quacking real loud.

If the ID arguments fail (all of them, just not the biology stuff), then guilt-by-association is unnecessary. But if the ID arguments succeed (or at least are reasonable), then guilt-by-association is irrelevant. In any case, guilt-by-association is an non-starter, because it happens to be a logical fallacy. Sure, it may win in court, I will grant you that. But why would anyone, especially an attorney interested in advancing the cause of justice, want to place that premise in our legal system as a legitimate ground by which to bar fellow citizens from shaping policy? It seems to me that a legal regime whose society is based on consent of the governed should not be in the business of marginalizing citizens because of their religious affiliations. I really hate guilt-by-association. It is a tactic that poisons dialogue, exarcebates prejudices, and gives license to our worst rhetorical impulses. It also sets a bad example for our young people. I hate when my friends do it. I shudder when my opponents do it, for I know it can be, and has been (as some of you know), used against me as a tactic to limit my civil rights to be a full participant in civil society. Now, it's back to vacation. Russell is right. Bye for now. Frank

Ed Darrell · 6 July 2004

Dr. Beckwith said:

Sure, it may win in court, I will grant you that. But why would anyone, especially an attorney interested in advancing the cause of justice, want to place that premise in our legal system as a legitimate ground by which to bar fellow citizens from shaping policy? It seems to me that a legal regime whose society is based on consent of the governed should not be in the business of marginalizing citizens because of their religious affiliations. I really hate guilt-by-association. It is a tactic that poisons dialogue, exarcebates prejudices, and gives license to our worst rhetorical impulses. It also sets a bad example for our young people.

It's not guilt by association, really. There are hard, concrete tests for expert witnesses in court. If no ID advocate can pass such a test to qualify as an expert in the field, how is that "guilt by assocation?" I am pained that whenever we mention standards, Dr. Beckwith claims we are religiously biased. His side is doing the moral equivalent of saying that the answers in algebra can never be concrete, so any answer should be accepted. That's just not the way it works in the real world. But of course, that's exactly the issue. If the real world worked the way the ID folk wish it did, they wouldn't need to resort to legal tools to bludgeon their way into the classroom. If ID had a real science component to it that could be studied by high school students in science classes, there would be no need for Dr. Beckwith to claim that, hypothetically, if ID did have science behind it, it could be taught as science. My problem with the legal polemics from ID sources is that they pose as actual legal analysis, but they pose that way on issues that will turn on the evidence. If ID had the evidence, an issue could turn in favor of ID. But ID doesn't have the evidence, it has never had the evidence, and there is no hope even among ID advocates that such evidence will ever turn up (I've asked to see the labs -- there are none). Could a philosopher of science qualify as an expert witness, Dr. Beckwith wonders? Not on these issues, no, not under the rulings in McLean and Aguillard. They don't have experience researching and publishing in intelligent design. Yes, if pigs had wings, they might fly. Yes, if wishes were horses, beggers would ride. Yes, if ID had evidence to back it up, it could be science. Pigs don't have wings, wishes are not horses, ID doesn't have evidence. Contrast the political shenanigans of the Discovery Institute and Dr. Beckwith's colleagues in assaulting state education standards, with the tactics of the advocates of cold fusion. Cold fusion has a hundred times the laboratory research backing it that ID does. Do we teach cold fusion in high schools? No. There is even more lab research that finds contrary results to cold fusion (yes, I'm aware Energy is looking again; that decision was made on the basis of lab evidence, and perhaps some political muscle; but there were lab results that pointed to cold fusion -- nothing like that exists for ID). ID advocates are asking for a free pass into the classroom. They demand equal time for a view that does not exist. Physicist Jeremy Bernstein wrote an article for The New Yorker if I recall correctly, in which he pondered how he would have reacted to Einstein's five universe-shaking papers had they landed on his desk. Bernstein wondered, what's the difference between true genius and crank science? His answer is that true genius generally -- rarely -- claims that all other scientists are dead wrong and part of some sort of cabal to keep the truth from coming out. And, true genius generally can explain why, if earlier theories are incorrect, they were so useful to science before. ID advocates often claim to be discriminated against unfairly by an unholy cabal (that is the point of Dr. Beckwith's book), and most of them outside of Michael Behe are happy to claim that evolution isn't even close to correct and has never proven useful. I'd like to see someone in ID read Bernstein's article, cite it, and explain why ID shouldn't be regarded as crank science. One of the great difficulties of the defense in the Arkansas creationism trial was finding expert witnesses on creationism. Most of those who qualified were professors of biology at small Bible colleges. They, under oath to tell the truth, admitted they had no science results to support creationism over evolution, and most admitted the basis of creationism was scripture, not science. That part of the case is generally ignored or downplayed in the "legal analysis" offered by ID advocates. Which is why I challenge them to produce expert witnesses. If they can't there's not even vapor there -- it's not even up to the levels of creationism. If they do have experts, we can put them under oath and get to the facts. Dr. Beckwith is in the thick of the ID movement, and he can name no one who would qualify as a real ID scientist. Why, then, does he think there is something there? Is he unaware of how a court case on such an issue would work? Witnesses would be called. If there are no witnesses for ID, there is no case. It would still be true that, if ID had evidence, it might qualify as science. But in the absence of such evidence, hard data, belief in ID is religiously made. "Evolution 2004" took place last week in Colorado. Once again none of Dr. Beckwith's colleagues were there to make their case for ID with the leading scientists in evolution. On the other hand, they did speak at several churches, and they produced articles for newspapers. It's not guilt by association with churches that disqualifies ID as science, though that is a solid indicator in cases such as last week. What disqualifies ID as science is the complete lack of science. There is not a laboratory on Earth doing ID-based research. Until there is one, and it produces real, usable results, any call for ID to be taught in public schools is a crass attempt to take away time for real science done by real scientists, and it's based on a belief in ID that can only be described fairly as religious, and not scientific.

Great White Wonder · 6 July 2004

FL says

Another example, imo, would likely be the SETI program, where again we simply don't know the characteristics of the extraterrestrials sending the intelligently- crafted radio signals, nor assess what they are likely to do, yet we humans spend millions of dollars on this program because we can scientifically distinguish and identify an intelligently-caused or designed radio signal, versus all the naturally occurring radio noises of the stars, planets, galaxies, etc.

I've heard this non-argument a few times now. First, for the record, all that SETI has shown us to date is that there no readily detectable intelligent designers "out there". Second, the "intelligence" that SETI is capable of detecting would appear to me much much much much more likely (although still incredibly dubious and not worth my dollar) than the sort of "intelligence" required to "design" each of the millions of species of living organisms on earth and their "irreducibly complex" biomolecular and physiological architectures. This latter sort of "intelligence" is indeed of the God-like or at least Star Trek (e.g., "Return to Tomorrow") level of intelligence. So all of this talk about how ID doesn't require "knowing" the "identity" or height (as Francis Beckwith suggested in a truly slapworthy comment) of the designer is bunk. When the capabilities required of ID's "designer" exceed the mental and physical capabilities of any single entity (or team of entities) within our understanding, we are back at square one: religion, gods, and supernatural creation.

Joe McFaul · 6 July 2004

Ed has good points. I hate to sound so practical, but in a trial, and in a debate, there are usually opposing "experts." As a lawyer, I can assure you I can ALWAYS find an expert on any subject to say what I want said. (Such experts are commonly called whores.) Not surprisingly, given that fact, experts at trials often reach opposite conclusions. These conclusions can't even be offered unless they are deemd essentially "over the heads" of the judge/jury. Otherewise there's no need for an expert opinion atall. Non-experts--judges, juries, the common public--have to determine of the conflicting experts to believe, when these experts have financial interests and biases just as other people do. If an expert is funded by a religous based organization and is part of a movement which has already suffered defeats in the courts and courts of public opinion, and has not actually engaged in research, university level teaching, publication in peer reviewed journals, is there any chance that he has simply repackaged old incorrect ideas and his opinions can be discounted?

What about an expert who makes his living simply holding himeslf out at as an expert, not actually doing research and field work?

What about an expert who works solely for a lobbying special interest group such as Discovery Institute that doesn't have an ongoing research arm? Should his opinion be taken over that of a scientist who has an ongoing teaching, publishing and research program with a nobel prize potential?

What about an expert who only makes his living as an expert witness?

Is there anything wrong with demonstrating that not only is an expert wrong once, but the reason for his errors is based in outside intersts to such an extent that there's no need to ever take him seriously again without a candid recantation of his earlier mistakes?

This is not guilt by association. It is a recognition of time economy. I, like most people, have limited resources to devote to any particular issue. If a certain person announces that he has a revolutionary breakthrough but the scietific establishment is against him, and I find out he is a member of the flat earth society and also believes in geocentriscism and alien abductions, I'm not going to sacrifice any more of my limited time resources to doubt his scientific accuracy. It's not guilt by association--he may be a very nice guy--just not someone I want involved in making major decisions in my kids' science curriculum.

Great White Wonder · 6 July 2004

Ed wrote

Which is why I challenge them to produce expert witnesses. If they can't there's not even vapor there --- it's not even up to the levels of creationism. If they do have experts, we can put them under oath and get to the facts. Dr. Beckwith is in the thick of the ID movement, and he can name no one who would qualify as a real ID scientist.

Francis, just fyi: I recall that Jerry Don Bauer agreed to testify as an expert. If I were defending ID in a court, Jerry Don Bauer is proabably about as good an expert as I could hope for (assuming he doesn't show up wearing those ridiculous headphones). He's unflappable. At worst, he's incomprehensible. Of course, he's incomprehensible at best, too. ;) Ed also wrote

Why, then, does he think there is something there? Is he unaware of how a court case on such an issue would work? Witnesses would be called. If there are no witnesses for ID, there is no case.

I've heard rumors that Francis is a lawyer but he might just be a Luskin-type lawyer: the kind that is prone to play dumb when it comes to defending certain religious beliefs (such as a belief that God designed all the earth's critters). Are transcripts of the depositions or cross-exams of the creationists in the Arkansas trial available online?

Francis J. Beckwith · 6 July 2004

Ed writes:

Could a philosopher of science qualify as an expert witness, Dr. Beckwith wonders?  Not on these issues, no, not under the rulings in McLean and Aguillard.  They don't have experience researching and publishing in intelligent design.

I'm glad you suggested McLean as the standard, for it was in that case that Judge Overton relied heavily on the testimony of Michael Ruse, a philosopher of science, who offered a definition of science that the Court accepted almost entirely. See here: http://mclean_project.home.att.net/pf_trans/mva_tt_p_ruse.html And see here: http://mclean_project.home.att.net/ I talk about Judge Overton's definition of science and his reliance on Ruse in both my book as well as my article in the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, which specifically deals with McLean v. Arkansas. One may obtain a free copy of my article in http://francisbeckwith.com To answer the GWW, I am not a lawyer. I am a philosopher (Ph.D., Fordham) with a graduate degree in law (Master of Juridical Studies) from Washington University School of Law in St. Louis, for which I wrote a dissertation that became the book Law, Darwinism, and Public Education. You can find a more complete bio on my website. Take care, Frank

Joe McFaul · 7 July 2004

With respect to Michael Behe's qualifications as an "expert" in a court, he would undoubtedly qualify. Same with Francis Beckwith. However, that does not end the discussion. Here's the Federal rule of Evidence relating to experts:

Rule 702 Testimony by Experts

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.

There's a 2 step analysis: (1) Is the person a qualified expert? and (2) Does he have anything useful to say? Almost everybody who posts here, and all of the contributors, would qualify as experts based on academic credentials. It's not uncommon in the courtroom to have experts on opposite sides saying different things. That leads to the second step. A court can still reject the testimony of an expert when the testimony is outside the expert's area of expertise, or that expert has made unfounded conclusions, failed to account for obvious alternative explanations and whether the field of expertise has developed any reliable results.

The Daubert decision made the federal court judges the "gatekeepers" with the purpose of keeping all forms of junk science out of the courtroom. It's the job of good lawyers to remind the federal judges of their gatekeeping function and to marshal the evidence to establish what is and is not junk science. In my opinion, ID can't meet the initial condition of being helpful to a factfinder, and can't meet step 2--there's nothing "useful" to say.

In short, I don't think you'll ever see Philip Johnson as an expert on any scientific matter at all. There have been times (as noted above) when philosophers have been called as experts, and I've even testified as an expert in specialized areas of law.
It would be hard to imagine that you could attempt to offer ID expert opinions unless you had at a minimum, a highly qualified biologist. I think that excludes Dembski as well.

Ed Darrell · 7 July 2004

Joe McFaul said he thinks ID experts can be found. He said, "As a lawyer, I can assure you I can ALWAYS find an expert on any subject to say what I want said."

Please, name the expert, and the state under whose rules you think the person could qualify.

My point is that, even in a business where "experts" are known as "whores" because they bring so little real science to the table, there is no one who does research with ID, and therefore no experts. I would imagine the qualifying examination like this:

Lawyer: "You claim to be an expert in intelligent design. Tell us how many papers you have published laying out the theory of intelligent design"

Witness: "Why, I've never published one."

L: "Then tell us about your research using intelligent design as a model -- where do you do this work? What is your current research looking into?"

W: "Well, my current research is in trying to make vacuum cleaners suck harder. I don't do research in intelligent design."

L: "And yet, you claim to be the best qualified expert in intelligent design on Earth?"

W: "Yes, a review in the Harvard Law Journal said so. I can't count how many times I've been nominated for the Nobel Prize."

Please, name the expert.

It's not guilt by association with religious folk that disqualifies ID folk as experts. It's guilt by failing to associate with science, and by failing to let any tendency towards honest dealings with data rub off from the church folk.

Great White Wonder wonders: Are transcripts of the depositions or cross-exams of the creationists in the Arkansas trial available online?

Try the McLean trial site at TalkOrigins: http://www.antievolution.org/projects/mclean/new_site/index.htm

Dr. Beckwith said, I'm glad you suggested McLean as the standard, for it was in that case that Judge Overton relied heavily on the testimony of Michael Ruse, a philosopher of science, who offered a definition of science that the Court accepted almost entirely.

Overton mentioned Ruse in the opinion, once, yes. But the ruling is not hinged on Ruse's opinions. Judge Overton found that creationism meets no standard of science. I cannot see how intelligent design can be distinguished from creationism, with the possible exception that ID might allow that the designer be aliens (the Little Green Men argument). For years creationists have complained that the problem with Darwin's work is that it doesn't mention God enough, that it is essentially Godless. Are we supposed to get excited over Godless creationism, too?

Overton noted several ways in which creationism simply did not do science. Methodological naturalism or no, creationism still fails those tests -- and so does "intelligent design."

Ed Darrell · 7 July 2004

Behe an expert in intelligent design? Odd -- my searches for the papers he's done about intelligent design turn up nothing. Do you have a citation for a peer-review publication in which Behe advances anything either that supports intelligent design, or which questions the Darwinian synthesis?

What is Dr. Behe's current ID research project? When will it be published?

Reed A. Cartwright · 7 July 2004

"Intelligent design" proponents like to claim that their movement is based in science. Religious connections go to disprove certain arguments towards that, as I will demonstrate.

The statement: "Intelligent design is supported by highly qualified scientists and scholars."

The implication: "If highly qualified scientists and scholars are behind it, then it must be scientific. Why shouldn't this alternate scientific view be taught too?"

The reality: These "scientists and scholars" support ID/creationism/anti-evolution, not for any scientific merit that it contains, but because it says something that they agree with on the level of their faith and/or politics. Although they might be sincere in their faith, that is not enough to justify consideration for science class. The accuracy of science cannot be determined by emotion, ignorance, politics, or religion.

The religious conection explains why ID has the support it does with it has produced absolutely nothing scientific. It also explains why they haven't even attempted to do science with ID, despite the fact that a few of them know how to do science. The connection undercuts the argument from authority that tricks people who don't know any better.

The point of this is that, the above statement-implication combo is the number one tactic of ID activists trying to gather popular support. It is the entire reason the DI has their 100/300 lists and constantly claim that more and more are joining them every day. In fact, Meyer and Cambell (?) pulled it earlier this year in the AJC. So clearly this is a very applicible criticism and response.

It doesn't matter how many scientists and scholars support something, unless they actually support it for scientific reasons. This is not guilt by association; it is explaination of association.

Joe McFaul · 7 July 2004

Ed might have missed my point.

Can I get an expert on ID? Yes, Jed Macosko, a Ph.D from Berkeley with other advanced degrees. He quaifies by training education and experience. So does Behe. However, just becaue you're an expert doesn't mean you get to testify. Also, do I believe that both are prejudiced, subject to attack for bias and would ultimately be discounted. Yes, but that wasn't the question.

Can they testify that ID is accepted scietific theory?

That's the step 2 dicussed above and I would argue that the answer is, "no."

Ed Darrell · 7 July 2004

My apologies to Mr. McFaul -- yes, I missed the point. When I said "expert" I meant someone who could qualify to testify about it.

I'm still puzzled. Jed Macosko has training in I.D.? There is not a class offered in I.D. at any American university or college, nor any foreign institution I've found -- no seminar, no graduate or undergraduate class. There is no lab doing research in I.D. Where did he get training and experience? There will be an interesting tale.

Francis J. Beckwith · 7 July 2004

Ed writes:

Overton mentioned Ruse in the opinion, once, yes.  But the ruling is not hinged on Ruse's opinions.  Judge Overton found that creationism meets no standard of science.

That's misleading. In fact, I can't think of one commentator on the McLean case, from either side, who does not say that Ruse's testimony on the nature of science was accepted by the Court. There is a good reason for this. Here's Ruse's testimony (the germane portions are in bold):

Ruse: ...[if] I was going to extract one essential characteristic, is that it be predominantly brought in the law. In other words, what one's trying to do in science is explained by law, whereby "law" one means unguided, natural regularities. Q: When you say "law", you mean natural law? Ruse: I mean natural law. I mean Boyle's Law, Mendel's Law, Cook's Law. Q: Doctor, is there any one single definition of science? Ruse: I wouldn't say there is one single definition of science, but I think the philosophers today would generally agree on that point. Q: Are there other attributes of science that philosophers today would generally agree are important in defining what is a science and what is not? Ruse: Well, you say philosophers. Let's broaden it. I hope we can include historians. And I'd like to think that scientist agree with what we say. Yes. I think what one's got to do now is start teasing out some of the attributes of science, starting with the notion of law. Particularly, science is going to be explanatory. Another thing there, another very important aspect of science is it's going to be testable against the empirical world. Another characteristic, and perhaps we can stop with these, is that it's going to be tentative. It's going to be, in some sense, not necessarily the final word.... Q: .... In connection with the attributes of science and this issue of testability, does the concept of falsifiability mean anything to you? Ruse: Yes. The concept of falsifiability is something which has been talked about a great deal by scientists and others recently. It's an idea which has been made very popular by the Austrian-English philosophist, Karl Popper. Basically, the idea of falsifiability is that there must be, as it were, if something is a genuine scientific theory, then there must, at least, conceivably be some evidence which could count against it.... Q Doctor Ruse, in addition to those four characteristics, natural law, explanation, testability and tentativeness, are there other characteristics of science, methodological characteristics of science which serves to distinguish science from non-scientific endeavors?

Now, here's Judge Overton's definition:

More precisely, the essential characteristics of science are: (1) It is guided by natural law; (2) It has to be explanatory by reference to nature law; (3) It is testable against the empirical world; (4) Its conclusions are tentative, i.e. are not necessarily the final word; and (5) Its is falsifiable.

The only difference--if you can say there really is one--between Overton's criteria and Ruse's is that Ruse seems to see falsifiability as a species of testability. So, Ruse, a philosopher of science, was an expert witness in a case involving science and his testimony was employed as a standard by which to hold that a statute was unconstitutional. Ruse's understanding was the finding of the Court. It doesn't get any clearer than that. Frank

Great White Wonder · 7 July 2004

I guess the issue, Frank, is whether there is something unusual or controversial about the "characteristics" of science suggested by Ruse. I don't think there is. Therefore, it is accurate to say that the case did not hinge on Ruse's testimony any more than it hinged on the definition of "public school" which the judge relied on. You could come up with a similar list of characteristics of science, I imagine, by consulting any number of reputable resources where the characteristics of science are discussed (e.g., an encyclopedia, a dictionary, etc.).

Francis J. Beckwith · 7 July 2004

Dear GWW:

I'm pretty familiar with this case--McLean v. Arkansas--and the books and articles it spawned. I can't think of one of them that discusses Ruse's testimony that does not say that it was employed almost wholesale by Overton in his opinion.

Ruse's definition of science was, and is, controversial, as Larry Laudan argued soon after the case. Laudan, a Darwinist, was quite critical of Ruse, as was Notre Dame's Phil Quinn, a Christian Darwinist who opposes Creationism. A nice resource in this regard is Ruse's edited volume, But Is It Science? (Prometheus, 1988), which includes an abridged version of the McLean opinion as well as articles by Ruse, Laudan, and Quinn.

It seems to Ruse has had second thoughts about his testimony. See, for example, the article by Thomas Woodward: http://www.leaderu.com/real/ri9404/ruse.html. See also the talk of Ruse's from which Woodward cites: http://www.leaderu.com/orgs/arn/orpages/or151/mr93tran.htm.

Ed Darrell · 8 July 2004

Dr. Beckwith's answer is maddening. How is anything I said misleading? I noted only that the evidence in the McLean case carried the day, and that Ruse's testimony was hardly the hinge of the case. Important? There were others who testified on just what science was, as well. Nowhere does Judge Overton say he relied on Ruse alone, and Great White Wonder is absolutely correct in saying the definition is hardly unique. Controversial? No. There have been nits picked with Ruse's definition even by Ruse, but most of it is not controversial in the slightest. Science is what is done on the lab bench (or observed in the field), that which can be tested, has been tested and is known, to paraphrase Feynman. And that's the problem. Ruse offered only a test by which a rational person might determine whether a discipline that claims to be science might be measured as science. Dr. Beckwith ignores the substance of my observation, that creationism in no way met any of the tests. If we accept Ruse's later refining of his definition, creationism still can't meet any of the tests. And if we put the test to "intelligent design," it doesn't meet the tests, either. Dr. Beckwith goes to great lengths to question the details of the witnesses' testimony, and the philosophical underpinnings of everything they say and whether Western Civilization might hang in the balance of all they say is true; but he does not focus on the substance of the issue, the evidence. At deposition, and at trial, creationists testified that they had no science to back creationism. Whether Ruse's definition of what science is hits the mark exactly is completely beside the point -- creationism, and ID, can't even come within range of the target. Ruse's having second thoughts cannot change those facts. Ruse's second thoughts still leave modern creationism and intelligent design in the category of crank science. (Creationism, we must recall, was the science model extant circa 1809, the year of Darwin's birth; technically, we should call creationism dead science, or disproven hypothesis; continued efforts to make creationism walk like a zombie are crank science, however, in my opinion.) Creationists got skunked at trial. Even their expert witnesses offered testimony that helped disassemble their case. Judge Overton wrote:

The Court is at a loss to understand why Dr. [Chandra] Wickramasinghe was called in behalf of the defendants. Perhaps it was because he was generally critical of the theory of evolution and the scientific community, a tactic consistent with the strategy of the defense. Unfortunately for the defense, he demonstrated that the simplistic approach of the two model analysis of the origins of life is false. Furthermore, he corroborated the plaintiffs' witnesses by concluding that "no rational scientist" would believe the earth's geology could be explained by reference to a worldwide flood or that the earth was less than one million years old. The proof in support of creation science consisted almost entirely of efforts to discredit the theory of evolution through a rehash of data and theories which have been before the scientific community for decades. The arguments asserted by the creationists are not based upon new scientific evidence or laboratory data which has been ignored by the scientific community.

I have been particularly struck by one sign of crank science that Judge Overton notes in the decision. Creationists had complained that bias keeps them out of science journals. The creationist side was given the opportunity to present any science papers backing creationism which had been submitted to peer-review journals and rejected. No such material could be found:

Without using creationist literature, Ms. Wilson was unable to locate one genuinely scientific article or work which supported Section 4(a). In order to comply with the mandate of the Board she used such materials as an article from Readers Digest about "atomic clocks" which inferentially suggested that the earth was less than 4 1/2 billion years old. She was unable to locate any substantive teaching material for some parts of Section 4 such as the worldwide flood. The curriculum guide which she prepared cannot be taught and has no education value as science. The defendants did not produce any text or writing in response to this evidence which they claimed was usable in the public school classroom.

The participants in the ID protests (I'm not sure it's a movement) have the same myopia that creationists had in the Arkansas case. They keep claiming there is a philosophical difference and that is all -- when there is in reality a minimum bar of science up to which creationism and intelligent design cannot measure. Judge Overton ruled that creationism was religion, not because he was entranced by Michael Ruse, but because of the overwhelming evidence from letters, testimony, statements in the Arkansas legislature, and news accounts of proponents saying they were advancing the measure to further their religious beliefs. Whether Ruse is right or not is almost immaterial to the case in the light of the actual evidence. I want to know how to cure cancer. I have a personal stake in the issue: My father, mother and oldest brother all died with various cancers. Evolution science, applied, has offered a few cures, a lot of treatments, and promises more. Dr. Beckwith argues that the pursuit of a cancer cure should be questioned by high school texts as either religiously or philosophically flawed. Well, if this be religious error, make the most it. Give us evolution theory, or most assuredly we will have death. Judge Overton's decision in McLean v. Arkansas could be viewed as a road map on how to get creationism, intelligent design, or any other science that presupposes an intelligent intervenor, into the classroom. But the case offers a choice of two routes, one honorable and do-able if there is merit to the claim that creationism/ID should be considered science; the other dishonorable, but required if there is no merit to the case for science in creationism/ID. The first path is to go into a lab, do some research which either calls into question one or more of the pillars of evolution by natural and sexual selection or which establishes intelligent design/creationism as a preferred or alternative model, and publish that research. Such publication would, without the operation of any law, insert the science of creation into textbooks automatically in the next edition as publishers scramble to present the most up-to-date editions. The second path is to claim that our definitions of science are all in error, that science is all in error, and conduct a public relations campaign to hammer at the reputations of science and scientists in the hope that doubt may be sown with the public and with policy makers. Which path do ID advocates take? It is a moral failing of the ID movement that in any given year they spend roughly a million times on press releases and the equivalent of photo ops what they spend on hard research. Consider, Einstein's revolution of physics was proposed in 1905 in a series of papers that proposed several experiments or observations, and by 1919 was partly confirmed by observations made during an eclipse of the sun. 14 years from proposal to confirmation. A true science revolution can occur in less than a generation, if the data are there (or, as we Christians might put it, if God's creation supports the case). I noted earlier that creationism is disproven science; "Intelligent Design" has been around since at least 1991, and there has been organized work to advance it since a meeting of most of the ID principals at SMU in that year. In 13 years, ID has failed to put forth a single testable hypothesis, has produced not a single paper in a recognized juried journal of biology, and has failed to persuade a single scientist to dedicate a laboratory to ID research -- even a laboratory operated by an ID principal. Since William Paley, what other science ideas have survived so long without even a hypothesis? The contrast is sharp, and is consistent with intelligent design's being lumped in with other crank science. Ruse's philosophy, even if wrong, still leaves intelligent design as crank science. If we stacked every philosopher in the world in favor of intelligent design (with Leiter protesting all the way, of course), that still leaves not a shred of research data to support it. Intelligent design is the scientific and moral equivalent Oakland that Gertrude Stein warned us about: "There is no there there." It may be, as Dr. Beckwith argues, that if one could hoodwink a court into ruling, ID could be given time in a public school science classroom, under the Constitution. I hope the legal profession never falls that far. But even if such a legal argument could be made, it would be morally repugnant to teach that ID is what it has not shown itself to be: Science. Similarly, it is morally repugnant to question the science foundations of evolution, when the science is so clear and so useful in so many ways.

Bob Maurus · 8 July 2004

Excellent post, Ed. My compliments and thanks - it's definitely a keeper.

Francis J. Beckwith · 8 July 2004

Ed Darrell surely must recall his claim that only scientists could be expert witnesses in a court case involving whether a public school teacher may engage in the Socratic transgression of offering non-sectarian and thoughtful questions about the evolutionary paradigm. Here's what he said:

Could a philosopher of science qualify as an expert witness, Dr. Beckwith wonders? Not on these issues, no, not under the rulings in McLean and Aguillard. They don't have experience researching and publishing in intelligent design.

I pointed out that in fact Michael Ruse, a philosopher, was instrumental in shaping the McLean Court's definition of science, as everyone who has ever written seriously on this case, including Ruse, knows to be true. Ed replied:

Judge Overton ruled that creationism was religion, not because he was entranced by Michael Ruse, but because of the overwhelming evidence from letters, testimony, statements in the Arkansas legislature, and news accounts of proponents saying they were advancing the measure to further their religious beliefs. Whether Ruse is right or not is almost immaterial to the case in the light of the actual evidence.

Ed is partly right and partly wrong. There were, of course, several reasons that went into Overton's holding. But one of those reasons, Ruse's testimony, was a necessary condition. For the Court had to show that creationism was "not science," combined with the religious motivations of the statute's supporters, along with the text of the statute, in order to show the statute's religious purpose. If, for example, the Court was not convinced that creationism was not science, the statute would have a secular purpose as well as a religious purpose, which, as some of you know, is not fatal under the Lemon test. This is all documented in great detail in both my Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy article (which is on my website) as well as in chapter 2 of my book. Please read it and call me in the morning. ;-) Ed writes:

Controversial? No. There have been nits picked with Ruse's definition even by Ruse, but most of it is not controversial in the slightest. Science is what is done on the lab bench (or observed in the field), that which can be tested, has been tested and is known, to paraphrase Feynman.

Ed is simply wrong here. For Laudan and Quinn as well as scores of other philosophers of science, most of whom are not sympathetic to ID let alone creationism, Ruse's problems were not nit picks. You could drive a truck through them. Take for example, his claim--and Overton's claim--that scientific explanations are lawful. What do we do then with historical sciences, such as archaeology or anthropology in which non-lawful accounts of phenomena are common and have explanatory power? Even "testability" has its difficulties. Suppose one believes, correctly, in some form cosmic uniformitarianism--that the laws of nature are the same everywhere. This is a background belief of science. How would you test it? Suppose an anomaly occurs, something contrary to what is predicated based on scientific theory X that seems to violate some fundamental law of nature? Has uniformitarianism (U) been tested and failed, or does the scientist ad hoc it by postulating theoretical entity Y (or law Z) because U is a fruitful heuristic in scientific research and not worth abandoning? I suspect you would accept the latter, as would I. But in what sense can we really test U? It is scientific, but it really is not testable on any lab bench. In fact, the entire notion that science must be testable presupposes U as one of the background beliefs that makes testing possible, for it relies on notions about the nature of the universe, the rationality of the minds of the scientists who conduct the research, and the adequacy of our conceptual notions fitting the universe, all of which are not "falsifiable" or explicable in terms of any natural law. And yet, we could not do science without them. Interestingly enough, Del Ratzsch's book, that Ed frequently cites, brings these sorts of problems up. Ratzsch, though critical of Dembski, offers an extended argument for why design cannot be a priori prohibited in science as either a heuristic concept or the basis by which one may infer agency from natural phenomena. I agree with Ratzsch that there is much work to do in this area (especially in the area of biology). I document some of the problems with Ruse-Overton definition in the article and book mentioned above. As far as Ed's grievances with ID and its academic stature, that's not my fight. I've documented some of it in my book in its introduction, and I stand by what I've written. A PLEA FOR CIVILITY I don't mind having civil discussions, and even heated ones, but Ed has told two falsehoods about my work and me and has implied another. I will not tolerate falsehoods about me. I have restrained myself in calling Ed on it. But after the last bit of poison, my silence may be interpreted as acquiescence. So, here it goes. (1)One:

f Dr. Beckwith feels no moral twinge at advocating, before serious policy arms of governmental entities, that ID might be teachable (albeit with the qualifications he lists above), should he not also tell the whole truth about astrology and coffee colonics?

I have spoken before one government body in my entire life and it was last July in Texas. I was invited by a member of the Texas State Education Board to address it on the matter of my book and law review articles. I was honored to be asked by a member of a government body to testify on my area of expertise. I consider it my civic duty do so. The reason why I turned down an invitation to return the following September was because I did not believe that my work really touched on the issues debated in the textbook hearings. So, I declined. Thus, I have not testified before serious policy arms of government entities. I testified before one for 3 minutes one day in July, 2003. The impression Ed gives is that I go around the country as part of some dog and pony show. As far as coffee colonics, my only comment is this: with friends like that who needs enemas. (1)Two:

Discovery Institute pays no homage, monetary or titular, to advocates of coffee colonics. Is there a connection? No churches pin their hopes on cold fusion or any of the others.

Yes, that's it. I was bribed by Discovery to speak before the Board of Education. (heavy sarcasm). Actually, I paid for the whole trip out of my own pocket: gas, parking meter, and the crappy cafeteria food in the Austin Federal Building. I received no financial remuneration for what I did. I have been a gentleman during my discussions on this site. I don't think I deserve to be treated in this manner. I have never challenged Ed's integrity, and yet he implies that I would defend virtually anything given enough money. Sorry Ed, but I am a thoughtful person and only defend what I believe I am justified in believing. If you read my book, you will recall that I am pretty hard on my fellow Christians when I go over some of the post-Edwards cases. I criticize Ed Gaffney's assessment of Frieler in First Things, for example. (1)Three:

I want to know how to cure cancer. I have a personal stake in the issue: My father, mother and oldest brother all died with various cancers. Evolution science, applied, has offered a few cures, a lot of treatments, and promises more. Dr. Beckwith argues that the pursuit of a cancer cure should be questioned by high school texts as either religiously or philosophically flawed.

I suppose if I were untutored in the fine art of reasoning I could say in reply to Ed that materialism, applied (dialectically or morally), has offered us the Iron Curtain, Gulags, eugenics and the gangster-statesmen of the 20th century. The "Boys from Brazil," after all, was not about Menudo. However, that would be a caricature of Ed's position and an unfair guilt-by-association tactic. That's why I do not use it, unless it is a needed reductio ad absurdum to show my opponent, by analogy, the perversity of his reasoning (as I believe I showed above). Of course, if Ed had read my book, he would know, as he no doubt does know, that "evolution" is a slippery term, one that includes the adaptations and "natural selection" scientists rely on in their search for cancer cures and life-extending therapies. But evolution also may mean common descent or cosmic evolution (i.e., the grand materialist story, as it is sometimes called). In any event, it is as false to say that "Dr. Beckwith argues that the pursuit of a cancer cure should be questioned by high school texts as either religiously or philosophically flawed" as it is to say that "Ed Darrell exploits the suffering and deaths of his deceased parents and sibling in order to score a rhetorical point on an internet weblog." I would no sooner diminish in the eyes of high school students the value and promise of cancer research dependent on the veracity of a particular understanding of evolution as Ed would diminish the love for his family in order to make a point in a contentious debate over constitutional interpretation. This is a line that should not have been crossed on this weblog, and I regret that Ed did so. I will not bring it up again. But I had to defend myself. I apologize if I offended anyone with my pointed comments, but they had to be said. Warmly, Frank

Andrew · 9 July 2004

I find the question of whether a philosopher could be qualified as an expert witness more than a bit tangential (and perhaps intentionally so). The real question is whether such a witness would be able to offer intelligent design theory as expert testimony under the Supreme Court's (fairly lenient) standard as set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

Does anyone dispute that ID would be inadmissible under Daubert? Dr. Beckwith? Anyone?

Joe McFaul · 9 July 2004

I think ID's indadmissible under Daubert, for some of the reason I posted above. Although the standards are considered a relaxation over earlier interpretations of the Evidence Code Section 702, the Code itself and the gatekeeper language in Daubert along with later Supreme Cases supports excluding evidence on any form of "junk science" (I am not using that term as shorthand not as a full philosophical discussion of the nature of ID).

I believe Dr. Beckwith would disagree with me, however.

Andrew · 9 July 2004

I doubt he would, actually, since Dr. Beckwith appears to be reluctant to miscast actual judicial precedent. As far as I can tell, there are zero cases that would support even the most aggressive argument that ID would fall under Daubert. I'm not saying that someone who introduced an ID expert would necessarily be subject to Rule 11 sanctions; however, I would hate to defend a lawyer in a malpractice suit who hinged his client's case on the admissibility of ID testimony.

Andrew · 9 July 2004

I doubt he would, actually, since Dr. Beckwith appears to be reluctant to miscast actual judicial precedent. As far as I can tell, there are zero cases that would support even the most aggressive argument that ID would fall under Daubert. I'm not saying that someone who introduced an ID expert would necessarily be subject to Rule 11 sanctions; however, I would hate to defend a lawyer in a malpractice suit who hinged his client's case on the admissibility of ID testimony.

Great White Wonder · 9 July 2004

one of those reasons, Ruse's testimony, was a necessary condition

I think we all agree that *someone's* testimony about what constitutes science was probably needed for the judge to make his decision (or, alternatively, he might have relied on a dictionary or encyclopedia definition offered by the parties). But it doesn't seem likely that Ruse himself or his particular characterization of science played an irreplaceable role in the trial. I can not believe that a legally binding opinion is ever going to emerge which engages in the kind of gaseous metaphysical analysis of science that would lead to a conclusion which you favor, Frank (i.e., a definition of science that would include quackery like ID). I also find that when otherwise seemingly intelligent and overly educated individuals such as you or Casey Luskin or some of the other colorful characters on the ID apologist side of the aisle continue to believe -- in the face of so much clearly articulated evidence to the contrary -- that ID creationism is "science," then eventually it's difficult to avoid the conclusion that your motivations are, well, "sinister" and have nothing to do with science. I think that I (and possible Ed and others) find themselves in this state of shock from time to time, which explains the exasperated tone of some of our posts.

Francis J. Beckwith · 9 July 2004

I've never claimed that ID is "science" or "non-science," although I can certainly see why Great White Wonder would think that I would be affirming the former. For so much of these discussions are rooted in deep assumptions about what counts as knowledge. So, for example, if I say X is science, that carries with it epistemological gravitis. I, frankly, don't care whether something is "science" or not. What I care about is whether the arguments for it work. That's all that should really matter. If I have an argument for theory Z, and my premises are reasonable and the premises provide good support for the conclusion (assuming it is an inductive argument), the fact that my conclusion may be a defeater to a materialist construal of the world is so much the worse for materialism. If someone wants to say, "But that's not science," they are saying that something can be good science but not justified. I don't think anyone wants to say that.

All I've argued is that attempts to demarcate science from non-science with a bright-line have failed, and are unlikely to succeed in the future. I agree that if the ID arguments fail on their merits--regardless of whether their proponents are Presbyterians, Catholics, or Zulus--then they fail and ought to be treated as such. But if they succeed--regardless of whether their proponents are Prebsyterians, Catholics, or Zulus--and their success is contrary to our understanding of what counts as science, then we have to adjust our understanding of what counts as science.

For me, it's just a matter of arguments. Metaphysical and epistemological litmus tests, or attempts to unearth hidden motives or engage in religious-affiliation blacklisting wastes an enormous amount of time and needlessly offends people who would be willing to listen if these card weren't played like a condom machine at the Playboy Mansion. (Talk about your "Trojan" horses! Hee hee!)

Frank

Andrew · 9 July 2004

I would like an answer: is ID admissible under Daubert?

Reed A. Cartwright · 9 July 2004

For me, it's just a matter of arguments. Metaphysical and epistemological litmus tests, or attempts to unearth hidden motives or engage in religious-affiliation blacklisting wastes an enormous amount of time and needlessly offends people who would be willing to listen if these card weren't played like a condom machine at the Playboy Mansion. (Talk about your "Trojan" horses! Hee hee!)

— Beckwith
Frank, do you agree that the DI/ID utilize the argument from authority via the statement-implication combo I described above? Do you agree that pointing out that people support DI/ID from religious reasons and not scientific reasons undercuts this popular argument?

Joe McFaul · 9 July 2004

I think Francis Beckwith and Ed Darrell making be missing each other's points. I think Ed is correct that a philosopher of science cannot testify as an expert on whether or not a particular point of science is accurate. That includes ID. However, if the expert is testifying on how science in general operates and what is "science," a philosopher could testify and that's what Michael Ruse did. I think Ed Darrell is making the point that Michael Ruse didn't say anything extraordinary so Judge Overton didn't rely on Ruse per se, Ruse was just expressing and summarizing vast literature which says the same thing. Francis Beckwith, I think, holds a different opinion, detailed in his book, that demarcation issues are more difficult than Ruse stated at the trial and this might have affected the outcome. Ed Darrell doesn't think it would have affected the outcome ( I agree with that) In summarizing the respective positions I hope I didn't simplify so that they are inaccurate, if so, I apologize.

Ed does not believe that ID is an intellectually dishonest movement and this perhaps carries over to anyone who seems to support the issue in any way. I read the recent Touchstone (a conservative Christian Magazine) articles on ID by Philip Johnson, William Dembski, Jonathan Witt, et al (the usual suspects), and I can sympathize with Ed. In those articles Darwinism was explicitly linked with the Nazi extermination, complete with photos of crematoria (p. 32). Darwinism was blamed for the holocaust as well as all other 20th century evils including communism, eugenics and the collapse of morals in western civilization. Ed's reaction to ID is not surprising because that is standard argumentative fare, especially before sympathetic audiences, and it does threaten good science, including the cure for cancer. I don' think he's questioning Mr Beackwith with falsehoods regardign the Discovery Institiute's position on coffee colonics, but he is asking a valid question: Why doe ID provoke Discovery Istitute's interest when there's so much junk science out there?

Meanwhile, I'm intrigued by Francis Beckwith's position because he apparently concedes that there is a lack of empirical scientific support for ID at this time to the extent that ID should not be taught in schools. Now, I don't know why philosophers should be in any special position to determine the scope of science or any other discipline. Who make philosophers kings? (OK, Plato did, but what did he know?) But seriously, why aren't scientists themselves in the best position to determine the scope and define their own field of study? Certainly as a lawyer, I expect to have a say in distinguishing "law" from "pseudolaw."

Especially interesting is Laudan's position. As Mr. Beckwith notes, Laudan rejects the Ruse demarcation model, but also rejects ID because it's empirically false. If so, what's the realdifference between Ruse and Laudan. Is it any more significant than an argument between gradualism and punctuated evolution which are just alternate means to the overall truth of evolution? And if you accept Laudan or anything other than Ruse' model, how do you distinguish between quantum mechanics and, e.g., astrology, coffee colonics, ufo's or geocentrism? The demarcation issue may be significant for philosophers in the far margins but, on an everyday situation, it doesn't seem to be difficult to distinguish between science and non-science. I don't need the expertise of a philosopher of science for this the same way I don't need an ER surgeon when I get a paper cut. I personally don't see why it would require advanced philosophy to determine why it's difficult to determine the status of ID in particular, but I'm open to persuasion.

Great White Wonder · 9 July 2004

Francis

All I've argued is that attempts to demarcate science from non-science with a bright-line have failed, and are unlikely to succeed in the future."

In what sense have they "failed"? Success or failure depends on the goal of the demarcation effort. If the goal of the demarcation is to keep quackery, superstition, and religious beliefs from being presented as anything but quackery, superstition or religious beliefs in courtrooms or classrooms, then it seems to me that the attempts to demarcate science from non-science have succeeded. No offense, but at the risk of repeating myself, the metaphysical wheezing of a few "philosophers" is never going to blur the line between science and non-science sufficiently to allow ID to be taught as "science." This is not to say that the line, however vague, hasn't been or won't continue to be ignored by certain officials in certain forums. I maintain that, absent some pre-existing bias (e.g., a belief that "materialist" or "naturalistic" philosophies threaten the social fabric of humanity), no reasonable person with knowledge of the facts about ID can conclude that ID is "science," unless "science" is defined to include any conjecture about anything.

Joe McFaul · 9 July 2004

I would like an answer: is ID admissible under Daubert?

Lawyer's stock answer: "It depends." my serious answer: "I hope not but it could be a close call."

Ed Darrell · 9 July 2004

No, ID is not admissible under Daubert. As I've noted earlier, there is no school an ID advocate could attend to become an expert. There is no laboratory where one might work to gain experience to be an ID expert. There is no body of publications which lay out a science that others may follow.

Perhaps more important, I don't think there is a single issue upon which any ID advocate claims to provide insight, beyond the notion of whether a greater or supernatural intelligence had a role in creating or diversifying life on Earth.

An ID DNA expert, for example, seems a contradiction in terms.

I should have a longer answer to Dr. Beckwith's post later.

Great White Wonder · 9 July 2004

If I have an argument for theory Z, and my premises are reasonable and the premises provide good support for the conclusion (assuming it is an inductive argument), the fact that my conclusion may be a defeater to a materialist construal of the world is so much the worse for materialism.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't one of the premises of ID that an "intelligence" existed which could have "designed" every one of the billions of life forms which ever existed on earth and the molecular mechanisms they use to grow and reproduce? What is "reasonable" about this premise, Mr. Beckwith? How does this premise differ from a premise which assumes that a powerful being might have created all the fossils and stuck them into the ground so that scientists might find them later?

Russell · 9 July 2004

GWW: isn't one of the premises of ID that an "intelligence" existed which could have "designed" every one of the billions of life forms which ever existed on earth and the molecular mechanisms they use to grow and reproduce? What is "reasonable" about this premise...?

It is with huge trepidation that I wade into these waters, but isn't this one of those "what the definition of is is" things?

If "reasonable" means "rational, logical, feasible" or something like that, the answer would be "no". But if most Americans believe in God, and assigning all kinds of magical powers to God is more common among believers than not, and if "reasonable" is taken to mean something like "not extraordinary", perhaps the court would have to agree with Francis.

A slight digression, but not, I think, completely irrelevant: Here in Ohio, after much heated debate, the courts decided that the state motto "with God, all things are possible", was constitutional. (Despite the fact that the motto is taken directly from the Christian bible). So if in Ohio, if a court wrestles with GWW's question, it either has to broadcast the fact that the state motto is meaningless (which, of course, it is, but I don't think they like to advertise the fact) or agree with Francis.

So, what IS the operative definition of "reasonable"?

Francis J. Beckwith · 11 July 2004

Great White Wonder writes:

Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't one of the premises of ID that an "intelligence" existed which could have "designed" every one of the billions of life forms which ever existed on earth and the molecular mechanisms they use to grow and reproduce? What is "reasonable" about this premise, Mr. Beckwith? How does this premise differ from a premise which assumes that a powerful being might have created all the fossils and stuck them into the ground so that scientists might find them later?

You can call me "Frank." "Mr. Beckwith" is my Dad. :-) To answer your query, ID per se does not have premises, but the arguments offered by its proponents do. As far as the premise you are suggesting as a part of an ID argument, I have not come across it. (But I would not be surprised if there is one like that). Some of the ID arguments--especially the fine-tuning ones or the ones that are more causal than design-related, e.g., the kalam cosmological argument--offer an omnipotent agent as a conclusion rather than a premise. Given that these arguments are inductively strong or deductively valid, their soundness ultimately depends on the veracity of the premises. If the premises fail, the arguments are unsound. But they are not unsound because the conclusion conflicts with a particular understanding of ontology, naturalism. They are unsound because their premises are either implausible or false. What I was saying in the portion of my comments that GWW quoted was a conditional statement about the nature of arguments qua arguments. I was not referring to any particular argument per se. I agree with GWW that the acceptance of ID as a plausible account of natural phenomena should not turn on how one some clever philosopher defines science in order to sneak ID in under the tent, so to speak. ID should be rejected (or accepted) because it fails (or succeeds), whether or not it fits someone's definition of "science." This was Laudan's point in his critique of Ruse (on creationism), one that I echo in my analysis of McLean in both my book and in my Harvard L&PP piece. So, Ed is correct that Ruse's bottom line is the same as Laudan's: this stuff should not be taught (referring to the Creationism in the Arkansas statute). But their reasons are different. Ruse wanted to say it isn't science; Laudan wants to say its the result of bad reasoning. Laudan's approach has the virtue of not hinging on applying a metaphysical litmus test and needlessly marginalizing citizens by declaring their religious beliefs as a priori not knowledge (since science is thought to be the paradigm of knowledge in our culture). I think Joe's right about Daubert: it depends. As Joe knows, trying to predict these things is as difficult as predicting when Michael Moore will miss a meal. I think this is going to be my last post for a while. I have a book manuscript I need to complete: a massive revision of my 1993 monograph on the abortion controversy, which will be published sometime early next year by Eerdmans under a new title. I have just one more chapter to complete, but I have been putting it off for too many weeks and would like to have the whole thing done by August 1. Take care, Frank

Pim van Meurs · 11 July 2004

Frank hit the nail on the head when he said

If the premises fail, the arguments are unsound. But they are not unsound because the conclusion conflicts with a particular understanding of ontology, naturalism. They are unsound because their premises are either implausible or false.

As I and many others have shown that the foundations of ID (in other words, its premises) are false. It's not that science rejects ID because of its 'conclusions' but because of its faulty premises.

Pim van Meurs · 11 July 2004

Frank hit the nail on the head when he said

If the premises fail, the arguments are unsound. But they are not unsound because the conclusion conflicts with a particular understanding of ontology, naturalism. They are unsound because their premises are either implausible or false.

As I and many others have shown that the foundations of ID (in other words, its premises) are false. It's not that science rejects ID because of its 'conclusions' but because of its faulty premises.

Francis J. Beckwith · 11 July 2004

Okay, just one more before I go (I'm pulling a "Roger Clemens"). Joe McFaul writes:

I'm intrigued by Francis Beckwith's position because he apparently concedes that there is a lack of empirical scientific support for ID at this time to the extent that ID should not be taught in schools

As a point of clarification, I did not say that ID lacked empirical scientific support; I said that the case for ID in biology had not produced enough peer-reviewed published work to warrant inclusion in science textbooks. Frank

Dave S · 11 July 2004

As a point of clarification, I did not say that ID lacked empirical scientific support; I said that the case for ID in biology had not produced enough peer-reviewed published work to warrant inclusion in science textbooks.

— Frank
So in youre view, does ID have empirical support in some other science besides biology, where they have produced enough peer-reviewed published work to warrant inclusion in that science's textbooks?

Russell · 11 July 2004

FJB: As a point of clarification, I did not say that ID lacked empirical scientific support; I said that the case for ID in biology had not produced enough peer-reviewed published work to warrant inclusion in science textbooks.

I wouldn't want to distract Francis from his important anti-choice mission, but he does raise an interesting point I'd never thought about.

Is there a component of "ID" that is independent of biology? It always seemed to me that ID was another in a long series of anthropocentric (mis)perceptions of the natural world. The inherently biological ontogeny of anthropoi has to be key to a worldview that is essentially anthropocentric, no?

Dembski's "calculations" - at least that I'm aware of - all purport to deal with biological processes. Behe's musings certainly are all in the realm of biology. Though he's never contributed an original idea to the discussion, Jonathan Wells would certainly be considered one of the Icons of ID, and his agitprop is all in the realm of biology.

Is there any "intelligent design theory" to consider that is not inherently biological?

Great White Wonder · 18 August 2004

Fyi --

More bad legal analysis on the way!

http://www.cnn.com/2004/EDUCATION/08/18/falwell.law.school.ap/index.html

ROANOKE, Virginia (AP) -- The Rev. Jerry Falwell will open a law school this month in hopes of training a generation of attorneys who will fight for conservative causes.

"We want to infiltrate the culture with men and women of God who are skilled in the legal profession," Falwell said in a telephone interview Tuesday with The Associated Press. "We'll be as far to the right as Harvard is to the left."

[snip]

Classroom lectures and discussions will fuse the teachings of the Bible with the U.S. Constitution, stressing the connections between faith, law and morality, said law school Dean Bruce Green, who has experience in civil liberties litigation.