The heckler's veto over evolution

Posted 17 February 2005 by

↗ The current version of this post is on the live site: https://pandasthumb.org/archives/2005/02/the-hecklers-ve.html

The Texas Tech Law Review recently published an article about evolution disclaimers, which contains some interesting arguments about the creationism/evolution controversy generally. Chad Edgington, Disclaiming Darwin Without Claiming Creation: The Constitutionality of Textbook Disclaimers And Their Mutually Beneficial Effect on Both Sides of the Origins Debate, 5 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 135 (2004). Edgington (whose article was published before the Cobb County decision) argues "not only...that disclaimers which call for a critical approach to evolution are constitutional, but that a liberal policy allowing for their placement in textbooks is the most satisfactory solution to controversy surrounding the teachings of origins." Id. at 138.

Edgington notes (rightly) that "[t]he actual motivation behind the equal-time' laws and the disclaimer provisions is the concern that the exclusive placement of evolution in the science classroom provides de facto religious instruction because students are taught that science has proven that their religious beliefs are fraudulent." Id. at 154. This, of course, is only one motivation: the other is the belief on the part of many people that their religion ought to actually be promulgated in public school classrooms, and that the separation of church and state impairs this proselytizing. But Edgington is right that the reason many people complain about evolution education is because they believe that it is a kind of "religion" which is receiving preferable treatment over their own religions. "[B]y exclusively teaching evolution as fact and giving no credibility to the creation model in the classroom, school boards and teachers are inadvertently endorsing a belief system that is wholly incompatible with one of the central tenants [sic] of many religions, namely, that the universe is a special creation of a supreme being." Id. at 154-55.

There are three problems, however, with this argument. First, evolution, being science, differs from religion in that it is a testable, confirmable theory, which can be compared with observed results. The "creation model"--that is, a miracle story--is usually stated in an untestable way, and when it has been stated in a testable way (e.g., that the world was created in 4004 B.C.) such "models" have failed the tests. Second, evolution is taught as fact because it is a fact. It is as factual as any fact can be: it is a truth claim consistent with other testable truth claims. Teaching it as fact is therefore a legitimate enterprise. Creation, on the other hand, posits a supernatural entity which is allegedly "above" being tested for truthfulness. Third--and less abstract--the mere fact that a school teaches something that is "incompatible with" a religion does not mean that that thing may not be taught in the classroom. The government is certainly forbidden from teaching children that God does not exist; but it is not forbidden from teaching children that the earth orbits the sun, or that Israel exists, or that black people are not genetically inferior to white people. These facts may indeed be "incompatible" with the views of certain religious groups, but that does not mean the state may not teach them.

Any contrary rule would mean that religious people would have a heckler's veto over the classroom, or as I've put it earlier, a "get out of evolution free" card. Any time a fact challenged their preconceived religious notions, such people would be able not to silence the teacher and say "that is out of bounds, because we do not want to hear it."

An analogous argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). There, the petitioners were denied employment benefits because they had been fired for smoking peyote, which is illegal. They argued that their religion required them to smoke peyote, so punishing them for doing so violated their right to the free exercise of religion. The Supreme Court rejected their argument because it "mak[ing] an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is compelling'--permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, to become a law unto himself,'--contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense." Id. at 885 (citation omitted). Just as Smith could not use his religious "disagreement" with the peyote law to block the state from prosecuting him, so parents should not be able to use their religious disagreement with the fact of evolution to block the state from teaching it.

Ironically, Edgington follows his statement up with this sentence: "Because such teaching seeks to prove a theory that is incompatible' with the religious beliefs of many students, it would seem to violate the prohibition issued by the Supreme Court that state action may not oppose religion." And this he follows with a footnote that cites Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968). But here's what the Epperson Court actually said:

[The Establishment Clause] forbids alike the preference of a religious doctrine or the prohibition of theory which is deemed antagonistic to a particular dogma.... The State's undoubted right to prescribe the curriculum for its public schools does not carry with it the right to prohibit, on pain of criminal penalty, the teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine where that prohibition is based upon reasons that violate the First Amendment.

Id. (emphasis added). Epperson said that religious objectors may not silence teachers from teaching facts that people believe contradict their religious views--it did not say that the state may not take any action that "oppose[s] religion," whatever that might mean.

Edgington next provides a rather inflammatory "case study" to demonstrate what he's talking about: "Rape as an Adaptation in Men." Id. at 155. Edgington argues that evolution leads to the principle that morality is based on reproductive fitness: citing Randy Thornhill and Craig T. Palmer, A Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion (2000), Edgington argues that

evolutionary adaptations in humans evolve to help individuals overcome obstacles to individual reproductive success.... [Thornhill and Palmer]'s premise is that if males do not have the traits that are preferred by those granting the permission to mate, they are forced to rely on coercive measures.... [Therefore, a]ccording to the authors, the tendency of some males to rape women is an evolutionary adaptation that arose through random selection and has survived because it enhances male reproductive success by increasing the number of women with which a male can mate.

Id. at 155-56.

What this proves, Edgington argues, is that "[i]f people subscribe to the theory of evolution, they must be consistent with their reasoning concerning all living things and the behavior of all living things.... Thus, if evolutionists [sic] are logically consistent with their beginning assumptions, the end result is morally devastating because the theory of evolution and its implications are a package deal." Id. at 157. If you teach evolution, then "materialism" follows, and in its train, rape, robbery and ruin.

There are several problems with this. For one thing, it appears to commit the nudist fallacy. The mere fact that biology causes a phenomenon does not mean that that phenomenon is right or wrong. This fact is elementary for folks in the biological sciences, who deal with all sorts of biologically caused bad things, such as mental disorders which cause people to murder or rape others. For another, if morality is a product of evolutionary processes--which it is, in some way at least--then there must also be an evolutionary explanation for the notion that rape is wrong, also. Such explanations are, I'm sure, being proposed by evolutionary psychologists as we speak. I am not familiar enough with the controversy that Thornhill and Palmer's book sparked to comment more intelligently on the subject of rape specifically (although the fact that it was controversial is a crucial matter which Edgington ignores completely). But the mere fact that moral beliefs are evolutionary in origin does not denigrate from their rightness or truthfulness, as Daniel Dennett explains in his excellent example of the Boeing engineer.* Also, there are non-theistic explanations for the origins of individual rights and the wrongness of rape, which are perfectly consistent with evolution. And then, of course, many people believe that it is entirely possible to believe in biological evolution as well as theistic explanations for the personality, and of the individual rights that attach to the personality.

The point is, Edgington's argument that evolution = materialism = the destruction of morality is as baseless as when it was first proposed by William Jennings Bryan. It is not that evolution and "its implications" are a "package deal." It is that Edgington has performed a remarkable--though by no means rare--feat of intellectual gymnastics that combines such logical fallacies as the false dilemma, the straw man, and the undistributed middle.

But, of course, it is true that such fallacious thinking is very common among evolution's opponents.

Edgington concludes this argument by saying that "[b]y eliminating the possibility of a thoughtful planner who created the universe, or at least put the elements into motion, the theory of evolution has implications that are detrimental to theistic beliefs, even though it is not a religion or an anti-religion according to the courts." Id. at 157. Well, that may be true, but note the weasel word "implications." What Edgington's passive voice is meant to avoid is the fact that all facts can have "implications" to any number of people, based on their misunderstandings, their corrupt motives, or what have you. The mere fact that evolution can "have implications" (to whom?) which are "detrimental" (to what degree?) to "theistic beliefs" (why do these beliefs alone count in the consideration of this issue?) does not prove that teaching evolution is the same as propagating a religious viewpoint. One might easily construct any number of hypotheses along the same line to show the weakness of this "implications" argument: the fact that good, innocent people suffer from awful catastrophes is a fact that "has implications" that are "detrimental to theistic beliefs": many people turn away from religion because they think a just God would not allow the innocent to suffer. Ought we then to avoid telling students about the Christmas tsunami? Again, it is not a violation of the Constitution for a public school to teach children things that they find difficult to reconcile with their religious predispositions.

It may indeed be true that, as Edgington says, "[t]hese anti-religious implications cause parents and educators, who are trying to instill religious and moral values in their children, to find the theory of evolution repulsive." Id. at158. But a subjective feeling of discomfort is not enough to violate the Constitution. Again, if that were the case, people who are racists for religious reasons could cancel the teaching of Martin Luther King; anti-Semites could control the teaching of issues surrounding the Middle East--education would have to be tailored to suit the feelings of the most sensitive religious person.

Incidentally, Edgington senses a major flaw in his argument, and tries to avoid it when he says that "just because a critical approach to evolution may have religious implications, it is no more a religion or a violation of the Establishment Clause than is instruction on the theory of evolution, despite its religious implications." Id. at 159. But throughout his article, Edgington has argued that teaching evolution is an inappropriate form of indoctrination because it challenges folks' religious prejudices, and this makes them uncomfortable. If that is the case, neutrality would also require the government to avoid hurting the feelings of people who have non-religious prejudices. Since, in Edgington's argument, a way of thinking (i.e., science) is a way of "provid[ing] de facto religious instruction," id. at 154, it would seem that encouraging "critical thinking" would itself also be a form of "de facto religious instruction." It would, after all, offense people whose religions teach people not to think critically!

Edington's article is one of the best-written I've encountered on the subject, despite my disagreement with it. He is certainly correct in pinpointing the reason so many people find evolution education troublesome. But it's unfortunate that he does not also pinpoint their errors.

*--"[A] parody will expose the fallacy: The people at Boeing are under the ludicrous misapprehension that they have figured out the design of their planes on sound scientific and engineering principles...when in fact memetics shows us that all these design elements are simply the memes that have survived and spread among the social groups to which those airplane manufacturers belong.'" Freedom Evolves 187 (2003).

88 Comments

Reed A. Cartwright · 17 February 2005

According to Chad Edginton's website, he has been a "Alliance Defense Fund Blackstone Fellowship Intern, Christian Legal Society" and "Science and History Teacher [at] Park Avenue Christian School."

RBH · 17 February 2005

"Science and History Teacher [at] Park Avenue Christian School." Gack!

RBH

Randall · 17 February 2005

Well, since the Bible is both a science textbook and a history textbook, why not have one person teach both? ;-)

Lurker · 18 February 2005

So, is this another example of a Law review not being edited or reviewed before being published?

DaveScot · 18 February 2005

First, evolution, being science, differs from religion in that it is a testable, confirmable theory

— Sandefuer
What test has confirmed that the gradual accumulation of random mutations conserved by natural selection has resulted in novel new body forms? Even more to the point, what test has confirmed that inanimate chemicals self-organized into a living cell? I haven't read of such a test yet but I remain on the lookout. Maybe you can help where others have failed. Good luck with that.

RPM · 18 February 2005

"By eliminating the possibility of a thoughtful planner who created the universe, or at least put the elements into motion, the theory of evolution has implications that are detrimental to theistic beliefs, even though it is not a religion or an anti-religion according to the courts."

It's been said before, but I'll repeat it once again: Evolution says nothing about a) the origin of the universe, b) setting objects in motion, or c) the origin of life. Just thought I'd repeat that for those that haven't been listening.

Ed Darrell · 18 February 2005

In response to Mr. Sandefur:

First, evolution, being science, differs from religion in that it is a testable, confirmable theory

DaveScot said:

What test has confirmed that the gradual accumulation of random mutations conserved by natural selection has resulted in novel new body forms? Even more to the point, what test has confirmed that inanimate chemicals self-organized into a living cell? I haven't read of such a test yet but I remain on the lookout. Maybe you can help where others have failed. Good luck with that.

To the first question, we could look at the Silversword alliance in Hawaii, or the remarkable diversity of mustards, which in the past 2,000 years have expanded to include not only the standard mustards, but also radishes, broccoli, Brussells sprouts, and canola. To the objection I anticipate that these are plants, we should perhaps point out that there is not really much novel in the animal kingdom once we get to the reptiles. Variations on digits and addition of vertebra give us the range from snakes through elephants, and hummingbirds through ostriches. All with minor variations. The only way such an argument gets credibility is when the gullibility of the reader stops the reader from investigating what has already been observed in plants and animals. Self-organizing chemicals? Yes, all chemicals self-organize, and so far we have confirmed that each step required for chemicals to self-organize into living things is possible, replicable in experiments. No one has succeeded in getting a eukaryote cell yet. But then, evolution isn't about the origins of life. Darwin's observations work whether life was "breathed into" a few forms on the Earth, as Darwin wrote, or whether it arose without any outside pixie dust. So that claim is wholly irrelevant to the discussion. It's interesting to see that creationists cling to such irrelevancies, however, even when the overwhelming evidence is that their objections are overcome. If you want the information, Dave, check out Astrobiology Journal. It's online, and free.

Uber · 18 February 2005

Good comment RPM, I was going to post the same but these fellas are actually becoming boring in their ignorance.

I think the time has come to adjust our stance on this ID thing, it's patently false. We need to ask them to prove their case and explain the evidence that we have accumulated.

This defending evolution against the ignorant hordes is simply boring. The only reason to do it at all is that it goes by another name as well----EDUCATION.

Mostly I feel sad that youthful indoctrination can make people so blind they cannot see the evolutionary concept is so sound.

Fraser · 18 February 2005

Personally I find the Unemployment vs. Smith decision a dreadful one. The principle of the First Amendment is that yes, the government should have a compelling interest before it starts restricting religious belief and yes, people with sincere religious beliefs do have a right to seek exemption (conscientious objectors, children wearing turbans or hajjibs to school, Orthodox Jews holding sabbath services in their homes [which has been challenged as violating zoning laws in a couple of instances]). And the government never had trouble using the compelling interest rationale when it wanted to.

It's particularly amusing this decision had the support of Rehnquist and Scalia who then turn and whine about how government oppresses religion.

As to the central issue in your post, very well reasoned, no other arguments.

Reed A. Cartwright · 18 February 2005

So, is this another example of a Law review not being edited or reviewed before being published?

— Lurker
Actually that is the standard for law articles.

Sven · 18 February 2005

To the first question, we could look at the Silversword alliance in Hawaii, or the remarkable diversity of mustards, which in the past 2,000 years have expanded to include not only the standard mustards, but also radishes, broccoli, Brussells sprouts, and canola.

So what was the test that demonstrated that this diversity was the result of the accumulation of random mutations culled by natural selection?

Timothy Sandefur · 18 February 2005

I've deleted a comment just now, because it wasn't substantive. Don't make me a babysitter, please. It's not clever, it's just a waste of everybody's time and computer memory.

Ed Darrell · 18 February 2005

Turns out that the whole group of plants is related, Sven -- from the "trees" to the "grasses." All of them silverswords. Did you look to see? http://www.botany.hawaii.edu/faculty/carr/silversword.htm

caerbannog · 18 February 2005

DaveScot said:

What test has confirmed that the gradual accumulation of random mutations conserved by natural selection has resulted in novel new body forms?

Hey Dave -- what "novel new body forms" do humans have that other primates don't?

Aggie Nostic · 18 February 2005

The advocates of these labels apparently believe that the scientific community has not been sufficiently objective/critical towards evolution over the years. It does cause one to wonder how evolutionary science has made any progress at all since Darwin.

Frank Schmidt · 18 February 2005

Genie Scott and Glenn Branch point out three themes that are present in all creationist propaganda:

Evolution isn't real science, Evolution is anti-religious, It's only fair to teach both sides.

These memes are recycled continuously on this and other pages from the adherents of IDC (Intelligent Design Creationism), YEC (Young Earth Creationism), IGC (I'm a Genius Creationism) or CNC (Certified Nutcase Creationism). It's a Malthusian evolutionary strategy: replicate willy-nilly, and, even if they aren't very well-adapted, some offspring will survive. For most of these - -C'ers, the bottom line is #2. If their faith were more mature, they wouldn't have such a problem. How would Augustine have written

Get a grip

Latin or Greek? Come on scholars! Help me out here!

Timothy Sandefur · 18 February 2005

Would that be εχε δη? I was never good at Greek.

Reed A. Cartwright · 18 February 2005

How would Augustine have written "Get a grip?"

— Frank Schmidt
With a stylus. Thank you, I'm here all morning!

frank schmidt · 18 February 2005

That's really sticking it to me. Ouch.

Jeff Chamberlain · 18 February 2005

Re comment #16833. When I was on law review (30+ years ago, it pains me to say), articles were edited and reviewed, by the editorial board and/or professors and/or practitioners. (Lousy stuff may have gotten published occasionally, but we could share the blame.)

Reed A. Cartwright · 18 February 2005

Well my wife is on a law review right now and the only review that is done is on format and references. (This is at a top tier public law school.) From what I can tell the only thing the editors do to review the submissions for quality is to pick enough papers out of the submissions to fill an edition of the journal.

The concept of critical review by experts in the field appears to be foreign in law reviews. IIRC, some famous/infamous legal scholar called it recently massive self publication.

Timothy Sandefur · 18 February 2005

There are some law reviews that are subject to peer review, but not very many. Most of them are edited entirely by students, whose editorial changes are usually only to check citations, make sure quotes are accurate, and so forth. Some student editors are more conscientious--I'm working on an article for New York University Journal of Law And Liberty, and they've been really careful to make me prove what I argue. And a lot of it depends on the school; the more prestigious the school, the better quality the students, the better the law review will tend to be. But most law reviews are practically the same as self-publication, and even the Harvard Law Review ran a notorious pro-ID article recently.

Empiricist · 19 February 2005

The title of Sandefur's essay, "The heckler's veto over evolution", is curiously misleading. He is commenting on a law review article that attempts to justify the inclusion of "disclaimers which call for a critical approach to evolution" in textbooks. These disclaimers do not "veto" or "censor" the textbook. Instead these textual messages are an additional form of speech prepended to the textbook. There is a fascinating irony here since the individuals who now wish to prevent disclaimer statements are really calling for censorship. They want to "veto" the disclaimers. Consider the following paragraph from Sandefur:

Any contrary rule would mean that religious people would have a heckler's veto over the classroom, or as I've put it earlier, a "get out of evolution free" card. Any time a fact challenged their preconceived religious notions, such people would be able not to silence the teacher and say "that is out of bounds, because we do not want to hear it."

This is a humorous misrepresentation because it reverses the situation Sandefur is discussing. The censors are the people who want to ban the disclaimers. Sandefur is arguing for censorship in the essay above. He is the one who wants to silence the textbook. He is on the side of the people who "do not want to here it." All this self-satisfied dogmatism reminds me of the "The Central Dogma of Biology": DNA is transcribed to RNA and that is translated to protein. That is the direction of the flow of information. The happy dogmatist would say circa 1960s that this is not just a theory this is a fact! He would warn you never to let any small-minded know-nothing rabid fundamentalist tell you otherwise. Also, he would oppose any wimpy disclaimer stickers on textbooks saying one should "study carefully and critically consider material". But wait. "The Central Dogma of Biology" was incorrect. Reverse transcriptase was discovered and it can translate RNA into DNA! Well, perhaps a disclaimer can be useful sometimes. Sandefur states grandiloquently:

"First, evolution, being science, differs from religion in that it is a testable, confirmable theory, which can be compared with observed results."

OK. This also means that evolution is disconfirmable, i.e., future evidence might show that it is false. So why oppose a disclaimer? If one says that evolution is a "fact" but it might be shown to be false in the future then one is straining the notion of facticity.

DaveScot · 19 February 2005

Ed Darrell,

The mustards have not mutated into novel new forms of life any more than any breed of dog is a novel new form. There is merely a change of scale in both cases. Existing structures changed size. Observations of what mutation + selection (even unnatural selection) is capable of producing are bounded and that is a simple fact. A simple fact which is denied in The Church of Darwin where bounded observations are extrapolated to unbounded power and the extrapolation is portrayed as a fact instead of an extrapolation.

Not a single experiment has shown that chemicals can self-organize into the structures found in living organisms used in support of self-replication. Even the much touted Urey-Miller experiment in the 1950's, which is still the state-of-the-art so to speak, which only managed to produce a few simple amino acids, has been shown to have not accurately simulated the conditions of the ancient earth. If you want to know more try googling "RNA world" which is the latest faddish failure in this regard.

DaveScot · 19 February 2005

Hey Dave --- what "novel new body forms" do humans have that other primates don't?

— caerbannog
Gene sequencing machines. Space shuttles. Blogs. Just to name a few.

DaveScot · 19 February 2005

Empiricist

Very well said. Kudos.

DaveScot · 19 February 2005

It does cause one to wonder how evolutionary science has made any progress at all since Darwin.

— Aggie Nostic
What progress would that be? I'll cede that evolutionary science falsified Darwin's Lamarckian belief that acquired characters are heritable. What else? You got more entries in the tree of life but no less controversy over how correct the placements. You can't even agree on a definition for the word "species" fercrisakes. At least when I went to school it was defined as ability to interbreed and produce fertile offspring. Now that's dashed. That isn't progress. If you mention any bit of biochemistry, medicine, or the like I'm going to raise an objection in that those have no dependencies on Darwinian theory of descent with modification. No part of any of those gives a fig about whether birds came from dinosaurs or not. Chemistry and medicine work the same regardless of whether one believes God created everything for a purpose, it all happened by accident, or some combination thereof.

Timothy Sandefur · 19 February 2005

Empiricist claims that it's misleading to refer to a "heckler's veto" over evolution because the article I discuss is only "attempt[ing] to justify the inclusion of 'disclaimers which call for a critical approach to evolution' in textbooks." But as is obvious from my post, the interesting part of the article is the author's explanation of why people oppose evolution education generally. One primary reason---and one that Mr. Edgington seems to adopt himself---is the belief that being taught facts that conflict with a person's religious beliefs is somehow a violation of that person's constitutional rights. This flows from an "accomodationist" view of the First Amendment---that is, the view that Smith was wrongly decided, and that a person's religious beliefs ought to be allowed to trump secular policies. If a person's religious beliefs are offended by the teaching of evolution, then that person's rights are being violated. This is analogous to the peyote-users in Smith, who argued that their religious beliefs were offended by laws against drug use, so that their rights were being violated. The reason the Court rejected this argument in Smith is that it would create a sort of heckler's veto over the anti-drug laws. And that is why the term is appropriate to the argument Mr. Edgington seems to endorse. Empiricist, however, thinks about things backward all the way down the line. He says, for instance, that "[t]he censors are the people who want to ban the disclaimers. Sandefur is arguing for censorship in the essay above. He is the one who wants to silence the textbook. He is on the side of the people who 'do not want to here sic it.'" Well, that is just silly. It is not censorship when the government simply chooses not to speak. Those who do not believe in evolution are perfectly free to say so, and to say that they disagree with a biology textbook, and students are every bit as free to say this on a school campus as anywhere else. The First Amendment protects that right. But it does not protect the "right" of government schools to say religious things. While one might say that the government is "censored" from endorsing a religious view, such "censorship" is done on command of the First Amendment, which says that the government may not establish religion. If that's censorship, fine. Those hostile to science love to throw around the word "dogma." It's the last refuge of those who have no substantive argument to make against science. Of course, Empiricist himself shows how baseless this charge is when he says "'The Central Dogma of Biology' was incorrect. Reverse transcriptase was discovered . . . ." So, in other words, it was not dogmatic. People are permitted to question every scientific theory, even the most well established, and to prove it's wrong if they can. After well over a century, nobody has done so with regard to evolution. There is a point at which the dissenters stop being noble, and start being crackpots. That point was passed long ago with regard to evolution. And as far as a scientific dogma, as Jacob Bronowski put it,

There is today almost no scientific theory which was held when, say, the Industrial Revolution began about 1760. Most often, today's theories flatly contradict those of 1760. Many contradict those of 1900. In cosmology, in quantum mechanics, in genetics, in the social sciences, who now holds the beliefs that seemed firm sixty years ago . . . ? The society of scientists is simple because it has a directing purpose: to explore the truth.

J. Bronowski, Science And Human Values 67-68 (rev. ed. 1965). If creationists could provide any evidence of creation, or if there really were any evidence "disproving" evolution, it would be received with skepticism, but ultimately it would carry the day. Such evidence is not forthcoming. And just as there is a point at which a dissenter can be safely called a crackpot, there is a point at which a fact---though never 100 percent certain---can be called an established fact. Evolution has reached that point. Calling scientists dogmatic for believing in it is an abuse of the term and a confession of irrelevancy. (Since Panda's Thumb offers the scientific evidence supporting evolution on a daily and sometimes an hourly basis, I have not attempted to restate it all here. Readers are invited to, well, read each of our posts, if they want more science.) Fraser, on the other hand, agrees with my post but argues in favor of the "accomodationist" view of the First Amendment---i.e., that Smith was wrongly decided and that "people with sincere religious beliefs do have a right to seek exemption" from generally applicable, religiously neutral laws. This is a complicated and interesting debate, and I'll just say a few words about it. First, I think Walter Berns' article James Madison on Religion And Politics, in John Samples, ed., James Madison And The Future of Limited Government 135 (2002), presents the best short argument for accomodationism I've encountered. At some point, Berns argues, accomodationism makes sense---and he gives the example that Madison, who would have agreed with the Smith decision, nevertheless wrote a bill to allow Quakers exemption from military service for religious reasons. For the non-lawyers, here's the basic conundrum. The government passes a law: say, a law against drug use. Then along comes a person who says "my religious beliefs require that I use drugs." Do you exempt him from the anti-drug laws? Under Smith, the answer is no, under "accomodationism," the answer is yes. The problem with accomodationism is that it means government's policies must be tailored to suit the religious sensibilities of each individual person in the community. Each person can say "hey, my religion says such-and-such, therefore I don't have to obey your law" (or your law has to be written in the most narrow way possible). As the Smith Court held, this would make governing practically impossible, and as you can see, I agree with Smith. The problem with Smith, however, comes in cases involving conscientious objectors, or hat laws---the government bans hats in a certain building: then what about Hindus or Jews, who wear hats for religious reasons? Are they forbidden from entering that building? As Berns points out, "[ i]t is difficult, and among a democratic people, probably impossible, for the government to avoid taking cognizance of religion . . . by granting exemptions from the requirement to obey the law." Id. at 139. Traditionally, Americans have granted some exemptions: the SAT test, for example, is offered on different days for those who observe the Sabbath on Saturday. But does that tradition rise to the level of a constitutional requirement? While I am partial to some exemptions myself, I think not---particularly since those exemptions can so easily be perverted into an establishment of religion. Most importantly, I don't see how believers in accomodationism can get around the central problem of the heckler's veto. If government must jump through all sorts of special hoops any time a person can claim that his religion is offended by that particular law, then how can the government ever do anything?* Keep in mind that government is not allowed to inquire into the truth of any religion. It can ask whether a person sincerely believes in that religion, but that is all. In the jail cases that have arisen under RLUIPA, we have seen a microcosm of a reign of accomodationism and it isn't pretty. RLUIPA is a federal law which imposes accomodationism in prisons: if a prisoner objects, for religious reasons, to a policy of a prison, the prison officials are required to prove that the policy is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling incarceration interest. The result has been a flood of cases in which prisoners claim a religious right to eat steak and potatoes and whatnot, and the courts have been required to take evidence as to the sincerity of these beliefs. It's all been quite aggravating. But has it been productive? And can we run the rest of the world that way? Most importantly, does the Free Exercise Clause require it? I don't think so. The only solution, I think, is Smith as a constitutional principle, and maybe a little accomodationism by statute in some rare cases, so long as it doesn't violate the Establishment Clause. Finally, I disagree with RPM that evolution "says nothing about...the origin of life." I understand that many scientists would agree with this, but as a follower of the Richard Dawkins/Daniel Dennett school myself, I believe evolution can at least suggest the origin of life from replicating, non-living matter. But that is a debate for another day long in the future. *-I should add that, as a libertarian, I would like to see all government's acts required to pass strict scrutiny. I'm not very sympathetic to the "well, if we did that, government couldn't do anything" argument, because I'd prefer to see government do less. But such a thing is at least on the distant horizon, and in our current state of affairs, I think accomodationism would just introduce chaos into an already too complicated system.

mynym · 19 February 2005

"It's been said before, but I'll repeat it once again:

Evolution says nothing about a) the origin of the universe, b) setting objects in motion, or c) the origin of life.

Just thought I'd repeat that for those that haven't been listening."

Actually, many people have been listening and reading editorials written by evolutionists, etc. It seems that only where there are free forums where the evolutionist will actually have to back up some of their vast mythological narratives of naturalism will they begin to limit the scope of "evolution" as you try to.

E.g.,
"Evolution is the framework that makes sense of the whole natural world from the formation of atoms, galaxies, stars and planets, to the AIDS virus, giant redwood trees and our own health and well-being.
....
Dorothy was lucky because the Wizard of Oz was wise. The wizards of the Kansas State Board of Education look foolish in comparison."
--Dr. Maxine Singer
President of the Carnegie Institution of Washington
(Washington Post, August 18, 1999)

More? There is more. It is as if there is a public definition and a private definition of the buzzword "evolution." And there seems to be specious and disingenuous rhetoric among evolutionist relying on the intellectual dishonesty of shifting the definition of "evolution" this way and that, all around.

Everyone who disagrees with evolution is "foolish" or "ignorant" for not knowing the definition of evolution, yet the evolutionists do not seem to know what they are talking about.

mynym · 19 February 2005

"One primary reason---and one that Mr. Edgington seems to adopt himself---is the belief that being taught facts that conflict with a person's religious beliefs is somehow a violation of that person's constitutional rights."

This would all be moot if parents could spend their own tax money to educate their children as they saw fit. I.e., you would not find yourself discussing the vagaries of Judiciary, those who Jefferson called "....the subtle corps of sappers and miners...", etc. But some of the same educators who maintain the textbook orthodoxy are those who reject school vouchers, etc. They want to continue indoctrinating children, by force of the State through judicial diktat if necessary, with Naturalism. That is the foundation of socialism, after all. They do not seem to believe in freedom of Conscience. For after all, they do not agree with the Founders in believing that consciousness itself is free of the physical. So they cannot seem to grasp the difference between education and their indoctrination.

The Founders, on the advent of modern socialism in the French Revolution:
"And what was their Phylosophy? Atheism; pure unadulterated Atheism . . . . The Univere was Matter only and eternal; Spirit was a Word Without a meaning; Liberty was a Word Without a Meaning. There was no Liberty in the Universe; Liberty was a Word void of Sense. Every thought Word Passion Sentiment
Feeling, all Motion and Action was necessary. All Beings and Attributes were of eternal Necessity. Conscience, Morality, were all nothing but Fate."
Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 2, 1816)
in The Adams-Jefferson Letters

You will not have freedom of Conscience without admitting that consciousness is free, anymore than you will have civil rights sans civilization.

Ed Darrell · 19 February 2005

It may be useful to remember that Congress passed a law granting Native Americans exeptions from the law under the Smith decision. There is more than one way to accommodate the religious needs and wants of Americans.

Ed Darrell · 19 February 2005

Quite to the contrary, Mynym, Jefferson especially, and Madison, and at least a plurality of the founders agreed that freedom of conscience was impossible without education -- and they saw the duty of the state to provide that.

You may call it indoctrination -- but they saw it as prevention of tyranny by indoctrinators. They thought that without public education, religious groups would achieve unearned thrall over many citizens. It seems to me that they -- Madison and Jefferson --were right.

Empiricist · 19 February 2005

Sandefur's riposte contains a revealing and unintentionally hilarious comment about the word "dogma". I referred to the "The Central Dogma of Biology" and Sandefur says:

Those hostile to science love to throw around the word "dogma." It's the last refuge of those who have no substantive argument to make against science.

Sadly, Sandefur's knowledge of the history of genetics and molecular biology is rather impoverished so he does not recognize that the phrase "Central Dogma of Biology" was created by the scientist's themselves. Here is a link to the National Institutes of Health defining the term. Perhaps Sandefur believes that these eminent scientists are "hostile to science". I admit that when I gave the example built around the phrase "The Central Dogma of Biology" I thought that the reader would know enough scientific history to recognize the exquisite irony of the phrase that was crafted by the scientists themselves. It refers to a "Dogma" that was later shown to be false. Sandefur missed the connotations of jocularity. Personally I am not "hostile to science". I love science and that is why I am troubled by its crude politicization. The true dogmatist is the individual who opposes a simple disclaimer pointing out the growing, changing and conditional nature of scientific knowledge.

Enough · 19 February 2005

Put that disclaimer on every book, and would there be a problem?

Ed Darrell · 19 February 2005

DaveScot said:

The mustards have not mutated into novel new forms of life any more than any breed of dog is a novel new form. There is merely a change of scale in both cases. Existing structures changed size. Observations of what mutation + selection (even unnatural selection) is capable of producing are bounded and that is a simple fact. A simple fact which is denied in The Church of Darwin where bounded observations are extrapolated to unbounded power and the extrapolation is portrayed as a fact instead of an extrapolation.

Isn't this the same guy who was arguing a few days ago that anyone who doesn't recognize the differences between a bear and a cat just doesn't get it? You're trying to move the goalposts, Dave, in classic creationist fashion. If you're really claiming that radishes and broccoli structures differ only in size, then we should note (as I already did and you didn't respond) that the same may be said for almost all of animal life. The only differences are on emphasis of organs between snakes and humans. By your proposed definitions, snakes and humans are not "novel" from each other. I've known a few humans in my life who have been called snakes, but that was literary simile, not genetics. There are few, if any structures a snake has that a human doesn't have -- including Jacobson's organs. How far will creationism try to blur the lines ignoring real differences between species to make a point? Your claim that radishes and broccoli are almost the same species is as specious as a claim that humans and snakes are almost the same. DaveScot said:

Not a single experiment has shown that chemicals can self-organize into the structures found in living organisms used in support of self-replication. Even the much touted Urey-Miller experiment in the 1950's, which is still the state-of-the-art so to speak, which only managed to produce a few simple amino acids, has been shown to have not accurately simulated the conditions of the ancient earth. If you want to know more try googling "RNA world" which is the latest faddish failure in this regard.

Are you serious? There are a lot of new experiments in this area. How can you ignore the work of Andrew Ellington or James Ferris? Here, let's listen to Andy Ellington talking to the creationists (and others) on the Texas State Board of Education, on September 10, 2003:

(Dr. Ellington): I would initially like to point out that the primary purpose in having the Miller-Urey experiment in textbooks is to show that biological compounds can be generated by relatively simple prebiotic chemistry. This purpose is set forth in nearly every textbook. For example, in Raven, Page [TRANSCRIPT PAGE 320] 149, we find, "Organic building blocks arose from simpler chemicals." However, the criticisms leveled by the Discovery Institute's preliminary analysis of evolution in biology textbooks do not focus on this important fact. In other words, the argument against the inclusion of the Miller-Urey experiment almost never talk about the meaning of the experiment itself. In addition, though, the criticisms that are advanced by the Discovery Institute are either completely wrong or misleading to the point of dishonesty. There are two prime examples of this, although others can be found. First, the Discovery Institute says that, "When the Miller-Urey experiment is repeated with carbon dioxide, nitrogen, water vapor, no amino acids are produced." This statement is false. It is factually incorrect. Amino acids are produced when the Miller-Urey experiment is run with only carbon dioxide, water and nitrogen. This was shown in a classic paper by Schlessenger and Miller in the Journal of Molecular Evolution in 1983. The evidence is indisputable and has never been contradicted. [TRANSCRIPT PAGE 321] Why is this information which is readily available in the scientific literature not cited by the Discovery Institute? Dr. Wells, in fact, often cites a chapter by Dr. Henrik Holland of Harvard University that purports to prove their point. To quote Dr. Wells, "In 1984 Henrik Holland confirmed that mixtures of carbon dioxide, nitrogen, water vapor yield no amino acids at all." In fact, the Holland chapter cited by Dr. Wells was a review. The primary literature referenced in that chapter does not support Dr. Wells' claims. The original papers never even tested to see whether amino acids were made or not. These facts can readily be discovered by anyone with scientific training, and yet, the Discovery Institute has chosen to both mislead you and the citizens of Texas. Second, the Discovery Institute suggests that reducing gases would have not been present on the early Earth. This statement is false. It is factually incorrect. Current theories, in fact, support a mildly reducing atmosphere. Moreover, even if the overall atmosphere was neutral, there would have been multiple sites on the Earth's surface that were [TRANSCRIPT PAGE 322] locally reducing. For example, reduced gases such as hydrogen are produced at sites of volcanic activity. At many locales on the early Earth electric discharges precisely like those shown in the Miller-Urey apparatus represented in the textbooks would have yielded amino acids and other organics. Scientists are supposed to be impartial, judging evidence on its merits. However, having read the inaccurate testimony of the data submitted by the Discovery Institute, I can only conclude that their testimony with regard to the Miller-Urey experiment, in particular, is based solely on bias, rather than hard scientific evidence that is readily available and accurately reported in each textbook. As a further conclusion, I'd just like to especially ask not Dr. -- or not doctors, but members Leo, Lowe and McLeroy to please ask questions of an expert that you've been getting answers to by nonexperts.

(The transcript to this hearing is available at the website archives of the Texas Education Agency.) We have similar experts on this blog, and we should listen to them when the speak. We're 52 years past Stanley Miller's experiment. It has never been refuted. It has been replicated dozens of times, and new experiments tend to show that complex, organic chemicals that are the precursors of life arise in many different conditions.

Russell · 19 February 2005

...the phrase "Central Dogma of Biology" was created by the scientist's [sic] themselves. ... It refers to a "Dogma" that was later shown to be false.

"Empiricist" seems awfully smug. But who knows? maybe we can learn something from him/her. When, and by whom, was the term first used? Was it not already with a conscious sense of irony? When was it shown to be "false"? Would it not be more accurate to describe it as "tweaked" rather than "false"? (The first time I heard the term was when Temin and Baltimore described their discovery of reverse transcriptase, thus "tweaking" the "dogma").

steve · 19 February 2005

Miller-Urey discredited? No.

http://www.talkorigins.org/indexcc/CB/CB035_3.html

RBH · 19 February 2005

For those with fortitude and patience, the complete transcript of the September hearing is here. (Warning for dial-up users: It's a 3.8 meg file.) Ellington's testimony is on p. 319. Following his testimony there's a Q&A between him and a member of the board who tries to trap Ellington on chirality that's great fun to read. And the next guy, on p 329, compares Wells to Pons and Fleischman and cold fusion. :) There's a series of good witnesses following close on that.

RBH

frank schmidt · 19 February 2005

One of the facts that Wells and the DI conveniently ignore is that much of the same stuff that comes out of the Miller-Urey expt. has been found in the Murchison meteorite, in similar proportions. Unless one wants to invoke an Intelligent Chemist somewhere up there, this means that Miller-Urey type chemistry happens elsewhere in the Universe. In other words, there is nothing special about our planet regarding the chemical conditions for life.

This is another example of the Principle of Copernicus and my Mom, who has often told me that, though she loves me dearly, the universe does not revolve around my wants and desires.

steve · 19 February 2005

If I remember correctly, hydrothermal vents are the current interest for origin-of-life research, not Miller-Urey experiments anyway, because it's not thought that there was methane in the early atmosphere, and the chemistry you can get from hydrothermal vent-type systems circumvents that problem.

However, this post is off-topic, because it's not evolution.

Empiricist · 19 February 2005

Ed Darrell states the following:

Self-organizing chemicals? Yes, all chemicals self-organize, and so far we have confirmed that each step required for chemicals to self-organize into living things is possible, replicable in experiments.

This is woefully inaccurate and misleading in my opinion. There are many different hypotheses regarding the initiation of life on Earth but none of these hypotheses is anywhere near experimental validation or replication. Here is a link to an article from the Howard Hughes Medical Institute about the "RNA World" hypothesis for the origin of life which posits an intermediate living form based on RNA. This idea was greatly energized by the discovery of catalytic RNAs called ribozymes. But no scientist is pretending that a putative RNA life-form has been defined, and no scientist is claiming to understand the extraordinary evolutionary process that might have yielded such an organism. Consider this quote from the article:

There remain many skeptics. Some doubt that precellular RNA-based life would have had sufficient time to evolve into the most primitive bacterial cells that fossil evidence has revealed. The earliest date to about 3.8 billion years ago, leaving a fairly narrow 150- to 500-million-year span between the end of Earth's bombardment by solar system fragments and the appearance of the first simple bacteria. Therefore, some scientists, including Francis Crick, have indicated a preference for a theory called Panspermia, which speculates that earthly life had an extraterrestrial source. Others have explored the possibility that humble crystals of terrestrial clay might have served as "scaffolds" upon which the first genomes assembled themselves.

The knowledge in this area is so preliminary and the speculation is so open-ended that hypotheses involving extraterrestrial origin are under serious consideration. Of course, this class of theories allows for the possibility that this planet was seeded with a life-form that was actually "intelligently designed" by an extraterrestrial being. This territory is very dangerous indeed. Any teacher mentioning this possibility could face the wrath of select enraged constitutional scholars. Perhaps critics are afraid that a student reading the phrase "intelligently designed" might jump up, shout hallelujah, and initiate an illegal revival meeting. One final point illustrating the undeniably nascent state of origins research. The possibility that early proto-organisms were composed of PNA, Peptide Nucleic Acid, instead of RNA is now under consideration.

Ed Darrell · 20 February 2005

RBH, one great difference between cold fusion and intelligent design is that ID lacks the experimental support cold fusion has . . .

Ed Darrell · 20 February 2005

Empiricist complains when I point out that chemicals self-organize. But those are the facts. I've tried without success to unite hydrogen and oxygen with flame and not get water, for example -- can't do it. Elements do not combine randomly, and this characteristic of elements in their molecular forms leads to self-organization of chemicals into pre-biotic substances. It's not a complete description, but it's accurate.

No hypothesis of life involves something other than self-organizing chemistry.

The "RNA World" materials are based on observations that RNA self-organizes, and then catalyzes more organization. Same principles, lots of laboratory demonstrations. So those discussions are not rebuttals of self-organization, but support for the concept.

Discussions about the "narrow window" of 150 million to 500 million years (!!) presume not only that biochemistry occurs on Earth, but also consider the observed self-organization of biochemistry elsewhere in the universe. The question is not whether chemicals combine into biotic precursors, but where and when, and how. These discussions tend to indicate that there are many different ways for life chemistry to get going, and that it probably happens in any comfortable place in the universe. Hence the recent space probes to moons of other planets in the solar system, and to Mars.

Again, I urge you to look at the work of Ellington and Ferris, and others. Look here, for example, at NASA's astrobiology site, to see recent results based on the 1947 study that showed organic molecules organize on minerals.

Ed Darrell · 20 February 2005

Here's a site with a bio of Dr. James Ferris, with links to .pdfs of some of his more recent publications:
http://www.rpi.edu/dept/chem/faculty/ferris/ferris.html

Empiricist · 20 February 2005

Russell says that I seem to be "awfully smug". However, wouldn't you agree, Russell, that acknowledging the uncertainties associated with the acquisition of scientific knowledge helps one to avoid the pitfalls of complacency? Further, avoiding complacency might help one to avoid smugness? Russell also asks about the "central dogma". Here is some background from the February 17, 2003 issue of Time magazine:

Baltimore opted for the study of tumor viruses, fully aware of the so-called central dogma that double stranded DNA transfers genetic information to single-stranded RNA, but that information never flows the other way. One scientist, however, Howard Temin, had earlier hypothesized that RNA-DNA transfer could occur, and in 1970 Baltimore set out to prove him right. Assuming that the accepted wisdom was wrong was easy, he says. "I was trained in chemistry and saw it as a chemical problem." Baltimore shattered the dogma with his very first experiment. He discovered the enzyme, now called reverse transcriptase, that enables a retrovirus to transfer information from RNA to DNA.

Russell also wonders if the neologists that coined the expression "central dogma" did so with a "conscious sense of irony". All I can say is that I certainly hope so!

Kristjan Wager · 20 February 2005

the so-called central dogma that double stranded DNA transfers genetic information to single-stranded RNA

So we are taking Time Magazine's word for it being the central dogma? I would repeat Russell's question, which scientist first used that expression in the sense presented here? Please, provide a primary source. Time Magazine is undoubtly a useful source for news about what is going on in the world, though I prefer The Economist, but it's not particularly reliable, especially not when it comes to science.

frank schmidt · 20 February 2005

The phrase "Central Dogma" referred originally to the flow of information from DNA to proteins: DNA makes RNA (transcription) makes protein (translation), and yes, indeed, the term contains a definite sense of irony, since it was first enunciated by a group of iconoclastic molecular biologists.

Temin proposed the reverse flow of information based on considering how an RNA virus could incorporate a heritable change in a cell (i.e., at the DNA level). The characterization of reverse transcriptase by Temin, Baltimore, and coworkers verified the idea, but it needs to be remembered that this is essentially a case of copying nucleic acid information, and conceptually isn't that different from DNA replication, or transcription of RNA from DNA.

The one case where the Dogma is inviolate is in the one-directional flow from nucleic acids to protein. There is no "reverse translation" system, and the origin of translation remains incompletely known. This is fortunate for science (it gives us things to do) and bad politically, because it gives the creationists a claim that this makes a Gap for God to work.

Incredulity, however, isn't an argument. For example, how many of us, on learning about sex, couldn't imagine our parents doing such a thing? Let alone twice.

Empiricist · 20 February 2005

Kristjan Wager: The term "central dogma" is widely used in textbooks, and I have done scut work tracking down the NIH reference and the Time magazine reference to show that my use of the term is supported. Of course, it is certainly possible that Time magazine is not using the term correctly. But it is unclear to me why you believe that the onus is on your partner in colloquy to provide multiple references when you have not even provided an alternative meaning for the term "central dogma" nor have you provided a single reference. Of course, if you believe that demanding extensive references in a high-handed fashion is a useful communicative strategy then I will be happy to participate.

Kristjan Wager and Russell please present a precise alternative meaning for the term "central dogma". Please provide scans from diary entries, scans from laboratory notebooks, and conference report excerpts where appropriate to give supporting evidence. These primary historical documents should precisely trace the genesis and elaboration of the term "central dogma" and present exacting proof of the alternative meaning that you propose. Please also upload mp3 audio recordings of interviews with the individuals who coined the term. Of course, you should also present signed affidavits testifying to authenticity. I hope that you understand that this is satirical. My point is that conversations are actually a cooperative process. Perhaps you can move the conversation forward.

wildlifer · 20 February 2005

As far as I can tell, the term was coined by Francis Crick, Central Dogma of Molecular Biology, Nature. 1970 Aug 8;227(5258):561-3. The reference, of course, is to specific principles RNA/DNA follow. From wikipedia:

The central dogma of molecular biology (sometimes Crick's central dogma after Francis Crick who coined the term and discovered some of the principles) states that the flow of genetic information is "DNA to RNA to protein". With a few notable exceptions, all biological cells conform to this rule. It can be stated in a very short and oversimplified manner as "DNA makes RNA makes proteins, which in turn facilitate the previous two steps as well as the replication of DNA", or simply "DNA → RNA → protein". This process is therefore broken down into three steps: transcription, translation, and replication. By new knowledge of the RNA processing, a fourth step must be included: splicing.

frank schmidt · 20 February 2005

Although the idea of one-directional information flow was current well before the term "Central Dogma" was used. I believe that Watson wrote about messing with it on the train from London to Cambridge as reported in The Double Helix.

Frank Schmidt · 20 February 2005

More on the Central Dogma: The phrase is used as a section heading in the first edition of Watson's Molecular Biology of the Gene, copyright 1965. So it was probably in use right after the discovery of mRNA and the code in 1960-61.

Russell · 20 February 2005

Kristjan Wager and Russell please present a precise alternative meaning for the term "central dogma".... diary entries, scans from laboratory notebooks, ...mp3 audio recordings ... signed affidavits testifying to authenticity.

It seems I failed to communicate my point. Let me try again. I got the impression that "empiricist" was saying that scientists actually regarded the "central dogma" as, well, dogma. In fact, since there is no "dogma" in science, the term was never used (so far as I know; of course I could be wrong) except ironically. (Sort of like the Left's coinage of the term "politically incorrect") The reason I noted that "empiricist" seems awfully smug is this:

Sadly, Sandefur's knowledge of the history of genetics and molecular biology is rather impoverished so he does not recognize that the phrase "Central Dogma of Biology" was created by the scientist's themselves

I don't see where Mr. Sandefur has indicated any misunderstanding of the term's use or history. Rather, I got the sense that "empiricist" is tone-deaf to the irony of the term. Here's his introduction of the term in this thread:

All this self-satisfied dogmatism reminds me of the "The Central Dogma of Biology": ... The happy dogmatist would say circa 1960s that this is not just a theory this is a fact! He would warn you never to let any small-minded know-nothing rabid fundamentalist tell you otherwise. ....

So, who was this "happy dogmatist"? Who actually regarded the "central dogma" as "dogma"? Who said it was a "fact"? I don't see Mr. Sandefur stating or implying any incorrect use of the term (though, if he did, I don't think it would be "sadly", since that's really not his job). Rather - and here's the delicious irony -"empiricist" (whose moniker suggests that he prides himself on strict reliance on the data) seems to have imputed the "misunderstanding" to Mr. Sandefur, based on his own mistaken preconceptions of the sticker opponents' views.

Empiricist · 20 February 2005

Russell: I gave an example from molecular biology in which scientists are not being dogmatic. An example in which scientists were required to refine and modify a theory that was shown to be incomplete and inaccurate. Note, very carefully - the scientists did change the theory. I certainly hope that other readers did not miss this vital fact. Indeed, that was the key point of my example. Here is a precis: One should not be dogmatic when formulating or imparting scientific knowledge. After Russell presumably read my comment in a rather idiosyncratic manner it appears that he misunderstood it at a basic level and concluded that I was accusing scientists of being dogmatic! Now he indicates that I am "tone-deaf to the irony". Wow!

Russell · 20 February 2005

After Russell presumably read my comment in a rather idiosyncratic manner it appears that he misunderstood it at a basic level and concluded that I was accusing scientists of being dogmatic!

No, you continue to miss the point. You claim Mr. Sandefur misunderstood. Show where. Moreover, YOU say

All this self-satisfied dogmatism reminds me of the "The Central Dogma of Biology"... The happy dogmatist would say circa 1960s that this is not just a theory this is a fact!

Is it an idiosyncratic misreading of your comment to infer that you believe there were such "happy dogmatists"? If so, my apologies. But there's another, more important point in all of this. Humor me in this little thought experiment. Suppose we travel back to the 1960's and learn that there's a group pushing for the inclusion of a sticker to be plastered on every textbook warning that the "flow of information from DNA to RNA to protein" is just a theory. Is the effect of that more likely to be (a) students being reminded that this observation is no different from all other observations in science, and while basically accurate, may be tweaked in the future or (b) this observation stands out from all the other observations in this textbook in that it's on especially shaky ground, and may be completely off base. Just as an aside, do you imagine this group is a bunch of disgruntled RNA enthusiasts, miffed that their favorite molecule is being given short shrift, or do you think it's more likely to be a group worried that too much is being ascribed to mindless mechanistic molecules, robbing God of his glory?

DonkeyKong · 20 February 2005

You guys are sleep walking...

"There are three problems, however, with this argument. First, evolution, being science, differs from religion in that it is a testable, confirmable theory, which can be compared with observed results."

Evolution from amino acid to cell has not been tested or confirmed. Nor has increased complexity over time as a effect of an evolution cause. Increased complexity over time I will give you. But your linkage to gradual evolution is unproven. The argument that no other way is visible runs throughout the evolution theory.

The lack of tests, and confirmations of those tests is exactly what makes evolution quasi science. The usage of quasi-science because there is no stronger scientific explaination and calling it factual science is a from of Darwinism religion.

I believe religion should be kept out of school.

Wayne Francis · 20 February 2005

in Commnent # 16866 asked the question

Hey Dave --- what "novel new body forms" do humans have that other primates don't?

— caerbannog
to which DavidScot replied in Commnent # 16947

Gene sequencing machines. Space shuttles. Blogs. Just to name a few.

— DavidScot
So DavidScot believes that these are biological extensions of humans but programs can not create other programs to perform a function without humans needing to design the final program. DavidScot better watch out if he ever gets into an accident....he could be up for a Battery charge because he inflicted damage on a human new body form.

steve · 20 February 2005

So when the DMV calls and wants to know why I haven't had my car inspected, I'll tell them that I had it "amputated" by a tow truck.

Mike S. · 21 February 2005

While one might say that the government is "censored" from endorsing a religious view, such "censorship" is done on command of the First Amendment, which says that the government may not establish religion. If that's censorship, fine.

— Timothy Sandefur
Doesn't the First Amendment say that Congress shall pass no law respecting the establishment of religion? I don't think the stickers are a good idea, but I do think that the establishment clause has been wildly distended to include all sorts of non-Congressional acts. Wouldn't the school boards actions be considered an executive act, not legislation? I realize that reams of pages have been written about the establishment clause, and that there is lots of case law on it. I'm just wondering what your brief synopsis is of how we got from 'Congress shall make no law' to 'no governmental entity in the entire country can say anything with regard to religious beliefs'. That is, I think the stickers are a bad idea, but I don't see how the courts should be allowed to have jurisdiction over this particualar matter.

Fraser · 21 February 2005

Case law says that the Fourteenth Amendment extended First Amendment restrictions on government to the state governments and all their component parts, such as school boards.

Fraser · 21 February 2005

Most importantly, I don't see how believers in accomodationism can get around the central problem of the heckler's veto. If government must jump through all sorts of special hoops any time a person can claim that his religion is offended by that particular law, then how can the government ever do anything?* Keep in mind that government is not allowed to inquire into the truth of any religion. It can ask whether a person sincerely believes in that religion, but that is all. In the jail cases that have arisen under RLUIPA, we have seen a microcosm of a reign of accomodationism and it isn't pretty. RLUIPA is a federal law which imposes accomodationism in prisons: if a prisoner objects, for religious reasons, to a policy of a prison, the prison officials are required to prove that the policy is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling incarceration interest. The result has been a flood of cases in which prisoners claim a religious right to eat steak and potatoes and whatnot, and the courts have been required to take evidence as to the sincerity of these beliefs. It's all been quite aggravating. But has it been productive? And can we run the rest of the world that way? >>

1. If the constitution was set up to be productive, it would just have created a dictatorship. Justice requires inefficiency (appeals, protection of due process, etc.).
2.It's true you can make absurd claims under the Fist Amendment, but it's equally absurd to say the government can tell an Orthodox Jew or Muslim "You'll eat pork or go hungry." I object to the government being able to force anyone to violate their fundamental beliefs, which is the logical outcome of Smith (in practice, of course, it'll be the fringe religions that suffer).
3. The pre-Smith standard--government can overrule religion when there's a compelling interest--actually worked pretty well. After the Amish won the right to do all their Amish things I don't believe the courts have ever found the government didn't have a compelling interest. So no, I don't think the heckler's veto is that terrible a threat or in practice allows everyone to decide at whim whether or not to obey the law.
4. And no, I also don't think that letting people practice their religion automatically translates into an "establishment." If we go that way, the First Amendment's religious guarantees are close to meaningless.

Timothy Sandefur · 21 February 2005

Thanks to Russell for his common sense on this "dogma" nonsense. It's a confession of the creationists' weakness that they would spend so much time arguing that science actually contains the concept of "dogma," and do so on the basis of the use of the term in which it is so obviously not being used to actually refer to dogma. Mike S. asks

Doesn't the First Amendment say that Congress shall pass no law respecting the establishment of religion? I don't think the stickers are a good idea, but I do think that the establishment clause has been wildly distended to include all sorts of non-Congressional acts . . . . I'm just wondering what your brief synopsis is of how we got from 'Congress shall make no law' to 'no governmental entity in the entire country can say anything with regard to religious beliefs'.

When the First Amendment was originally written, several states had established churches, and one reason for the Establishment Clause was to permit those to continue. This is why the Clause says "no law respecting an establishment of religion," rather than "no law establishing religion." The Clause was, as Akhil Reed Amar puts it in his must-read book The Bill of Rights, essentially "agnostic" as to the desirability of established churches; the clause was primarily a protection for federalism---for the independent prerogatives of states. Indeed all of the Bill of Rights originally applied only to the federal government; the Supreme Court held that states were not prohibited from violating the freedom of speech, or the rights of private property, or other fundamental protections of the Bill of Rights. The Fourteenth Amendment changed this by declaring that from now on "no state" shall do certain things: first, no state could abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; second, no state could deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; third, no state could deprive any person of the equal protection of the laws. Although the privileges or immunities clause was originally intended as the primary guarantor of individual freedom under the Amendment, it was quickly erased from the Constitution in the Slaughterhouse Cases. In the years that followed, the Due Process Clause was instead held to protect certain rights from state interference. Under this theory, which I've explained at length here, certain political absolutes are considered a part of the Constitution and cannot be violated, even when the legislature approves of the violation. What are those political absolutes? The Supreme Court has held that they are those principles which are "essential to ordered liberty," and this includes certain provisions of the Bill of Rights. No government is truly free, for example, if it allows searches without a warrant, or if it allows the taking of private property without just compensation. These principles are therefore "incorporated" to the states by the Due Process Clause. When a state deprives a person of life, liberty or property in a manner that fails to include certain safeguards (like warrants or just compensation), then the state is said to be taking a person's life, liberty, or property without due process of law. The Establishment Clause was first "incorporated" to the states in the case of Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The incorporation theory essentially says that the Bill of Rights applies to the States directly. But this doesn't make literal sense in the case of the Establishment Clause, since saying "no state shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion" would leave states unable to legislate at all on the matter. The clause was originally written precisely so as not to apply to the states. So how can it be incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment? Amar argues that the disestablishmentarian principles of the Establishment Clause came to be regarded as an individual right, instead of a federalism principle, in the years between 1792 and 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was written, so that the drafters of the Amendment would have seen the freedom from established churches as an essential part of individual liberty. If he's right---and he makes a very convincing case for it---then states are forbidden from establishing churches. But as Justice Thomas explained in his opinion in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), a very strict disestablishmentarian reading of the Fourteenth Amendment causes some very serious conundrums as far as the limits of state authority are concerned. The issue does deserve to be explored more fully. To at least some degree, the Establishment Clause today ought to forbid states (and their subdivisions) from establishing religion. On the other hand, the Establishment Clause works better with regard to the federal government because it is a government of limited, enumerated powers. The states, on the other hand, are supposedly governments of residual sovereignty, and that makes policing the boundaries of the Establishment Clause far more complicated, and far more intrusive as far as state political authority goes. (Of course, that doesn't bother me as much, since I'd like to see all political authority more limited!) So the answer is, the Establishment Clause has come to be regarded as precisely the opposite of what it was originally intended: where it was first seen as a federalism provision designed to protect states' authority to create established churches, it has come to be seen as a rule forbidding states from depriving us of liberty by forcing us to support a church against our consciences. I applaud the discovery of the fact that established churches are unjust and tyrannical---but admit that the law on the subject is messy. Fraser argues in favor of accomodationism by saying "If the constitution was set up to be productive, it would just have created a dictatorship. Justice requires inefficiency (appeals, protection of due process, etc.)." I'm not sure what this means, or what the relevance is. Nor do I believe that dictatorships are productive. He also says

It's true you can make absurd claims under the Fist Amendment, but it's equally absurd to say the government can tell an Orthodox Jew or Muslim "You'll eat pork or go hungry." I object to the government being able to force anyone to violate their fundamental beliefs, which is the logical outcome of Smith (in practice, of course, it'll be the fringe religions that suffer).

Now that's a great example. It shows the sort of cold-heartedness about the Smith rule that troubles me, and that troubles religious conservatives even more. Nevertheless, the answer is, if you were to say that to an Orthodox Jew or Muslim, you would not be technically "forc[ing]" them to do anything, but simply providing them with a choice. If a Muslim visitor comes into my home and I say "you will eat pork or go hungry," I am not committing a tort against that visitor; he's welcome to leave. What's bizarre about Fraser's example is his presumption that the government would be telling anyone that they would go hungry. This government he is imagining sounds like it's already so big that it can't help but violate someone's rights. Under the Constitution of the United States, the federal government has absolutely no authority to tell any person "you will eat" anything, or "you will go hungry." As with so much in Constitutional law, the solution is to look to the limited, enumerated powers of the government. But putting that aside, and assuming the government is going to feed people, why can't it say just that? After all, it can say to the mendicant "you will try to find a job before you get unemployment compensation," or "you will not spend food stamps on cigarettes." Why can it not also say "pork is all we're giving out, and if you choose not to eat it, then tough toenails"? Suppose that I just don't care for the flavor of pork: can I force the government to give me beef instead? What about peppered, smoked salmon? If the answer is no, why does the Muslim get special treatment simply because he claims that Allah forbids him from eating pork? Further, Fraser writes, "The pre-Smith standard---government can overrule religion when there's a compelling interest---actually worked pretty well. After the Amish won the right to do all their Amish things I don't believe the courts have ever found the government didn't have a compelling interest. So no, I don't think the heckler's veto is that terrible a threat or in practice allows everyone to decide at whim whether or not to obey the law." Perhaps. The Amish case is the most troubling problem to me. If Smith means what it says, then the Amish case must be overruled, and the Amish must be forced to send their children to Pennsylvania's public school system. I think this is wrong---an obvious violation of their religious freedom. But the violation lies in forcing people to do things, not in the fact that some people get an exemption from that unjust coercion. (Also, it is a great exaggeration to say that government "can overrule religion." Of course government can not and never could, do any such thing.) Finally, Fraser says "I also don't think that letting people practice their religion automatically translates into an 'establishment.'" Obviously, but that isn't what I said. The problem with accomodationism is that it will never be really equal. Some religions will get special treatment and others will not, based on their popularity. Minority sects will be given no special treatment, and Christianity will get all the special favors. (And then what about particular sects?) This favoritism is constitutionally offensive. Then people will start making up fake religions to get special treatment, and the government will have to start inquiring into whether they are really fake religions or not---which is exactly what the First Amendment was intended to prohibit. This is the problem, and it isn't solved by mischaracterizing the issue as one of "letting people practice their religion" or not. Of course they can practice their religion. Just not on my dime, and not in a way that absolves them of the duty to obey the law.

GCT · 22 February 2005

One thing that is missing from all the discussion of the heckler's veto is that the people pushing to include these stickers in textbooks are not just trying to excerise their own personal heckler's veto, but are trying to make sure that everyone around them is vetoed as well. It's even more insidious than the Smith case where the people involved only wanted to do something that would affect them personally. Also, mynym says:

This would all be moot if parents could spend their own tax money to educate their children as they saw fit. I.e., you would not find yourself discussing the vagaries of Judiciary, those who Jefferson called " . . . .the subtle corps of sappers and miners . . . ", etc. But some of the same educators who maintain the textbook orthodoxy are those who reject school vouchers, etc. They want to continue indoctrinating children, by force of the State through judicial diktat if necessary, with Naturalism. That is the foundation of socialism, after all. They do not seem to believe in freedom of Conscience. For after all, they do not agree with the Founders in believing that consciousness itself is free of the physical. So they cannot seem to grasp the difference between education and their indoctrination.

The problem with that is that parents don't spend their own tax money to educate their children, they spend everyone's tax money, which is also the problem with school vouchers. The education system could not survive if the general public did not finance it. If it is possible for a parent to spend their own tax money to educate their own child, then why is it not possible for a child-less taxpayer to take their own education tax money and spend it on something else instead? The answer is that we, as a society, place an emphasis on the education of our children, so the government collects taxes from all to educate all the children. If we allow parents to use vouchers to send their kids to parochial schools, the effect is that someone else's tax money will be paying to support those schools, which would be violating that person's right to not fund non-secular institutions. This isn't a case of "freedom of Conscience" as you put it or about Naturalism. It's about keeping the government free from the entaglements of religion and upholding the wall of separation between church and state.

Fraser · 22 February 2005

First, my apologies: I rushed through yesterday's post, making it unclear.

Instead of saying "dictatorships are more productive" I meant "efficient." No debate, no negotiation, no dickering about what gets done, just Do It (if you've spent a lot of time around city government, you'll appreciate the difference that makes). Likewise, the lengthy death-penalty appeals system is tremendously inefficient compared to say, shooting convicted killers right after the verdict (or Obviously Guilty People without waiting for a verdict). In both cases we opt for an inefficient system to protect people's rights.

Same with accommodation. Yes, there will be debates and lawsuits and dickering and fakes taking advantage of it--but the fact the No Exemption approach is neat and clean and tidy and efficient doesn't mean it's better. I don't think it is, and I think it's fundamentally wrong.

Barring cases of say religions calling for human sacrifice or child rape (or other "compelling interest" cases) the government has no business deciding which religious practices are acceptable--which Smith gives authorities the power to do. The gains to religious freedom (something about which I am passionate) more than outweigh the problems.

When I spoke of making Muslims or Jews eat pork I was thinking specifically of prison food (another casualty of my rushed post). While I personally do not think God judges us on diet (okay, cannibalism might be an exception) someone for whom that's fundamental divine law shouldn't be required to break their duty to god, even if they're a convict. And yes, that gives them higher rights than me (I'm a vegetarian, but for ethical, not religious reasons--in fact I can't think of any religious exemption I could personally claim), I believe that is consonant with the first amendment (which refers to Religion not to Personal Opinion).

Nor is that making them a "law unto themselves"--these are, after all, traditions believed in by millions. And yes, some jailbirds do try to make up their own religions to get special breaks, but the system has managed to hold up despite them.

And yes, government can indeed "overrule" religion. During Prohibition, some Baptist-dominated states wouldn't exempt the use of wine in the Catholic Mass. Some local governments today have refused to allow Christian or Orthodox Jewish prayer groups to meet in private homes because they're not zoned for "house of worship"

Timothy, you argue that with exemptions, the big powerful religions will get breaks that the little ones won't. Agreed--but you can't possibly believe that won't happen under Smith, too. Consider Hialeah, where they passed a law banning Santeria animal sacrifice (overturned, because it specifically targeted Santeria, rather than being a general-purpose law that just happened to snag the worshippers in its net)--would they have tried anything equivalent on Catholics or Baptists?

<>

So we wind up with a system where believers will only be able to practice only with government consent. I find that equally constitutionally offensive (by the way, would I be correct to assume you have the same objection to the state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, which restore the pre-smith situation at the state level? That gets around any question of first amendment interpretation but I'd assume since it still includes an exemption, you're against 'em).

And as for operating on your dime, if religion is interchangeable with any other system, then it has just as much right to compete for federal funding as secular NGOs (I don't think it should have that option, but that's because I think it should be treated differently).

Obviously we won't agree on this--as far as I'm concerned, this is one of those defend-to-the-death the rights of others issues (fortunately I don't think dying would actually do much to defend anyone's religious rights, so I'll stick to writing).

arbitraryaardvark · 22 February 2005

"Justice Thomas explained in his opinion in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), a very strict disestablishmentarian reading of the Fourteenth Amendment causes some very serious conundrums as far as the limits of state authority are concerned"

I'm unclear here. Are you for or against the position held by Thomas and the antidisestablishmentarianists*? In the interests of devil's advocacy, I'm going to disagree with you. So if you are a proantidisestablismentarianist, I'd be an antiproantidisestalishmentarianist, otherwise an antiantiantidisestablishmentatistista**.
1,3,7-trimethylxanthine brings out my sesquipedalian tendencies.
*29
*37

arbitraryaardvark · 22 February 2005

About dogma:
I have not seen or read the textbooks the non-forbidden stickers were stuck to.
But I can draw on my experiences as a former public school student.
What I'm wondering is do the texts teach evolution as received wisdom, or as a testable replicable theory students can validate for themselves?
In 9th grade we had a class called "chem-phys" in which physics and then chemistry were taught by the scientific method. Starting with gallileo and the speed of falling objects, we went through Hook's Law and Boyle's Law and Cole's Law with experiments that demonstrated that they worked.
But by 10th grade biology and senior year economics, we had gotten away from this use of scientific method and critial thinking, and were just supposed to learn by rote the received wisdom. The authority was the teacher, and behind the teacher was the principal, and behind the principal was the government, and the government was allpresent, allknowing, and allgood, but a jealous government, saying, thou shall have no other governments before me.
I did not learn until college that evolution is testable and readily verifiable, and that biologial evolution is a subset of the general role of evolution as a key component of systems theory. I also learned that they Keynesian macroeconomics fed to us as dogma in high school was unsound -
it wasn't after all that I was too stupid to understand economics, it was that they'd been preaching a set of lies to support statism.
I suspect that some of the objection from the creationist camp to the social function of the teaching of evolution in public institutions, is that it is being used to support "scientific socialism" and statism. This might be a form of either violation of the establishment clause or of free exercise. It's also bad science.
I think it is in the interest of creationists and evolutionists to oppose the teaching of evolution in a dogmatic manner, and that it is in the interests of the military-industrial-NEA complex to teach it that way, with resulting harm to society. From this perspective, the alliances shift, and forces that are currently bitterly opposed have a common cause, if they can somehow learn to work together.
One simple way to disrupt the cooptation of evolution is to loudly and widely spread the meme that Darwin got his key insight from reading Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. Smith shows how no central authority or intellegent design is needed to efficently manufacture something like a pencil. Darwin applied those ideas to finches in the Galapagos. The economic principle of comparative advantage results in specialization and speciation, so that from lower forms of life evolve higher ones, culminating in God's magnificent creation, the aardvark.

Mike S. · 22 February 2005

Thanks for the brief exposition, Timothy. I guess I'd say that, generally speaking, I have no problem with states being able to support a particular religion or even a denomination. I don't think that it would be a good idea, from either a political or a religious perspective (nor does it seem likely even if it were possible), but as a legal matter I don't see any reason why the federal government should overrule it, if that's what the people of the state want. For those that didn't like it, they're always free to move to another state, same as if they don't like the tax laws in the state where they live.

I think it is in the interest of creationists and evolutionists to oppose the teaching of evolution in a dogmatic manner

— aa
That all depends upon how you frame the 'interests': some evolutionists are quite interested in teaching it in a dogmatic manner, so they can beat conservative Christians over the head with it. And many creationists are just as interested in having it taught dogmatically, so that they can use it as proof that evolution=dogmatic atheism. It's a symbiotic relationship.

Russell · 22 February 2005

Mike S:

some evolutionists are quite interested in teaching it in a dogmatic manner

Can you think of particular instances of this? I rather suspect that it's just easier to teach a lot of things "dogmatically" rather than well.

Ed Darrell · 22 February 2005

My sources differ. Mr. Sandefur said:

When the First Amendment was originally written, several states had established churches, and one reason for the Establishment Clause was to permit those to continue. This is why the Clause says "no law respecting an establishment of religion," rather than "no law establishing religion." The Clause was, as Akhil Reed Amar puts it in his must-read book The Bill of Rights, essentially "agnostic" as to the desirability of established churches; the clause was primarily a protection for federalism---for the independent prerogatives of states. Indeed all of the Bill of Rights originally applied only to the federal government; the Supreme Court held that states were not prohibited from violating the freedom of speech, or the rights of private property, or other fundamental protections of the Bill of Rights.

Madison wrote to Jefferson in Paris, sending a copy of the proposed Constitution, circa end-of-September, 1787. Jefferson wrote back immediately saying that the lack of a bill of rights was probably a fatal flaw, especially with regard to freedom of religion. Madison responded that he made a calculated gamble in leaving such a thing off: First, it would have taken a couple of weeks to get one written, and too many delegates were too anxious to get home to dying mothers and dying wives, neglected farms and businesses, and generally just get-the-tarnation out of Philadelphia; and second, each state already had a bill of rights[/] which already guaranteed freedom of religion. We should note there that it is unlikely that Madison was not paying attention, since he was the guy who 11 years earlier had to stand up to George Mason to get freedom of religion into the Virginia Bill of Rights, and just the previous summer had concluded a two-year effort to preserve freedom of religion in Virginia by passing the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom into law, over the vociferous and grand opposition of Patrick Henry, who was governor of Virginia. Did any state have an established church? Hudson notes in his several editions of Religion in America that each colony had disestablished by 1778. The only effort I know of to re-establish was Patrick Henry's 1785 proposal to fund religion teachers of several denominations -- but it failed and instead resulted in the Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom, an antiestablishment law if ever there was one. Four states had vestiges of the old establishment, but those vestiges went no farther than the voluntary state collection of tithes to churches. Jefferson responded that every citizen deserves a bill of rights against every government, especially with regard to such things as religion, and, Jefferson wondered, what guarantee was there that the yahoos wouldn't seize power in some state and vitiate that bill of rights? Madison agreed, not all reluctantly -- for by that time the drumbeat for a bill of rights had already come from some of the state ratifying conventions. In Congress, in 1789, Madison proposed 12 amendments including what we now call the First -- but his proposal was a much broader, freedom of conscience proposal he had crafted based on his experiences already. In debates, there was discussion of limiting it to a national establishment, but that language was ultimately quashed in favor of what we have now. Was it intended to apply only against the federal government? There is not an iota of evidence to that claim. Madison and Jefferson had made it clear that they intended it to sit alongside the Article VI ban on religious dabbling in government, which specifically names the states as also included. In the end, Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists should have put the issue to rest. The Danbury Baptists wrote to Jefferson for help, fearing that Connecticut Congregationalists would somehow frustrate their religious freedom. Jefferson's response was the famous declaration of policy that spelled out a "wall of separation" between church and state. Since the feared action would have come from the State of Connecticut, and since Jefferson said the national design prevented such a thing, an act "of the whole American people," I think it's incorrect to ascribe to the founders views they did not express. Yes, Story wrote in 1833 that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states. Dumb decision. Still doesn't change the meaning and intentions of the founders. Amar can claim the founders were "agnostic" on state churches only if he completely ignores the history, their words, and their actions.

Ed Darrell · 22 February 2005

Oh, I should have read the entire post.

Here it is in a nutshell: Not only does the Constitution leave all religious rights and duties in the hands of citizens, first by not delegating anything to churches in the operation of government nor to government in the operation of churches, in Articles I, II, III and IV (the state government article), but the Constitution then expressly forbids Congress from carving out any new structures that might circumvent that plan, by saying Congress cannot even legislate in the area.

So the states lack the authority to expressly support religion from the federal Constitution.

Whether a state could have established a church is the wrong question: All states disestablished before the union was made, and no state ever backtracked on that plan. New states all came into the union without established churches or any authority to establish a church, under their own constitutions.

So, simply, there is no federal or state constitutional well from which anyone could draw the authority to have government do the churches' jobs. "Congress shall make no law" simply means that Congress cannot create a new structure of any stripe to get around the other bans. It's an appositive statement, a restatement and reinforcement of other bans.

If a school district wished to endorse religion, on what grounds could it claim the authority to do so? School districts are arms of the state government, and so they would need to look to the state's authority to delegate to them. The states lack such authority under their own constitutions -- the people have withheld that power from the states. A school district might, in a final plea, appeal to Congress, but Congress is especially estopped from providing such authority.

A school district can't endorse stickers unless they are delegated authority from some other body. The state constitutions prevent the state legislatures from making such a delegation, and the federal Consitution forbides Congress from making such a law. Without that authority, the school boards may not act within the bounds of the law.

A lot of this discussion of the 14th Amendment is hoo-haw required to get around Barron v. Baltimore without flatout noting that it was a bad decision, made by "activist" judges I suppose. But we don't even need to go that far if we just read the state constitutions and note that there never has been delegated from the people any power for government to take such a role in religion. It's the wrong question to ask.

Frank Schmidt · 22 February 2005

I was always taught that the 14th amendment applied the Bill of Rights to the states:

No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;

So states, and school boards, can't endorse religion.

Colin · 22 February 2005

That's true, Frank, but it's not the whole story. The 14th Amendment doesn't expressly apply the BOR by its own language - it's implied, which is the sort of thing conservative jurists hate. The sticky part is figuring out which parts of the Bill of Rights were implied to be applied to the states. Modern jurists, at least the ones who are fun to have around at parties, say it's the whole thing, and that's working pretty well for us. But it took a while to get there - for a while it looked like the BOR was going to be dribbled down to the states bit-by-bit. And, obviously, there are still some malcontents (*cough*Thomas*cough*) who think that this whole "rights" business has just gone too far, and that the states should be free to undisestablishmentize themselves and get right with Jesus.

Timothy Sandefur · 22 February 2005

Mr. Darrell is wrong that the states had all disestablished by 1778. In 1789, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, South Carolina, and Georgia all had established religions. Virginia only eliminated its established church in 1785. It was not until 1834 that all states had abolished their established religions---well after the ratification of the Establishment Clause. See Michael McConnell, The Origins And Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1437 (1997). It is therefore not true that "[a]ll states disestablished before the union was made, and no state ever backtracked on that plan," and, shall we say, something of an exaggeration to say that Professor Amar, one of the most well respected members of the legal academy (and rightly so) is somehow ignoring the facts. Have you read Amar's book, Mr. Darrell? As to whether the Bill of Rights really was intended only to apply to the federal government, as Amar shows, that proposition is indeed shakier than some people have assumed, and I think there's an extremely good argument to be made that it was intended to apply to states as well, or at least some of its provisions. Certainly amendments like the second or third or fourth never refer to the federal government explicitly, as does the First Amendment. Amar calls the position that the Bill of Rights was originally intended to apply to the states as well as the federal government "Barron contrarianism," in reference to Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (which, incidentally, was written by Chief Justice Marshall, not by Joseph Story), the Supreme Court case that held that the Bill only applies to the feds. As Amar and others have shown, Barron contrarianism was one of the fundamental principles of anti-slavery constitutional scholars, and thus laid the foundation for the Fourteenth Amendment. (I should add that Barron was very far from being an "activist" decision; if anything, it served the interests of "judicial deference," because a holding that the Bill of Rights applied to the states would have seriously threatened the power of slavery.) Although Madison was extremely outspoken as to the evils of established religion, as was Jefferson, their view was in the minority at the time that the Constitution was ratified. The argument, therefore, is that it would be wrong to interpret the First Amendment in the way that they would have---it is instead proper to interpret it in the way that those who ratified the Constitution understood it. If we assume that Barron was correct, then the states retained (before the Fourteenth Amendment) the "residual sovereignty" to legislate over all matters not specifically delegated to the federal government by the Constitution. As Madison put it,

The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.

Thus the states would have the power to "to expressly support religion." Take, for example, government-supported education, of which Mr. Darrell is quite fond. The states would have, and did in fact exercise, long after the ratification of the Constitution, the authority to take money from citizens and use it to preach an established religion to children, despite the fact that doing so is beyond the legitimate authority of any government. My point is that Mr. Darrell is overstating a noble case. States lack the legitimate political authority to establish religion, regardless of the First Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment, because doing so violates natural rights. But that doesn't mean the federal government has the authority to stop them. What gave the federal government that authority was the Fourteenth Amendment. I do not understand Mr. Darrell's argument that "the states lack the authority to expressly support religion from the federal Constitution...there is no federal or state constitutional well from which anyone could draw the authority to have government do the churches' jobs" The states obtain their sovereignty from the people within that state. While the federal government has only that authority that is granted in Article I section 8 of the Constitution, the states are generally believed to have all legitimate political authority that is not denied them. What is not denied is permitted for states; what is not permitted is denied to the federal government. I have serious qualms with this interpretation, but it is by far the prevailing interpretation. And if it is not---if Mr. Darrell is right that there must be some federal or state constitutional well from which to draw the authority to have the government do the church's job---then whence do states draw the authority to run a public education system (which was inn many places traditionally seen as the church's job)? In American history, government-run education has been seen as one of those unspecified general political powers which states may exercise because it is not explicitly denied them. Mr. Darrell seems to have led himself into a contradiction. Mike S. writes

generally speaking, I have no problem with states being able to support a particular religion or even a denomination. I don't think that it would be a good idea, from either a political or a religious perspective (nor does it seem likely even if it were possible), but as a legal matter I don't see any reason why the federal government should overrule it, if that's what the people of the state want. For those that didn't like it, they're always free to move to another state, same as if they don't like the tax laws in the state where they live.

Well, I appreciate his candor. The argument that using the government to support a particular religion is a violation of individual freedom rests on the principles best articulated by Thomas Jefferson in his Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom (passed in 1782, four years after 1778). In it, Jefferson says "that to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical." I agree with this, and I think violations of this principle are not only unjust, but unwise, as historical experience has demonstrated. Fraser writes

Barring cases of say religions calling for human sacrifice or child rape (or other "compelling interest" cases) the government has no business deciding which religious practices are acceptable---which Smith gives authorities the power to do. The gains to religious freedom (something about which I am passionate) more than outweigh the problems.

Why bar religions calling for human sacrifice or child rape? Seriously. Why are they excluded? Plus, keep in mind that Smith does not, I repeat, does not allow government to "decide which religious practices are acceptable." Government has absolutely no authority to do that, before or after Smith. Instead, that decision addresses whether government must grant special treatment to persons on the grounds that their religion requires it. The question arises when government passes a general law that has nothing to do with religion, but which a person finds objectionable because of his religion---for instance, when the government bans hats, but a Hindu needs to wear a headdress; or when the government requires all children to attend public school, but the Amish say this contradicts their religion. Under what circumstances is government required to accomodate the needs of those with special religious sensitivities? That is what Smith addresses. It does not address whether the government may decide which religious practices are acceptable. Fraser's point that the religious sensitivities in question are passionately held and very old does not change the issue at all. The question is, when government decides on a policy, does the Constitution require it to change that policy whenever a religious person raises an objection to it on religious grounds? If the answer to that is no, then we will have serious problems such as Fraser's prison-food example. That is a serious consideration. But if the answer is yes, we have even worse problems, as when a prisoner makes up a religion and says that it requires him to eat steak for dinner, (I am not making that example up: see Theriault v. Silber, 453 F. Supp. 254, 260 (W.D. Tex. 1978)), or when people claim their religion requires then to engage in all sorts of illegal conduct, such as human sacrifice or child rape. Fraser puts these off the table---but on what grounds? "Compelling interest"? That's an awfully vague answer. Again, it is vital to keep in mind that Smith does not in any way create "a system where believers will only be able to practice only with government consent." No. It does create a system in which people who receive government benefits must choose between forgoing that benefit or abiding by government conditions that they may find upsetting; it does create a system in which government may pass general laws that bother sincere religious persons; it does create an incentive for legislators to disguise their attacks on religion as "general" laws, as in the Hialeah case. But we have to make choices in life, and it does not seem to me to be a Constitutional violation when the government says "here is a general law which all must obey, and if your religion requires you to violate it, you don't get out of jail free." Nevertheless, I acknowledge there are serious problems with that holding and it does make me uncomfortable, because I do think we need to defend to the death each person's right to disagree.

Timothy Sandefur · 22 February 2005

Colin's comment unfairly characterizes Justice Thomas' opinion in Zelman. Those interested can read the opinion here. Thomas clearly states that

in the context of the Establishment Clause, it may well be that state action should be evaluated on different terms than similar action by the Federal Government. 'States, while bound to observe strict neutrality, should be freer to experiment with involvement [in religion]--on a neutral basis--than the Federal Government.' Thus, while the Federal Government may 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion,' the States may pass laws that include or touch on religious matters so long as these laws do not impede free exercise rights or any other individual religious liberty interest.... Whatever the textual and historical merits of incorporating the Establishment Clause, I can accept that the Fourteenth Amendment protects religious liberty rights....

(emphasis added). This is rather different from suggesting that states "should be free to undisestablishmentize themselves and get right with Jesus." In fact, it is exactly the opposite from such a suggestion, and Colin ought to know better than to mischaracterize Justice Thomas' views in this way.

Colin · 22 February 2005

In fact, [Justice Thomas' view] is exactly the opposite from such a suggestion, and Colin ought to know better than to mischaracterize Justice Thomas’ views in this way.

— Timothy
I stand by my characterization. I should note, though, that neither "undisestablishmentize" nor "get right with Jesus" are legal terms of art, and I accordingly reserve the right to define (or re-define) them however I please, at any time that is convenient to me. In other words, I wasn't worried much about detail or precision. My basic point is that Thomas is hostile to the [entirely correct, socially responsible, and beloved by God] idea that the Establishment Clause is applied to the states by the 14th Amendment. I see a lot less in that excerpted passage than you do. Or, at least, what I see is not reassuring at all. To me, and I think to Thomas, what he's saying is that he's willing to live with free exercise incorporation. I'm not worried about Thomas' stance on free exercise - it's his establishment jurisprudence that I find troubling. Hence, my concern that he's willing to let states "undisestablishmentize" themselves. Do I really think he'd let Texas set up the Official Texas Baptist Congregation? No... Probably not. But that's not how the question will come up, is it? The devil is in the details, and Thomas' idea of 'establishment,' especially as applied against the states, isn't nearly enough of a wall between church and state to suit me. Moreover, I'd stress different parts of that passage. I deeply question Thomas' idea of "strict neutrality" - I wonder if he thinks neutrality is necessary as between Christian denominations, or between Christian and non-Christian faiths, or between religion and non-religion? Whatever his approach is, I get the feeling I wouldn't like it much. For instance, when he says that "the States may pass laws that include or touch on religious matters so long as these laws do not impede free exercise rights or any other individual religious liberty interest" I don't think he's including the right to be free of religion. What's the practical impact? I don't know, especially since he's moderated by the rest of the Court. But my original, albeit too-sarcastic and too-shallow point remains: Thomas is much, much too permissive on establishment clause jurisprudence. To whit, he doesn't think that it binds the states. I strongly disagree.

Timothy Sandefur · 22 February 2005

What Colin "stand by" is a brazen (and, it appears, admitted) misrepresentation of Justice Thomas' opinion, and one which can be easily dispelled by actually reading the opinion fairly. If we are going to debate constitutional law, it is important to "worr[y] much about detail [and] precision," and to be honest about what one's opponents really say and really believe. Like Prof. Amar, Justice Thomas is essentially arguing that what is wrong about the establishment of religion is that it violates the freedom of conscience---that is, that the individual injury that arises from an establishment of religion is a type of free exercise violation. When I am forced to support an established church, the harm I experience is the fact that my right to freely exercise my religion is being violated. Thus when Thomas says that he believes "States may pass laws that include or touch on religious matters so long as these laws do not impede free exercise rights or any other individual religious liberty interest," that would mean that states would be forbidden from establishing religion. This accounts for Colin's confusion with regard to Thomas' views of free exercise and establishment. I leave it as an exercise for the reader: what injury is caused by establishment that is not already addressed by the free exercise clause? I am not saying I agree with Thomas; I do not know if I do or not. But these are fair questions, and deserve respectful treatment. Note that Colin can point to absolutely no evidence to substantiate his "concern that [Thomas is] willing to let states 'undisestablishmentize' themselves." That fact, combined with his admission that he is not "worried much about detail or precision" seriously undermines his characterization of Thomas' views. If "[t]he devil is in the details," we have a right to expect details from Colin. Perhaps it is true that "Thomas' idea of 'establishment,' especially as applied against the states, isn't nearly enough of a wall between church and state," but we would first need a fair assessment of what Thomas' idea of establishment is; second, we would need an answer to the question I've posed above. I see nothing in Zelman to suggest that Thomas "doesn't think that [the Establishment Clause] binds the states." Instead, what I see is the following:

Whether and how this Clause should constrain state action under the Fourteenth Amendment is a more difficult question . . . . Consequently, in the context of the Establishment Clause, it may well be that state action should be evaluated on different terms than similar action by the Federal Government. "States, while bound to observe strict neutrality, should be freer to experiment with involvement [in religion]---on a neutral basis---than the Federal Government." Thus, while the Federal Government may "make no law respecting an establishment of religion," the States may pass laws that include or touch on religious matters so long as these laws do not impede free exercise rights or any other individual religious liberty interest . . . . Whatever the textual and historical merits of incorporating the Establishment Clause, I can accept that the Fourteenth Amendment protects religious liberty rights.

(citations omitted). I have shown above that Thomas is absolutely correct to say that the incorporation of the Establishment Clause is a more difficult question than has previously been admitted. Any person who can find in the passage I have quoted (or those I have not) any evidence that Thomas would be "willing to let states 'undisestablishmentize' themselves" or that he "doesn't think that [the Establishment Clause] binds the states" is reading such things into an opinion that are not there. What the motives for doing so could be, I shall not speculate.

Ed Darrell · 23 February 2005

Mr. Sandefur said:

I do not understand Mr. Darrell's argument that "the states lack the authority to expressly support religion from the federal Constitution . . . there is no federal or state constitutional well from which anyone could draw the authority to have government do the churches' jobs" The states obtain their sovereignty from the people within that state. While the federal government has only that authority that is granted in Article I section 8 of the Constitution, the states are generally believed to have all legitimate political authority that is not denied them. What is not denied is permitted for states; what is not permitted is denied to the federal government. I have serious qualms with this interpretation, but it is by far the prevailing interpretation. And if it is not---if Mr. Darrell is right that there must be some federal or state constitutional well from which to draw the authority to have the government do the church's job---then whence do states draw the authority to run a public education system (which was inn many places traditionally seen as the church's job)? In American history, government-run education has been seen as one of those unspecified general political powers which states may exercise because it is not explicitly denied them. Mr. Darrell seems to have led himself into a contradiction.

I don't have the time right now to provide the response Mr. Sandefur's piece deserves. He's right -- the prevailing belief among legal scholars, especially conservative ones, is that the states at some time after 1789 had the right to establish churches, and so the First Amendment may be limited in some way. I'll summarize my argument by pointing out that the trend to religious freedom has been away from established churches in the states since they were disestablished in 1778. No state ever acted to reverse that action. The argument that the states had the right after 1789 rests on the erroneous assumption that states had fully established churches in 1787 and 1789. But that is not the case. At best there were established churches in four states; a closer examination shows that none of the four was a fully-established church. I regret I was unclear. What I meant is that states were not delegated any authority from the federal Constitution to do anything in religion. A careful study of the constitutions of the states will show that the people did not delegate such powers to the states, in the state constitutions, either. The states since 1787 have never had the right to establish a church. Had the First Amendment been intended to reserve that right for the states, it would have had to specifically grant such a right first, because such a right did not exist for them at the time. In sum, the states cannot rely on a federal delegation to dabble in religion. Nor has any state been delegated that power from its people in the state constitutions. Consequently, there simply is no authority that any government at any level has to dabble in religion. Madison was clear, there is no legitimate political authority for any government over religion. The state constitutions are clear. The federal charter is clear. I'm not sure where anybody got the idea it was otherwise. History's trend on religious freedom is one-way. The comparison of education to the right to be free from government interference in faith issues is a non-starter for me. There is no right to be ignorant for most purposes, to pose against the right of a citizen to be free from government interference in religion. The very idea is bizarre. While it is true that churches urged education, and sometimes provided it, there is no inherent reason that education should be considered a religious act. In fact, the "founders" were quite clear that freedom of religion rests on education, in the various Northwest Ordinances for example, where education is "encouraged" in order to promote a general trend to morality. Jefferson was more direct, perhaps, when he noted that people who could read scriptures for themselves could not be held in bondage by a priestly class who interpreted scriptures to an illiterate people. Education in the U.S. was tending toward civicly-provided, secular education by 1750. That trend also did not change. In any case, several state constitutions specifically delegate powers in education issues to the state governments. I see no contradiction where education is specifically delegated to the government and religion is not. The duties of the states are clear: Do what the people delegated to them to get done. On the issue of stickers, I think we agree: States don't have the authority to order a sticker in books for religious reasons. Whether they've lacked that authority since 1778 or since the 14th Amendment, they lack it now. Your stuff is always good, Mr. Sandefur, and you're always polite. I always learn something. But there are some other nits: Jefferson wrote the Statute for Religious Freedom in 1779 according to his notes; it was passed into law in 1786, the legislative session following Madison's petition we know as Memorial and Remonstrance. The proposal in Virginia in 1785 was not to disestablish, but to re-establish, since the state support for the church had been dropped in 1776 (with a few sticky issues on glebe lands hanging on). And, the views of Madison and Jefferson were obviously not in the minority -- they won a majority in Virginia, at Philadelphia, and they prevailed in the ratification of the First Amendment. None of those passed by a plurality, but instead by a supermajority in Congress and a supermajority of the state legislatures.

Colin · 23 February 2005

Wow, I had no idea that I was opening up a serious argument. I'm honestly a little surprised by the vigor of your response; my contribution was half-hearted and half tongue in cheek. Well, let me set out where I stand. My razzing about "unantidesestablishmentize" means that Thomas does not think that states are subject to the Establishment Clause, and that what I would call Establishment Clause violations could arise from that. In other words, Thomas wouldn't enforce the EC against the states, and the states would take advantage of the leeway. I assume our disagreement is more or less confined to the first part - my reading of Thomas' position. I don't think I'm misrepresenting him at all. You say, "I see nothing in Zelman to suggest that Thomas 'doesn't think that [the Establishment Clause] binds the states.'" I disagree, because I read Zelman differently. But it's a moot point, because Thomas is explicitly clear in Newdow. Thomas, in the first paragraph, writes: Because I agree with The Chief Justice that respondent Newdow has standing, I would take this opportunity to begin the process of rethinking the Establishment Clause. I would acknowledge that the Establishment Clause is a federalism provision, which, for this reason, resists incorporation. In the first paragraph of Section II, he continues: I accept that the Free Exercise Clause, which clearly protects an individual right, applies against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. But the Establishment Clause is another matter. The text and history of the Establishment Clause strongly suggest that it is a federalism provision intended to prevent Congress from interfering with state establishments. Thus, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, which does protect an individual right, it makes little sense to incorporate the Establishment Clause. (Citation to Zelman omitted.) I read "resists incorporation" as "does not bind the states." Accordingly, I stand by my statement. As far as I can tell, Thomas' position is essentially this:

Free Exercise is an individual right, and therefore rightly incorporated by the 14th Amendment. Establishment, though, is all about federalism, and it doesn't make sense to incorporate it. It would be meaningless, like trying to incorporate the Commerce Clause.

I see that, and it's not an insane argument. I don't agree with it, though. I think the Establishment Clause creates an individual right, however it was originally understood. Thomas acknowledges my opinion: The best argument in favor of incorporation would be that, by disabling Congress from establishing a national religion, the Clause protected an individual right, enforceable against the Federal Government, to be free from coercive federal establishments. Incorporation of this individual right, the argument goes, makes sense. I have alluded to this possibility before. (Citation to Zelman omitted again.) I think this is exactly right. The EC does create an individual right to be free of any religious institution invested with the power of law. If it wasn't written that way, then it has certainly come to embody a right that I believe is crucial to civil society. Is that the best-supported argument from a historical perspective? You would know better than I. But it's the approach that I feel is correct and responsible, and the one I want the Court to take. I agree with you that EC jurisprudence has to be a little different when applied against the states from its application against the federal government, but I don't think it's a significant problem. At least, it's a smaller problem than not incorporating the clause would cause. So, whereas you say my take on Thomas' view of incorporation is a "brazen" misrepresentation, I think it's exactly right. He doesn't think that the EC is incorporated by the 14th Amendment. Am I missing something? ___________________ Now, you seem to argue in your comment (please correct me if I'm misreading you) that incorporation of Free Exercise cures this, because it covers all the same potential violations. I really don't think that's right, for two reasons. First, I'd follow the lead of statutory construction pedantism and say that two clauses don't mean the same thing. (I realize that this argument is hot air if you assume that the EC is a federalism rule, but I don't, so it's worth mentioning.) One clause protects a citizen's right to worship freely, and another protects another set of rights. The right to be a citizen of a state unbeholden to religious interests, for example. They're related but very different rights. They blend together almost completely if you assume that "free exercise" means the right to not exercise, I suppose - then a citizen has the right to not have tax dollars applied to sectarian causes without a good secular reason. That's getting fuzzy, though, and I haven't thought it all the way through. Suffice it to say, for now, that I see the two clauses as protecting different rights, because FE isn't a negative right. I see FE and EC as the positive and negative sides of the same basic concept. Second, we're back to how a jurist like Thomas would see 'neutrality' in an EC situation. Now I don't know what Thomas' position is. I do know that a lot of conservative jurists see the necessary neutrality as being only between Christian denominations, or, more realistically, only between religion and non-religion. In other words, many jurists would say that the state is free to establish religion in general, so long as it doesn't favor one sect over another, but that it can favor religion over atheism. I think this is abhorrent, and I won't take the easy road out, which is arguing that atheism is essentially just another religion to be respected. I think atheism (or, more properly, anything outside the scope of "religion") is qualitatively different, and still entitled to protection. I'm *not* saying that Thomas takes any of the above positions, only demonstrating potential problems with an unincorporated EC. Now, those two points are muzzy, and lacking the details you so pointedly demand. I'll blame the lateness of the hour. You ask a simple question to bring out the important distinction, though, which is this - "[W]hat injury is caused by establishment that is not already addressed by the free exercise clause?" It's a good question, and I don't have a killer answer. My first instinct is that one answer would lie in the borders of ceremonial deism; when government crosses the line in recognizing a supreme being or beings, but doesn't commit serious resources to the recognition (I'm thinking particularly of donated monuments), what free exercise right has been violated? Certainly, if free exercise has a negative component, then that has been violated, but I'm not sure that there is a strong negative component. I see the negative side of free exercise as being more properly covered by the Establishment Clause, which was incorporated by the 14th Amendment along with the Free Exercise clause. In other words, if the State of Texas sticker on state textbooks that read "Be a Good American and Worship!" then Thomas would say, "That's not a free exercise violation, because no one is being prevented from worshipping as they please. And it's not an establishment violation, because Texas can't violate the Establishment Clause, because the EC only exists to protect Texas from federal incursion." I would say that that's an example of a harm that's not covered by the incorporated Free Exercise Clause, because I think that would violate the individual right to be free of state-supported religion. So that's my take. In short, I think I've accurately characterized Thomas' position, and I don't like it because it's different than mine. I apologize for any lack of detail; it's late and I'm tired and con law was never my specialty. I find the arguments about the historical nature of the EC interesting, if not dispositive, and I look forward to learning more about it. Thanks. Colin

Colin · 23 February 2005

Bah, I totally forgot to mention - I'm from Lubbock, the home of Texas Tech, and went to church across the street from the university for twenty years, give or take. Most of my religious education was from a priest who also taught philosophy there. It's a small world.

Timothy Sandefur · 23 February 2005

Mr. Darrell continues to argue that states had all ended their establishments by 1778. As I've said, that is not true. He says that "a closer examination shows that none of the four was a fully-established church," as though a church could be only partially established. That, however, is rather like being partially pregnant. In reality, Virginia abolished its established church only in 1785, Maryland maintained government control over the church until the 1780s; Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Vermont were still legally Congregationalist until 1789---and so forth. When Mr. Darrell says "states were not delegated any authority from the federal Constitution to do anything in religion," he repeats the error I have already discussed in connection with residual sovereignty. The states are not "delegated any authority" by the federal constitution to do anything, because (at least, prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment) states are not governments of delegated, enumerated powers. They are governments of residual powers, and may do anything not specifically prohibited, even if the authority does not appear in the state's constitution. It is on this ground that the states created government education systems. Note that the states are not "delegated any authority from the federal Constitution to do anything" in education, either, or to do anything in police, or sewer construction, or to pay people not to work. The federal government is delegated certain limited powers, and the states "reserve" any powers which are not delegated to the federal government. That means that the states may legitimately do anything that any government may, of right, do, and that they may constitutionally do anything that is not explicitly forbidden to them. What that means is that states can even get away with doing illegitimate things, in cases where the federal government has no authority to stop them from doing these things. So when Mr. Darrell says "[t]he states since 1787 have never had the right to establish a church," that can be taken two ways. As a matter of legitimacy, of course, that's true, because established religion is unjust, and no government has a right to establish religion. But the federal constitution does not appear to prohibit it, prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. So they could constitutionally get away with it. The First Amendment carefully only says that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion---wording intended to preserve the states' authority to maintain the established churches that existed until the 1830s in some places. Since states are not forbidden from establishing religion, the Tenth Amendment reserves that right to the states. I think it would be swell if we could say that the states had no authority to maintain established religions, but that only becomes true with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in the 1860s. And really, that ought to be good enough. So no, states "cannot rely on a federal delegation to dabble in religion," but they don't have to. States are not governments of enumerated, delegated powers. If states had to rely on federal delegation, then, again, where is the delegation of the authority to run a government education system? Mr. Darrell finds none, but simply asserts a startlingly untrue claim when he says "There is no right to be ignorant for most purposes . . . ." But that is not the case. There most certainly is a right to be ignorant for most purposes, and we all exercise that right on a daily basis. I am patently ignorant of almost every fact about Ed Darrell, and about most other things in the world---particle physics, the temperature in Denver right now, whether Michael Jackson is innocent or guilty of child molestation. I do not care to know these things, and I have a right to be ignorant about them. I even have the right to be ignorant about them for religious reasons, if I so choose. (It so happens that the only reason I choose to be ignorant about them is laziness and limited time, but that, too, is my right.) I am not intending only to be humorous. People most certainly do have the right to remain ignorant, particularly when the alternative is a government-run system of education that is very easily transformed into a mechanism of state indoctrination and propaganda. It is very easy for the government to force people to "learn" what they ought to "learn," including untrue things, or ideological things, on the grounds that they have no "right to be ignorant." But in any event, the question is this: if we must look for some specific delegation of power in the federal constitution to the states, if we are going to justify an exercise of state authority, where is the delegation of authority over education? Mr. Darrell switches to looking to the state constitution for such delegation now: "several state constitutions specifically delegate powers in education issues to the state governments." Well, sure! But several state constitutions also used to delegate authority over religion to state government (and vice versa) as well. The questions are (a) whether any legitimate government may exercise these powers, and (b) whether the federal constitution forbids the states from exercising them. As to the "nits,": "Jefferson wrote the Statute for Religious Freedom in 1779 according to his notes." No, it was written in 1777, while Jefferson was sitting on a committee to revise the laws of Virginia. This was the most productive period of his legislative life---it was also the same time that he wrote the Bill For The More General Diffusion of Knowledge (his public education bill) which failed to pass. See Alf Mapp, Thomas Jefferson: A Strange Case of Mistaken Identity 176 (1987). As to whether "the views of Madison and Jefferson were . . . in the minority" or not, I was not referring to the Statute of Virginia for Religious Freedom (which was, indeed, passed in 1786---my apologies for saying 1785), but to Madison's interpretation of the Establishment Clause as forbidding even chaplains in Congress. Although I agree with that interpretation, I do not know of any of his contemporaries who shared it. And, again, while the First Amendment received a supermajority, remember, it only says that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion---so that people who liked established religion could also support the amendment. Colin writes that he's surprised by the vigor of my responses. I do apologize for my confrontational tone of late. I've been trying to buy a house. I think that ought to excuse murder. But it's also very important for readers who are not familiar with the intricacies of constitutional law and might be led by the caricatures of Justice Thomas that appear so often in left-leaning sources, into thinking that he is a wild-eyed Yahoo seeking to reestablish religion and get right with Jesus---it's important for them to know that that is not the case, and that there is much substance to what he does say in Zelman. (By the way, I wrote half of a brief in Zelman; Justice Thomas appears to have at least partly relied on the other half of the brief, which was written by Prof. John Eastman, and which made the argument we've been discussing.) Anyway, Colin writes "Thomas wouldn't enforce the EC against the states, and the states would take advantage of the leeway." Again, it is not true that he would not enforce the Establishment Clause against the states. Justice Thomas would enforce the Establishment Clause against the state whenever a plaintiff could point to a violation of his individual rights by the state government. In cases where the plaintiff could not show such an injury, however, he would say that the state has more leeway to commit what we might call "Victimless Establishments," as where state education funds end up in the coffers of religious schools. This would indeed be "rethinking" of the Establishment Clause, which prohibits even "Victimless Establishments." In Newdow, Thomas writes that "the Establishment Clause, [if incorporated] . . . would probably cover little more than the Free Exercise Clause." This, of course, is quite sensible, since the Fourteenth Amendment specifically protects individual rights against violations by state governments. It does not place any specific limits on state government beyond that. The Amendment forbids the states from abridging the privileges or immunities of citizenship, or depriving a person of life, liberty or property without due process. It does not, however, say that a state may not establish a church, if such an establishment doesn't deprive a citizen of privileges or immunities, or life, liberty or property without due process. So, suppose the state government passes a recommendation that people observe a day of religious thanksgiving. The question would be, does that deprive a citizen of liberty without due process? Does it deprive a citizen of privileges or immunities? What's important is not how you answer that question, but rather that we recognize that that question is the same as the Free Exercise question. That is, the injuries protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are the same injuries protected by the Free Exercise Clause. That's why "the Free Exercise is an individual right, and therefore rightly incorporated by the 14th Amendment. Establishment, though, is all about federalism, and it doesn't make sense to incorporate it. It would be meaningless, like trying to incorporate the Commerce Clause." That's very well put, and indeed it is not insane. I think it is wrong to "read 'resists incorporation' as 'does not bind the states.'" But even if it does mean that, the question isn't whether the conclusion is unpleasant, but whether it is correct, and it certainly is true that the Establishment Clause resists incorporation---Colin admits it is not insane. The Establishment Clause says Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. But states must make laws "respecting an establishment of religion," one way or the other---either creating such an establishment or abolishing such an establishment. Literal incorporation, as Prof. Amar explains, and Colin admits, makes no sense. Colin is right to see that this raises the spectre of reducing the Establishment Clause to redundancy, but there are two answers to that: first, as he says, the Clause was intended as a federalism rule. Second, however, as Amar argues, by the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, the Establishment Clause had come to be seen as an individual right---that is, even "Victimless Establishments" were considered violations of individual liberty, and therefore, the absence of Establishment was seen as one of the privileges or immunities of citizenship. Colin comes up to this argument, then, when he says "I think the Establishment Clause creates an individual right, however it was originally understood." Aha! That is good, because, again, the Fourteenth Amendment protects individual rights, not particular government structures. The next question is, what individual right is at issue here that is not already covered by the Free Exercise Clause? Colin refers to "an individual right to be free of any religious institution invested with the power of law." But that's already protected by the Free Exercise Clause: if the government tells me how to pray, then it's violating my right to free exercise.

One clause protects a citizen's right to worship freely, and another protects another set of rights. The right to be a citizen of a state unbeholden to religious interests, for example. They're related but very different rights. They blend together almost completely if you assume that "free exercise" means the right to not exercise, I suppose---then a citizen has the right to not have tax dollars applied to sectarian causes without a good secular reason. That's getting fuzzy, though, and I haven't thought it all the way through. Suffice it to say, for now, that I see the two clauses as protecting different rights, because FE isn't a negative right. I see FE and EC as the positive and negative sides of the same basic concept.

Now that is excellent legal reasoning. What we need---and what Prof. Amar has come close to providing---is a non-fuzzy understanding of an individual right protected by the Establishment Clause that is not already protected by the Free Exercise Clause. The right to be unbeholden to religious interests in some general sense---or, rather, the right not to have one's tax money support a religion one despises---had come, Amar argues, to be seen as an individual right by 1868, and therefore, as one of the privileges or immunities of citizenship. And that is how an honest incorporation of the Establishment Clause ought to work, if it is to work at all. What Colin says about "neutrality" is correct: "a lot of conservative jurists see the necessary neutrality as being only between Christian denominations." That troubles me, as well, and I think it's unworkable because in the end it begs the question. (Is Mormonism a "sect" of Christianity or a separate religion? What about Unitarianism? Or liberal Quakerism?) It is indeed "abhorrent," that some would allow states to establish "religion in general," whatever that would mean. (Is the Trinity religion in general, or only the creed of a particular sect? What about the existence of a supernatural god?) As an atheist, and a libertarian, I very strongly believe that government should not be doing anything that has anything to do with religion. But it is very important that we keep in mind that the law is not what we "feel is correct and responsible, and [what we] want the Court to [do]." Again, I apologize for my hostile tone. I'm only cruel because I love you all, you see? It hurts me more than it hurts you. In the end, Colin, who once said that Thomas "think that this whole 'rights' business has just gone too far, and that the states should be free to undisestablishmentize themselves and get right with Jesus," now says that he "agree with [Thomas] that EC jurisprudence has to be a little different when applied against the states from its application against the federal government." (Mr. Burns voice) Excellent. (/Mr. Burns voice)

Ed Darrell · 23 February 2005

Mr. Sandefur said:

So when Mr. Darrell says "[t]he states since 1787 have never had the right to establish a church," that can be taken two ways. As a matter of legitimacy, of course, that's true, because established religion is unjust, and no government has a right to establish religion. But the federal constitution does not appear to prohibit it, prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. So they could constitutionally get away with it. The First Amendment carefully only says that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion---wording intended to preserve the states' authority to maintain the established churches that existed until the 1830s in some places. Since states are not forbidden from establishing religion, the Tenth Amendment reserves that right to the states. I think it would be swell if we could say that the states had no authority to maintain established religions, but that only becomes true with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in the 1860s. And really, that ought to be good enough.

The federal constitution prohibited established churches in the states by the simple method of failing to delegate that authority from the citizens to the states. There is nothing in Article IV that grants a state the right, privilege or duty of establishing a church. Claims that such a right exists rely on some ghost article that no one has ever seen, even in spectre form. No established churches existed after 1778, if we include the trappings of establishment such as appropriations from the public coffers, formal roles in government, specific grants of land for churches, etc. The ONLY vestige of establishment that existed after 1787 was that four states would, if the taxpayer consented, act as a pass through for tithes. Is that an establishment of religion? How does that differ from granting a tax deduction to a citizen for contributing to a church, in substance? Are we next to hear, as the reconstructionists have on occasion argued, that such tax deductions are, indeed, establishments? Unworkable, as well as bizarre. What other powers did these established churches have? Where is the legislation? Only Massachusetts had even that single-hair-of-the-head establishment after 1816. And for what it's worth, John Adams and other Massachusetts "founders" fought to get rid of that -- indicating once again that there was broad agreement that government and church should not be mixed. Since the states did NOT have established churches in 1787, nor the power to establish them, if the Congress had intended to "preserve" such a right in the First Amendment, they would have had first to have spelled out what the right was. But instead of listing such a right to the states, the amendment instead lists religious freedoms as belonging to citizens. Then it says these rights are so sacred that Congress cannot legislate in the area. Where in the First Amendment is there any "preservation" of state churches? Certainly not in the plain language. If you have any legislation passed by any legislature after 1778 which re-established a church, I'd like to see it with references. I've been looking for years. Ours is a limited government. It may do only what it is delegated from the people. It is true that there is no prohibition on states establishing churches -- there doesn't have to be. In a limited government where the government can only do what is delegated to it, there must first be a delegation of such authority before it could be banned. Where is that delegation? It doesn't exist.

Colin · 23 February 2005

You certainly don't have anything to apologize for - you've been as polite and respectful as ever. I was merely surprised at having off-the-cuff comments taken so seriously. I realize that Thomas is often caricatured, and while I don't think he's incompetent, evil, or insane, I certainly don't like his jurisprudence. That's as much a political disagreement as jurisprudential, I suppose. I still believe that Thomas is much too lax when it comes to enforcing the separation of church and state on both the federal and the state levels. Thus, when you quote me:

Colin, who once said that Thomas "think that this whole 'rights' business has just gone too far, and that the states should be free to undisestablishmentize themselves and get right with Jesus," now says that he "agree with [Thomas] that EC jurisprudence has to be a little different when applied against the states from its application against the federal government."

I don't think there's any dissonance there. Ignoring the flippant tone of my first remark, I basically said that Thomas is too eager to ignore the evolved understanding of the Establishment Clause and too willing to see states commit themselves to public religiosity. I agree with him that the EC needs to be handled differently, because of its wording (and, as I'm learning from you, its history), but I still disagree with how it should be incorporated. I think it should be, Thomas doesn't. It looks like we agree more than we disagree, in general. I'm a little more hesitant to accept that FE covers all potential individual liberty harms; I see a class of harms that only EC can cover, especially if we look at how a judge like Thomas interprets FE. I'm not sure what you mean when you say that "it is not true that he would not enforce the Establishment Clause against the states." Isn't his position explicit? He pretty much comes out and says, "I would not enforce the EC against the states, because the EC is only meant to apply on behalf of the states against the federal government." Any time that he enforced an individual right against a state establishment, he would call it a Free Exercise action. (And I think he would be right some of the time, but that he would protect that right much too rarely - Thomas seems to think, from Newdow, that "the kind of coercion implicated by the Religion Clauses is that accomplished 'by force of law and threat of penalty,' whereas I would say that softer Newdow-like coercion is also a real concern.) To pick an example, I think Thomas would say that a giant monument on the state capitol steps that said "GOD RULES AMERICA" would be constitutional. He would say, I think, that it can't be a FE violation because (a) no one is prohibited from worshipping and (b) there's no coersion involved. I would call it an EC violation, because the state is using its power to establish a religion, and in effect co-opting my voice and my support as a citizen for its religious position. Now, I admit that a (large) part of my position is more political and philosophical than jurisprudential. I want the EC to be incorporated. But I believe that it has been, and the Court's precedent seems to agree for now. It may be, and from your argument it sounds like it probably is, the case that the incorporation is imperfect and based on a shaky understanding of what the EC means after incorporation, and how it works differently against the states as against the federal government. I would like to see more precedent on this, and obviously I need to read Amar. But I think Thomas is the wrong Justice to help us rationalize EC jurisprudence; I think he would take us in the wrong direction, for the wrong reasons. In short, this is how I see religious freedom after the 14th Amendment: FE is both positive and negative: it covers the positive right of individuals to worship as they please, and the negative right to not be coerced into worshipping in a particular way. But "worship" doesn't include, to me, walking by a Decalogue monument or reading a disclaimed biology textbook. EC is purely negative: it covers the right of a citizen to be unbeholden to religion. It would also cover the right to not be coerced into worship, but it stretches farther than that - for instance, it forces the state to remain neutral as between religious and non-religious interests, and prohibits the expenditure of state resources on religious causes. The two clauses reach different rights, in different directions, but meet in the middle, where the both cover the most important freedom: freedom from being forced to worship. (I see that as more important than freedom to worship, mostly for irrelevant practical reasons.) This is both what I "feel is correct and responsible, and what I want the Court to do," and what I feel the law is. You are correct, of course, that those are different things, but I think they dovetail here. (There is some separation. I would like to see the wall of separation cut government off from even ceremonial deism, but I don't think that the Constitution compels that outcome as it has been interpreted to date.) I'm enjoying the discussion very much; please, don't hold back on the vigor. I'll refrain from caricaturing Justice Thomas; for instance, I won't even mention the persistant rumor that he devours live human babies during oral arguments. As far as I know, there's no actual proof that he's a flesh-eating ogre. In all seriousness, I concede that he's a better jurist and not as radical as many of my fellow liberals paint him to be. But I still don't like his EC jurisprudence.

Timothy Sandefur · 23 February 2005

I've explained already why Mr. Darrell fundamentally misunderstands the Constitution. He says "The federal constitution prohibited established churches in the states by the simple method of failing to delegate that authority from the citizens to the states." But the federal constitution does not delegate any authority from the citizens to the states. That's not its job. It delegates authority to the federal government. But the federal constitution is not intended to delegate authority of any sort from citizens to their states; states receive their authority from state constitutions, not from the federal constitutions. States may exercise any authority that is not forbidden by the Federal Constitution, and they receive that authority from their citizens directly, not from any intermediary federal step.

Further, Mr. Darrell says "if the Congress had intended to 'preserve' [a state's authority to establish a church] in the First Amendment, they would have had first to have spelled [that] out...." But, of course, they did spell it out. They wrote "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion," which forbade the federal government from disestablishing churches. That's the plain language. If the First Amendment forbade states from establishing churches, it would have said "Congress and the states may not establish religion." Instead it forbids Congress from writing a law to disestablish a state's church, and then it reserves all powers not prohibited, to the states.

Mr. Darrell is of course right that "Ours is a limited government." But it is limited in two ways. First, by our natural rights---no government may ever violate natural rights. But that doesn't mean that the federal government has the authority to interfere when a state does violate natural rights. It only has the authority to do so under the Fourteenth Amendment. The second way that government is limited is through the enumeration of powers. But this applies only to the federal government: the federal government is one of enumerated limited powers. States are not. They are governments of all residual sovereignty. That means that they are limited only by natural rights, as well as the specific prohibitions in the federal Constitution or the state Constitutions. But they may do anything not forbidden, while the federal government may do only what is permitted.

Let us pause to make sure we use our terms clearly. All governments are governments of delegated powers from the people, because all just government rests on the consent of the governed. All governments are governments of limited powers, because our natural rights limit all government. (As the Declaration says, the just powers of government rest on the consent of the governed.) Not all governments are governments of enumerated powers. Only the federal government is. The states do not receive their powers by delegation from the federal Constitution at all---it exists only to specify the powers of the federal government, not the states; instead, state governments receive their powers by delegation from the people within that state, via the state constitution. And the people are free to put whatever they want in their state constitutions so long as it does not violate the Federal Constitution or natural rights.

Jon Rowe · 23 February 2005

I've been skimming this topic here b/c it interests me. I'll read it in more detail later.

I'd like to publish something about this, but I'm not sure if I have the intellectual prowess to write anything that will make a difference. Or perhaps my ideas have been done already by other people, probably much more qualified than I.

Here's how I see it: I agree with the "victimless" framework regarding the establishment clause. That, in order for the EC properly to be incorporated, it must related to an individual right.

However, LIBERTY rights are not the only rights properly incorporated and protected; EQUALITY rights are properly incorporated as well. When our founders spoke of unalienable rights, they typically grouped Liberty with Equality. And in Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, he makes it clear that all men, by nature, possess unalienable Free AND Equal rights of conscience.

I know Phillip Hamburger and Noah Feldman have argued against this interpretation. And they may be just too above me for me to be able to refute them. And refuting them certainly requires accepting natural law as binding -- that men by nature have free and equal rights. Otherwise if we simply look to dominant opinion, we might rightly conclude that the populace didn't think so highly of equality back then. But Justice Thomas DOES accept natural law.

When I saw Phillip Hamburger speak at Princeton, he noted, that "the Establishment Clause is not an equal protection clause" to which another speaker replied -- and this was one of the wittiest retorts I've ever heard -- "yes, but the equal protection clause IS an equal protection clause."

And this reflects what Amar wrote in his book on the Bill of Rights that even if the EC is not properly incorporated, much of what the Court has that clause doing would be proper under both the Free Exercise AND the equal protection clauses, both of which reflect the natural fact that men have unalienable free AND equal rights of conscience.

That's my argument.

Fraser · 24 February 2005

Why bar religions calling for human sacrifice or child rape? Seriously. Why are they excluded?>>

I find this as silly as the religious arguments that teaching evolution is the first step to locking up Christians in concentration camps.

Simply, the right of religious freedom doesn't allow anyone to trample on anyone else's rights. No forced conversions, no murder, no stoning of unbelievers. I don't see that as conflicting with my views at all.

If someone wanted to be a human sacrifice for some reason .... trickier question. After all, Jehovah's Witnesses are allowed to refuse blood transfusions, even at the cost of their life (which isn't the same thing as letting someone kill them but you get my point).

Tim, you say that the "compelling interest" standard is "an awfully vague answer." True, it's not a nice, clear standard, but the fact is it worked: It was the operating standard from about 1973 to Smith and we didn't see the country slide into chaos with people everywhere slipping out from under the laws with fake cries of "religious freedom!" (We did see more infringement of religious practice than I'd like, but that's a separate problem). So the actual evidence indicates this is not the unworkable system you worry it is (including religious claims by prisoners).

<< Plus, keep in mind that Smith does not, I repeat, does not allow government to "decide which religious practices are acceptable." Government has absolutely no authority to do that, before or after Smith. Instead, that decision addresses whether government must grant special treatment to persons on the grounds that their religion requires it. The question arises when government passes a general law that has nothing to do with religion, but which a person finds objectionable because of his religion---for instance, when the government bans hats, but a Hindu needs to wear a headdress; or when the government requires all children to attend public school, but the Amish say this contradicts their religion. Under what circumstances is government required to accomodate the needs of those with special religious sensitivities? That is what Smith addresses. It does not address whether the government may decide which religious practices are acceptable. >>

In theory, yes. In practice, you're wrong. If someone wanted to ban Santeria in their community, they could do so if they didn't mind restricting other forms of public animal killing (Hialeah's mistake was that it exempted every conceivable kind of killing except Santeria services). Or discourage Wiccans by restricting religious ceremonies outdoors, perhaps. Or decide zoning won't allow Orthodox Jews to hold prayer services in their homes (if nobody else in the community does the same, that means a town can pass a general ban that still targets only Jews). Or allow religious buildings in certain zoning only on a case-by-case basis (as some communities have done, thereby making it easier to discriminate).

Or of course pass a bill and selectively enforce it only against some religious practices. So I find your solution a lot less workable in practice than mine is.

<>

That is absolutely what it does, in practice if not in theory.

<<. But we have to make choices in life, and it does not seem to me to be a Constitutional violation when the government says "here is a general law which all must obey, and if your religion requires you to violate it, you don't get out of jail free.">>

As I've said, here we disagree. And as I've pointed out, the state and federal Religious Freedom Acts shift this off the Constitutional playing field--do you object to the principle in that case (I'm guessing yes, but I don't know)?

I agree with you though, there is no perfect solution on this issue. So what else is new?

Timothy Sandefur · 24 February 2005

Fraser says that under Smith, "[ i]f someone wanted to ban Santeria in their community, they could do so if they didn't mind restricting other forms of public animal killing (Hialeah's mistake was that it exempted every conceivable kind of killing except Santeria services)." Yes, that may be true. To clarify for those who may just be joining us, Smith holds that

the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a "valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."

Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (citation omitted). By a "neutral law of general applicability," is meant a law that is not a disguised attempt to persecute a particular religion. In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), the Court found that a law banning animal sacrifice was not a "neutral law of general applicability" because, although it appeared neutral, it was in reality an attempt to ban a particular religious practice, and therefore a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. In making that determination, the Court relied strongly on evidence from the legislative history---that many of the city council members had explicitly declared that they wanted to ban Santeria sacrifice. In other words, Smith and Hialeah together create an incentive for clever legislatures to write laws aimed at particular religious practices but drawn in seemingly neutral language, and then to keep their mouths shut in public about their true intentions. If they're good enough at that, as Fraser says, the legislature could effectively ban a particular practice. (Let's quickly note, however, that Hialeah presented a slightly different scenario than Smith in one regard: in Smith, the citizen was seeking a benefit from the government, which the government denied because it places conditions on the receipt of those benefits, and the citizen did not comply with those conditions, for religious reasons. In Hialeah, the government criminalized certain conduct outright. That's different than a case involving conditions on the receipt of benefits. See also Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004)). This, however, is not something that can be effectively banned even in a world that does not include Smith. If legislatures are clever enough, they can do all sorts of damage to constitutional principles. And the alternative still seems to present more mischief: if the First Amendment does "relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes),'" then the government's laws, even the most sensible laws, would be unenforceable any time a citizen plausibly claimed that his religion required him to engage in an act that is against the law. Fraser says that it's silly for me to question the issue of human sacrifice and child rape. But consider what he is saying: it is legitimate to ban these practices because "the right of religious freedom doesn't allow anyone to trample on anyone else's rights." Obviously I myself agree with that principle, but suppose that someone doesn't, for religious reasons. Suppose his religion teaches him that women have no rights, and that it is his duty to murder his wife under certain circumstances. (Stranger things are believed.) If Fraser is willing to prosecute this man for murder anyway, he can do so only on the principle that the First Amendment does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability. In other words, if you believe in an overarching principle (such as individual rights) which cannot be evaded by appeal to one's religious beliefs, then you are saying that there are some rules of conduct which a person cannot evade simply by claiming a religious exemption---which is, of course, is just what Smith says. Finally, as to the religious freedom acts---the Religious Freedom Restoration Act which was held unconstitutional in the City of Boerne case, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the constitutionality of which is currently under review---I haven't made up my mind. Those cases involve a different issue: namely, whether Congress has the power under the Fourteenth Amendment to increase legal protections for certain rights, or whether doing so is a violation of separation of powers. At a basic level, I am very much in favor of wide Congressional authority under the Fourteenth Amendment---wider than most libertarians would be comfortable with, I suspect. But the City of Boerne rationale does seem to make sense to me. So I'm not sure, but at the moment I lean in favor of the constitutionality of those acts---which is not the same thing as thinking that they (a) embody principles already found in the First Amendment (which I do not believe) or (b) that they are a good idea (which I don't know).

Mike S. · 24 February 2005

I agree with this, and I think violations of this principle are not only unjust, but unwise, as historical experience has demonstrated.

— Timothy Sandefur
I was a bit too cavalier in my comment about states establishing churches. I too, think it would be unjust and unwise (and said almost as much above, although I also said I would "have no problem with it"). I meant "have no constitutional problem with it. (Although that is probably too cavalier even with the modifier.) I think the subsequent exchanges are in agreement that it would be (although I didn't read everything carefully), but in any case it would appear that it isn't an obvious conclusion. I still don't get the connection between legislation and school board decisions, though. Everyone seems to think there's a simple link (i.e. "it's an arm of the government"). But it still seems like a long stretch, to me.

Chad Edgington · 13 March 2005

Thank you for the review of my article.

Chad Edgington · 13 March 2005

Zachary Hall emailed me the following after he was unable to post a comment to the site. Since I was able to I will post his email.
I might add that I do not consider myself a rising star of the legal community, but I do thank Zak for his kind words.
-Chad

"Well, I tried to post a comment, but I couldn't, because I don't belong to the online community that sponsors the website. Here's what I was going to post:

As a former member of the Executive Board of the Texas Tech Law Review, I just need to say that the selection and editing process at our law review is very thorough, and includes editing for substance at the front end of the process. We do not select articles for publication that make weak arguments. Mr. Edgington's article was well-researched, well-written, and made some excellent points.
Whether you agree with his position or not, Mr. Edgington's article makes a great contribution to the evolution vs. creationism debate. We would not have published it if it didn't.
I strongly recommend that every person who has posted a comment on this review read the article for themselves, and not just rely on the review by Mr. Sandefur.
Mr. Edgington is a rising star in the legal community, and his article is excellent.

Zak Hall
Lead Articles Editor
Texas Tech Law Review, Volume 35"