Response to radio listener's questions

Posted 2 April 2005 by

↗ The current version of this post is on the live site: https://pandasthumb.org/archives/2005/04/response-to-rad.html

I was on Tom Conroy’s radio show ‘Conroy’s Public House’ last Wednesday (KLWN, 1320 AM in Lawrence, Kansas), along with lawyer John Calvert of the Intelligent Design network.  (I will report more on this as time allows.)

A listener sent this email to Tom with some questions for me, and Tom asked me to reply.  These are good questions which contain a number of important misconceptions about science,  Here are some brief responses.

The questions

A question of the man defending naturalism (Jack Krebbs) [actually Krebs]. He said that there was no scientific evidence for design. What scientific evidence can he point to that would point to naturalism? What scientific evidence can he present that demonstrates that something must be scientific in order to be true?  What scientific evidence is there that demonstrates that the scientific method brings true knowledge?

My answers

1.  I was not defending naturalism.  I was defending science.  As I pointed out on the show, millions of Christians and others accept science and also have religious beliefs: these two are not in conflict for most people.  The listener seems to have bought Calvert’s argument that science and naturalism are equivalent, but I certainly never said anything like that: in fact, I pointed to incontrovertible evidence (the beliefs of millions of people) that this equivalence is not true.

2.  I also did not say that ‘something must be scientific in order to be true.’  Again, the listener is assuming things based on his preconceptions rather than understanding commonly held perspectives on science.  Science produces a limited and tentative type of knowledge about the physical world.  Science does not claim that it can answer all types of questions — in fact, science clearly acknowledges that many questions are outside the realm of things it can investigate. Science does not address questions about how one ought to live, such as morals, values, emotions, aesthetic judgments, etc.; nor does science address questions about metaphysical entities or forces that might underlie the physical world, such as God, the human soul, Platonic ideals, etc.

3.  The listener asks, ‘What scientific evidence is there that demonstrates that the scientific method brings true knowledge?’  Obviously, this is a tautological question, as no system of belief can justify its own validity.  Science produces knowledge that the world in general has found to be practically useful.  Scientific knowledge is considered true ‘within the limits to which it has been tested and its scope of applicability’ (to quote a nice phrase from the Kansas science standards) because the methods which produce it have been successfully tested against additional empirical evidence, not because it claims any internal proof that it can provide Ultimate Truth.

4.  Last, the listener writes, ‘He [Krebs] said that there was no scientific evidence for design. What scientific evidence can he point to that would point to naturalism?’

There are a couple of issues here.  The first is that the Intelligent Design as advocated by the Intelligent Design movement is different than the more general theological claim of design.  Orthodox Christianity holds that everything is designed: everything that exists and happens reflects God’s will, purpose, and design for the world.  Science does not address this meaning of design.

Intelligent Design advocates makes a much more specific claim.  They claim that there is scientific evidence that certain parts of the biological world have been specifically designed by God — and by ‘specifically’ they mean God has intervened to produce things that natural processes, which God himself has created, were unable to produce.  This is an interventionist view of God that is in conflict with, or at least inconsistent with, the orthodox Christian viewpoint of design described above. The orthodox view is that God doesn’t need to perform a set of little miracles to manifest his design for the world, but Intelligent Design claims that scientific evidence for these interventions exists.

My claim is that the Intelligent Design movement has offered no scientific evidence of God’s intervention in this latter sense.

Conversely, I don’t claim that scientific evidence allows one to conclude naturalism.  Scientific evidence seems to continuely confirm that there is an internal causal consistency within the physical world, but that causal consistency can ‘point to’ either orthodox theism or naturalism, depending on other beliefs a person may hold.

Science cannot address the question of whether there is or isn’t a metaphysical foundation to the physical world, and thus is neutral on the subject of whether naturalism is true.

326 Comments

PvM · 2 April 2005

Very good article Jack. Too bad that ID is still using equivocation of naturalism and methodological naturalism, which started with Philip Johnson, to confuse and mislead their followers.
ID is scientifically vacuous, theologically risky and philosophically misleading.

Michael Finley · 2 April 2005

Too bad that ID is still using equivocation of naturalism and methodological naturalism....

— PvM
That method influences (perhaps determines) belief cannot be denied; this is standard after Descartes. The results of the method reflect the philosophical underpinnings of the method. Naturalism simpliciter is a metaphysical position. If it is adopted for methodological reasons, the results of that method will bear the stamp of the metaphysical position.

Russell · 2 April 2005

So, Michael Finley, do infer correctly that you endorse the Discovery Institute's notion that we should abandon naturalism* as a foundation of science?

*(Note the lack of adjective, philosophical or methodological, as, I gather, you don't really distinguish)

PvM · 2 April 2005

The problem is that by conflating naturalism and methodological naturalism, the impression is given, no in fact this suggestion is created, that the scientific method contradicts religious beliefs. However, science is clear about its limitations and thus cannot address issues of religious faith. To suggest that naturalism simpliciter is adopted for methodological reasons, misses the point. Naturalism simpliciter is NOT adopted.

Methodological and Philosophical Naturalism

Methodological Naturalism and Philosophical Naturalism: Clarifying the Connection (2000) by Barbara Forrest

Methodological Naturalism and the Supernatural (1997) with post-conference notes (updated 4-7-1997) by Mark I. Vuletic

Justifying Methodological Naturalism (2002) by Michael Martin

Confusing the scientific method with philosophical naturalism has been exploited by many creationists in their fervor to reject science. Lamoureux exposes much of these problems in Johnson's arguments in the book 'Darwinism defeated?".
Well worth reading.

Air Bear · 2 April 2005

Engineers, in their engineering work, rely strictly on naturalism. No supernatural forces, no appeal to unknown Intelligent Beings.

Yet, as far as I know, neither Michael Finley nor anyone else claims that engineering is atheist for sticking to naturalism.

MF is needlessly singling out science in his criticism. Does he rely strictly on naturalism when he drives his car? Does that betray the philosophical underpinnings of driving?

And Michael Finley's assertion that method determines philosophical underpinnings is given the lie by the fact that there are many, many religious engineers, and some of their works can serve religious purposes, such as the great cathedrals of Europe.

Michael Finley · 2 April 2005

[do] you endorse the Discovery Institute's notion that we should abandon naturalism as a foundation of science?

— Russell
I endorse the notion that supernatural causes should not, in principle, be rejected as unscientific.

Note the lack of adjective, philosophical or methodological, as, I gather, you don't really distinguish.

The distinction between two kinds of naturalism is a confusion. Metaphysical or philosophical naturalism is unqualified naturalism, i.e., naturalism simpliciter. Methodological naturalism is the adoption of naturalism qua method. And if a method is naturalistic, the conclusions of that method will be naturalistic.

The problem is that by conflating naturalism and methodological naturalism, the impression is given ... that the scientific method contradicts religious beliefs. However, science is clear about its limitations and thus cannot address issues of religious faith.

— PvM
If a divine creator is a religious belief (and it may also be a metaphysical belief), and the scientific method excludes divine creation as a possible conclusion, then belief and method are in conflict. They can only be reconciled by some version of the scholastic "two truths" doctrine, i.e., there are scientific truths and theological truths, and never the twain shall meet. Such a division is implicit in your response.

To suggest that naturalism simpliciter is adopted for methodological reasons, misses the point. Naturalism simpliciter is NOT adopted.

The distinction between naturalism and naturalism as method does not free the method from its metaphysical roots. It is a method that, by definition, produces naturalistic conclusions, i.e., conclusions that depend on metaphysical naturalism (or some version of the "two truths" doctrine).

Michael Finley · 2 April 2005

Air Bear,

I have no problem with a science employing natural causes. It is the a priori exclusion of supernatural causes that I object to.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 2 April 2005

If it is adopted for methodological reasons, the results of that method will bear the stamp of the metaphysical position.

How dreadful. Would you mind showing everyone how a NON-methodologically-naturalist science can be done? Maybe an example can help. One claim made by many ID creationists explains the genetic similarity between humans and chimps by asserting that God supernaturally created both but used common features. Let's take this hypothesis and put it through the scientific method,shall we? (If you don't like this particular hypothesis, feel free to substitute ANY super-natural or non-materialist hypothesis that you DO like). 1. Observe some aspect of the universe. OK, so we observe that humans and chimps share unique genetic markers, including a broken vitamin C gene and, in humans, a fused chromosome that is identical to two of the chimp chromosomes (with all the appropriate doubled centromeres and telomeres). 2. Invent a tentative description, called a hypothesis, that is consistent with what you have observed. OK, the proposed ID hypothesis is "an intelligent designer used a common design to produce both chimps and humans, and that common design included placing the signs of a fused chromosome and a broken vitamin C gene in both products." If you have some OTHER non-naturalistic hypothesis that you'd like to use instead, please feel free to substitute it here. 3. Use the hypothesis to make predictions. Here is ID non-naturalistic methodology's chance to shine. What predictions can we make from ID's hypothesis. If an Intelligent Designer used a common design to produce both chimps and humans, then we would also expect to see . . . . . . . . . . . .? Fill in the blank. And, to better help us test ID's hypothesis, it's most useful to point out some negative predictions --- things which, if found, would FALSIFY the hypothesis and demonstrate conclusively that the hypothesis is wrong. So, then --- if we find (fill in the blank here), then the "common design" hypothesis would have to be rejected. 4. Test those predictions by experiments or further observations and modify the hypothesis in the light of your results. 5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 until there are no discrepancies between theory and experiment and/or observation. Well, we seem to be sort of stuck on step 3. Help us out here, IDers. Give us some testible predictions from your hypothesis. Tell us how to go about testing them. Or, would you rather than we just skip steps 3,4 and 5, and just take your religious word for it that your hypothesis must be true. Is that, after all, what ID is all about? Take note here --- there are NO limits imposed here on the nature of your predictions, other than the simple ones indicated by steps 3,4 and 5 (whatever predictions you make must be testible by experiments or further observations.) You are entirely free to invoke whatever deities or supernatural causes that you like, in whatever number you like, so long as you follow along to steps 3,4 and 5 and tell us how we can test these deities or causes using experiment or further observation. Want to tell us that the Good Witch Glenda used her magic non-naturalistic staff to POP these genetic sequences into both chimps and humans? Fine --- just tell us what experiment or observation we can perform to test that. Want to tell us that God didn't like humans very much and therefore decided to design us with broken vitamin C genes? Hey, works for me -- just as soon as you tell us what experiment or observation we can perform to test it. Feel entirely and totally free to use all the supernaturalistic causes that you like. Just tell us what experiment or observation we can perform to test your predictions. Let's throw methodological materialism right out the window. Gone. Bye-bye. Everything's fair game now. Ghosts, spirits, demons, devils, cosmic enlightenment, elves, pixies, magic star goats, whatever god-thing you like. Feel free to include and invoke all of them. As many as you need. Show us all how to apply the scientific method to whatever non-naturalistic science you choose to invoke in order to subject your hypothesis "genetic similarities between chimps and humans are the product of a common design" to the scientific method. Show us how your non-naturalistic science works and how the rest of us can apply it. I await with bated breath. Let the arm-waving begin.

George Felis · 2 April 2005

I have no problem with a science employing natural causes. It is the a priori exclusion of supernatural causes that I object to.

— Michael Finley
There is nothing a priori about the exclusion of supernatural causes. If one actually investigates cause and effect events in the universe, with as much critical thinking and self-honesty as possible, one finds no events inconsistent with natural causes. This is clearly an a posteriori CONCLUSION (as tentative and falsifiable as any other conclusion based on critical thinking and empirical investigation, not an a priori assumption. The accusation of a priori assumption is simply unsupported creationist cant. Quit parroting it.

Joe McFaul · 2 April 2005

Jack, your answers are superb. They exactly answer the questions posed and fairly address the underlying concerns of the questioner.
Very well done!

Too bad the Discovery Institute can't do the same.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 2 April 2005

I endorse the notion that supernatural causes should not, in principle, be rejected as unscientific.

Um, they're NOT. The scientific method consists of five easy steps: 1. Observe some aspect of the universe 2. Form a hypothesis that potentially explains what you have observed 3. Make testible predictions from that hypothesis 4. Make observations or experiments that can test those predictions 5. Modify your hypothesis until it is in accord with all observations and predictions Nothing in any of those five steps -- nothing at all whatsoever in any way shape or form -- precludes, excludes, rejects, kicks out, or in any other way limits the use of any "supernatural cuase" that you like. You are entirely free to invoke as many non-material pixies, ghosts, goddesses, demons, devils, djinis, and/or the Great Pumpkin, as many times as you like, in any or all of your hypotheses. And science won't (and doesn't) object to that in the slightest. Indeed, scientific experiments have been proposed (and carried out and published) on such "supernatural causes" as the effects of prayer on healing, as well as such "non-materialistic" or "non-natural" causes as ESP, telekinesis, precognition and "remote viewing". So your arm-waving claim that science rejects supernatural or non-material causes out of hand on principle, is demonstrably quite wrong. However, what science DOES require is that your supernatural or non-material hypothesis, whatever it might be, then be subjected to steps 3, 4 and 5. And **HERE** is where ID falls flat. It is NOT, repeat NOT, any "unfair rejection of supernaturalism" that stops ID dead in its tracks. It is ID's simple inability to make any testible predictions using its "supernatural cause" hypothesis -- any testible predictions at ALL -- that can be confirmed by experiment. Deep down inside, IDers are bitching and moaning NOT that science unfairly rejects their supernaturalistic explanations, but bitches and moans because science demands that those supernaturalistic explanations BE TESTED ACCORDING TO THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD. Not only can ID *not* test any of its, uh, explanations, but it doesn't WANT TO, and instead wants to modify science so it DOESN'T HAVE TO. In effect, the IDers want their supernaturalistic "hypotheses" to have a privileged position --- they want their hypotheses to be accepted by science WITHOUT being tested; they want to follow steps one and two of the scientific method, but NOT steps three, four or five. Me, I see *no* reason why the IDers should be so privileged. I see no reaosn why ID "hypotheses" should not follow the same scientific method as every OTHER hypothesis has to, no matter HOW holy and righteous the IDers think they are. So when IDers weep and whine to us about science unfairly rejecting their supernaturalistic explanations, they are just BS'ing us. That's NOT their real complaint. Their REAL complaint is that science demands their "hypotheses" be TESTED, and WILL NOT just accept their "hypothesis" on faith and the IDers holy say-so. THAT is what ID all boils down to.

Michael Finley · 2 April 2005

Mr. Flank,

How dreadful; you don't seem to recognize a philosophical discussion when you see it. Your rhetoric has gotten you quite ahead of the question. I suggest you slow down and return to the actual disucssion under way.

Scientific method is, of course, not a concern of science. It is not an empirical question. It is, rather, a metaphysical question. We are currently discussing whether or not scientific methodology must be naturalistic. Naturalism is also a metaphysical topic as well. So save your clever talk of chimps and humans for another day.

Emanuele Oriano · 2 April 2005

Of course, Rev. Otherwise, why would they insist that "it takes as much faith to believe in Evolution as it takes to believe in God"?

And they are completely oblivious to the irony of trying to "drag down" science by equating it with "faith" (something no sane theist would probably do).

Bruce Thompson · 2 April 2005

I think something is being missed when it is claimed the ID bunch has no test of their hypothesis. They routinely argue that they are only providing evidence of design and not information about the designer (old hat),but I think it is an important distinction. They can rightly claim that it is the prevue of the empirical sciences and not the theorists to provide testable hypotheses.
For example, their overall argument for the validity of the "scientific" basis of their model would go as follows: OBSERVATION Looking as bacterial flagella, it is to complex to have arisen by mutation and selection (critiqued in depth). GENERALIZATION There must be some agent at work producing all these complex structures. HYPOTHESIS There is an intelligent designer. ID theorists support this with theoretical framework showing how chance can be eliminated in the production of structures (critiqued in depth). Their theoretical framework only needs to provide evidence of a designer, not who/what the designer is/was. That's up to other scientists once ID is accepted, so arguments about the "designer" are irrelevant. Then finally, Baramologists using their version of cladistics show how organisms can be grouped according to "kinds" which are discontinuous. This supplies PREDICTIONS AND TESTS. The anti-evolutionist can now argue with even more conviction that they have provided a model, even though segments of that model have been discredited. It will be the testing methodology that will tie all the previous work back to the creationist foundations. Even with all the pleadings that ID is not rooted in the creationist tradition this last step would reveal the true goal of ID movement. Baraminology is clearly a YEC construct as demonstrated by a review of the current literature. Articles such as It's a horse, of course! reexamining equine phylogeny can seem almost reasonable. But in light of phrases like "biblicial systamatics" found in the references a reasoned critique requires a level of sophistication not found in many casual readers. Am I missing the mark?

Pete · 2 April 2005

M Finley says

Scientific method is, of course, not a concern of science. It is not an empirical question. It is, rather, a metaphysical question.

So, no trial & error was involved at arriving at the general method? A philosopher just decided, and scientists fell in line without concern over whether it works?

We are currently discussing whether or not scientific methodology must be naturalistic.

As it applies to science, naturalism just means following the evidence. As archaeology and forensic science show, science can easily deal with design, given appropriate evidence. What science must not do is partake of the DI's argument from ignorance.

Tom Clark · 2 April 2005

Finley supposes that mainstream science, which rejects ID, presumes naturalism and thus is philosophically biased against the supernatural. But as Flank admirably points out, science is perfectly capable of evaluating supernatural hypotheses, were any forthcoming. Science is a method for achieving reliable knowledge that makes no ontological assumptions one way or the other, even though some of its advocates talk about methodological naturalism in describing the scientific method. (I wish they wouldn't, since it gives folks like Finley a rhetorical opening.)

The sorts of entities and processes that science discovers, on the basis of evidence and experiment, are what we call the natural world. It isn't that there is some apriori quality attached to an entity or process that marks it out as natural in advance of scientific confirmation. Rather it's that the scientific method establishes what we can reliably say exists *independent* of ideology, religion, or philosophy, and it's this we call the natural.

I've responded to John Calvert, who made the same ill-begotten claims about science presuming naturalism, at http://www.naturalism.org/science.htm#truescience.

Emanuele Oriano · 2 April 2005

Mr. Thompson:

there is no way of knowing what is designed and what is not, except when we know the designer.

So, we have two categories of entities: those where we know who or what designed them (and we call them, for brevity's sake, "designed"); and those where we do not know who or what designed them (everything else).

The only difference between elements of these two sets is our knowledge of one or more designers.

Therefore, there is exactly one kind of "evidence for design", i.e. the designer(s).

Despite all the smoke and mirrors of creationists of any variety, complexity is not, in and of itself, evidence for design; nor is "specification", nor is "CSI", nor is "fine tuning", nor any other convoluted attempt to shift the onus probandi off their feeble shoulders.

Michael Finely · 2 April 2005

This is all a mere muddying of the water.

Either the scientific method adopts methodological naturalism or it doesn't. If it doesn't then I have no point of contention. If it does, then it depends on metaphysical naturalism.

Methodological naturalism is the decision to be a metaphysical naturalist relative to a particular activity. That is, the scientist qua methodological naturalist is a metaphysical naturalist relative to science. Therefore, any conclusions of methodologically naturalistic science depend on metaphysical naturalism.

Otherwise, what is the point in being a methodological naturalist? Take care that your answer doesn't beg the question.

PvM · 2 April 2005

If a divine creator is a religious belief (and it may also be a metaphysical belief), and the scientific method excludes divine creation as a possible conclusion, then belief and method are in conflict.

Science does not exclude divine creation as a possible conclusion. It merely realizes that science is unable to address these questions. Religious belief can co-exist quite nicely although some ID proponents seem to be confused about the extent of Methodological Naturalism and Ontological Naturalism, leading them to suggest that science is anti-religious. Finley is confused by the meaning of methodological naturalism which does NOT assume that there is no supernatural designer, but merely accepts that science is unable to address these issues, one way or another.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 2 April 2005

How dreadful; you don't seem to recognize a philosophical discussion when you see it.

Of *course* I do --- that's how I know that ID isn't sciecne, and IDers are just lying to everyone when they cliam it IS. But I notice you've not answered my question. Please show us how to use the scientific method to test a supernatural hypothesis. Please be as detailed as possible and use as many screens as you need. Put up or shut up. Fish or cut bait. Shit or get off the toilet.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 2 April 2005

They can rightly claim that it is the prevue of the empirical sciences and not the theorists to provide testable hypotheses.

I very much doubt that any theoretical physicist would agree with you.

Air Bear · 2 April 2005

Michael Finley wrote

I have no problem with a science employing natural causes. It is the a priori exclusion of supernatural causes that I object to.

Engineering excludes supernatural causes and effects a priori. Do you object to that? Why not?

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 2 April 2005

Therefore, any conclusions of methodologically naturalistic science depend on metaphysical naturalism.

Reeaaalllyyyyyy. Um, why are so many scientists (who practice methodological naturlaism) Christians (who, I presume, are not metaphysical naturalistic, believing in God and all . . . . . ) Oh, and why are the vast majority of Christians (who, once again, I presume are not metaphysical naturalistic) accepting of evolution and all the rest of modern science (which, I point out, follow methodological naturalism). Explain, please. And TRY not to wave your arms too much.

Jim Harrison · 2 April 2005

In an effort to be nice, lots of folks suggest that the sciences are missing something because they are unable to detect the supernatural. It's much more likely that what's missing is the supernatural itself. If the sciences had detected a God in the Universe, you can be sure that believers wouldn't be talking about the defects of scientific methodology.

Standard disclaimer: nothing in these comments should be taken to imply that only the natural sciences produce meaningful results.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 2 April 2005

This is all a mere muddying of the water.

Yes, it is. So stop muddying the waters and just answer my question; how do you propose a non-methodologically-naturalistic science would work. Please be as detailed as possible, and take as many screens as you need. Or am I correct after all in concluding that what IDers *really* want is to have their "hypotheses" accepted by science solely on the holy say-so of IDers. Do you, or do you not, think that ID hypotheses should be tested using the scientific method, the same way that everyone ELSE's hypothesis should be tested using the scientific method. If you do NOT think ID hypotheses should be subject to the same testing as everyone else's, then please explain why ID hypotheses should be privileged in this manner. If you DO think that ID hypotheses should be subject to the same testing as everyone else's, then what the hell are you bitching about.

Air Bear · 2 April 2005

The Flankster wrote:

But I notice you've not answered my question. Please show us how to use the scientific method to test a supernatural hypothesis.

We went through this a few days ago here. The healing power of prayer is an excellent example of a supernatural effect that can be tested by the scientific method. The experts here pointed me to articles showing no effect, or that the experiments purportedly showing an effect were seriously flawed. And we've just had anecdotal evidence that the fervent prayers of millions of the faithful were not sufficient to heal a dying old man.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 2 April 2005

I have no problem with a science employing natural causes. It is the a priori exclusion of supernatural causes that I object to. Engineering excludes supernatural causes and effects a priori. Do you object to that? Why not?

Indeed, so does weather forecasting (I've never yet heard any meteorologist conclude that "this hurricane followed this track into that cuty because God wanted to punish sinners there"), or accident investigation (I've never yet heard an FAA investigator conclude "this airplane crashed because it was the will of God"). In law, supernatural causes and effects are also ruled out a priori -- no lawyer is allowed to argue "my client is innocent of the murder because the Devil made him do it". Heck, the rules of baseball don't mention any supernatural causes or effects either. Utterly materialistic and naturalistic. Medicine? Gee, when Mr Finley gets sick, do you suppose he asks his doctor to utilize supernatural methods or non-material cures? Or does he just ask his materialistic naturalistic doctor to cure his materialistic naturalistic diseases by using materialistic naturalistic antibiotics to kill his naturalistic materialistic germs? So why is it that IDers get their panties all in a bunch about "atheistic naturalistic materialistic evolution", but NOT about "atheistic naturalistic materialistic" weather forecasting or accident investigation or law or medicine or rules of baseball? Or . . . DOES "renewing our culture" indeed include forcing DI's particular brand of theism into all those areas as well . . . . . ? .

Michael Finley · 2 April 2005

Finley is confused by the meaning of methodological naturalism which does NOT assume that there is no supernatural designer, but merely accepts that science is unable to address these issues, one way or another.

— PvM
Your confusion has led you to mistakenly attribute confusion to me. Let me illustrate the problem by a comparison. Suppose science were to adopt methodological solipsism. Thus, while driving his car, going to church, or spending time with his family, the scientist believes that there is an external world populated by other people. While doing science, on the other hand, his methodology constrains what kinds of conclusions are permissible, i.e., he cannot conclude that there is an external world, etc. As a result, every scientific conclusion reached by the scientist would depend on metaphysical solipsism in the following way - if metaphysical solipsism were false, his scientific conclusions could not be applied to the world. There would be an a priori disconnect between the two. There is no principle difference in this regard between methodological solipsism and naturalism. Both suppose their metaphysical counterparts.

Pete Dunkelberg · 2 April 2005

Finley writes
"Methodological naturalism is the decision to be a metaphysical naturalist relative to a particular activity."

It always helps one's argument if one can make up one's own definitions.

"That is, the scientist qua methodological naturalist is a metaphysical naturalist relative to science. Therefore, any conclusions of methodologically naturalistic science depend on metaphysical naturalism."

"Otherwise, what is the point in being a methodological naturalist?"

We don't need these big words. People are attracted to a way of finding things out that works. For a long time people just didn't realize that so many interesting, not otherwise apparent, indeed often very surprising things could be found out by studying nature systematically. Once people found out, the method became popular.

What occasions this weblog and our discussions is that some people, for no good reason, just don't like some things that have been found out.

Calling this 'metaphysical' is too much like a yam wearing a tie.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 2 April 2005

We went through this a few days ago here. The healing power of prayer is an excellent example of a supernatural effect that can be tested by the scientific method.

I see --- so IDers can't even reach the level of science achieved by faith healers, who are at least capable of proposing SOME testible hypothesis. ID, uh, "theory" can't even do THAT. And take note, Mr Finley ------------------ the "healing power of prayer" supernatural hypothesis was NOT, repeat NOT, as in N-O-T, rejected a priori by science. Which sort of makes your entire line of argument . . . well . . . kind of stupid.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 2 April 2005

There is no principle difference in this regard between methodological solipsism and naturalism. Both suppose their metaphysical counterparts.

How dreadful. What, again, did you say your non-naturalistic science consists of? How, again, did you say we can use the scientific method to test any supernatural or non-material cause? In what way, again, did you say that any other researcher can follow and utilize this non-naturalistic science of yours? Oh wait, you DIDN'T say, did you . . . . . . What seems to be the problem?

Bruce Thompson · 2 April 2005

Please call me Bruce, my momma did name me Mr. My only goal was to point out that a whole area of poor science, Baraminology, will rise to the surface and try to fulfill the requirements of predictions and tests. I apologize for interrupting a philosophical discussion. Hi to the Anderson lab from the Doane lab.

jeff-perado · 2 April 2005

Lenny Flank:

You couldn't have nailed down this issue any more than if you'd worked on it for decades. Let them squirm. You threw down the right gauntlet, let them pick it up and explain it.

(Althought I wouldn't have used the phrase, "shit or get off the toilet" because I have found that they perceive any turn of phrase like this as an "insult" and thus claim that this invalidates any need to respond to the actual debate. I know, for I just recently claimed one small part of one pointless debate was "sophmoric" and thus my entire line of reasoning was rejected.

When will these defenders of ID mediocrity learn? (that we get frustrated with there useless arguments)

Michael Finley · 2 April 2005

Calling this 'metaphysical' is too much like a yam wearing a tie.

A mildly clever turn of phrase is a poor substitute for abstract thought.

P. Mihalakos · 2 April 2005

Kudos to Jack and Lenny Flank for throwing down the gauntlet in such a well thought and articulated way. I, too, am now waiting eagerly to discover by what possible slippery means, by what possible linguistic sleight-of-hand proponents of ID will employ to backtrack out of the mess they have made of their so-called argument.

In fact, attributing "argument" to the half-baked wisps of sympathetic magic that ID constantly invokes, is perhaps too flattering. The bottom line is that there are rules to science; both the practice of science and the discourse that surrounds such practice depend on those rules.

So... ID folk, listen up: In context of science, it is NOT that your proposition of a supernatural designer of nature (alas, the paradox!) is wrong; it is that it is not EVEN wrong. It simply invites no heuristic activity at all.

Personally, I'll applaud grubby, interesting, scientific failures any day of the week over ID's (yawn) insulated bubbles of ethereal musing.

Jack, in your answer #2 you listed a few items as being outside the purview of scientific method. As a student of neuroscience, I would only add that you might be casting some researchers' work in an overly modest light. You are undoubtedly correct, of course, about the hard sciences being limited in their ability to offer insight regarding value systems, the "ought" and "whys" of life. However, we are coming to understand a great deal about the neural substrates of human emotion. And I imagine there will come a day, indeed not too far off, when we may reach testable conclusions about how certain cognitive-emotional states, as realized by signature neural dynamics, may constrain what we unconsciously choose to accept as fact or fiction.

Maybe only then will we really begin to glimpse why, or at least how ID (and its myriad other ancient incarnations) persists in our species as such a powerfully attractive folk "theory."

Air Bear · 2 April 2005

To Michael Finley -

There's a good reason why modern science uses methodological naturalism -- because it's productive. As long as natural philosophers assumed the primacy of theology and the implications for Nature from it, they got nowhere. Only when Galileo, Copernicus, et al began to stick to naturalism did start multiplying their understanding of the natural world. Sure, Newton was tempted to do some handwaving about Divine Intervention, but over the last several hundred years, methodological naturalism in science has paid off.

One might postulate a sort of evolution by natural selection going on. The techniques, observations, theories and people who have stuck to methodological naturalism have thrived and multiplied, while the supernaturalists have been barren and have survived only in a small niche in popular culture that nutures them until they die, to be replaced by similarly-barren mutants from mainstream science or elsewhere.

The experience of Michael Behe is suggestive. Someone here said that he formerly published regular scientific work. But since getting the religion of ID, his only publications are his popular books and opinion articles in the general media. If his ideas had reproductive value, then he'd be turning out ID-trained PhDs at Lehigh.

Michael Finley · 2 April 2005

Mr. Flank,

You really need to learn to parse issues.

Whether or not supernatural causes are excluded a priori by the method of science is a philosophical question.

Whether or not a scientific explanation incorporating supernatural causes is practically possible is a separate question that is subordinate to the first.

Please attempt to focus, and respond with something more substantive than "How dreadful."

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 2 April 2005

Calling this 'metaphysical' is too much like a yam wearing a tie. A mildly clever turn of phrase is a poor substitute for abstract thought.

How dreadful. I notice that you haven't answered my simple question AGAIN. That's OK --- I'll just ask again. And again. And again and again and again and again, as many times as I need to, until you answer. *ahem* What, again, did you say your non-naturalistic science consists of? How, again, did you say we can use the scientific method to test any supernatural or non-material cause? In what way, again, did you say that any other researcher can follow and utilize this non-naturalistic science of yours? Oh wait, you DIDN'T say, did you . . . . . . What seems to be the problem? .

PvM · 2 April 2005

Whether or not supernatural causes are excluded a priori by the method of science is a philosophical question.

Nope that is a methodological issue.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 2 April 2005

You really need to learn to parse issues.

And YOU really need to learn to answer questions. After all, I notice that you haven't answered my simple question AGAIN. That's OK --- I'll just ask again. And again. And again and again and again and again, as many times as I need to, until you answer. *ahem* What, again, did you say your non-naturalistic science consists of? How, again, did you say we can use the scientific method to test any supernatural or non-material cause? In what way, again, did you say that any other researcher can follow and utilize this non-naturalistic science of yours? Oh wait, you DIDN'T say, did you . . . . . . What seems to be the problem? .

Air Bear · 2 April 2005

P. Mihalakos wrote

I, too, am now waiting eagerly to discover by what possible slippery means, by what possible linguistic sleight-of-hand proponents of ID will employ to backtrack out of the mess they have made of their so-called argument.

You'll be disappointed. Note how Michael Finley is also ignoring repeated questions about methodological naturalism in engineering and medicine. As always, the ID proponents will just make some pointless off-the-subject remarks (see "solipsism" above), go away, and come back in a few days with the same arguments. The Rev wrote

I see ---- so IDers can't even reach the level of science achieved by faith healers, who are at least capable of proposing SOME testible hypothesis. ID, uh, "theory" can't even do THAT.

I've found that the good old-fashioned honest creationists actually put out testable hypotheses (e.g. Neandertals were modern humans deformed by ricketts) while these New Age Postmodern IDers give me nothing to chew on. I'll take that old-time religion any day.

PvM · 2 April 2005

Either the scientific method adopts methodological naturalism or it doesn't. If it doesn't then I have no point of contention. If it does, then it depends on metaphysical naturalism.

— Finley
Not at all, since ontological naturalism makes claims that are beyond what MN does. In other words, more accurately ON depends on MN but extends its claim to state that all there is, is natural.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 2 April 2005

Whether or not supernatural causes are excluded a priori by the method of science is a philosophical question.

And we've already answered that question. Scientific studies have been conducted on the "healing power of prayer". I'm no theologian, but I'm pretty sure that "the healing power of prayer" is a supernatural cause. It was not rejected a priori by science. Not. As in "not". N-O-T. Not. I've already listed the five steps of the scientific method. Please feel free to point out to us which one you think excludes supernatural causes a priori. Or do you plan on just continuing to weep and whine about how the big bad atheistic scientists won't accept your religious opinions based on your holy say-so.

Whether or not a scientific explanation incorporating supernatural causes is practically possible is a separate question that is subordinate to the first.

Glad to hear it. We've already answered the first question; *nothing* anywhere in any of the five steps of the scientific method excludes supernatural causes a priori. None. Zip. Zero. Zilch. Not a single one of them. Just ask the guys who carried out and published the scientific experiments on the healing power of prayer. Now that we've shown you to be wrong about THAT question, it's time to move on to the second question. Please explain to us how a non-naturalistic science would work. Be as detailed as possible, and take as many screens as you need. Put up or shut up. And give your arms a rest -- they must be getting awfully tired from all that waving you're doing. .

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 2 April 2005

Do you, or do you not, think that ID hypotheses should be tested using the scientific method, the same way that everyone ELSE's hypothesis should be tested using the scientific method. If you do NOT think ID hypotheses should be subject to the same testing as everyone else's, then please explain why ID hypotheses should be privileged in this manner. If you DO think that ID hypotheses should be subject to the same testing as everyone else's, then what the hell are you bitching about.

You, uh, haven't answered THIS question either, Finley. What seems to be the problem? .

Lurker · 2 April 2005

A science that chooses not to reject any explanations a priori leads to an incoherence much like solipsism. That said, there's no end to the combinations of a priori, minimalist assumptions from which you can begin with. If you'd like to propose an alternate set of assumptions from the one adopted by the majority of scientists, fine. But in a free marketplace of ideas, one does not merely demand and then expect to receive welfare and equal treatment without doing some hard work. Nor can one simply cheat by offering fake products using false advertisements of superiority. If you have other a prior assumptions, Michael Finley, then the most pertinent question to ask is if they demonstrate superior worth.

Jack Krebs · 2 April 2005

As is usual, I find the comments here quite interesting, and I am glad all you folks are hanging out at the Panda's Thumb this afternoon. :-)

To Mr. Finley: here are several comments/questions have been made about your position by several people, but I'm not sure I've seen you address them.

1. The first is that "supernatural causation" is not excluded a priori but rather has been found a posteriori to not be found. Supernatural causation was the default explanation for many things that science has found to be naturally caused.

2. The second is that "supernatural causation" is not excluded a priori, as witnessed by studies on prayer, ESP, etc. One is entirely free to make a hypothesis about supernatural causation and test it. However, as I pointed out in comment 1, this has proven unsuccessful for about 500 hundred years now, so not very many people are interested in pursuing such hypotheses.

3. How would one test supernatural causation?

One person mentioned that despite the prayers of millions, the Pope died. The obvious Christian explanation of this is that given by the Catholic church -- God had called him home.

I mean no sacrilege here at all: prayer is a request that is answered according to the Will of God, and we have no way of knowing why God answers some prayers and not others, as that falls beyond all human understanding.

So how can science study something that exhibits no regularity and occurs according to the inscrutable will of a divine being whose view of the world is utterly different than ours?

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 2 April 2005

Kudos to Jack and Lenny Flank for throwing down the gauntlet in such a well thought and articulated way. I, too, am now waiting eagerly to discover by what possible slippery means, by what possible linguistic sleight-of-hand proponents of ID will employ to backtrack out of the mess they have made of their so-called argument.

I will make a testible prediction here (something that ID's "supernatural science" seems to be utterly incapable of doing) -- Finley's response will be: .

Michael Finley · 2 April 2005

I see everyone has conveniently dodged my methodological solipsism comparison (excepting Mr. Flank's penetrating analysis: "How dreadful").

Nope that is a methodological issue.

— PvM
Indeed. And what discipline treats methodological issues? That's right, the philosophy of science.

We've already answered the first question; nothing anywhere in any of the five steps of the scientific method excludes supernatural causes a priori.

— Mr. Flank
If the scientific method does not, in principle, exclude supernatural causes, then it does not adopt methodological naturalism. And if that is your position, then we are in agreement. Unfortunately for you (us), the majority of scientists and PT participants disagree with you. Just to prove my point: anyone who thinks that supernatural causes are, in principle, scientific, please voice your support here.

darwinfinch · 2 April 2005

Michael Finley wrote:

I have no problem with a science employing natural causes. It is the a priori exclusion of supernatural causes that I object to.

---The purity of the ignorance of the above statement, in both proving the writer a fool, and yet in mischaracterizing the opposition, is well-nigh 100%.
The vanity that imbues it also seems at nearly toxic levels.

"What an awful way to experience life!" might describe the feeling of pity that ran though my mind for this MF fellow mortal.

P. Mihalakos · 2 April 2005

Mr. Finley,

It really is a quite simple question that has been asked of you. It has already been demonstrated via the 'healing-power-of-prayer" example that science admits "supernatural" (for lack of a better word) queries into its general scope of possible explanations. The problem is that, by all shared accounts, science regularly finds much more useful, satisfying, and more elegant explanations for how things happen.

I will forgo my need to understand how anything categorized as 'natural' could ever interact with anything 'supernatural', and in the interest provoking your response, I will join the chorus of pleas for you to answer what has been repeatedly asked of you.

Be a gentleman and at least try.

Michael Finley · 2 April 2005

Darwinfinch, I bow in the face of a superior argument... whatever your argument was.

Be a gentleman and at least try.

— P. Mihalakos
As I've repeatedly pointed out to Mr. Flank, my concern here is methodological naturalism. To my sudden surprise, everyone seems to be denying that science adopts methodological naturalism. If that is indeed the case, then I have no complaint. As for the practical question, I have started to address it in another place and would love to invite any and all to participate: http://www.antievolution.org/cgi-bin/ikonboard/ikonboard.cgi?s=424f302571daffff;act=ST;f=14;t=8

Pete Dunkelberg · 2 April 2005

A dash of irony:

... for I just recently claimed one small part of one pointless debate was "sophmoric" and thus my entire line of reasoning was rejected.

— jeff-perado in Comment #22965

A mildly clever turn of phrase is a poor substitute for abstract thought.

— Michael Finley in Comment #22966
thus disposing of comment #22961. New question from M Finley: "Just to prove my point: anyone who thinks that supernatural causes are, in principle, scientific, please voice your support here." It's a question of evidence. A priori we could have evidence like this: "Oh, you humans drove that species to extinction? Don't worry. I'll make you a new one, even better. Shazamm!" ... and the new species pops up right there. But the world didn't turn out that way.

DavidF · 2 April 2005

Michael,

What do you mean by supernatural? Do you have a definition? Many things which we can do today probably would be considered supernatural if we transported them back in time - read a Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court for an amusing example. Equally, it seems certain that future advances will lead to remarkable discoveries and capabilities - perhaps the ability to artificially engineer life or intelligence. If that happens should it be considered supernatural? In these things theology follows science.

Too often "supernatural" is merely code for "we don't understand." Without a definition of supernatural it's hard to know how it could be detected.

If we look at the track record of religion versus science in explaining phenomena then it is abundantly clear that religion is usually wrong and science if usually right in the sense that it ultimately converges to the right answer answer without recourse to invoking God. Religion doesn't converge - it usually comes up with a new set of doctrines to replace those which have been discredited. Even in areas where religion claims to have authority - morals etc. - it has been a failure. Not only do diametrically opposed religious viewpoints exist but people of most religions are quite willing to kill other members of their faith in wars over essentially materialistic concerns. What does this say for supernatural intervention?

If supernatural causes exist then they are clearly "scientific" in the sense that they are part of the universe or some larger entity which contains the universe. However, until a single example can be cited in which a scientific explanation has been overthrown by a theological one it is unconvincing to posit that science needs to invoke supernatural causes.

One way to think about it is the following; if we followed religion we would be unaware, e.g., of the so-called fine-tuning problem. ID-ers merely are capitalizing on the fact that science cannot explain many phenomena while ignoring the progress that has been made. Scienctific knowledge will almost certainly always be incomplete and ID-ers will, therefore always be able to claim that supernatural causes are needed to fill in the gaps. It's always easier to criticize others than to produce something oneself which is about all ID is.

The telling point is that the things to which religionists pointed to as evidence for God as a designer are different today than they were a century or 5 centuries ago and will be different yet again in another 500 years. That is, of course, unless the fundies have managed to wipe human civilization off the planet thanks to their love affair with capitalism and consumption.

DavidF · 2 April 2005

Jeff,

Actually what you are saying is a direct lie; I didn't reject what you were saying because you claimed my argument was sophomoric. I presented actual evidence that your point was incorrect - you didn't beyond an ill conceived metaphor that had little to do with the point at hand. That you were unable to defend your point is one thing. That you now lie about it shows how the fundie mindset is by no means restricted to fundamentalists. But, if it makes you feel better then go ahead and delude yourself.

P. Mihalakos · 2 April 2005

Mr. Finley,

I was unable to locate your promised argument at the website you referenced:

http://www.antievolution.org/cgi-bin/ikonboard/ikonboard.cgi . . .

Would you be so kind as to expend the energy needed to cut and paste whatever portions of relevant text I may have overlooked into this forum?

Michael Finley · 2 April 2005

P. Mihalakos,

The chorus you joined was an invitation for me to spell out predictions that would follow from supernatural causes (see most posts by Mr. Flank), i.e., to defend the practical possibility of non-naturalistic science. That is precisely what I am undertaking on the linked website. I am attempting to make predictions from a theoretical claim, viz., common design.

James Wynne · 2 April 2005

A mildly clever turn of phrase is a poor substitute for abstract thought.

— Michael Finley
I think part of the problem here is that Mr. Finley is way too smart for any of us to even dream of independently generating abstract thought that will rise above his obvious right to condescension. I can tell when someone is too smart to argue with; they use a lot of unnecessary Latin and avoid directly answering the questions at hand by use of what a teacher of mine used to call "polysyllabic obfuscation."

Russell · 2 April 2005

If the scientific method does not, in principle, exclude supernatural causes, then it does not adopt methodological naturalism. ... [T]he majority of scientists and PT participants disagree ....

— M.Finley
I may be out of line here, being an experimental scientist not formally schooled in the purely philosophical side of things. But it seems to me that what we have here is a question where supernatural causes are open to scientific investigation as a subject, but the methodology (the measurement of clinical improvement, the interviews with those "performing the prayers") are necessarily naturalistic. (It's difficult to imagine nonnaturalistic methodology!)

James Wynne · 2 April 2005

A mildly clever turn of phrase is a poor substitute for abstract thought.

— Michael Finley
I think part of the problem here is that Mr. Finley is way too smart for any of us to even dream of independently generating abstract thought that will rise above his obvious right to condescension. I can tell when someone is too smart to argue with; they use a lot of unnecessary Latin and avoid directly answering the questions at hand by use of what a teacher of mine used to call "polysyllabic obfuscation."

Michael Finley · 2 April 2005

P. Mihalakos,

The chorus you joined was an invitation for me to spell out predictions that would follow from supernatural causes (see most posts by Mr. Flank), i.e., to defend the practical possibility of non-naturalistic science. That is precisely what I am undertaking on the linked website. I am attempting to make predictions from a theoretical claim, viz., common design.

Thank you all for the discussion. My family is demanding I unplug and go to dinner. Until later, then.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 2 April 2005

I see everyone has conveniently dodged my methodological solipsism comparison

And I see (surprise surprise) that you've still not answered any of my questions. As note before, I will simply ask again. And again and again and again. As many times as I need to until I get an answer. *ahem*

Please show us how to use the scientific method to test a supernatural hypothesis. Please be as detailed as possible and use as many screens as you need.

Do you, or do you not, think that ID hypotheses should be tested using the scientific method, the same way that everyone ELSE's hypothesis should be tested using the scientific method. If you do NOT think ID hypotheses should be subject to the same testing as everyone else's, then please explain why ID hypotheses should be privileged in this manner. If you DO think that ID hypotheses should be subject to the same testing as everyone else's, then what the hell are you bitching about.

Therefore, any conclusions of methodologically naturalistic science depend on metaphysical naturalism. Reeaaalllyyyyyy. Um, why are so many scientists (who practice methodological naturlaism) Christians (who, I presume, are not metaphysical naturalistic, believing in God and all . . . . . ) Oh, and why are the vast majority of Christians (who, once again, I presume are not metaphysical naturalistic) accepting of evolution and all the rest of modern science (which, I point out, follow methodological naturalism). Explain, please.

Indeed, so does weather forecasting (I've never yet heard any meteorologist conclude that "this hurricane followed this track into that cuty because God wanted to punish sinners there"), or accident investigation (I've never yet heard an FAA investigator conclude "this airplane crashed because it was the will of God"). In law, supernatural causes and effects are also ruled out a priori --- no lawyer is allowed to argue "my client is innocent of the murder because the Devil made him do it". Heck, the rules of baseball don't mention any supernatural causes or effects either. Utterly materialistic and naturalistic. Medicine? Gee, when Mr Finley gets sick, do you suppose he asks his doctor to utilize supernatural methods or non-material cures? Or does he just ask his materialistic naturalistic doctor to cure his materialistic naturalistic diseases by using materialistic naturalistic antibiotics to kill his naturalistic materialistic germs? So why is it that IDers get their panties all in a bunch about "atheistic naturalistic materialistic evolution", but NOT about "atheistic naturalistic materialistic" weather forecasting or accident investigation or law or medicine or rules of baseball? Or . . . DOES "renewing our culture" indeed include forcing DI's particular brand of theism into all those areas as well . . . . . ?

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 2 April 2005

If the scientific method does not, in principle, exclude supernatural causes, then it does not adopt methodological naturalism.

Hey Finley, wre those guys who did scientific studies on the effects of prayer on healing, rejecting supernatural causes, a priori, in principle? How about the journals that published their studies? Perhaps you are a much better theologian than I am, but it sure seems to ME as if "the power of prayer" is . . well . . . supernatural. Do you disagree? .

Michael Finley · 2 April 2005

James Wynne,

My apologies. Apparently I should not disdain sarcastic rhetoric that is unsupported by argument, and should use smaller words. Nevertheless, thanks for the concession. In your case, I agree with your assessment of me.

Thank you for the discussion. My family is demanding that I unplug and come to dinner. Until later, then.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 2 April 2005

The chorus you joined was an invitation for me to spell out predictions that would follow from supernatural causes (see most posts by Mr. Flank), i.e., to defend the practical possibility of non-naturalistic science. That is precisely what I am undertaking on the linked website. I am attempting to make predictions from a theoretical claim, viz., common design.

Glad to hear it. Let's see these predictions. And your description ofm how to test them using the scientific method. Or are you just waving your arms again. .

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 2 April 2005

My apologies. Apparently I should not disdain sarcastic rhetoric that is unsupported by argument, and should use smaller words.

Use whatever words you like, Finley. Just answer my friggin questions.

PvM · 2 April 2005

PvM wrote: Nope that is a methodological issue.

Finley: Indeed. And what discipline treats methodological issues? That's right, the philosophy of science. That's a silly argument. First of all the philosophy of science is not ontological naturalism, second of all, your statement to which I responded was "Whether or not supernatural causes are excluded a priori by the method of science is a philosophical question." As others have also shown, science does not reject the supernatural (intelligent design) apriori, but it has found so far that the evidence for the supernatural seems to be lacking, certainly the evidence for intelligent design in biology. ID proponents often complain that science rejects intelligent design apriori, and argue at the same time that science has succesfully applied detection of intelligent design in archaeology, criminology etc. This self-contradictory statement shows the level of obfuscation involved. Show us how the rejection of the supernatural (a priori or not) by science is a philosophical issue. I see it as a methodological issue. God did it is just not a very useful explanation (just look at the history of science)... I am not sure what Finley is trying to show with his solipsism argument. Methodological naturalism takes no position on whether or not nature is all there is, or whether or not there exists a supernatural. These are conclusions that cannot be supported by science. Methodological solipsism similarly does not claim that self is all there is, merely that such a research strategy cannot address issues beyond 'self'. In other words, the methodology restricts the applicability. (Fodor's "Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology shows how it is a methodology for a 'research strategy' not a claim about the world).

Henry J · 2 April 2005

Re "If the sciences had detected a God in the Universe, you can be sure that believers wouldn't be talking about the defects of scientific methodology. "
On the contrary, imo if science had detected evidence of god, it would more than likely produce details at odds with what the believer's believed. Then the believers would really be upset.

Henry

Tom Clark · 2 April 2005

Russell wrote

I may be out of line here, being an experimental scientist not formally schooled in the purely philosophical side of things. But it seems to me that what we have here is a question where supernatural causes are open to scientific investigation as a subject, but the methodology (the measurement of clinical improvement, the interviews with those "performing the prayers") are necessarily naturalistic. (It's difficult to imagine nonnaturalistic methodology!)

Actually, scientific methods of measurement, observation, etc., as well as scientific criteria for explanations, make no mention of the natural/supernatural distinction. In a way, the term "methodological naturalism" is an unfortunate misnomer, since as we've seen in this discussion it can give the impression that science presumes naturalism in some important philosophical sense. Creationists and IDers will seize on this to claim that science should be "balanced" by introducing what they themselves call supernatural hypotheses. We must patiently explain that no, science is ontologically neutral, and its methods do not assume any apriori characterization of what's natural vs. supernatural. This effectively blunts the Wedge strategy, since IDers can no longer claim science is biased in favor of naturalism. About which see http://www.naturalism.org/science.htm. As Larry pointed out a while back, science can pronounce judgment on the supernatural hypotheses profferred by ID supporters (assuming they have any testable content), simply by applying its ontologically neutral methods. It's just that such hypotheses usually don't have sufficient content to be testable - they are non-starters, in which case they properly get rejected as non-science. And it's the fact that they aren't testable that ends up classifying them as supernatural hypotheses, not that science is biased against them by an apriori commitment to naturalism. Science generates the natural/supernatural distinction, it doesn't assume it.

Flint · 2 April 2005

As far as I can see, Flank laid out the situation clearly and exhaustively, and Finley has simply run away it. As usual. I had been hoping (admittedly against hope) that we would find an IDist actually respond to a request honestly. Or even half-honestly, by recognizing the request itself. But I guess even that would be asking too much.

Still, if anyone is genuinely trying to make sense of the issue, the behavior we've seen demonstrated is at least clear and unambiguous. Where is the evidence? Silence. Where are your tests? Silence. How would a test be constructed at all? Change of subject. Demands that Finley at least address these critical questions. Finley leaves without even trying. There is a lesson hidden in here somewhere, I think.

Mike Dunford · 2 April 2005

As I've repeatedly pointed out to Mr. Flank, my concern here is methodological naturalism. To my sudden surprise, everyone seems to be denying that science adopts methodological naturalism. If that is indeed the case, then I have no complaint.

— Michael Finley
Whether or not you believe that science adopts methodological naturalism really depends on the specific definitions that you are using, and where in the process you are looking. Science does not adopt methodological naturalism in the sense of excluding any possibility of anything that might be considered to be supernatural. Science does adopt methodological naturalism in the sense of excluding any hypothesis that cannot be tested against what is observed in the natural world. This is precisely why Lenny's repeated question is so critical - whether or not any given hypothesis is scientific depends on whether or not it can be tested using basic scientific methods. That is not something that cannot be evaluated in general, universal terms. Instead, the question of whether or not a given hypothesis is scientific can only be answered on a case-by-case basis. This is true regardless of whether the hypothesis invokes natural or supernatural causes. The hypothesis that you have proposed over on antievolution.org regarding common design is not scientific as currently formulated. You have specified some observations that you would expect to see if common design was true, which is good, but you have not specified anything that you would only expect to see if common design were true, and you have not specified anything that you would expect to never find if common design were true. As a result, you are not really testing the hypothesis.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 2 April 2005

As far as I can see, Flank laid out the situation clearly and exhaustively, and Finley has simply run away it. As usual.

Well, I *did* tell him to either shit or get off the toilet. And the toilet appears to now be unoccupied.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 2 April 2005

So . . . ID folk, listen up: In context of science, it is NOT that your proposition of a supernatural designer of nature (alas, the paradox!) is wrong; it is that it is not EVEN wrong. It simply invites no heuristic activity at all.

That's right. ID isn't "wrong". It's WORSE than "wrong" -- it's utterly useless. Except as a legal ploy to push religious apologetics into a science classroom. Which is, of course, it's only INTENDED use.

P. Mihalakos · 2 April 2005

Lenny,

I agree. I originally gave the ID movement more benefit of the doubt than I should have, at least in terms of their motives. I assumed that they were just being a little lazy, and in need of a little patient education. But, I am beginning to realize that the real rabble-rousers behind ID know exactly what they are doing and what they are saying. It smacks of a coordinated effort, not to change science, but to change culture at large.

Longhorm · 3 April 2005

According to Michael Finley:

I endorse the notion that supernatural causes should not, in principle, be rejected as unscientific.

According to Michael:

I have no problem with a science employing natural causes. It is the a priori exclusion of supernatural causes that I object to.

Michael, I'm not sure what you mean by "unscientific" and "science." But given what I think you mean, I agree with I think you are getting at. Let me explain. If a person says "event X occurred," I will consider whether it did. In some cases, I won't know for certain whether X occurred. But there have been millions of cases when some people believed that a given event occurred, and it did not. Or, at least there are occassions when I'm really really really justified in believing that a given event did not occcur -- or will not occur. For instance, some people believe that the universe is about 6,000 years old. Michael, which event(s) do you believe a designer caused? If it is not inconvenient, please be specific. That makes it easier to determine whether the claim is plausible. And please offer any key data that you believe enables you to justifiably believe that the designer caused said event(s). A designer did not turn dust -- poof! -- directly into the first two elephants (one male and one female). Same goes for the first two humans. Aardvarks. Ferrets. Goats. Gorillas. Etc. Self-replicating molecules that were on earth about 3.8 billion years ago evolved into all of the organisms to have lived on earth. Or to put it another way: All organisms to have lived on earth descended from one of, at most, a few single-celled microorganisms that lived on earth about 3.8 billion years ago. And all the organisms that are alive today descended from the very same cell. If you have some beliefs that are inconsistent with what some people call "the theory of evolution," please indicate what those beliefs are. I will try to assess whether said events actually occurred. Or any claim for that matter. If I have time, I will consider the claim. I might not have time. And I might not have the expertise. But I'll do the best I can. Some scientists won't consider -- at least publicly -- whether some events occurred. I will. For instance, someone might say that he or she was abducted by aliens. I'll try to determine whether the event that person claims occurred actually did.

Great White Wonder · 3 April 2005

But, I am beginning to realize that the real rabble-rousers behind ID know exactly what they are doing and what they are saying. It smacks of a coordinated effort, not to change science, but to change culture at large.

Um, yes. And it's a change that will benefit sweet talking preachers, not scientists or honest people who tire easily of sweet talking preachers. Don't forget that.

Ed Darrell · 3 April 2005

Michael Finley said:

I endorse the notion that supernatural causes should not, in principle, be rejected as unscientific.

First, what changes do you think that would make in science? Second, how could that possibly be done, short of throwing up our hands at some point saying "it's Zeus' will?" Third, if we do that, how could we possibly know that we had found evidence of a god's existence when it surfaced?

Ed Darrell · 3 April 2005

Oh, and Mr. Finley: Please offer any evidence you may have that science does reject the idea of divine intervention, a priori. For example, tell us how the search for a cure for breast cancer would differ were you to reject methodological naturalism.

And if that method works better, why in the Name of God hasn't the DI set up a non-naturalism lab to do it?

Lurker · 3 April 2005

Michael Finley. Would you explain to us what a priori assumptions should a science not make reject?

Lurker · 3 April 2005

I apologize my previous post was entered prematurely.

I am interestd in hearing Finley explain to us what kinds of explanations a science should a priori reject, if any.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 3 April 2005

I originally gave the ID movement more benefit of the doubt than I should have, at least in terms of their motives. I assumed that they were just being a little lazy, and in need of a little patient education. But, I am beginning to realize that the real rabble-rousers behind ID know exactly what they are doing and what they are saying. It smacks of a coordinated effort, not to change science, but to change culture at large.

You can read all about their coordinated effort and the tactics they have chosen to implement it, in their own words, here: http://www.geocities.com/lflank/wedge.html

P. Mihalakos · 3 April 2005

Lenny Flank, RE:

http://www.geocities.com/lflank/wedge.html . . .

Thanks! That was a telling document. It explains why when I am having an exchange with a proponent of ID, I sometimes have the vague feeling that I'm talking to an attorney, rather than a scientist--or even a fellow student or an interested layperson. It also explains the minor scientific credentials backing most professional "ID notionists." There appears to be no shortage of Ph.Ds in philosophy that have signed on to the ID movement, which again makes perfect sense. The language of philosophy is more easily imported into the courtroom, and there are fewer technical details that might task the attention span of a typical jury.

I live and work in Dallas, which is a hotbed of this kind of multi-tiered political activity, so I have no excuse for being surprised. And by "kind" I mean the strange alliance that has formed between the wealthy harvesters of grassroots fundamentalism and the larger neocon movement as a whole. (Sweet talking preachers, indeed.)

I'm just glad that someone (Jack Krebs) was available to provide a credible and articulate response to the radio listener's questions. Unfortunately, that is not always the case. There aren't enough real scientists with enough time on their hands to go around. It's hard enough just keeping an eye on the "fair and balanced" media and the organized "intellectual exchanges" that take place regularly in venues as respectable( ?) as the University of Texas at Dallas.

What is needed is a nationally coordinated pro-science grassroots movement to compliment the professional response of real scientists and engineers. Think: Educated laypeople, K-12 educators, moderate theists, who would be prepared to spot any sneaky linguistic reframing of basic scientific knowledge toward hidden political goals, and feel confident enough to respond with the FACTS.

And not just the facts, actually, but also a framework for understanding them. George Lakoff has stated correctly that without a correct framing of the issues, facts will bounce off certain arguments (no matter how absurd) like bullets bouncing off of superman's cape.

Or, maybe this already exists? If so, does anyone know where I can sign up?

Michael Finley · 3 April 2005

There is a difference between not responding and being ignored. I have responded to Mr. Flank's query (and everyone else who joined the chorus) by directing him to a related site (see comment Nos. 22986 and 22981). The discussion I initiated there is an attempt to make scientific predictions from the assumption of common design. It may be successful, it may not. It is, nevertheless, an honest attempt. So spare me the tired rhetoric about sinister motives, etc.

http://www.antievolution.org/cgi-bin/ikonboard/ikonboard.cgi . . .

I would also point out that a person cannot be ready to respond on this board 24 hours a day.

Michael Finley · 3 April 2005

Make that comment Nos. 22986 and 22991.

Jim Wynne · 3 April 2005

I have responded to Mr. Flank's query (and everyone else who joined the chorus)

— Michael Finley
If by "responded" you mean "I also dodged the question on another site" then you are absolutely correct. With regard to the idea that we should expect the same output from the processes of common descent and common design, the point you are either missing or clumsily dodging is that as far as biological evolution is concerned, it doesn't matter. What does matter is that we can test for common descent, but we can't test for the existence of a designer, so the metaphysical road isn't taken by science because because it will (predictably) lead nowhere. This is not to say that possible metaphysical causes are ignored, however, as has been pointed out. But we are limited by our senses to what we can perceive and test, so before admitting for supernatural causes, we have no choice but to eliminate the natural ones first. The alternative is to just stop and ascribe all of our sensations and perceptions to the designer. Putting it another way: if you want to eliminate the possibility of common design (which is the scientific way to work towards verifying it) how can you do it without first eliminating potential natural causes?

Ed Darrell · 3 April 2005

P. Mihalakos said:

What is needed is a nationally coordinated pro-science grassroots movement to compliment the professional response of real scientists and engineers. Think: Educated laypeople, K-12 educators, moderate theists, who would be prepared to spot any sneaky linguistic reframing of basic scientific knowledge toward hidden political goals, and feel confident enough to respond with the FACTS.

Go to the right side of the "Main" Panda's Thumb screen, and scroll down to "state science groups." You'll see a Texas group listed. I ran into Steve Schaffersman, the chief organizer of the Texas group, at the ID fete at the University of Texas-Dallas on March 26 -- were you there? He's in Lubbock or somesuch, but there are members throughout the state. And if you'd care to be notified, zip me an e-mail and I'll get you on the list of the Dallas Textbook Coalition, a widely ecumenical group that came together on textbook issues in 2003. And have you joined NCSE?

Ed Darrell · 3 April 2005

I would also point out that a person cannot be ready to respond on this board 24 hours a day.

But, Mr. Finley, this is a question that has been posed to ID advocates since 1992, at least. Do you think that, if there were in fact a "growing number of scientists" who endorse ID (though you and I both know there is not a growing number), that at least one ID advocate would take a couple of hours out of the past 13 years to pose a testable hypothesis about intelligent design? I'll allow you to say the dog ate your homework, once. ID has been claiming that every day for 13 years. I think it's animal cruelty to feed nothing but homework to a dog, especially for so long.

PvM · 3 April 2005

The discussion I initiated there is an attempt to make scientific predictions from the assumption of common design. It may be successful, it may not. It is, nevertheless, an honest attempt.

— Finley
What is the 'assumption of common design"? Does it include natural designers (chance and regularity)? Ruse has argued that teleology or design in nature is not unexpected given the processes of variation and selection. What do you propose the methods of common design could be?

Michael Finley · 3 April 2005

Ed Darrell,

What has "...since 1992" to do with me.

There are three lines of argument, it seems to me, for ID.

(1) Argue that the predictions of common descent and common design are coextensive.

(2) Argue that the "predictions" of common descent are not predictions, but are merely consistent with common descent.

(3) Use an inductive elimination (i.e., a destructive dilemma with an inductive disjunction) to argue against the viability of the mechanism(s) of common descent.

Dembski and Behe are involved in the third. On the website I linked to I am exploring the first. If these ultimately fail, then so much the better for Darwinian evolution. Personally, I think the discussion needs to be evaluated over a longer period of time.

Michael Finley · 3 April 2005

What is the "assumption of common design"?

— PvM
As I am presently using it, it excludes "natural designers." Accordingly, it is contrary to common descent. I am not in principle opposed to natural designers, though I am wary of the notion of chance. I would need a causal (as oppossed to probabilistic) definition of chance.

PvM · 3 April 2005

Are you aware of Richard B Hoppe's work on multiple designer theory?

given your argument that common design is contrary to common descent, do you propose continued interventions? In what sense is it contrary to common descent?
Also, is this common design approach different from methodological naturalism which has quite succesfully detected 'design' in nature in areas such as criminology, archaeology etc.

PvM · 3 April 2005

In evolutionary theory, chance does not preclude a causal theory since 'randomness' does not refer to mechanism but to its (immediate) effect given a particular environment. In other words, variation does not exclusively lead to beneficial changes.

Henry J · 3 April 2005

Re "There are three lines of argument, it seems to me, for ID.
(1) Argue that the predictions of common descent and common design are coextensive.
(2) Argue that the "predictions" of common descent are not predictions, but are merely consistent with common descent.
(3) Use an inductive elimination (i.e., a destructive dilemma with an inductive disjunction) to argue against the viability of the mechanism(s) of common descent."

Huh? None of those argue "for" ID. 2 and 3 just argue that there are factors not presently accounted for (which is pretty much inevitable in a complex subject), and 1 implies that design can't be distinguished from descent, which is in itself an argument against design as science.

Henry

Michael Finley · 3 April 2005

None of those argue "for" ID. 2 and 3 just argue that there are factors not presently accounted for (which is pretty much inevitable in a complex subject), and 1 implies that design can't be distinguished from descent, which is in itself an argument against design as science.

— Henry J
I disagree. No. 1 argues that common descent and common design make the same predictions, and therefore, confirmation of one is confirmation of the other. It attempts to set common descent and common design on equal evidentiary footing, so to speak. No. 2 argues that there are no confirmed predictions of common descent because there are no predictions at all. If, for example, basic structural similarities were not shared by all life, it would not falsify the theory. Accordingly, common descent is merely consistent with the unity of life. And as common design is equally consistent with the unity of life, the two are again set on equal footing. No. 3 sets up a destructive dilemma with the following inductive disjunction: Either neo-Darwinian mechanisms (are responsible for the diversity of life) or design or .... The elipses represent unknown but logically possible theories. If it can be established that "not neo-Dawinian mechanisms," then it can be concluded "Either design or ...". And as these other theories are unknown, design occupies the strongest position. No.

Michael Finley · 3 April 2005

Ellipses.

plunge · 3 April 2005

"Just to prove my point: anyone who thinks that supernatural causes are, in principle, scientific, please voice your support here."

Define a supernatural cause in a positive sense (i.e., not just a negation of natural), and maybe we'll have something to talk about. Otherwise, we will simply make do with the testable vs the untestable, which seems to line up with what people mean by "natural vs. supernatural" anyway. How else to exaplin how "supernatural" things become "natural" as we gain the ability to examine them scientifically?

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 3 April 2005

There is a difference between not responding and being ignored. I have responded to Mr. Flank's query (and everyone else who joined the chorus) by directing him to a related site (see comment Nos. 22986 and 22981). The discussion I initiated there is an attempt to make scientific predictions from the assumption of common design. It may be successful, it may not. It is, nevertheless, an honest attempt. So spare me the tired rhetoric about sinister motives, etc.

Don't bullshit me, Finley. What about my other questions -- are you answering them "elsewhere" too . . . ?

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 3 April 2005

There are three lines of argument, it seems to me, for ID. (1) Argue that the predictions of common descent and common design are coextensive. (2) Argue that the "predictions" of common descent are not predictions, but are merely consistent with common descent. (3) Use an inductive elimination (i.e., a destructive dilemma with an inductive disjunction) to argue against the viability of the mechanism(s) of common descent.

TRANSLATION: You don't have any testible theory of ID, you don't EXPECT to ever have one, so you want to just argue for a God of the Gaps by plugging your designer into anything you think is wrong with evolution. Got it.

Michael Finley · 3 April 2005

Mr. Flank, As far as I can tell, the only question you've asked is the following (No. 22932):

Here is ID non-naturalistic methodology's chance to shine. What predictions can we make from ID's hypothesis?

That is the scope of the linked discussion. Let's take up the conversation there, if you please (though I have not had the chance this weekend; all my bloging has been here). Otherwise, be so kind as to run along.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 3 April 2005

As I am presently using it, it excludes "natural designers."

Why. Upon what do you base this assumption. Oh, and why don't ANY of the leading IDers share this assumption --- they ALL have declared publicly that the "intelligent deisgner" might be nothing but advanced space aliens -- i.e., "natural designers". Why are you correct in your assumption, but they are not. Or are they just lying to us when they say that . . . . . {quote}Accordingly, it is contrary to common descent.{/quote] Why. Why can the designer not have used the mechanism of common descent.

I am not in principle opposed to natural designers, though I am wary of the notion of chance. I would need a causal (as oppossed to probabilistic) definition of chance.

Who do you NOT need a "causal" definition of your deisgner --- i.e., tell us what it does, tell us how it does it, tell us where we can see it doing anything today. Or do you just want us to take your religious word for all of that . . . . .

No. 1 argues that common descent and common design make the same predictions, and therefore, confirmation of one is confirmation of the other

If, according to this view, common descent and common design are identical and cannot be told apart, and since we've SEEN common descent but NOT seen common design, why should anyone accept that any common design even exists . . . . . . Other than your say-so.

Michael Finley · 3 April 2005

TRANSLATION: You don't have any testible theory of ID, you don't EXPECT to ever have one, so you want to just argue for a God of the Gaps by plugging your designer into anything you think is wrong with evolution.

— Mr. Flank
Until you improve your translation skills, use some measure of charity in treating the arguments of others, and stop the rhetorical grand-standing, I think our conversation has come to an end.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 3 April 2005

No. 1 argues that common descent and common design make the same predictions, and therefore, confirmation of one is confirmation of the other. It attempts to set common descent and common design on equal evidentiary footing, so to speak. No. 2 argues that there are no confirmed predictions of common descent because there are no predictions at all. If, for example, basic structural similarities were not shared by all life, it would not falsify the theory. Accordingly, common descent is merely consistent with the unity of life. And as common design is equally consistent with the unity of life, the two are again set on equal footing. No. 3 sets up a destructive dilemma with the following inductive disjunction: Either neo-Darwinian mechanisms (are responsible for the diversity of life) or design or . . . . The elipses represent unknown but logically possible theories. If it can be established that "not neo-Dawinian mechanisms," then it can be concluded "Either design or . . . ". And as these other theories are unknown, design occupies the strongest position.

I, uh, don't see any of the steps of the scientific method in here, Finley. Why is that. All I see is the same "evolution can't explain X Y and Z, therefore my designer dunnit" crapola that I've seen from IDers for 15 years now. Where is the **TESTIBLE SCIENTIFIC THEORY OF INTELLIGENT DESIGN** that you promised me. Or were you just lying to me about that.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 3 April 2005

Until you improve your translation skills, use some measure of charity in treating the arguments of others, and stop the rhetorical grand-standing, I think our conversation has come to an end.

boo hoo hoo. Want some cheese to go with that whine? Our conversation ended before it even began, Finley --- IDers HAVE NO testible scientific theory of ID, and just like you, they are flat-out lying to us when they claim they do. Thanks for demonstrating that so clearly for everyone.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 3 April 2005

As far as I can tell, the only question you've asked is the following (No. 22932): Here is ID non-naturalistic methodology's chance to shine. What predictions can we make from ID's hypothesis?

Then let me refresh your memory, you evasive little liar:

Do you, or do you not, think that ID hypotheses should be tested using the scientific method, the same way that everyone ELSE's hypothesis should be tested using the scientific method. If you do NOT think ID hypotheses should be subject to the same testing as everyone else's, then please explain why ID hypotheses should be privileged in this manner. If you DO think that ID hypotheses should be subject to the same testing as everyone else's, then what the hell are you bitching about.

Therefore, any conclusions of methodologically naturalistic science depend on metaphysical naturalism. Reeaaalllyyyyyy. Um, why are so many scientists (who practice methodological naturlaism) Christians (who, I presume, are not metaphysical naturalistic, believing in God and all . . . . . ) Oh, and why are the vast majority of Christians (who, once again, I presume are not metaphysical naturalistic) accepting of evolution and all the rest of modern science (which, I point out, follow methodological naturalism). Explain, please.

Indeed, so does weather forecasting (I've never yet heard any meteorologist conclude that "this hurricane followed this track into that cuty because God wanted to punish sinners there"), or accident investigation (I've never yet heard an FAA investigator conclude "this airplane crashed because it was the will of God"). In law, supernatural causes and effects are also ruled out a priori --- no lawyer is allowed to argue "my client is innocent of the murder because the Devil made him do it". Heck, the rules of baseball don't mention any supernatural causes or effects either. Utterly materialistic and naturalistic. Medicine? Gee, when Mr Finley gets sick, do you suppose he asks his doctor to utilize supernatural methods or non-material cures? Or does he just ask his materialistic naturalistic doctor to cure his materialistic naturalistic diseases by using materialistic naturalistic antibiotics to kill his naturalistic materialistic germs? So why is it that IDers get their panties all in a bunch about "atheistic naturalistic materialistic evolution", but NOT about "atheistic naturalistic materialistic" weather forecasting or accident investigation or law or medicine or rules of baseball? Or . . . DOES "renewing our culture" indeed include forcing DI's particular brand of theism into all those areas as well . . . . .

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 3 April 2005

If it can be established that "not neo-Dawinian mechanisms,"

How, exactly, do you establish this. How, exactly, do you rule out not only every KNOWN "neo-Darwinian mechanisms" from TODAY, but all the CURRENTLY UNKNOWN ones that may potentially appear in the indefinite FUTURE . . . ? Or are you just codifying "God of the Gaps" --- "anything we can't explain now, then God -- uh, I mean, The Unknown Intelligent Designer -- musta dunnit". This brings up yet ANOTHER question for you, Finley (that I suspect you will ALSO never answer). Suppose we have a phenomenon A that we cannot explain today using "neo-Darwinian mechanisms". According to your, uh, "scientific theory of ID", we would therefore conclude that "The Designer Dunnit". However, suppose that five years from now, we DO find a "ne-Darwinian mechanism" that explains A. Does that mean, in your view, that (1) the Designer did NOT really do it and you were simply wrong to think it did, or does it mean that (2) the Designer DID do it for a little while and then STOPPED doing it right before we discovered a mechanism, or does it mean (3) there never was any Designer there in the first place and the mechanism we just found was operating all along. Which is it, Finley . . . . . . ? See, Finley -- THIS is the problem with a God of the Gaps.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 3 April 2005

Either neo-Darwinian mechanisms (are responsible for the diversity of life) or design or . . . . The elipses represent unknown but logically possible theories. If it can be established that "not neo-Dawinian mechanisms," then it can be concluded "Either design or . . . ". And as these other theories are unknown, design occupies the strongest position.

We can, of courdse, turn this around, with equal validity. You are in essence arguing "if not neo-Darwinian mechanisms, then an unknown designer using unknown methods". I, of course, can say "if no designer, then an unknown neo-Darwinian mechanism". And since you cannot produce a single shred of testible evidence anywhere for any unknown designer, and since there are TONS of neo-Darwinian mechanisms that we can observe directly in action, it would appear as if *I* am the one in the strongest position. Unless, of course, you can produce some testible hypothesis that would differentiate "common descent" from "common design". Which you have already admitted you can NOT do (after waving your arms at me all day that you COULD).

PvM · 3 April 2005

Dear Rev Dr Lenny Flank, would you mind toning down your ad hominems. Finley raises some good questions and if he believes he can propose a scientific theory of common design then let's explore this.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 3 April 2005

Dear Rev Dr Lenny Flank, would you mind toning down your ad hominems.[/quote}

I have not MADE any ad hominems. I pointed out, correctly and accurately, that Finley is a liar. That is not an ad hominem -- it is a simple obervable statement of fact.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 3 April 2005

Finley raises some good questions and if he believes he can propose a scientific theory of common design then let's explore this.

OK, let's. I've already cited the example of the genetic similaritires between humans and chimps. Finley, here's your big chance. Use your, uh, scientific theory of ID to tell us ---- are those genetic similarities the product of common design, or are they the product of common descent. And how can we tell. Please show all your steps and be as detailed as possible.

PvM · 3 April 2005

Frank, your comments are needlessly hostile. You may believe that Finley is a liar but such personal beliefs serve little to further communication. Focus on your arguments, point out the flaws but please try to refrain from such ad hominems as 'liar/lying' which require a level of evidence, seldomly met.

PvM · 3 April 2005

OK, let's. I've already cited the example of the genetic similaritires between humans and chimps. Finley, here's your big chance. Use your, uh, scientific theory of ID to tell us ------ are those genetic similarities the product of common design, or are they the product of common descent. And how can we tell.

— Frank
Now that is a perfectly good question. Present a competing hypothesis of ID and compare it with the evolutionary theory. The problem is that any competing hypothesis of ID needs to constrain the designer otherwise it can be used to explain anything and thus nothing.

Michael Finley · 3 April 2005

Define a supernatural cause in a positive sense (i.e., not just a negation of natural), and maybe we'll have something to talk about.

— plung
I can attempt to address the distinction between natural and supernatural, though it is difficult. The definition of "cause" is more difficult; I'm not sure modern science has a definition of cause (though I'm be no means read up on the issue). First, What is a natural event? An event that can be perceived by the senses? What about quarks, etc.? An event subject to natural laws? That, of course, uses the defined in the definition. An event that excludes the supernatural? That is a negative definition on the other side. Perhaps if you got me started with a definition of natural, I could try to get somewhere from there.

Longhorn · 3 April 2005

According to Michael Finley:

There are three lines of argument, it seems to me, for ID. (1) Argue that the predictions of common descent and common design are coextensive. (2) Argue that the "predictions" of common descent are not predictions, but are merely consistent with common descent. (3) Use an inductive elimination (i.e., a destructive dilemma with an inductive disjunction) to argue against the viability of the mechanism(s) of common descent. Dembski and Behe are involved in the third. On the website I linked to I am exploring the first. If these ultimately fail, then so much the better for Darwinian evolution. Personally, I think the discussion needs to be evaluated over a longer period of time.

Michael, what do you mean by "predictions?" On the issue of predictions, I'm not interested in what you think will happen. I want to know what you think happened -- in the past. Also, I don't care about the nature of the designer. Maybe it's an extraterrestrial scientist. I don't even really care what powers or technology the designer used. That's not important to me. What I want to know is what event(s) on earth the designer cause. For instance, did the designer cause a bacterium to grow a flagellum? Did the designer contribute to the extinction of the dinosaurs (and thereby helping bring about the age of the mammals) by causing a large meterorite to hit earth? On your third point: I'd be willing to discuss that with you, as well. I looked at the website you linked to. It's big. There is a lot of information there. Is there one particular idea that we can talk about now? I know that blogging can be a pain. It can take up a lot of time.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 3 April 2005

First, What is a natural event? An event that can be perceived by the senses? What about quarks, etc.? An event subject to natural laws? That, of course, uses the defined in the definition. An event that excludes the supernatural? That is a negative definition on the other side. Perhaps if you got me started with a definition of natural, I could try to get somewhere from there.

I would prefer that you just answer my friggin question, and tell me how to use the scientific method to test for the presence or absence of any "supernatural causes". I've already given a suitable example; the genetic similarity between humans and chimps. Show me how we can use the scientific method to determine whether or not these similarities are or are not the result of "supernatural common design". Please be as detailed as possible.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 3 April 2005

What I want to know is what event(s) on earth the designer cause. For instance, did the designer cause a bacterium to grow a flagellum? Did the designer contribute to the extinction of the dinosaurs (and thereby helping bring about the age of the mammals) by causing a large meterorite to hit earth?

Indeed, "what did the designer do, and how did it do it" would seem to be the most basic requirements of any purported "scientific theory of ID". Yet IDers are utterly unable to present any such thing. All of thier arm-waving simply boils down to "an unknown thing did an unknown thing at an unknown time using unknown methods". Gee, thanks, guys. THAT sure is useful . . . . . Let's see if Finley can do any better. I'm betting he can't.

PvM · 3 April 2005

Yes, I did say that "science does not include the supernatural." But does that make me opposed to the supernatural? Would a blind man be opposed to color because he does not see a rainbow? Rather, would it not be that a blind man simply lacks any sensory means for detecting it? That is my claim for why science does not include the supernatural. It is not for Dr. Geisler's supposed reason of opposition, but simply that with the methods of sensory experience we do not apprehend the supernatural. Because of the limitations on the methods of science we were left with no alternative but to leave the identity of the intelligent cause affirmed by experience unspecified as to philosophical category.

Thaxton Replies to Geisler See also On Methodological Naturalism and Intelligent Design (or Why Can't Lawrence VanDyke Leave Well Enough Alone?) on the issue of science having an a priori commitment to MN.

Michael Finley · 3 April 2005

Now that is a perfectly good question. Present a competing hypothesis of ID and compare it with the evolutionary theory. The problem is that any competing hypothesis of ID needs to constrain the designer otherwise it can be used to explain anything and thus nothing.

— PvM
An ID proponent can argue against the "fact" or mechanisms of evolution. Behe, Dembski et al. are involved in arguments against the mechanism. I am presently interested in arguments against the "fact." Accordingly, the relevant evolutionary hypothesis is common descent. A contrary and competing hpyothesis is common design, i.e., a single designer created the present diversity of life (as the theory of common descent is independent of mechanisms, so too is common design; therefore, I ignore the mechanism for the purposes of this discussion). The problem you mention was raised by Dr. Elsberry in the discussion on antievolution.org. Perhaps it is devestating, but let me offer a possible answer. It is a universally accepted metaphysical prinicple that sameness of cause produces sameness of effect. Therefore, it can be expected that the products of a single designer will share a basic structural similarity to each other.

Flint · 3 April 2005

I agree that Lenny Flank's comments are hostile. I strongly disagree that they are needlessly hostile. He has made the context of what we consider scientific investigation (i.e. using evidence, constructing tests intended to disprove hypotheses) perfectly clear, and asked (repeatedly) how ID might show that it uses the scientific method to investigate anything.

Finley has doubletalked, has evaded, has changed the subject, has (repeatedly) pointed to Flank's alleged shortcomings, and has above all refused to even address these dead-on-point questions. Now, we all know why: Finley has no honest answer. Even admitting he has no honest answer would at least be honest, and he can't even do that.

The failure to communicate has nothing whatsoever to do with Flank's hostility, and everything to do with the cause of that hostility: soup-to-nuts dishonesty. So long as we continue to bend over and agree to provide lubrication in the interests of being polite, our invitation will continue to be taken advantage of. At this point, I think we are justified in setting aside Finley's "good questions" until he shows some sign of producing some good answers.

Flint · 3 April 2005

It is a universally accepted metaphysical prinicple that sameness of cause produces sameness of effect. Therefore, it can be expected that the products of a single designer will share a basic structural similarity to each other.

More doubletalk. The question was: Here we have genetic similarities. We have two hypotheses: common descent, and common design. HOW DO WE DECIDE WHICH IS CORRECT? Saying "the products of a single designer will be similar" does presume (in the absence of any evidence at all) something about the preferences of the designer, but it fails to address the question. Since the question is very clear and has been asked repeatedly, I think we can conclude, once again, that Finley knows he can't be honest in his answer and can't be honest in admitting that either.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 3 April 2005

It is a universally accepted metaphysical prinicple that sameness of cause produces sameness of effect. Therefore, it can be expected that the products of a single designer will share a basic structural similarity to each other.

That's nice. Now answer my friggin question. Are the genetic similarities between humans and chimps the product of common descent, or common design, and how do we tell. Where is this "testible scientific theory of ID" that you were waving your arms about all day yesterday. Or were you just lying to me about having one.

Jim Harrison · 3 April 2005

"Universally accepted metaphysical principle that sameness of cause produces sameness of effect." That expression evokes nostalgia in those of us familiar with the scientific debates of the early 18th Century.

ID is so retro. I guess that explains its charm.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 3 April 2005

It is a universally accepted metaphysical prinicple that sameness of cause produces sameness of effect.

You have not established any "sameness of cause", Finley. Indeed, you have not established ANY cause. None at all, whatsoever. You simply want us to assume it, by accepting your religious opinion about a Designer, *without* putting that opinion to any test using the scientific method. I want you to ESTABLISH it. Using the scientific method. ALL of the scientific method. Just like everyone ELSE has to do with THEIR scientific hypotheses. Can you, or can't you. Which is it.

Jack Krebs · 3 April 2005

I've been away at a meeting today and I come back and there are 45 posts! I have not read them all, but I would like to comment on this "common design vs. common descent."

There is one small difference between common design and common descent, which is that common descent has a mechanism - babies, and common design has no mechanism. That is, the only way we see new organisms come into the world is through some type of sexual or asexual reproduction.

Therefore the question I have for Michael Finley is this: if biological parent-child descent isn't the way every organism has come into existence, what is? Creation de novo? - instantaneous and miraculous materialization? What alternative hypothesis for the material specifics of the origin of new organisms do you offer, and what positive evidence do you have for that hypothesis?

Longhorn · 3 April 2005

Michael Finley wrote:

I endorse the notion that supernatural causes should not, in principle, be rejected as unscientific.

Ed Darrel responded:

First, what changes do you think that would make in science? Second, how could that possibly be done, short of throwing up our hands at some point saying "it's Zeus' will?" Third, if we do that, how could we possibly know that we had found evidence of a god's existence when it surfaced?

Ed, my experience is that it is usually not good to respond to a claim by saying: "That is not science." It is usually good (at least for me) to respond to some claims by saying: "The event you describe did not occur." Or, at least: "I'm justified in believing that the event you described did not occur." For instance, say someone says: "God turned dust directly into the first man, and then took out one of his ribs to form the first woman." It is good to say: "With all due respect, you are mistaken. That didn't occur." And then go on to describe what did occur. Or at least what you are jusified in believing did occur. For instance, I might say something like the following: "The first organism to live on earth that looked a lot like me anatomically was born in the same way I was born." This approach is often good because those who offer claims about the past often want those claims to be treated as claims about events that acutally occurred. Second, this approach tends to be clearer than distinguishing between "science" and "non-science" and then going on to say: "what you are doing is not science." That tends to get unclear -- and muddle things up. Finally, for whatever it's worth, my personal experience is that the approach I'm suggesting seems to be more effective at getting people to understand evolution and realize how well-supported it is. It seems to help people realize that evolution (molecules to humans) happened. I find this particularly to be the case with U.S. citizens. They tend to like things straight-forward -- without a lot of conceptual baggage. Now, one can argue about whether this "U.S. trait" is a good trait. I have mixed feeling. I would say that in some contexts it is a good trait; in other contexts it is not so good. But a lot of U.S. citizens respond favorably to what some people call "straight-talk." Straight-talk can often mask difficulties and be unjustified. People often say George Bush is a straight-talker, and, really, many of his claims are quite unclear. And sometimes we should convey to people that a certain idea is not well-established, or that there is a lot to be learned. Sometimes it is better to communicate shades of grey. But in the case of the hypothesis of common descent, that is really well-established. A deity did not turn dust directly into two elephants (and male and one female). I'm not a scientist, but I would like to learn more about the causes of what scientists call "mutations." That is, I'd like to have a better understanding of what causes daughter-cells to have genomes that are different than the genomes of their parent-cells. I'd also like a better understanding of how much of the differences among organisms has been caused by sexual reproduction/genetic recombination rather than by mutation. I suspect sexual reproduction/genetic recombination contributed massively to the genetic and phenotypic differences between some organisms. though that is beyond the scope of this post. I also would like to know more about the role of recessive genes in evolution. It seems like they must have contributed to significant differences among organisms. In addition, I don't know what series of events resulted in the first cell on earth. Finally, I think we should keep exploring to try to learn more about the events that have caused the differences among organisms. But the issue of common descent is overwhelmingly well-established. In most contexts, the word "fact" is the best word. If someone presents me with a dichotomy of whether common descent is a "fact" or a "theory," I may indicate that I don't like that distinction. But I will say: "Given what I think you mean by those words, common descent is a fact." However, perhaps one is short on time and/or not as comfortable with the approach that I'm suggesting. In that case, maybe it is better for one to go with the "that is not science" approach.

Longhorn · 3 April 2005

According to Michael Finley:

An ID proponent can argue against the "fact" or mechanisms of evolution.

Michael, are you willing to "argue against the 'fact' or mechanisms of evolution" now? What concerns do you have? And could you elaborate on what you mean by "mechanisms of evolution?" According to Michael:

Accordingly, the relevant evolutionary hypothesis is common descent. A contrary and competing hpyothesis is common design, i.e., a single designer created the present diversity of life (as the theory of common descent is independent of mechanisms, so too is common design; therefore, I ignore the mechanism for the purposes of this discussion).

Michael, I don't see what you are getting at here. What do you think the designer did? Did it turn dust (or "nothingness") -- poof! -- directly into some organisms? Which ones?

Michael Finley · 3 April 2005

Finley has doubletalked, has evaded, has changed the subject, has (repeatedly) pointed to Flank's alleged shortcomings, and has above all refused to even address these dead-on-point questions. Now, we all know why: Finley has no honest answer. Even admitting he has no honest answer would at least be honest, and he can't even do that.

— Flint

More doubletalk. The question was: Here we have genetic similarities. We have two hypotheses: common descent, and common design. HOW DO WE DECIDE WHICH IS CORRECT?

It is only doubletalk if you mistake the actual question. Common descent makes a number of predictions; I am beginning with the first prediction Ostwald mentions in his FAQ, viz., the unity of life (I can't be expected to treat them all at once). Let's be clear what is involved in that prediction. It is the bare claim that a basic structural similarity will be found in all life. It does not follow logically from common descent what that similarity will consist in, i.e., what basic functions are common to all life or what mechanisms carry out those functions. Thus, common descent predicts all organisms will have a basic structural similarity, whatever that happens to be. I want to argue that the same prediction follows from common design. There is a shared intuition that underlies that prediction, that products by a single hand, so to speak, share something distinctive of their common source (i.e., an instance of the basic metaphysical principle already mentioned). Our discussion, then, should focus on whether it a basic similarity of structure is a reasonable prediction of the hypothesis of common design. If it is, then the hypothesis is confirmed on that count because there is indeed a shared basic structure. Details concerning species or genes are irrelevant to both predictions (of common descent and design), because neither is that detailed. My point, then, is fairly straight-forward. Disagree or don't, but at least recognize its simplicity.

Stuart Weinstein · 3 April 2005

Finley writes:

"Mr. Flank,

You really need to learn to parse issues.

Whether or not supernatural causes are excluded a priori by the method of science is a philosophical question.

Whether or not a scientific explanation incorporating supernatural causes is practically possible is a separate question that is subordinate to the first.

Please attempt to focus, and respond with something more substantive than "How dreadful."

They are not excluded. However, until one come up with a way to measure the supernatural, the supernatural is simply outside of science. One potential way, was to examine the ability of prayer to heal the sick. In the case of JPII, it was inadequate to say the least.

Then again, Finley might believe Benny Hinn.

Now be a good pretend philosopher and answer Lenny's question.

What has ID achieved scientifically, technologically or philosophically?

Longhorm · 3 April 2005

There is a shared intuition that underlies that prediction, that products by a single hand, so to speak, share something distinctive of their common source (i.e., an instance of the basic metaphysical principle already mentioned). Our discussion, then, should focus on whether it a basic similarity of structure is a reasonable prediction of the hypothesis of common design. If it is, then the hypothesis is confirmed on that count because there is indeed a shared basic structure.

Michael, are you not going to respond to me? I've posted a number of messages to you. What do you mean by "common design?" What did the designer do? Did the designer turn inert matter into the first cell on earth and then sit back let evolution unfold? Did the designer turn dust directly into two humans? Your current claims seems something like this: "Sometime over the last 3.8 billion years a deity or extraterrestrial specially intervened and caused some events to occur on earth that enabled some organisms to live and/or reproduce." I don't for certain that the above claim false. But I'm justified in believing that it is not true, though I can't get into the issues right now. But, Michael, it would be much easier if you would just say which event(s) you believe the designer caused.

Longhorm · 3 April 2005

Stuart Weinstein posts:

They are not excluded. However, until one come up with a way to measure the supernatural, the supernatural is simply outside of science.

Stuart, what do you mean by "outside of science?" There are some events that people have claimed occurred that did not occur -- or at least I am justified in believing that they did not occur. Whether we call the claims "science" or "non-science," the events referred to did not occur. For instance, a deity did not turn dust directly into the first humans. Some people believe that at Time T there were no humans. Then a deity intervened; and a deity turned dust into a human so that at Time T + .2 seconds there was a human on earth. That didn't happen. The first organism that was very similar anatomically to me was born in the same way I was born. Whether we call the claim that a deity turned dust directly into the first two humans "science" or "non-science," the event did not occur. I deal with this issue in post 23133. I try to show that the approach I'm using to deal with certain kinds of claims is a good approach.

Michael Finley · 3 April 2005

Michael, are you not going to respond to me? I've posted a number of messages to you. What do you mean by "common design?" What did the designer do? Did the designer turn inert matter into the first cell on earth and then sit back let evolution unfold? Did the designer turn dust directly into two humans?

— Longhorm
It's difficult to keep up, my apologies. I believe your question is not relevant here. It is maintained by evolutionists (e.g., Ostwald) that the "fact" of evolution, that evolution occurred (common descent), is independent of questions concerning how evolution occurred (mechanisms). By the same token, the veracity of common design can be discussed without addressing a mechanism. It seems to me that your question concerns a mechanism of common design. Am I mistaken?

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 3 April 2005

It is only doubletalk if you mistake the actual question. Common descent makes a number of predictions; I am beginning with the first prediction Ostwald mentions in his FAQ, viz., the unity of life (I can't be expected to treat them all at once). Let's be clear what is involved in that prediction. It is the bare claim that a basic structural similarity will be found in all life. It does not follow logically from common descent what that similarity will consist in, i.e., what basic functions are common to all life or what mechanisms carry out those functions. Thus, common descent predicts all organisms will have a basic structural similarity, whatever that happens to be. I want to argue that the same prediction follows from common design.

So in your view there is NO DETECTIBLE DIFFERENCE, ABSOLUTELY NONE AT ALL WHATSOEVER, between "common descent" and "common design". . . . ?

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 3 April 2005

Our discussion, then, should focus on whether it a basic similarity of structure is a reasonable prediction of the hypothesis of common design. If it is, then the hypothesis is confirmed on that count because there is indeed a shared basic structure.

And then the "design" hypothesis would be DIS-confirmed if there is a DIFFERENCE in structure, right? Or do you want it BOTH ways ---- similarity of genetics and morphoilogy is evidence of design, but so is DIFFERENCE in genetics and similarity . . .

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 3 April 2005

I believe your question is not relevant here. It is maintained by evolutionists (e.g., Ostwald) that the "fact" of evolution, that evolution occurred (common descent), is independent of questions concerning how evolution occurred (mechanisms). By the same token, the veracity of common design can be discussed without addressing a mechanism. It seems to me that your question concerns a mechanism of common design. Am I mistaken?

More dishonest arm-waving and douible-talk. Evolution presents mechanisms. Those mechanisms can be tetsed using the scientific method. Why can't *ID* present mechanisms that can be tested using the scientific method. Other than the simple fact that ID isn't science.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 3 April 2005

It is only doubletalk if you mistake the actual question.

The actual question has been, still is, and will remain (until you answer it); How do we use the scientific method to test for the presence or absence of supernatural causes. After all, it was *YOUR* claim that science unfairly rules out a priori any supernatural causes (we will forget for the moment that I've already cited studies of supernatural effects of prayer on healing, and thus demonstrated that your assertion is utterly wrong). Are you going to *ANSWER* that question, or are you just going to keep spouting out lots of pseudo-philosophical bullshit as an excuse why you don't HAVE to test your hypothesized supernatural causes. In all your arm-waving and blathering, you have still not yetr subjected ANY prediction made by your supernatural "hypothesis" to ANY process of the scientific method. Why is that.

Longhorm · 3 April 2005

I believe your question is not relevant here. It is maintained by evolutionists (e.g., Ostwald) that the "fact" of evolution, that evolution occurred (common descent), is independent of questions concerning how evolution occurred (mechanisms). By the same token, the veracity of common design can be discussed without addressing a mechanism. It seems to me that your question concerns a mechanism of common design. Am I mistaken?

Michael, all I want to know is what you think happened? Whether you use the word "mechanism" or not is not important to me. What do you think happened? I'll tell you what I think happened. Evolution -- molecules to humans. What do you think happened? The reason it is important for you to say what you think happened is that otherwise your claim is too vague for it to be justified. Just be clear. For instance, do you think Lee Harvey Oswald shot JFK? I do. Do you think all organism that live on earth today descended from a single-celled microorganism? You posted: "Our discussion, then, should focus on whether it a basic similarity of structure is a reasonable prediction of the hypothesis of common design." I don't know you mean by "common design." I don't care what powers the designer used. What events did the designer cause on earth? "Basic similarity of structure?" I don't know what you mean by that. But some organisms are pretty different than others -- for instance, elephants and viruses. But any similarities between elephants and viruses does not enable me to justifiably believe that a deity turned dust into the first elephants and the first virus. I'm similar to my mother, and she is similar to her mother. And all three of us were born. So that some organisms are similar does not enable me to justifiably believe that a deity turned inert matter into them.

Longhorm · 3 April 2005

Michael Finley, when you talk about "mechanism" I start getting lost. My parents had sex one night awhile ago. My father's sperm-cells, after meiosis, were put into my mother. My mother's egg-cell, after meiosis, was in her uterus. One of my father's sperm-cells fertilized my mother's egg-cell. The cell started dividing. I was born!

Various factors contributed to my having the genome that I have. But one of the proximate causes of my genotype and phenotype is that my parents had sex.

What do you think happened?

Michael Finley · 3 April 2005

Michael, all I want to know is what you think happened? ... I'll tell you what I think happened. Evolution --- molecules to humans. What do you think happened?

— Longhorm
Isn't it obvious? I think a single divine being specially created the present diversity (i.e., species as oppossed to every individual animal) of life. Whether such creation was ex nihilo, whatever that might mean, or out of already existing matter ("dust," as you say) is beside the point.

Great White Wonder · 3 April 2005

The failure to communicate has nothing whatsoever to do with Flank's hostility, and everything to do with the cause of that hostility: soup-to-nuts dishonesty. So long as we continue to bend over and agree to provide lubrication in the interests of being polite, our invitation will continue to be taken advantage of.

I hope Paul Nelson is paying attention -- creationist trolls are simply the worst! Fyi, to my dear comrade Dr. Flank: don't get on Pim's bad side. ;)

Jack Krebs · 3 April 2005

So Michael, do you believe that the earth is only 6000-10,000 years old, and all this was done recently, or do you accept an old earth and believe this has been done 100's of 1000's of times over 3 or so billion years?

Michael Finley · 3 April 2005

Various factors contributed to my having the genome that I have. But one of the proximate causes of my genotype and phenotype is that my parents had sex.

— Longhorm
The mechanism of sex, by itself, is insufficient to explain the current diversity of life. Mutation, natural selection, etc. are required. I also think that my proximate cause is the sexual union of my parents, etc. But what is the proximate cause of the human beings as a species? Common descent and design are answers to that question. That said, the how is not relevant here. We are discussing the that of evolution, i.e., that it has occurred.

Flint · 3 April 2005

This seems straightforward, for a rare change. Finley thinks life, and all of the changes life has undergone, can be attributed to sheer inexplicable magic. No mechanism required, none need be investigated, the claim that any science is involved in any way is, uh, a smokescreen hiding the sheer faith-based suspension of rational thought.

Still, it's sad that Finley can't achieve the epiphany that John Davison reached: there's no need for all the evasion and doubletalk. All that's necessary is sheer bald-faced denial of evidence in the service of superstition. Now let us pray...

Michael Finley · 3 April 2005

So Michael, do you believe that the earth is only 6000-10,000 years old, and all this was done recently, or do you accept an old earth and believe this has been 100's of 1000's of times over 3 or so billion years?

— Jack Krebs
The age of the earth is irrelevant to my position, as far as I can tell. I am not a Biblical literalist, if that is what you're asking. I believe that the book of Genesis is a mythological account. I happen to believe that the universe is very old given the speed of light and the distance of the stars. I do not have a definite opinion about the age of the earth, but have no reason to prefer one age to another.

Flint · 3 April 2005

the how is not relevant here. We are discussing the that of evolution, i.e., that it has occurred.

The how is always relevant. We observe that life forms have changed over the course of time. Nobody is denying this. Changes of life forms over time is defined as being evolution, what the word itself applies to. Now, IDists hold that the mechanism by which such changes occurred was Divine Intervention. Scientists hold that natural mechanisms are sufficient to explain our observations. Tests of wide variety and long standing confirm that natural mechanisms are sufficient. Claims that magic is ALSO sufficient can't be denied, but are otherwise utterly useless. We can also attribute life's changes to the Great Green Arkleseizure. These changes still happened. Once again, Finley is trying to change the subject.

Pete Dunkelberg · 3 April 2005

Evidently Finley sees a philosophical issue where others don't think there is one. The discussion could go on forever. But Finley can't be expected to reply to each post from numerous other posters. Perhaps each side could state one more time, without accusing anyone else of anything, what their issue or position is. Meanwhile a comment on the following may help:

There is a shared intuition that underlies that prediction, that products by a single hand, so to speak, share something distinctive of their common source (i.e., an instance of the basic metaphysical principle already mentioned). Our discussion, then, should focus on whether it a basic similarity of structure is a reasonable prediction of the hypothesis of common design.

— Finley
We have no information on the Designer. But He is the default explanation for anything, and so His powers are unlimited so far as we know. And His imagination is unlimited. His tastes are unknown. He may abhor repetition and prefer to make an entirely original creation each time. Or not. Hence "The Designer did it" does not imply similar designs or anything else.

Michael Finley · 3 April 2005

No mechanism required, none need be investigated, the claim that any science is involved in any way is, uh, a smokescreen hiding the sheer faith-based suspension of rational thought.

— Flint
By "no mechanism required" I presume you mean "no natural mechanism required," which of course begs the question. Is this really that hard? Make a distinction between the fact of common descent and design, and the mechanisms of each. Recognize that these are independent of each other. Now let's discuss the first. What exactly is unscientific about that? Perhaps you'll reply that non-natural mechanisms are unscientific. In which case, we're back to methodological naturalism. Right?

Michael Finley · 3 April 2005

We have no information on the Designer. But He is the default explanation for anything, and so His powers are unlimited so far as we know. And His imagination is unlimited. His tastes are unknown. He may abhor repetition and prefer to make an entirely original creation each time. Or not. Hence "The Designer did it" does not imply similar designs or anything else.

— Pete Dunkelberg
Finally, a relevant comment. That may well be the correct, in which case my argument fails. But let's at least consider the question. We do not have information on the designer, but we do have information on the category "designers." What you say about the designer is equally true of a mere mortal designer, i.e., it is possible that he abhor repetition, etc. Does it follow from that possibility that similarity of products is an unreasonable prediction of designers simpliciter? I think not. Is it a probable prediction of designers on the whole, that products of a single hand share features that products by different hands do not? If so, given that we do not have particular knowledge of the designer, isn't it reasonable to attribute to him features characteristic of designers per se?

Jack Krebs · 3 April 2005

Yes, Michael, but that takes me back to my original question. Given a choice between creatures being born of each other and creatures being miraculously created, why would anyone even consider the second option? The first has all sorts of evidence that it happens (every birth) and the second absolutely none. It's not a matter of natural vs. supernatural, it's a matter of preferring an explanation with evidence vs. one that is totally evidence-free.

Michael Finley · 3 April 2005

Yes, Michael, but that takes me back to my original question. Given a choice between creatures being born of each other and creatures being miraculously created, why would anyone even consider the second option? The first has all sorts of evidence that it happens (every birth) and the second absolutely none. It's not a matter of natural vs. supernatural, it's a matter of preferring an explanation with evidence vs. one that is totally evidence-free.

— Jack Krebs
Were that my position, it would be ridiculous. Fortunately for me, it is not. Of course I believe that the proximate cause of my existence is the sexual union of my parents, etc. So it is with all of us. We know this because births are rountinely observed. The origin of the species was not observed. Common descent is a hypothesis that has to be established by inference. I am arguing for a different hypothesis.

Longhorm · 3 April 2005

Michael Finley posts:

Isn't it obvious? I think a single divine being specially created the present diversity (i.e., species as oppossed to every individual animal) of life. Whether such creation was ex nihilo, whatever that might mean, or out of already existing matter ("dust," as you say) is beside the point.

First, no it wasn't obvious. It wasn't obvious at all. I thought you would say God caused the Big Bang or the existence of the first cell. But I didn't think you would say: "I think a single divine being specially created the present diversity (i.e., species as oppossed to every individual animal) of life. Whether such creation was ex nihilo, whatever that might mean, or out of already existing matter ('dust,' as you say) is beside the point." Now my question for you is this: What reason is there to believe that what you think happened actually happened? More importantly, you are mistaken. What you think happened didn't happen. I recommend Enrst Mayr's book What Evolution Is. He is one of the greatest biologists to ever live, and he wrote the book for a general audience. Also, there is an article at Talkorigins that you might be interested in. By Douglas Theobold. It is entitled something like "Evidence for Common Descent." On the issue of sex. You are, of course, right: sexual reproduction did not cause the existence of all the organisms to have lived in earth. Sex didn't even evolve until like 1.5 billion years ago. Or maybe 650 million years ago. The oldest fossils we have found are the remains of bacteria that was alive about 3.5 billion years ago. But I used the example of my parents having sex and my getting born to try to indicate that we know at least some of the kinds of events that resulted in the existence of organisms. Also, sometimes cells divide so that the daughter-cell has a genome that is different than the genome of its parent-cell. When this happens, most scientsts say: "The organism has a new mutation." Apparently, RNA-based lytic viruses average one mutation per division. Apparently, humans average about 1.5 mutations per sexual generation among coding genes. Apparently, mice average about 1 new mutation per sexual generation among coding genes. Finally, that some organisms reproduced more time than some other organisms contributed significantly to the existence of every organism to live on earth subsequent to the first self-replicating molecules. I can't get into this in more depth right now.

Jack Krebs · 3 April 2005

But the hypothesis of common descent is supported by the reasonable assumption (one that is made throughout science) that what we see happening today also happened in the past, and your hypothesis of special creation is not.

Why would/should a scientist entertain the notion of special creation happening innumerable times in the past when common descent is consistent with what we see happening now and special creation necessitates the hypothesis of multiple miraculous creations.

Henry J · 3 April 2005

Re "No. 1 argues that common descent and common design make the same predictions, and therefore, confirmation of one is confirmation of the other. "

But they don't make the same predictions.

Descent implies that a new species will be a slightly modified version of a slightly earlier nearby species. Design is consistent with having lots of species with drastic differences from any "predecessor" (or even not having a predecessor).

Descent implies a heirarchical classification scheme should work. Design is consistent with having types that can't be arranged that way.

Descent implies that a species won't acquire an exact copy of something from a species in a different class. Design is consistent with mixing of dna and features across classes. (Just look at the way human technology mixes ideas from lots of different areas.)

Re "If, for example, basic structural similarities were not shared by all life, it would not falsify the theory."

If two species were found that shared no basic structures, that would imply separate origins for those two. It wouldn't falsify common origin of one of them with some other species.

Re "And as these other theories are unknown, design occupies the strongest position.

I disagree. Even if somebody were to demonstrate that known genetic processes were by themselves insufficient, that wouldn't be evidence for a process for which nobody has yet managed to describe any evidence. (And lists of unanswered questions do not constitute evidence, since the existance of unanswered questions doesn't surprise anybody.)

Of course, that presupposes said demonstration, which afaik nobody is even close to doing anyway.

---

Re "A contrary and competing hpyothesis is common design,"
Actually, design isn't contrary to descent, since the presumed designer could have used descent as a tool. (Calling them contrary is saying that a contradiction can be deduced if both are assumed.)

Oh, and btw, "designed" doesn't in itself require "common" design (assuming "common design" means a single or at least unified designing entity).

Re "It is a universally accepted metaphysical prinicple that sameness of cause produces sameness of effect. Therefore, it can be expected that the products of a single designer will share a basic structural similarity to each other."
I disagree. Anything that could design a new life form would most likely be able to produce a variety of distinct causes, so "sameness of cause" doesn't apply here.

Re "Thus, common descent predicts all organisms will have a basic structural similarity, whatever that happens to be.
I want to argue that the same prediction follows from common design."
I'm sure you want to do that. But that's assuming limitations about a "designer" about which we know nothing.

Re "Details concerning species or genes are irrelevant to both predictions (of common descent and design), because neither is that detailed."
I disagree, simply because at least some of the predictions of common descent are about species and genes.
And also because "design" as a concept doesn't make any predictions. It implies that there might be evidence inconsistent with undesigned evolution. But, without something more specific than that, there'd be no reason to take an inconsistency as a sign of design over merely a sign that there's some process we haven't found out about yet.

Henry

Russell · 3 April 2005

The predictions of common descent vs. common designer are not the same. If there's a common designer, you might (depending on assumptions about Its imagination, resources, constraints, etc.) expect certain commonalities across the whole range of living things. Like maybe the same genetic code being used throughout. But what, in the "common designer argument", predicts that the nestedness of the hierarchies of homologies? I.e. if chimps and humans were separately and independently poofed into existence, why would all their genes be more closely related to one another than to, say, the corresponding goat genes?

The nested hierarchies make perfect sense in light of common descent, and are not at all predicted by the common designer argument.

How come that doesn't end this discussion?

[I see that Henry J posed pretty much the same point while I was composing this. All the more reason it demands a response]

Michael Finley · 3 April 2005

1.1 The Fundamental Unity of Life. According to the theory of common descent, modern living organisms, with all their incredible differences, are the progeny of one single species in the distant past. In spite of the extensive variation of form and function among organisms, several fundamental criteria characterize all life. Some of the macroscopic properties that characterize all of life are (1) replication, (2) heritability (characteristics of descendents are correlated with those of ancestors), (3) catalysis, and (4) energy utilization (metabolism). At a very minimum, these four functions are required to generate a physical historical process that can be described by a phylogenetic tree. If every living species descended from an original species that had these four obligate functions, then all living species today should necessarily have these functions (a somewhat trivial conclusion). Most importantly, however, all modern species should have inherited the structures that perform these functions. Thus, a basic prediction of the genealogical relatedness of all life, combined with the constraint of gradualism, is that organisms should be very similar in the particular mechanisms and structures that execute these four basic life processes.

— 29+ Evidences for Evolution
This, according to Ostwald, is the relevant prediction of common descent. It reduces to the simple claim that all life will share basic structural features ("basic" here defined in terms of the "fundamental criteria [that happen to] characterize all life"). It should be clear that the structures that happen to perform these functions do not follow logically from common descent (e.g., DNA as the mechanism of heritability cannot be deduced from common descent alone). Forget about the truth or falsity of my argument for a moment and focus on its structure. If it could be established that a basic similarity of structure among all life was a logical consequence of a common designer, then common design would be confirmed on that count. Such an argument, if correct would be as scientific as the similar argument for common descent. If nothing else, can we agree on that?

Michael Finley · 3 April 2005

But what, in the "common designer argument", predicts that the nestedness of the hierarchies of homologies?

— Russell
Nested hierarchies are a different prediction (the second of 29 predictions in Ostwald's FAQ; the unity of all life is the first prediction). As nested hierarchies are often counted as the strongest evidence for common descent, I would love to discuss them. Perhaps we can treat them next, or later, or whatever.

PvM · 3 April 2005

The problem you mention was raised by Dr. Elsberry in the discussion on antievolution.org. Perhaps it is devestating, but let me offer a possible answer. It is a universally accepted metaphysical prinicple that sameness of cause produces sameness of effect. Therefore, it can be expected that the products of a single designer will share a basic structural similarity to each other.

— Finley
Which is why the multiple designer theory seems far more likely since it seems that there is more than a single 'designer' involved. Until you can explain why a single designer is constrained to using similarity, your argument however suffers from something called begging the question.

Michael Finley · 3 April 2005

Longhorm, I'd like to hedge on my previous statement. I am currently testing the position that "a single divine being specially created the present diversity of life." If that fails, I will test versions of intelligently guided evolution. If those fail, my last refuge is the position that a divine designer "fined tuned" the universe to produce intelligent life (intelligent life being the imago dei. I believe as a matter of faith and a philosophical position that my existence owes to a divine designer. I am attempting to work out that belief rationally, which includes empirical enquiries - fides quaerens intellectum as the Scholastics say ("faith seeking understanding"). I'll take a look at the Mayr. The Ostwald FAQ is the basis for my topic at the antievolution.org board.

What reason is there to believe that what you think happened actually happened?

That's the question. My common design argument tries to give an answer by co-opting the evidences of common descent. Well it's getting late where I live. Until tomorrow, then.

386sx · 3 April 2005

Michael Finley: It is a universally accepted metaphysical prinicple that sameness of cause produces sameness of effect. Therefore, it can be expected that the products of a single designer will share a basic structural similarity to each other.

So then one of the things that your "designer" (winky! winky!) cannot do is break your supposed
"sameness of cause. sameness of effect" rule. Let me guess: the designer can do whatever it wants, but you have determined that it didn't break the Finley's Law because, well, it just wasn't done that way.

Michael Rathbun · 3 April 2005

If it could be established that a basic similarity of structure among all life was a logical consequence of a common designer, then common design would be confirmed on that count.

— Michael Finley
I'm having trouble following this line of argument. Doubtless it is due to mental infirmity associated with my confirmed status as a Technogeezer. My career as a designer of software systems spans just over 42 years (nice number, that). Looking back at many of these masterpieces, including my first program written for a CDC 160A in 1962, I observe you'd never be able to associate them all with any particular author; they have absolutely no shared stylistic similarities. On the other hand, recently I spent some time examining a piece of open-source code that was so close in approach to "how I would have done it" that it would be easy for me to believe that I had written it myself and had just forgotten the incident. (And, unfortunately, the "forgetting" bit is not an implausible scenario nowadays.) This leads me to suggest that, observing designs, we can reliably infer absolutely nothing.

Great White Wonder · 3 April 2005

Forget about the truth or falsity of my argument for a moment and focus on its structure.

Good Gorb, can you believe this guy? Finley, please rest assured: we understand your "argument." Your problem is that your argument is not compelling to the vast majority of people who understand the evidence and who are interested in learning more about life on earth and its rich history. The reasons why your argument are not compelling have been laid out so plainly that a high school student at a decent public school could understand those reasons perfectly. And isn't that your real "problem" Finley? I'm just guessing. Let's call it an educated guess.

Longhorm · 3 April 2005

Michael, thanks for the thoughtful and sincere post (#23167). I think Michael Behe has said that he subscribes to common descent and believes that a designer intervened on a few occasions to cause the existence of some parts of some organisms. For instance, I think he thinks a designer caused the existence of the first bacterial flagellum. I haven't seen him say whether the designer created the first bacterial flagellum from "nothingness" or turned inert matter into. Regarding 23164: According to Michael:

This, according to Ostwald, is the relevant prediction of common descent. It reduces to the simple claim that all life will share basic structural features ("basic" here defined in terms of the "fundamental criteria [that happen to] characterize all life"). It should be clear that the structures that happen to perform these functions do not follow logically from common descent (e.g., DNA as the mechanism of heritability cannot be deduced from common descent alone).

I don't know what you mean by "follow logically." Some of the key data relevant to my understanding that all organisms alive today descended from a single cell is that the existence of billions and billions of organisms was caused by cell-division or sexual reproduction. And it is clear that, over the last 10,000 years, no event other than sexual reproduction or division has caused the existence of a muticellular organism on earth.

Forget about the truth or falsity of my argument for a moment and focus on its structure. If it could be established that a basic similarity of structure among all life was a logical consequence of a common designer, then common design would be confirmed on that count. Such an argument, if correct would be as scientific as the similar argument for common descent.

I don't think I see your point. But a single-celled microorganism that was on eath about 3.8 billion years ago evolved into all the mutlicellular organisms to live on earth subsequent to it. So, in essence, the issue is moot. Evolution (from molecules to elephants) happened.

Russell · 3 April 2005

Nested hierarchies are a different prediction (the second of 29 predictions in Ostwald's FAQ; the unity of all life is the first prediction). As nested hierarchies are often counted as the strongest evidence for common descent, I would love to discuss them. Perhaps we can treat them next, or later, or whatever.

This is an artificial distinction. The unity of life describes the tightly constrained, basic function, mess-with-this-and-your-dead end of the continuum. The nested hierarchy is more easily detected in the less constrained, optional, any-of-countless-similar-genes-will-do-the-trick end of the continuum. And there's everything in between. A big part of the strength of the common descent explanation is how it all works together. I do hope we're not trying to downplay that extremely important fact by pretending that these are all independent questions.

Wesley R. Elsberry · 4 April 2005

The Ostwald FAQ is the basis for my topic at the antievolution.org board.

— Michael Finley
Really? Here I've been thinking that Michael was quoting from Douglas Theobald's "29 Evidences for Macroevolution: The Scientific Case for Common Descent" FAQ. Where is this "Ostwald FAQ" supposed to be at?

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 4 April 2005

Isn't it obvious? I think a single divine being specially created the present diversity (i.e., species as oppossed to every individual animal) of life.

In other words, ID is religious apologetics, and IDers are simply lying to us when they testify in court that it's not. Got it. That's what I thought. Thanks for confirming it for me. But now I am curious; you say that God -- uh, I mean, the Unknown Intelligent Designer --- specially created all species. As I am sure you are aware, the t.o. archives has a long list of observed speciation events. I don't recall anyone who reported these speication events mentioning any divine designer being involved in them. Would you mind pointing to one of these speicaiton events and explaining (1) what the designer did to produce the new species and (2) why the people observing the speciation event didn't notice the designer doing whatever you think it did? Oh, and I am STILL waiting for you to use the scientific method to scientifically test any part of your, uh, scientific theory of ID. What seems to be the problem?

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 4 April 2005

Perhaps you'll reply that non-natural mechanisms are unscientific. In which case, we're back to methodological naturalism. Right?

We've already BEEN through all this before, Finley. You lost. There is NO step of the scientific method that rules out any supernatural explanations. Just ask the authors of all those "healing power of prayer" studies. So quit waving your arms, quit changing the subject, quit spouting out your pseudo-philosphical BS, and just answer my goddamn question; how do we use the scientific method to test any sueprnatural cause. So far, in ALL your verbose arm-waving, you have NOT included any steps of the scientific method. Why is that, Finley.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 4 April 2005

If it could be established that a basic similarity of structure among all life was a logical consequence of a common designer

How do you propose to use the scientific method to test this huypothesis. Please be as specific as possible. And spare us all the pseudo-philosophical pontificating --- it doesnt' have diddley to do with the scientific method. I want you to (1) give us an observation, (2) make a hypothesis that explains that observation, (3) use your hypothesis to make testible predictions, (4) test your predictions using experiment or observation, and (5) modify youtr hypothesis until it is consistent with all observations and experiments. Or do you jsut want to keep arguing that you dont' HAVE to test any of your "hypotheses" using the scientififc method . . . .

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 4 April 2005

I am currently testing the position that "a single divine being specially created the present diversity of life."

Why aren't you using the scientific method to "test it", like you SAID you would . . . . . Or can't you . . . . .

Uber · 4 April 2005

in fact, I pointed to incontrovertible evidence (the beliefs of millions of people) that this equivalence is not true.

Well not actually. It just means that they are good at rationalizing what they know to be true(science) with what they hope or have indoctrinated into them from a young age.

Pete Dunkelberg · 4 April 2005

Is it a probable prediction of designers on the whole, that products of a single hand share features that products by different hands do not? If so, given that we do not have particular knowledge of the designer, isn't it reasonable to attribute to him features characteristic of designers per se?

— Mike Finley, in Comment #23156
We can not extrapolate from humans to a unique, perhaps radically different individual, aka The Designer. If there is just one Designer we can not do statistics on Him in any event. If there are lots of them, perhaps a whole society within a species that evolved long ago and far away (and have become 'devine' compared to us) and if we could gain access, then we could do statistics on them and make predictions. We might find that four out of five Designers do it with evolution. [Have I just invented a bumper sticker?]

If it could be established that a basic similarity of structure among all life was a logical consequence of a common designer, then common design would be confirmed on that count.

— ... and later, in Comment #23164
If we don't know anything about the Designer, then in particular we don't know what He would do. But there is one known designer that would produce the complex pattern of interrelatedness that we find in nature: evolution. Mike, it looks like evolution is just what you need to put it all together. Why not?

Emanuele Oriano · 4 April 2005

... which is still much, much better than going in deep denial of science in order to salvage the "Truth" that's been spoon-fed in some other people's minds.

I'll take a sane, rationalizing theist over an insane, denial-addicted one any day till the Sun freezes over.

neo-anti-luddite · 4 April 2005

I believe as a matter of faith and a philosophical position that my existence owes to a divine designer. I am attempting to work out that belief rationally, which includes empirical enquiries - fides quaerens intellectum as the Scholastics say ("faith seeking understanding").

— Michael Finley
Finally, some honesty. You know what really happened, and now you're looking to shove some round facts into that square hypothesis of yours. Remind me how this is following the scientific method again?

PaulP · 4 April 2005

If it could be established that a basic similarity of structure among all life was a logical consequence of a common designer

Logically this is not correct. It confuses if/then/else (which it uses) with if-and-only-if/then/else (which it wants to use). Even if it could be established that a basic similarity of structure among all life was a logical consequence of a common designer, you would still have to prove that nothing else could produce the same basic similarity. It is not enough to prove that all life forms known to have existed could have been created, it is necessary to prove that e.g. the modern synthesis cannot explain them.

GCT · 4 April 2005

If it could be established that a basic similarity of structure among all life was a logical consequence of a common designer, then common design would be confirmed on that count.

— Michael Finley
How do you propose to establish that? What scientific methods will you propose to address that question?

Such an argument, if correct would be as scientific as the similar argument for common descent.

Only if it adheres to the rules of science and is backed by tested hypotheses, as common descent is. You still have the problem that confirmation is not enough if you've not phrased your hypotheses correctly. In other words, "Goddidit," is confirmed by everything, and therefore has no use to us. You have to put constraints (as others have already noted) or else your "theory" predicts everything and nothing all at once.

David Heddle · 4 April 2005

What is the significance of the fact that while the DNA between humans and chimps is very similar, human/chimp proteins are very different? What is the explanation from evolution?

Russell · 4 April 2005

What is the significance of the fact that while the DNA between humans and chimps is very similar, human/chimp proteins are very different?

They're not. What are you talking about?

David Heddle · 4 April 2005

Yes they are, I have read that the proteins are 80% different

Russell · 4 April 2005

David, I read somewhere that you are a moron. But I'm skeptical.

Michael Finley · 4 April 2005

OMNIBUS RESPONSE: Dr. Elsberry, You are correct. Instead of Ostwald, I should have said Theobald. Mental typo, I guess.

A big part of the strength of the common descent explanation is how it all works together.

— Russell
Indeed. But it is practically impossible to treat them all simultaneously, which is why the artificial distinction is useful.

Finley, please rest assured: we understand your "argument." Your problem is that your argument is not compelling to the vast majority of people who understand the evidence and who are interested in learning more about life on earth and its rich history. The reasons why your argument are not compelling have been laid out so plainly that a high school student at a decent public school could understand those reasons perfectly.

— Great White Wonder
You need to pay closer attention. I havn't really had the chance to make a sustained argument at all. I've spent the majority of my responses parsing issues. As for your quip about high-school students and my lack of education, you have much too high an estimation of high-schoolers and much too low an estimation of me.

I don't know what you mean by "follow logically."

— Longhorm
I mean the following: from the general hypothesis of common descent, i.e., that every living organism is descended from a single common anscestor, it cannot be deduced, e.g., that DNA is the mechanism of heritability. In other words, the details of common descent cannot be deduced from the general hypothesis of common descent without the introduction of further premises.

Mike, it looks like evolution is just what you need to put it all together. Why not?

As my previous post to you suggested (and thanks for your civil reply), I may be headed in that direction. I'm just trying to exhaust any alternatives.

I'll take a sane, rationalizing theist over an insane, denial-addicted one any day till the Sun freezes over.

— Emanuele Oriano
By which I take you to mean that I am preferable to the Taliban. Thanks... I think. :)

Finally, some honesty. You know what really happened, and now you're looking to shove some round facts into that square hypothesis of yours.

— neo-anti-luddite
I've never been dishonest. I believe for religious and philosophical reasons that I owe my existence to a divine being. I am merely trying to determine how that debt was incurred. Motivation is irrelevant to the merits of an argument. I suspect many evolutionists harbor a driving desire to be "intellectually fulfilled atheists." What's the difference?

Logically this is not correct. It confuses if/then/else (which it uses) with if-and-only-if/then/else (which it wants to use).

— PaulP
I am no more guilty of affirming the consequent than science generally. If philosophers of science can get around the problem (and I'm not sure they can; I am trying to get a handle on this beginning with Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery), I can follow their lead.

How do you propose to establish that? What scientific methods will you propose to address that question?

— GCT
The only relevant "method" is that of deductive logic. A prediction is an observation sentence (a la Quine) that is logically deduced from a hypothetical sentence such as "all living organisms are descended from a single common ancestor." Accordingly, I must attempt to logically deduce observation senteces from the theoretical sentence "all kinds of organism were specially created by a single designer." Perhaps no deductions can be made from that sentence, but as of yet, I havn't really had the chance (see my next post).

S. Calhoun · 4 April 2005

Did not quasi-scientific method exist long before there were philosophers? Would not the hunter-gatherer's recollection of the soft spot under the chin of its prey deploy the basic method?

What would say about: what the job of the philosopher of science is, in light of the utility of method that exists prior to the critical inquiry and reflection into this method made a different order of inquiry?

Are there striking examples of scientific method(s) that first require philosophical concludions?

Glen Davidson · 4 April 2005

No David, 80% of the proteins are different (so it is claimed) in some way or other. Which does suggest that humans and chimps have made the most of the differences that arose during the course of evolution. But the similarities are still very striking.

The problems that creationists and IDists have with the science of evolution was pointed out by David Hume a couple centuries ago. This is the fact that correlation does not prove causation, thus the extremely high level of correlation of genes between organisms really does not prove that causation underlies the similarities between chimp and human genomes.

Hume was correct, of course, but he didn't abandon science or scientific causation because of this. The problem for creationists and IDists is that all of science has this flaw in it, that we have never been able to show that billiard balls interact as we observe due to causal forces, and not simply due to some cosmic coincidence. But most IDists (and even many scientists) don't really know all that much about the philosophy of science, so they use the impossibility of determining causation (for certain) as if it applied only in the biological realm, and as if we don't have enough statistical correlation in biology to be as confident as to causation as we are in complex physics scenarios.

The fact is that the correlations between humans and apes, and even between humans and fruit flies, are far too close to suppose that they arose by chance. And you can't even begin to show causation with regard to putative "design" if you're not going to correlate this "design" with specific activities and causes. So that's not even close to becoming science. Thus, if we're going to actually propose causation, we must stick with science and the realm of contingent cause. The obvious relationships between organisms calls out for good causal explanations as much as do relationships between languages and those between manuscripts.

This is how science and court cases are settled. If religion wants to use non-contingent causation, that's okay too, but keep it where it belongs, in metaphysics.

David Heddle · 4 April 2005

Glen, my question had nothing to do with ID. Stop preaching.

Emanuele Oriano · 4 April 2005

Mr. Finley:

the sane, rationalizing theist is one who recognizes the evidence for evolution and rationalizes his/her faith in God as compatible with that.

The insane, denial-addicted one is one who denies the evidence for evolution in favour of a "revealed Truth" backed by no evidence whatsoever.

In other words, "truth cannot contradict Truth": the sane theist gently bends dogmatically revealed "Truth" to make it compatible with evidence-based reality; the insane one discards evidence to salvage dogma.

If you still feel you want to thank me, you're welcome.

Russell · 4 April 2005

David. Use your Heddle. 80% of the proteins differ. I.e. in the hundreds of amino acids that typically make up each one, there will be at least one difference between the chimp and human version. That means for a full 20% of proteins, there's not a single difference between the human and chimp version. It may shock you to learn the 100% of chromosomes differ between my brother and me!

I'm curious though. Where did you get this talking point? I'd be wary of that source. They may be trying to make you look stupid.

Glen Davidson · 4 April 2005

You totally ignored the fact that you screwed up what the article actually states, didn't you David? You attack when someone corrects your many mistakes, irrelevantly, irresponsibly, and without dealing with your inability to correctly portray science.

Your posts always have something to do with ID, both because of context and because of your constant claims for ID of some sort or another. To claim otherwise is disingenuous. But I wouldn't care if your posts had nothing to do with ID at all, I could still point out the mistakes of ID in relation to science, for they overlap with your inability to understand science properly.

All you can do is snipe, David. Why don't you learn something about the subject that you have waded into, instead of diverting all questions to fit your lack of ability to discuss biology?

David Heddle · 4 April 2005

Russell,

In what is probably par for the non-scientists that frequent and write for PT, you attitude went from "skeptic" to "of course, I knew that, but it doesn't mean anything."

David Heddle · 4 April 2005

Glen, the article's title is "Eighty percent of proteins are different between humans and chimpanzees" and I asked , what does it mean that 80% of the proteins are different, so how the hell did I screw up what the article states? Maybe Hume or Popper can explain that.

Russell · 4 April 2005

David, excuse me? Are you suggesting that I'm not a scientist? Are you suggesting that I did not know that most proteins differed between chimp and human by at least one amino acid? Are you suggesting I didn't just tell you something you didn't know?

As I told your fellow phallocephalic, DaveScot, try to use better table manners when eating crow. You'll repulse fewer potential sympathizers.

GCT · 4 April 2005

The only relevant "method" is that of deductive logic. A prediction is an observation sentence (a la Quine) that is logically deduced from a hypothetical sentence such as "all living organisms are descended from a single common ancestor." Accordingly, I must attempt to logically deduce observation senteces from the theoretical sentence "all kinds of organism were specially created by a single designer." Perhaps no deductions can be made from that sentence, but as of yet, I havn't really had the chance (see my next post).

— Michael Finley
Hmmm, the problem here (and from some of your other comments) is that you seem to be taking the wrong way around the problem. You seem to want to start with your conclusions, then work back to the arguments as was previously pointed out. This does not work. Deductive logic is also not the only relevant method, nor is it the one that you should propose to use, except it is the only one available to you. You want to conflate your philosophic arguments with no evidential basis to the level of a scientific one with much evidential basis by using deductive reasoning? Then you want to call that exercise science? That does not work. Plus, you still have the problem that "Goddidit" explains everything and nothing at the same time. How do you propose to address that issue?

Glen Davidson · 4 April 2005

Of course, you re-write history in your lack of comprehension and your unconcern about the truth. You did not write "what does it mean that 80% of the proteins are different", what you wrote was:

Yes they are, I have read that the proteins are 80% different.

The two statements mean quite different things. The first that you wrote meant that chimp and human proteins differ by 80%, a statement extremely different from what the paper claimed, which is that 80% of the proteins differ. Likely, human and chimp proteins differ by less than a percent, or a few percent at most (that's assuming that quantitative measures are an appropriate comparison, which they may not be). So you apparently don't mind claiming that you had written something that agreed with the article, when you emphatically did not. But I'm not going to argue with someone who uses words and concepts as badly as you do for very long. It's tedious and a waste of time, since you never seem to actually comprehend your mistakes.

Russell · 4 April 2005

How the hedll you screw up? Did you ponder, at all, the significance of the fact that my brother and I differ in 100% of our chromosomes? Do you see the relevance of that at all? Here I am trying to save you from yourself, and all I get is contempt and condescension. Really - where did you get this talking point? I tell you, they're trying to make you look stupid.

David Heddle · 4 April 2005

Yes Ruseel, that is what I am saying based on the evidence. To wit,
1) I asked about the 80% difference
2) You were skeptical
3) I posted the article
4) Then you said (paraphrasing) of course, but what is the big deal?

So why did these guys publish such a trivial result?

Michael Finley · 4 April 2005

Emanuele Oriano,

Some argue for special creation because they are committed to special creation as revealed truth (with a capital "T"), say, as set forth in Genesis. The only revealed truth I am committed to in that regard is that a divine being is somehow responsible for my existence. Thus, my theism is completely compatible with Darwinian evolution.

Now, on to my argument.

Can constraints be placed on an unknown designer? If we know nothing of the designer other than that he is a "designer" (ex hypothesi there is a designer), then we can only characterize him qua designer. Can we make probable characterizations of designers per se?

It seems to me that, ceteris paribus, it is more reasonable to expect the products of a single designer to share a basic structural similarity, than to be radically dissimilar. If we can agree on the "reasonableness" of that expectation, then perhaps we can objectively ground that "reasonableness."

This is a first step. If we cannot agree here, subsequent steps cannot be taken.

Russell · 4 April 2005

and I asked , what does it mean that 80% of the proteins are different

— Heddle
Here's the original question

What is the significance of the fact that while the DNA between humans and chimps is very similar, human/chimp proteins are very different? What is the explanation from evolution?

Now correct me if I'm wrong, but I inferred from this that you believed that the proteins differ from one another a lot more than the DNA. That's just dumb. I continue to wonder: who fed you this talking point?

David Heddle · 4 April 2005

My "talking point" was based on the abstract that I posted. I cannot read the whole article. I made the bad assumption that someone on here would have something to say about it without resorting to dogma. That was my mistake. I should take my question to an actual science blog.

Russell · 4 April 2005

It seems to me that, ceteris paribus, it is more reasonable to expect the products of a single designer to share a basic structural similarity, than to be radically dissimilar.

While, of course, all the Latin makes your argument look much more plausible than it otherwise would, what can "ceteris paribus" possibly mean when we're comparing divine miraculous creation with human design? Ceteris certainly are not paribus!

This is a first step. If we cannot agree here, subsequent steps cannot be taken.

I'm afraid we're out of luck then. You want to abandon the discussion or move on to the next item on Ostwald's Theobald's list

Russell · 4 April 2005

My "talking point" was based on the abstract that I posted. I cannot read the whole article. I made the bad assumption that someone on here would have something to say about it without resorting to dogma. That was my mistake.

Really! You just happened to stumble across that article? It wasn't brought to your attention by some quote-mining creationist - excuse me - "intelligent design theorist"? Yeah, you made a bad assumption alright. But what "dogma" are you referring to?

I should take my question to an actual science blog.

By all means! I don't suppose you could let us know which "actual science" blog you'll be taking it to, so we can maybe gnash our teeth in jealousy as we watch your question given the consideration it deserves?

Glen Davidson · 4 April 2005

Michael Finley, no scientist can agree with regard to your designer qua designer. Such language is nothing other than metaphysics, coupled to the unconvincing belief that words like "designer" mean something apart from what can be observed.

We really have no reason at all to suppose that God the designer (if one reduces God to a designer) would be limited to producing similar results in different creations. In fact it seems faintly blasphemous to my inherited religious sensibilities to suggest such human limitations in God.

Yet we can study design so long as we are studying limited phenomena, such as human designs, animal "designs", and probably even alien designs. This is because human and animal designs are not god-like, thus must rest upon limitations and repetitions built into the animal mind. God, to be God (at least in the majority of Christian thought), must be beyond our limitations, and thus is no subject for scientific study. He may be ultimately responsible for everything, of course, but only in an inscrutable manner.

IDists try to have it both ways, a God whose activities are not known, and the glorified engineer who can be discovered to have made certain "machines" called plants and animals. Even as metaphysics goes, it is unbelievably bad thinking. The Greeks who gave us the God beyond the "natural world" (itself a metaphysical mistake) would not make the mistakes either of supposing animals to be machines, or of God as being a "designer".

Which is why Antony Flew is interesting, for his God is the Aristotelian God, and yet Flew was persuaded to this viewpoint by questions regarding abiogenesis and the like. Aristotle's god is not one who would "design life", for "his" thoughts consist in thinking himself. Flew's first mistake is in taking up metaphysical philosophy, and the second is not recognizing that metaphysics does not allow for god as creaturely craftsman and designer.

Michael Finley · 4 April 2005

While, of course, all the Latin makes your argument look much more plausible than it otherwise would, what can "ceteris paribus" possibly mean when we're comparing divine miraculous creation with human design? Ceteris certainly are not paribus!

— Russell
The use of Latin is academic, and it makes for good fun (witness your reaction). By the way, you misread my post. I stated that "other things being equal" [better?], it is more reasonable to expect the products of a single designer to share a basic structural similarity, than to be radically dissimilar." No mention is made of "divine miraculous creation." I am first trying to determine whether there are constraints implicit in the notion of a "designer" simpliciter [sorry, I couldn't resist]. If there are, then perhaps they can be applied to an unknown designer.

Emanuele Oriano · 4 April 2005

Mr. Finley: Unfortunately, your way of reasoning cannot lead anywhere. Why should it be reasonable to expect an unknown designer to design different "things" using similar characteristics? Is she/he/it lazy? Is she/he/it dim-witted? Is she/he/it parsimonious? And why should this argue pro or against there being a whole set (species? race? pantheon?) of designers? Who knows? You wrote:

Can constraints be placed on an unknown designer? If we know nothing of the designer other than that he is a "designer" (ex hypothesi there is a designer), then we can only characterize him qua designer. Can we make probable characterizations of designers per se?

And the answer is "no", as the only intelligent designers we know of are human beings, so we cannot really separate what is intrinsic of an intelligent designer from what is intrinsic of a human mind.

JIm Wynne · 4 April 2005

It seems to me that, ceteris paribus, it is more reasonable to expect the products of a single designer to share a basic structural similarity, than to be radically dissimilar. If we can agree on the "reasonableness" of that expectation, then perhaps we can objectively ground that "reasonableness."

— Michael Finley
I'm not sure that ceteris paribus makes any sense in this context, but that would follow the rest of your Big Idea, I suppose. Here's the simple problem that you don't seem to get: You have no basis for the "reasonableness" of your key assumption--that we "...should expect the products of a single designer to share a basic structural similarity..." if your only evidence of the nature of the designer is the product in question. Show us a test that doesn't require tautological reasoning.

Longhorm · 4 April 2005

Michael Finley wrote:

Of course I believe that the proximate cause of my existence is the sexual union of my parents, etc. So it is with all of us. We know this because births are rountinely observed. The origin of the species was not observed. Common descent is a hypothesis that has to be established by inference. I am arguing for a different hypothesis.

Michael, we can agee that no person saw the series of instances of sexual reproduction that resulted in a rodent-like mammal changing until we had a human being. But that no person has seen an alleged event does not enable you and me to determine that it is no more plausible than not that said event occurred. No person has seen the core of the moon, and I'm sure it is not made of cream-cheese. No person saw planet earth 65 million years ago, and I'm sure it existed 65 million years ago. No person has seen a living T-Rex, and I'm sure some T-Rexes ate things. In addition, awhile back I was walking my dog. I made sure that no other person was around. My dog and I walked up to a fire hydrant. Right after my dog lifted its leg, I closed my eyes. I kept them closed for about a minute. When I opened them, the fire hydrant was covered in dog pee and my dog looked relieved. I'm very very justified in believing that my dog peed on that fire hydrant. So, that no person saw a rodent-like mammal evolve into a human does not enable you and me to determine that it is no more plausible than not that said event occurred.

Michael Finley · 4 April 2005

Such language is nothing other than metaphysics, coupled to the unconvincing belief that words like "designer" mean something apart from what can be observed.

— Glen Davidson
Science is shot through with metaphysics. Read Hume. Our words and categories are the only we have, and they have the meaning we give them. Whether those can be applied to God is an old dispute. You seem to be of a via negativa persuasion (nod to Russell). I am not. Duns Scotus has a rather knock down drag out argument against negative approaches to the divine. I count myself a scotist in that regard.

In fact it seems faintly blasphemous to my inherited religious sensibilities to suggest such human limitations in God.

Your sensibilities need to be supplemented by theology. Ockham and Aquinas give the paradigmatic discussions concerning divine limitations.

Even as metaphysics goes, it is unbelievably bad thinking. The Greeks who gave us the God beyond the "natural world" (itself a metaphysical mistake) would not make the mistakes either of supposing animals to be machines, or of God as being a "designer".

Whatever text-book you're relying on, I can suggest a better one. The Greek understanding of nature (phusis) does not recognize the later Christian distinction between nature and the supernatural. And it is commonplace throughout human thought to compare physiology to engineered machines (e.g., the heart as a "pump," the brain as a "computer," etc.).

Aristotle's god is not one who would "design life", for "his" thoughts consist in thinking himself.

It's a moot point for Aristotle as he believed that the kinds are eternal.

GCT · 4 April 2005

Can constraints be placed on an unknown designer? If we know nothing of the designer other than that he is a "designer" (ex hypothesi there is a designer), then we can only characterize him qua designer. Can we make probable characterizations of designers per se?

— Michael Finley
But, that's a problem, is it not? If there are no constraints how can you characterize anything about the designer? It's an illogical leap to jump to an explanation that you know nothing about.

It seems to me that, ceteris paribus, it is more reasonable to expect the products of a single designer to share a basic structural similarity, than to be radically dissimilar. If we can agree on the "reasonableness" of that expectation, then perhaps we can objectively ground that "reasonableness."

I'm in agreement with the other posters here that we can not come to agreement on this. If you can't know anything about the designer, then it is illogical to make the assumption that a single designer would share a basic structural similarity. I know you've used the artist analogy a few times, but we can not infer that the designer is like the human artist in your analogy. We simply can't know.

PvM · 4 April 2005

The 80% of the proteins difference shows how small genotype changes can have large phenotype impacts. Despite the 95-98% genetic similarity, the phenotype differences are actually much larger.

Longhorm · 4 April 2005

Michael Finley wrote:

I mean the following: from the general hypothesis of common descent, i.e., that every living organism is descended from a single common anscestor, it cannot be deduced, e.g., that DNA is the mechanism of heritability. In other words, the details of common descent cannot be deduced from the general hypothesis of common descent without the introduction of further premises.

Michael, I don't know if I see your point. I don't know what you mean by "DNA is the mechanism of heritability." Of course an organism's genome contributes significantly to the existence of most -- perhaps in some cases all -- of the organism's observable physical traits. I can cite data, but you don't need that. You know that. You are saying that one cannot "deduce" that "DNA is the mechanism of heritability" from common descent. Well, I don't know what you mean by "deduce." I guess the claim that DNA affects observable traits is different than the claim 2 + 2 = 4. Am I less certain of it? It's hard to say. If I'm less justified in believing it, I'm only a little less justified in believing it. But let's say that the certainty that some people ascribe to mathematics and modus tollens is not present in the case of the affect of genes on observable traits. We are dealing with correlations in the latter case. Hume taught is to be weary of correlations. But putting Humean skepticism aside, I'm very very very very justified in believing that DNA affects phenotypes. Similarly, I'm very justified in believing that differences in mass between the earth and stones causes some stones to fall to the earth.

Russell · 4 April 2005

By the way, you misread my post.

No, I read your post just fine, thanks. I - and a few others since - are just pointing out that ceteris paribus is absurd in this context. Makes me wonder if you really think about what you're writing, or just like to sprinkle in the Academese for "good fun", or maybe you aspire to the Williamf Buckley Award for Superciliousness Above and Beyond the Call of Duty.

Michael Finley · 4 April 2005

Off to lunch [punches card].

Paul Flocken · 4 April 2005

Comment #23195 Posted by David Heddle on April 4, 2005 10:24 AM (e) (s)

Yes they are, I have read that the proteins are 80% different

Comment #23197 Posted by Russell on April 4, 2005 10:28 AM (e) (s)

David, I read somewhere that you are a moron. But I'm skeptical.

Comment #23207 Posted by David Heddle on April 4, 2005 11:02 AM (e) (s)

In what is probably par for the non-scientists that frequent and write for PT, you attitude went from "skeptic" to "of course, I knew that, but it doesn't mean anything."

Comment #23213 Posted by David Heddle on April 4, 2005 11:24 AM (e) (s)

Yes Ruseel, that is what I am saying based on the evidence. To wit, 1) I asked about the 80% difference 2) You were skeptical 3) I posted the article 4) Then you said (paraphrasing) of course, but what is the big deal?

Russell, You seem to have established Heddle's "moron-ness" because he didn't catch the joke about your skepticism about his "moron-ness". Or maybe he did and did not want to acknowledge it. Maybe he cleverly twisted it to apply your skepticism to proteins so as to get under your skin. Did he? Sincerely, Paul

Longhorm · 4 April 2005

GCT wrote:

But, that's a problem, is it not?  If there are no constraints how can you characterize anything about the designer?  It's an illogical leap to jump to an explanation that you know nothing about.

GCT, first, I should say that this whole discussion doesn't seem particularly valuable. Evolution (from molecules to elephants) happened. So, why am I wrestling with Michael Finley? I guess I am for a couple of reasons. I'm worried about our public schools. And I'm worried about the high percentage of U.S. citizens who don't realize that evolution happened. It's disconcerting. You don't see anything like this in Japan or Sweden. I also want to understand where Michael is coming from so that I can help other people understand that evolution happened. But I have to admit that I am sympathetic with Michael on this point about who or what the designer is. It doesn't seem important in terms of whether I am justified in believing that a designer turned dust directly into two elephants. I can know what events were caused by an event without knowing a lot about the event that did the causing. For instance, I know Jonbenet Ramsey was murdered. I don't know who did it. And I don't know much about the person who did it. But she was murdered. And a person did it. In the case of organisms on earth, a designer (whether it be a deity or extraterrestrial or whatever) did not turn inert matter (or "nothingness") directly into any of the organisms. They all came into being through sexual reproduction or cell-division. But I don't need to know much about the designer that Michael has in mind to know that the designer did not turn dust into two elephants (one male and one female).

Russell · 4 April 2005

Paul Flocken:

Maybe he cleverly twisted it to apply your skepticism to proteins so as to get under your skin. Did he?

...um, no. I always reserve the possibility that I'm missing something, but it seems to me Heddle comes out of this exchange with egg on his face. Crow's egg, at that. But here's my favorite part:

I made the bad assumption that someone on here would have something to say about it without resorting to dogma.

As we seem to have lost our Heddle for the meantime, I'm curious to know: can anyone else spot the dreaded dogma in this exchange? This is standard beheddlement, incidentally. When things don't go so well for him here, it's always because the low-brow nature of the clientele. That's why I'm eager to find out what "actual science" blog will treat him with the respect he deserves.

Emanuele Oriano · 4 April 2005

Russel:

Why, a statistics blog, of course!

Paul Flocken · 4 April 2005

Needing a quick definition I did the google thing...
Ceteris Paribus

And what, on the third entry, should I come across but...
http://www.iscid.org/encyclopedia/Ceteris_Paribus

A coincidence? I think not. There must be a Designer around here somewhere!

Sincerely,

Paul

PS
Maybe iscid is offering Latin lessons to potential proselytizers to help improve their already impressive rhetorical skills. Naaaaaahhhhhh.

JIm Wynne · 4 April 2005

For instance, I know Jonbenet Ramsey was murdered. I don't know who did it. And I don't know much about the person who did it. But she was murdered. And a person did it.

— GCT
Maybe not. Maybe Finley's designer is a Metaphysical Murderer.

GCT · 4 April 2005

Science is shot through with metaphysics. Read Hume. Our words and categories are the only we have, and they have the meaning we give them.

— Michael Finley
I'm sorry, I don't understand this statement at all. Is the gravitational constant metaphysical? Is the speed of light metaphysical?

But I have to admit that I am sympathetic with Michael on this point about who or what the designer is. It doesn't seem important in terms of whether I am justified in believing that a designer turned dust directly into two elephants. I can know what events were caused by an event without knowing a lot about the event that did the causing. For instance, I know Jonbenet Ramsey was murdered. I don't know who did it. And I don't know much about the person who did it. But she was murdered. And a person did it. In the case of organisms on earth, a designer (whether it be a deity or extraterrestrial or whatever) did not turn inert matter (or "nothingness") directly into any of the organisms. They all came into being through sexual reproduction or cell-division. But I don't need to know much about the designer that Michael has in mind to know that the designer did not turn dust into two elephants (one male and one female).

— Longhorn
Perhaps I should have been more clear that I was talking about Mr. Finley's assumptions made. If you know nothing of the designer, how can you make assumptions about what kind of designer he/she/it is? In your examples, you have made assumptions. In the Ramsey case, you have made the assumption that the killer is human. Plus, the assumption that it was murder. Are you justified in making these assumptions, yes, because we have evidence of these assumptions. But, without evidence of any of these, would you be justified in making these assumptions?

Glen Davidson · 4 April 2005

Science is shot through with metaphysics. Read Hume.

I've read Hume, though not a lot, and also Kant. Kant is the one who went ahead and said, okay, we'll call it the "transcendental", but it really belongs to our own minds and interpretations. Kant called metaphysics the bottomless abyss, and Kant was a scientist as well as a philosopher. And science is not shot through with metaphysics. Very often it does use the terms of metaphysics, and sometimes even the concepts, but the better philosophers know that science has to be done without any real regard for metaphysics. That's is just an old canard that you're throwing around. Continental philosophy gets away from metaphysics to varying degrees, with Nietzsche probably doing the best at it (Heidegger is one of the worst, but faults Nietzsche for being metaphysical (which he is sometimes, true), when he mostly is not). Even philosophy doesn't need to rely on metaphysics, and it would cause less confusion (about "methodological naturalism" and other bastard concepts) if it were better at ignoring metaphysics.

Our words and categories are the only we have, and they have the meaning we give them.

Yes, and you only can give the kind of meaning to "designer" that is based upon "inter-subjective" experience with only non-god beings. "Design" is not a heavenly form as far as science, and good philosophy, are concerned. Whether those can be applied to God is an old dispute. You seem to be of a via negativa persuasion (nod to Russell). I am not. Duns Scotus has a rather knock down drag out argument against negative approaches to the divine. I count myself a scotist in that regard. No, it is not a nod to Russell, we're going back to the old tradition running from Plato on down to Kant. And Kant's line of thought (disregarding metaphysics per se) is carried on more by the Continental thinking than the analytic type exemplified by Russell. What is more, I don't really care about any of it except as a history and an explanation for why people still think that "designer" means anything outside of the human context.

In fact it seems faintly blasphemous to my inherited religious sensibilities to suggest such human limitations in God.

Your sensibilities need to be supplemented by theology. Your sensibilities need to be supplemented by a recognition that not all of theology agrees with your particular kind. And even more so by the fact that we don't need to use theology and metaphysics in order to do science, but need not to use theology and metaphysics in science (some scientists are veritable metaphysicians, but as long as they're doing routine science, it doesn't hurt).

Ockham and Aquinas give the paradigmatic discussions concerning divine limitations.

And Plotinus and Maimonides disagree. So does Spinoza in his way. This is why I don't care about metaphysical discussions, since they don't resolve anything, even what a "designer is".

Whatever text-book you're relying on, I can suggest a better one. The Greek understanding of nature (phusis) does not recognize the later Christian distinction between nature and the supernatural.

I don't appreciate lies from someone who doesn't understand Greek thought. I'm not relying on a textbook, though I doubt that you're about to care about the truth in this matter any more than you deal properly with what I wrote. The fact is that "physis" refers first to living things, and is expanded to include "physics" (hence the latter name). Physis does not extend into the heavenly realm. There is, as far as I know, no term for the "supernatural" in Greek, but there are phenomena (according to Aristotle) that are beyond physis. Indeed, the Aristotelianism of late scholastic thought is part of the reason why churchmen were reluctant to consider physics as applying to the sun and beyond. Thus I don't know what you're trying to get across with your comments. It was no great leap to start labeling the "beyond" with the term "supernatural". And I didn't say that the Greeks called it the supernatural, for I know that they did not (at least not in earlier times), and had not thought to guard against the pedantic nonsense that you seem eager to spread as a substitute to actual science. It's typically recognized in continental philosophy that the Christian god is the Greek philosophical god, never mind the evolutions in concept and in language.

And it is commonplace throughout human thought to compare physiology to engineered machines (e.g., the heart as a "pump," the brain as a "computer," etc.).

Yes, the analogy is used. It is time that you learn to distinguish between what words really mean, and the metaphysical belief in a meaning beyond human experience. Real biologists don't mistake machines for life in the most usual sense of "machine", or vice-versa.

It's a moot point for Aristotle as he believed that the kinds are eternal.

Of course it's not a moot point, because if Flew claims Aristotle's god he can hardly base this claim on physics. The fact is that metaphysics has never agreed well with Christian creationism, and it does so even less in this day of the IDist engineer-god.

Great White Wonder · 4 April 2005

Finley

Off to lunch [punches card].

Finley, when you come back please let us know what you decided to eat and how you made your decision.

Longhorm · 4 April 2005

Michael wrote:

Science is shot through with metaphysics. Read Hume.

What do you mean by that, Michael? Are you saying that no beliefs are justified? The claim that no beliefs are justified has always puzzled me. It seems logically inconsistent. Isn't the person asserting it as something that he or she is justified in believing?

Henry J · 4 April 2005

Michael,

Re "If it could be established that a basic similarity of structure among all life was a logical consequence of a common designer, then common design would be confirmed on that count. Such an argument, if correct would be as scientific as the similar argument for common descent.
If nothing else, can we agree on that?"

Nope. Basic similarity of structure is not a logical consequence of being designed. (And even if it were, it wouldn't be distinct from descent, and so wouldn't be evidence for design anyway.)

Henry

Henry J · 4 April 2005

Pete,

Re "We might find that four out of five Designers do it with evolution. [Have I just invented a bumper sticker?]"
I hope not ( :rolleyes: ).

Uber · 4 April 2005

the sane, rationalizing theist is one who recognizes the evidence for evolution and rationalizes his/her faith in God as compatible with that.

One could argue that is equally insane as you are rationalizing a known with an unknown just, well, because.

The insane, denial-addicted one is one who denies the evidence for evolution in favour of a "revealed Truth" backed by no evidence whatsoever.

Both are forms are in denial. One throws out all science, one uses it and rationalizes it into already held beliefs. In some ways the insane denial addicted is more cnsistent.

In other words, "truth cannot contradict Truth": the sane theist gently bends dogmatically revealed "Truth" to make it compatible with evidence-based reality; the insane one discards evidence to salvage dogma

This was a Pope statement and is at it's core rather silly if one truth is proven and the other dogma. Much of what is dogma with the church goes against reality based(is there another kind?) truth. examples include virgin births, flying people, 900 year old folks, global floods, etc. If truth can't contradict 'truth' you have a problem.

Glen Davidson · 4 April 2005

I should just add another fact about Aristotle. Not only did he distinguish between nature (physis) and the heavens, he also had the good sense to distinguish between physis and what is made by techne. As this source correctly notes, "natural beings" and "made beings" are distinguished in Aristotle:

It is true that flowers and trees are not produced in the same way that houses and violins are, and Heidegger notes that Aristotle distinguishes between phusis onta and techne onta, whereby the former "produces itself by arising out of itself; techne onta is produced by human planning and production." As a natural being (phusis onta), flowers and trees are not in need of another in order to be produced, or they contain within themselves the principle which governs their emergence as flowers and trees; houses and violins, on the other hand, do not contain their own principle of emergence, or they only emerge because of the human ability (i.e., techne) to execute his/her ideas

http://www.selu.edu/Academics/Faculty/jbell/1.1comm.html It's fairly basic Aristotle, of course. It goes back to my earlier observations that the IDists don't evey utilize metaphysics in any credible way, for they don't even distinguish between "made beings" (techne onta) and "natural beings" (phusis onta--using the spelling in the quote above, instead of the common Anglicization "physis"). Everything that we have in observation distinguishes between techne (design and production) and phusis ("natural" forms developing). The most basic phenomenological observations, like Aristotle's, agree with the distinction, as do all scientific (empirically-based) measures of design. Even if the IDists could stick with good metaphysical thinkers they'd not fall into so very much error as they do, but could settle back into a more measured life of error based on coherent metaphysics.

Paul Flocken · 4 April 2005

Comment #23198 Posted by Michael Finley on April 4, 2005 10:32 AM (e) (s)

OMNIBUS RESPONSE: You need to pay closer attention. I havn't really had the chance to make a sustained argument at all. I've spent the majority of my responses parsing issues.

Comment #23120 Posted by Michael Finley on April 3, 2005 05:57 PM (e) (s)

plung wrote: Define a supernatural cause in a positive sense (i.e., not just a negation of natural), and maybe we'll have something to talk about. I can attempt to address the distinction between natural and supernatural, though it is difficult. First, What is a natural event? An event that can be perceived by the senses? What about quarks, etc.? An event subject to natural laws? That, of course, uses the defined in the definition. An event that excludes the supernatural? That is a negative definition on the other side. Perhaps if you got me started with a definition of natural, I could try to get somewhere from there.

Comment #23225 Posted by Michael Finley on April 4, 2005 12:07 PM (e) (s)

Your sensibilities need to be supplemented by theology. Ockham and Aquinas give the paradigmatic discussions concerning divine limitations. Whatever text-book you're relying on, I can suggest a better one. The Greek understanding of nature (phusis) does not recognize the later Christian distinction between nature and the supernatural.

Finley is nothing if not an expert at parsing, as any creationist(oh pardon me, pseudo-creationist{oh pardon me further, "Divine Intelligent Design Theorist"}) troll needs to be. But I think he has just handed you a gift wrapped present letting you finally pin him down to what he thinks are the definitions of natural and supernatural. Really, he would do Bill Clinton proud(It depends on what the definition of is, is).

Emanuele Oriano · 4 April 2005

Uber:

I disagree. I think that going from "truth cannot contradict Truth" (i.e. the universe cannot contradict the Bible, therefore any scientific finding that runs against our interpretation of the Bible must be wrong) to "Truth cannot contradict truth" (i.e. the Bible cannot contradict the universe, therefore any Biblical passage that runs against the findings of science must be reinterpreted in the light of the new evidence) is a step forward.

By the way, I'm no theist by any stretch of imagination, but I think that, once they both acknowledge reality, theists and atheists need not enter into permanent warfare.

DaveL · 4 April 2005

If it could be established that a basic similarity of structure among all life was a logical consequence of a common designer, then common design would be confirmed on that count.

This is wrong on both counts, actually. 1) There is no requirement that a common designer would produce works of basic similarity. Examples I can cite off the top of my head include Harrison's Chronometers, of which H-1 and H-2 are remarkably similar, but H-3 is an utterly different design which owes little to the earlier ones, and Picasso's paintings, which include such dissimilar works as Guernica, Les Demoiselles d'Avignon, and his Self Portrait from the Blue Period. Human designers borrow ideas from one design and re-use them in another. This has quite obviously never happened in the fossil record (except at the bacterial level). Eyes have evolved several different times, using different physiology in each case. Even the eponym of this blog was not re-used from (say) the chimpanzee, but rather had to evolve from the materials at hand in the panda. Surely an omnipotent designer would not be constrained in this way. 2) Even if you could establish your premise, it would hardly confirm design. Rather, it would merely show that design is not disconfirmed as a cause of basic similarity. You would then have to go further and find additional evidence.

Russell · 4 April 2005

Uber & Mr. Oriana:
RE: sane rationalizing theists vs. insane denial addicted ones.

I'm with Mr. Oriana. I don't know in what parts of the world the two of you two are living, but here in the United States of America there is what seems like a strong and growing movement that is willing to deny any reality that gets in the way of its theology. They've got a grip on the government, and it's frightening. Reconcile your religious beliefs with reality in whatever way works for you, I say, but let's not go rewriting the science we teach our kids to accommodate our religion!

Uber · 4 April 2005

I disagree. I think that going from "truth cannot contradict Truth" (i.e. the universe cannot contradict the Bible, therefore any scientific finding that runs against our interpretation of the Bible must be wrong) to "Truth cannot contradict truth" (i.e. the Bible cannot contradict the universe, therefore any Biblical passage that runs against the findings of science must be reinterpreted in the light of the new evidence) is a step forward.

Perhaps so, but then when extended to other aspects of reality, it is never addressed such as those mentioned above. Truth doesn't contradict 'truth'? Virgins don't give birth.

By the way, I'm no theist by any stretch of imagination, but I think that, once they both acknowledge reality, theists and atheists need not enter into permanent warfare.

I agree. But once you acknowledge reality the superstition of religion fades away----is that a bad thing?

Emanuele Oriano · 4 April 2005

Russell:

[tongue-in-cheek]

I know, I know, I wrote "Russel", but it was a mistake, I swear!

You didn't need to call me "Oriana" in retaliation!

[/tongue-in-cheek]

Canada here.

Uber · 4 April 2005

I disagree. I think that going from "truth cannot contradict Truth" (i.e. the universe cannot contradict the Bible, therefore any scientific finding that runs against our interpretation of the Bible must be wrong) to "Truth cannot contradict truth" (i.e. the Bible cannot contradict the universe, therefore any Biblical passage that runs against the findings of science must be reinterpreted in the light of the new evidence) is a step forward.

Perhaps so, but then when extended to other aspects of reality, it is never addressed such as those mentioned above. Truth doesn't contradict 'truth'? Virgins don't give birth.

By the way, I'm no theist by any stretch of imagination, but I think that, once they both acknowledge reality, theists and atheists need not enter into permanent warfare.

I agree. But once you acknowledge reality the superstition of religion fades away----is that a bad thing?

Uber · 4 April 2005

Reconcile your religious beliefs with reality in whatever way works for you, I say, but let's not go rewriting the science we teach our kids to accommodate our religion!

That I agree with in principle. I just don't understnad the 'why' for many people. :-)

Emanuele Oriano · 4 April 2005

Uber:

Once we acknowledge reality, what happens to your, my, or everybody else's religiosity is of no concern whatsoever to me.

steve · 4 April 2005

Comment #23195 Posted by David Heddle on April 4, 2005 10:24 AM (e) (s) Yes they are, I have read that the proteins are 80% different

Comment #23201 Posted by Glen Davidson on April 4, 2005 10:45 AM (e) (s) No David, 80% of the proteins are different (so it is claimed) in some way or other.

Comment #23208 Posted by David Heddle on April 4, 2005 11:13 AM (e) (s) Glen, the article's title is "Eighty percent of proteins are different between humans and chimpanzees" and I asked , what does it mean that 80% of the proteins are different, so how the hell did I screw up what the article states?

Glen Davidson · 4 April 2005

If it could be established that a basic similarity of structure among all life was a logical consequence of a common designer, then common design would be confirmed on that count.

I guess I may as well add something on this matter as well. Noting the "if" at the beginning of that statement, clearly it has been established that the similarities among life are not at all distributed according to any design that we understand. DaveL and others have hit on the problem, but I think it's even more extensive than that. Take "the Panda's thumb". Gould seems to have been mistaken on it's being a "bad design", however it clearly shows a lack of common design between pandas and monkeys. It is an innovative adaptation of a wrist bone, one that happened to oppose the panda's hand, including the old "thumb", and so adapted to become the panda's new "thumb". Where is the "common design"? In the fact that the "old thumb" was prevented from being adapted to act as an opposable thumb? Why would the "designer" stick with the most current bear paw "design" and use a wrist bone as a "thumb"? Or is there a bear designer, a fish designer, and a monkey designer? Or my favorite, birds vs. bats. The bone structure of bird and bat wings is homologous. The bat wing appears to have evolved out of a hand that retained five fingers rather later than the hand that the bird wing evolved from, but the bird wing is still homologous with the bat wing. One may discover this via fossils and from embryology. Why aren't feathers homologous in bats and in birds? Why aren't the membranes of bats' wings homologous with bird wing structures? Why do birds have scales and bats don't? What sense does it even mean to say "common design" for the wing of the bird and the bat's wing, if we don't see "common design" in scales, feathers, or the skin of the bat's wing? We do see common descent, where birds and bats share fingers evolved from a much earlier ancestor. Then we see common descent among feathered saurischians, which include homologies with bats, but exclude other homologies with bats. Bird ancestors diverged from the same lineage as bats, but feathers evolved after this divergence, so that feathers per se are not homologous with bat structures (distantly, the hair and the feathers are no doubt homologous, but one infers that from similar materials and through genetics, not by viewing bat hairs and feathers). So is a "common designer" responsible for the homologies between bats and birds? How about the dissimilarities? Why would bats have to fly without the superb aerodynamics afforded by "sculpted feathers", except that there was no "common designer" to design the bat, but only mammalian characteristics to be modeled into a bat's wings? Bats and birds share characteristics, just not the added characteristics that allow these animals to fly. The vertebrate hand is retained, as it is in most vertebrates, but the actual design elements needed to convert this hand into a wing are not common to bats and birds. It makes no sense to suggest "common design" to explain the bones in bird and bat wings, when the actual flight adaptations (including the lengthening of the fingers) is not homologous in either one. Commonality exists, just not any commonality of anything that could be considered design.

PvM · 4 April 2005

In other words, the proteins are not 80% different but rather 80% of the proteins are different. A small though important difference.

Uber · 4 April 2005

Fair enough

Michael Finley · 4 April 2005

It's fairly basic Aristotle, of course. It goes back to my earlier observations that the IDists don't evey utilize metaphysics in any credible way, for they don't even distinguish between "made beings" (techne onta) and "natural beings" (phusis onta---using the spelling in the quote above, instead of the common Anglicization "physis").

— Glen Davidson
That's quite amusing. Heidegger is your source for Greek language distinctions. The same Heidegger who spent a good portion of his career arguing that alethea ("truth") properly means "unconcealment," only to later retract that veiw as unsupported by an philological evidence? Most of Heidegger's Greek textual analysis is the result of his own philosophical project rather than sound scholarship. Let me suggest a far superior source: Jospeph Owens, Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. Once you've read up, come back to discuss.

Russell · 4 April 2005

In other words, the proteins are not 80% different but rather 80% of the proteins are different. A small though important difference.

Not so small. In the case of my brother and me, the chromosomes are 0.01% (or something like that) different, but 100.00% of the chromosomes are different. A huge and important difference. Had Heddle not beaten a hasty retreat, I would have asked him for a pair of animals with more closely matched proteins than humans and chimps. Or, alternatively, by what measure the human/chimp protein difference is, as he clearly implied, greater than the corresponding DNA difference.

Glen Davidson · 4 April 2005

That's quite amusing. Heidegger is your source for Greek language distinctions

Try not to be stupid, Michael. The fact is that it is not a simple matter to demonstrate the Aristotelian distinctions between physis and techne, I don't have my Aristotle books with me where I am, and I don't have the time to go through a lengthy argumentation anyhow. So I used a source I could get off of the internet. It's clear in Aristotle's Physics how he differentiates between techne and physis, but you should know that already. It's also clear between Physics and Metaphysics how unlike physis and physics Aristotle's heavenly bodies are portrayed to be, and particularly his god. Regardless, Heidegger is not a bad source on the meaning of physis. You sneer, appealing to an obvious flaw in Heidegger's scholarship on an unrelated matter, and pretend that you have answered me. The fact is that you're almost as egregious in philosophical matters as you are in scientific ones. Your cretinous assumption that I base my comments on Heidegger only goes to show how poorly you regard evidence, and how cheap your shots are.

Let me suggest a far superior source: Jospeph Owens, Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics.

I see, you really are relying on textbooks, rather than original sources, aren't you? So you tell me to read a secondary source, when I've read much in the primary sources. No doubt you can go far in certain philosophies by recycling authorities, but it is unacceptable as scholarship to do so.

Once you've read up, come back to discuss.

If you ever learn to think without jumping to conclusions, and using your sad little sources and fallacies, then we might be able to discuss something. As of now I can only see that you know far too little even in your own subject, let alone the one that you deign to discuss here without knowledge of science.

Paul Flocken · 4 April 2005

Comment #23262 Posted by Michael Finley on April 4, 2005 02:39 PM (e) (s)

Let me suggest a far superior source: Jospeph Owens, Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics. Once you've read up, come back to discuss.

What does it matter what stuffy old philosophers had to say once. (Or stuffy new ones, like here at PT.) Metaphysics is fun and all but it can be used to justify and explain anything about anything. When are you going to get around to doing some real science. Like explaining why the evidence points to common design rather than exclusively common descent. Or why the fact that the evidence points to common descent does not exclude common design. Sincerely, Paul

Paul Flocken · 4 April 2005

There should have been a smiley face after PT;)

Sincerely,

Paul

Michael Finley · 4 April 2005

If you ever learn to think without jumping to conclusions, and using your sad little sources and fallacies, then we might be able to discuss something. As of now I can only see that you know far too little even in your own subject, let alone the one that you deign to discuss here without knowledge of science.

— Glen Davidson
[Yawn] This is my subject, and this is hardly the place for an Aristotle lesson. My suggestion of a secondary source was to allow you to get a better view of the primary texts. Aristotle is hard, and one can hardly read, e.g., the Metaphysics "cold turkey" and hope to understand it. People go to graduate school for that. I hate to be harsh, but you are not on equal footing here. I will admit that I am an amateur at science. To be quite honest, I come here to learn. The best way I assimilate information is to argue with knowledgeable people. And because I don't have a team of Darwinists on call (who does these days), so I visit PT. I also have no problem admitting that, as a result of the foregoing, I am inclined to think that my approach probably won't work. I don't think the argument got a fair shake, but that was expected. Despite that, I was able to benefit from the exchange.

PvM · 4 April 2005

I also have no problem admitting that, as a result of the foregoing, I am inclined to think that my approach probably won't work. I don't think the argument got a fair shake, but that was expected. Despite that, I was able to benefit from the exchange.

— Finley
That's good to hear because I see the main function of PT to evaluate arguments and provide a forum for indepth discussions.

Glen Davidson · 4 April 2005

Actually, it may be that heavenly bodies could belong to physis according to Aristotle (I'm really not sure, partly because Aristotle wasn't terribly clear), but the crux of the matter is that God is not portrayed as nature. Even the soul seems to be problematic to Aristotle's categorization of "nature" and what is not nature.

[Yawn]

Typical bad manners of those who think they're above the rest, due to their area of study.

This is my subject, and this is hardly the place for an Aristotle lesson. My suggestion of a secondary source was to allow you to get a better view of the primary texts. Aristotle is hard, and one can hardly read, e.g., the Metaphysics "cold turkey" and hope to understand it. People go to graduate school for that. I hate to be harsh, but you are not on equal footing here.

And why do you assume that I haven't gone to grad school for that? You continue in your incapacity to deal properly with matters and with people, simply assuming some sort of superiority.

I also have no problem admitting that, as a result of the foregoing, I am inclined to think that my approach probably won't work. I don't think the argument got a fair shake, but that was expected.

No, it's that we do not agree with metaphysical claims against the evidence. Aristotle is not an area I have studied a whole lot (though I've had several courses), considering the fact that he's mostly wrong about science, and belongs to a philosophical tradition that has been superseded by Kant, Nietzsche and later thinkers. We simply are unwilling to accept ancient claims that are purported to be above the evidence, and to have priority over inductive methods. If you've learned here, good. What's probably best to take from this is that metaphysics is not the basis for science, and even the a priori methods that we bring to science are considered to be within the realm of questioning. That is to say, we may study Kant's "categories", their "natures" (which are not like Kant claimed), and how they may have evolved through time.

Great White Wonder · 4 April 2005

Finley

I am inclined to think that my approach probably won't work.

Could you be more specific?

I don't think the argument got a fair shake

Then why are you inclined to think now that your "approach won't work"?

I hate to be harsh, but you are not on equal footing here.

That's hilarious.

Glen Davidson · 4 April 2005

What does it matter what stuffy old philosophers had to say once.

There is one reason, and it is that ID relies on typologies and assumed categories in order to claim that "design" means something apart from human language and human experience. Their metaphysics is what they substitute for science. Unfortunately, much of "mind science" continues to rely on similar metaphysical beliefs, which is why very little of value comes out of most "consciousness studies". Neuro-science works, on the other hand. What we've got in "consciousness studies" is the equivalent of ID in biology, an application of metaphysics over the data of science. ID needs to be called what it is, ancient philosophy trying to run over science.

Michael Finley · 4 April 2005

You continue in your incapacity to deal properly with matters and with people, simply assuming some sort of superiority.

I am rarely arrogant, and a review of my posts on this thread will not find any appeals to authority. The few times I cited sources were responses to cursory throw-away lines about exceedingly complicated issues.

What's probably best to take from this is that metaphysics is not the basis for science, and even the a priori methods that we bring to science are considered to be within the realm of questioning. That is to say, we may study Kant's "categories", their "natures" (which are not like Kant claimed), and how they may have evolved through time.

Again, this is not the place for discussions about the history of philosophy, but I think your incorrect. Take Hume, who I mentioned. Hume points out that basic principles of science (e.g., causality, probability, that there is a regularity from past to future, etc.) cannot be empirically justified. They are metaphysical, and for Hume have no ground whatsoever (excepting as custom). Kant is driven by Hume to make these metaphysical principles part of the structure of experience. Nevertheless, Kant is doing his own brand of metaphysics, one that very shortly after his zenith leads to German idealism. Science makes a host of metaphysical assumptions. That is not a bad thing. It is just a fact.

PvM · 4 April 2005

I am rarely arrogant, and a review of my posts on this thread will not find any appeals to authority. The few times I cited sources were responses to cursory throw-away lines about exceedingly complicated issues.

— Finley
I have found Michael to be overall quite reasonable despite being approached with hostility from a few. It may be that we get so used to creationists recycling worn arguments that we do not give those interested in the arguments a fair chance to present and defend them. Remember that one can learn far more from those with whom one disagrees that from those with whom one agrees. At least that's how it works for me and I always encourage and enjoy well reasoned debates, even when they may not go the way I was hoping them to go.

Science makes a host of metaphysical assumptions. That is not a bad thing. It is just a fact.

— Michael
But are these assumptions a priori ones or not?

Michael Finley · 4 April 2005

Could you be more specific?

— Great White Wonder
For an unqualified designer, it still seems to me correct that his/her/its products probably share a basic structural similarity. That is, for a designer, the statements "his products are basically similar" and "his products are basically dissimilar" do not seem to be of equal probability. Be that as it may, it would be difficult to make that intuition more rigorous. Even if it could, it would not approach the strength of a deductive inference. And as deductive inference is the method of prediction, it would never yield predictions.

Then why are you inclined to think now that your "approach won't work"?

Based on what was discussed, I was able to supply the missing criticisms.

That's hilarious.

Touche.

Paul Flocken · 4 April 2005

Comment #23275 Posted by Michael Finley on April 4, 2005 03:54 PM (e) (s)

Again, this is not the place for discussions about the history of philosophy, but I think your incorrect. Take Hume, who I mentioned. Hume points out that basic principles of science (e.g., causality, probability, that there is a regularity from past to future, etc.) cannot be empirically justified. They are metaphysical, and for Hume have no ground whatsoever (excepting as custom).

From the post that opened the entire thread of comments.

3. The listener asks, "What scientific evidence is there that demonstrates that the scientific method brings true knowledge?" Obviously, this is a tautological question, as no system of belief can justify its own validity. Science produces knowledge that the world in general has found to be practically useful. Scientific knowledge is considered true "within the limits to which it has been tested and its scope of applicability" (to quote a nice phrase from the Kansas science standards) because the methods which produce it have been successfully tested against additional empirical evidence, not because it claims any internal proof that it can provide Ultimate Truth.

"true knowledge" is purely metaphysical crap. Science can't help with it. What MORE do you want of science? The following is probably incoherent but: As far as assumptions go(e.g., causality, probability, that there is a regularity from past to future, etc.) Godel's incompleteness theorem is only strictly applicable to mathematics, but by analogy its conclusions bear remembering for the rest of science. The absolute rock bottom assumption of science is that nature is an honest teacher. The alternative to horrible to contemplate. Sincerely, Paul

Michael Finley · 4 April 2005

But are these assumptions a priori ones or not?

Take causality. Hume has demonstrated that causality cannot be grounded empirically, i.e., a posteriori. It must, therefore, be a priori.

Science ("physics," in the classical sense) cannot justify its own principles. It requires metaphysics for that. Attempts to completely eradicate metaphysics, e.g., logical positivism, have failed.

Great White Wonder · 4 April 2005

Finley,

What did you eat for lunch? Did you step outside, lift the welcome mat to your building, and munch on the residue stuck to the bottom? And for dessert did you enjoy a languid licking of the nearest parking meter?

If not, what is the metaphysical explanation for your alternate behavior?

Ed Darrell · 4 April 2005

Paul Flocken said:

The absolute rock bottom assumption of science is that nature is an honest teacher. The alternative to horrible to contemplate.

That's an assumption most Christians and all scientists happily start from -- and it can be heavily evidenced if one does not wish to take it as a given. Creationists and IDists, on the other hand, state that nature is not honest. Of course, they also refuse to acknowledge that in making that statement they have accepted that horrible alternative.

Michael Finley · 4 April 2005

"True knowledge" is purely metaphysical crap. Science can't help with it.

— Paul Flocken
Nevertheless, science depends on metaphysics. We don't want to say that "A causes B" is merely "useful" in an instrumentalist sense (some may, but I find such a position grotesque). We want to say that "A causes B" is correct of the world, i.e., is true.

Michael Finley · 4 April 2005

What did you eat for lunch? Did you step outside, lift the welcome mat to your building, and munch on the residue stuck to the bottom? And for dessert did you enjoy a languid licking of the nearest parking meter? If not, what is the metaphysical explanation for your alternate behavior?

— Great White Wonder
I'm afraid you're too clever for me. I'll let your scathing retort speak for itself.

PvM · 4 April 2005

For an unqualified designer, it still seems to me correct that his/her/its products probably share a basic structural similarity.

That would depend. What if one were an omnipotent designer who is not constrained by limited knowledge and tinkering? What about a designer who is a tinkerer? Does this mean that such a designer has a low probability of being omnipotent? What about a designer who is an experimentalist and likes to design many different approaches? What if one applies the multiple designers theory by Richard B Hoppe and find many different 'designs'?

Ed Darrell · 4 April 2005

Michael Finley said:

Again, this is not the place for discussions about the history of philosophy, but I think your incorrect. Take Hume, who I mentioned. Hume points out that basic principles of science (e.g., causality, probability, that there is a regularity from past to future, etc.) cannot be empirically justified. They are metaphysical, and for Hume have no ground whatsoever (excepting as custom). Kant is driven by Hume to make these metaphysical principles part of the structure of experience. Nevertheless, Kant is doing his own brand of metaphysics, one that very shortly after his zenith leads to German idealism. Science makes a host of metaphysical assumptions. That is not a bad thing. It is just a fact.

But then the physician (as opposed to a metaphysician) takes those assumptions and tests the tarnation out of them. As Feynman noted, science is done on a lab bench (sometimes a natural bench, but a bench nevertheless). Intelligent design stops short of such testing. That's the problem. For example, Darwin spent two decades working to disprove certain parts of the framework of evolution theory, without success -- and then was still loathe to publish. He had assumed that the birds he took were, as they appeared, 13 different Galapagos species. When the ornithologiss at the British Museum off-handedly informed him they were all finches, he didn't take their word alone. He went back and analyzed the specimens again. Because evolution requires that plants survive at sea, in salt water, Darwin soaked in salt water a variety of seeds for the periods of time required to drift to certain islands by natural current. He found that, contrary to assumption and Paleyism, the seeds germinated just fine. He tested plant relationships and animal relationships. If we combine all of the labs of intelligent design, they don't occupy a corner of the smallest table in Darwin's study in area, and they have not produced a single experiment nor any hypothesis worthy of testing, either to confirm or deny evolution, or to confirm or deny intelligent design. One may argue that Illinois is a better basketball team on paper than North Carolina for a good long time. But tonight we will put the teams on the floor and test the proposition. Intelligent design is happy to claim the paper arguments as proof. That was Paley's error, and Aristotle's before him. They assumed things were they way they wanted them to be in nature, without having looked. Darwin looked. Darwin reported what he saw. And what nature provided was not what Paley had assumed. It is not a problem that evolution assumes nature to be a true and wise teacher. Science tests that proposition ten thousand times a day. It is a problem that intelligent design fails to test any assumption at all, let alone some of the assumptions it makes in contradiction to what nature does, and in contradiction to what nature shows. Metphysics don't mean a thing when the physics don't support it.

Michael Finley · 4 April 2005

Metphysics don't mean a thing when the physics don't support it.

Please supply a physical "support," i.e., justification, for the principle of causality. And after you do, send it off to the most prestigious philosophy journal you can find for immediate publication.

Great White Wonder · 4 April 2005

Finley

I'm afraid you're too clever for me. I'll let your scathing retort speak for itself.

Finley, it wasn't a "scathing retort". It's an honest question. And there's nothing "clever" about it if you're serious about understanding why your "arguments" fail to gain the slightest traction with the overwhelming majority of scientists. I understand that I haven't accidentally describe your actual lunch (thank goodness). It's important that you recognized how unlikely such a lunch is, however -- unlikely, that is, for a sane human being who is hungry, wants to remain healthy, and has the means to acquire and consume healthier foods. So what is the metaphysical reason, Finley, that a sane adult human being like yourself didn't get down on his knees and start eating dirt and old pennies for lunch?

Michael Finley · 4 April 2005

Great White Wonder,

My lunch, chicken-fried-steak, and my desire to remain healthy have nothing to do with one another.

Your going to have to spell out the relation between my lunch and the previous discussion. I'm sure you have a point, I just don't know what it is.

Great White Wonder · 4 April 2005

My lunch, chicken-fried-steak, and my desire to remain healthy have nothing to do with one another.

Your quoted statement is patently false. Did you randomly choose the chicken fried steak amongst all the objects you saw around you that could fit into your mouth? Please. Stop playing games, Mr. Finley. Either you are half the philosopher you claim to be and you know exactly what point I'm making, or you are entirely full of it. Why can't you just answer the question: what is the metaphysical basis for your choice of chicken-fried-steak for lunch? C'mon Mr. Philosopher. Step up to the plate. I'm throwing softballs.

euan · 4 April 2005

Please supply a physical "support," i.e., justification, for the principle of causality. And after you do, send it off to the most prestigious philosophy journal you can find for immediate publication.

The principle of causality is something that physics supports by finding it useful empirically. Sorry if this is news to philosophers. Physicists are willing to consider they might be able to find problems with it, though. See e.g.: Rotating cylinders and the possibility of global causality violation Tipler, Phys.Rev. D 9, 2203-2206 (1974)

Michael Finley · 4 April 2005

Great White Wonder,

Your more obscure than you realize. I sincerely have no clue what you're up to. That you're unwilling to spell it out makes me wonder whether you know what you're up to.

Nevertheless, let me take a stab. One instance of metaphysical belief operating in my lunchtime behavior was a belief that, if I ordered a chicken-fried-steak, it would be brought out to me, and if I ate it, it would be filling, etc. These are instances of suppossed causality.

I suppose along the same lines, I believed that scum under my door mat would taste bad (though this actually never entered my mind), and would not satisfy my hunger. Again, instances of suppossed causality.

If this is not what your after, please be so kind as to steer me along the correct path.

Michael Finley · 4 April 2005

Make that "supposed." I'm so lost without spell-check.

Jim Harrison · 4 April 2005

Quoting Hume in defense of ID or a related position is ironic indeed since nobody every demolished teleology more comprehensively. Hume was the amused enemy of the 18th Century-style metaphysics that has resurfaced here in defense of the long-exploded theory of the special creation of natural kinds.

Michael Finley · 4 April 2005

The principle of causality is something that physics supports by finding it useful empirically. Sorry if this is news to philosophers.

— eaun
"Usefulness" needs to be defined. People find various explanations useful for different reasons. Does that fact justify the explanations? What makes something "useful"? What is the relation between "usefulness" and truth? I'm reminded of Dennet's instrumentalism in psychology, i.e., belief-desire psychology is false, but it is nonetheless "useful" to predict behavior. It's always seemed odd to me that a false explanation accurately predicts behavior. What a coincidence!

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 4 April 2005

I'm finished with this conversation -- there is simply no need for me to go on. I've already pointed out that:

(1) ID isn't science
(2) ID is nothing but religious apologetics
(3) ID can't make any statements about anything anywhere around us that can be tested using the scientific method
(4) IDers simply want us to accept their "hypothesis" on their holy say-so, WITHOUT putting any of it to the test using the scientific method
and
(5) IDers are flat out lying to us when they claim otherwise.

I thank Finley for making all of that so crushingly clear to everyone.

I also thank him for his dishonest, evasive, prevaricating, deceptive stone-walling and arm-waving. It demonstrates to everyone, much more clearly than I ever could, exactly what ID "theory" is all about.

If IDers ever have something SCIENTIFIC to say, that is testible by the scientific method, please let me know. Until then, I find their pseudo-philosophical apolgetics utterly useless as well as utterly boring.

NelC · 4 April 2005

For an unqualified designer, it still seems to me correct that his/her/its products probably share a basic structural similarity.

— Michael Finlay
But the Designer's products don't share a basic structural similarity. I do not share much structural similarity with a horse-shoe crab, and neither of us share similarity with an oak tree. Now, I am similar to other great apes, which in turn are structurally similar to monkeys, which are similar to other creatures, and so on. If we draw lines connecting the most structurally similar species, I'm fairly confident that we'd end up with something that resembles an evolutionary tree. Which is pretty remarkable really. If the Designer has chosen -- for reasons of ineffable economy, perhaps -- to design a worldwide ecology of plants and animals reusing and restating certain design themes, I wonder why He would choose to do so using a scheme that resembles what one would expect from evolutionary processes, instead of, say, a completely random collection of chimeras. Say, creatures with a shark's tail, a rhino's flanks, an octopus's arms, and a pipestrel bat's ears, and with no similar "relatives", say with vestigial arms, or weaker ears and better eyes, neither extant nor in the fossil record. Why are the Designer's products so tidily arranged in hierarchal groups of similar creatures, exactly as though they had evolved from common ancestors?

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 4 April 2005

I suspect many evolutionists harbor a driving desire to be "intellectually fulfilled atheists."

I am not an atheist, Finley. And I suspect IDers and the Taliban have a lot more in common than you think. Ever wonder where (or more correctly, *who*) Discovery Institute gets its money from? Ever wonder why he gives it?

PvM · 4 April 2005

Science ("physics," in the classical sense) cannot justify its own principles. It requires metaphysics for that. Attempts to completely eradicate metaphysics, e.g., logical positivism, have failed.

— Finley
Could you give any examples? I may be more of a Popperian, less interested in metaphysical issues and philosophy and more in the practical nature of science.

PvM · 4 April 2005

Please supply a physical "support," i.e., justification, for the principle of causality. And after you do, send it off to the most prestigious philosophy journal you can find for immediate publication.

I see causality more as a posteriori issue for science. If it cannot be repeated or duplicated, one may start wondering about causality. That science works provides strong evidence that causality exists. Is there an apriori expectation by science that causality exists or is it a requirement without which science would not work?

euan · 4 April 2005

"Usefulness" needs to be defined. People find various explanations useful for different reasons. Does that fact justify the explanations? What makes something "useful"? What is the relation between "usefulness" and truth?

1. Usefulness in science means able to build a model that anticipates the results of future observations. 2. So what? 3. Anticipatory modelling of the world 4. Who cares?

I'm reminded of Dennet's instrumentalism in psychology, i.e., belief-desire psychology is false, but it is nonetheless "useful" to predict behavior. It's always seemed odd to me that a false explanation accurately predicts behavior. What a coincidence!

Are you so reminded? Looks more like a clumsy attempt at poisoning the well to me.

Great White Wonder · 4 April 2005

One instance of metaphysical belief operating in my lunchtime behavior was a belief that, if I ordered a chicken-fried-steak, it would be brought out to me, and if I ate it, it would be filling, etc. These are instances of suppossed causality. I suppose along the same lines, I believed that scum under my door mat would taste bad (though this actually never entered my mind), and would not satisfy my hunger. Again, instances of suppossed causality.

Wow. Had you never eaten a chicken-fried steak before, Mr. Finley? Has no piece of dirt, lint or hair ever found its way into your mouth during the course of your brief visit to earth?

Flint · 4 April 2005

Lenny Flank:

What do you do when:
1) Your faith makes totally non-negotiable demands on your preferences; and
2) The facts unambiguously contradict those preferences?

Your options are limited. You can abandon your faith only in principle; most of us can voluntarily abandon our faiths no better than we can voluntarily reverse our sexual orientation. We might be able to fake it well enough to fool some people, but we ourselves would know better.

On the other hand, you can reinterpret the facts within a wide latitude. I think Finley is being sabotaged by his intelligence. He can't simply deny; he knows better. So he must finesse the facts with careful redirection, resorts to philosophy when asked for practical principles, dismissal of salient questions as being off topic (which they are, after he changes the subject!), and the usual litany cribbed from the dishonest debater's handbook.

I think Finley is attempting a more subtle strategy as well: Find people hopefully somewhat less articulate about what science is, cherry-pick the most plausible misunderstanding of what they said, try to lead these people around in circles by redirection, and conclude (internally) that these science types don't really know what they're talking about after all.

Do you seriously expect him to say "You're right, my notion of being created in the image of my God is childish; if there are any gods, we really know nothing about them whatsoever"? Would you believe him if he DID say such a thing? Finley, intelligent and thoughtful as he is, has been permanently crippled and at some level he realizes this. He has his nose pressed against the glass of rational, practical inquiry but he can't come in.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 4 April 2005

Lenny Flank: What do you do when: 1) Your faith makes totally non-negotiable demands on your preferences; and 2) The facts unambiguously contradict those preferences?

I change my faith. Reality is a stubborn thing. It won't go away just because I happen not to like it.

Flint · 4 April 2005

I envy your magic wand. I might as well have asked, what do you do when you wish to play center in the NBA and you're only 5'5"? And you blythely reply. "I'd grow two feet taller." Uh huh, right.

Reality is not nearly as stubborn as hardwired faith. Reality can be tuned out, run away from, denied, misrepresented, fabricated, and otherwise distorted as required. Faith, on the other hand, sits there in your mind like a steel clamp.

I challenge you to become a creationist. NOT a fake one, parroting their lines, but a genuine, sincere, deeply believing creationist. Someone whose heart Jesus has entered never to leave, and who filters every little experience through this deeply certain conviction. I challenge you. If you can't do it, please answer a little bit more honestly next time. You demand it of others.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 4 April 2005

And I suspect IDers and the Taliban have a lot more in common than you think. Ever wonder where (or more correctly, *who*) Discovery Institute gets its money from? Ever wonder why he gives it?

More than one person has contacted me by private email to ask about DI's funding source. So I'll post it here for everyone. The information is available in several published press reports. The Discovery Institute, not surprisingly, doesn't like to talk about it. It should come as no surprise to anyone that nearly all of the Discovery Institute's money comes in the form of grants from wealthy "conservative" fundamentalist Christians. They once got around $350,000 from the Maclellan Foundation, for instance, a fundie lobbying group in Tennessee. Their *single biggest* source of money, though, by far, is Howard Ahmanson, a California savings-and-loan bigwig. Ahmanson's gift of $1.5 million was the original seed money to organize the Center for (the Renewal of) Science and Culture, the arm of the Discovery Institute which focuses on promoting "intelligent design theory". By his own reckoning, Ahmanson gives more of his money to the DI than to any other poilitically active group (he funds a variety of other religious-right groups as well) -- only a museum trust in his wife's hometown in Iowa and a Bible college in New Jersey get more than DI does. In 2004, he reportedly gave the (Renewal) Center another $2.8 million. Were it not for Ahmanson and his checkbook, the intelligent design movement simply would not exist. Ahmanson is a Christian Reconstructionist (also known as "Theonomy") -- a lunatic-fringe group of fundies who argue that the US Constitution should be abandoned and the US should be "reconstructed" under "Biblical law". The Reconstructionists were founded by Rouas John Rushdoony. According to the Reconstructionist view, the United States should be directly transformed into a theocracy in which the fundamentalists would rule directly according to the will of God. The Reconstructionists propose doing away with the US Constitution and laws, and instead ruling directly according to the laws of God as set out in the Bible---they advocate a return to judicial punishment for religious crimes such as blasphemy or violating the Sabbath, as well as a return to such Biblically-approved punishments as stoning. Creationism has *always* had close ties with Reconstructionists. Rushdoony was one of the financial backers for Institute for Creation Research founder Henry Morris's first book, "The Genesis Flood", and Morris's son John was a co-signer of several documents produced by the Coalition On Revival, a Reconstructionist coalition founded in 1984. ICR star debater Duane Gish was a member of COR's Steering Committee, as was Richard Bliss, who served as ICR's "curriculum director" until his death. Gish and Bliss were both co-signers of the COR documents "A Manifesto for the Christian Church" (COR, July 1986), and the "Forty-Two Articles of the Essentials of a Christian Worldview" (COR,1989), which declares, "We affirm that the laws of man must be based upon the laws of God. We deny that the laws of man have any inherent authority of their own or that their ultimate authority is rightly derived from or created by man." ("Forty-Two Essentials, 1989, p. 8). Ahmanson, as a Christian Reconstructionist, was long associated with Rushdooney, and sat with him on the board of directors of the Chalcedon Foundation -- a major Reconstructionist think-tank -- for over 20 years. Just as Rushdooney was a prime moving force behind Morris's first book, "The Genesis Flood", intelligent design "theorist" Phillip Johnson dedicated his book "Defeating Darwinism" to "Howard and Roberta" -- Ahmanson and his wife. Some of Ahmanson's donations are also channeled through his Fieldstead Foundation, which is a subspecies of the Ahmanson foundation ("Fieldstead" is Ahmanson's middle name). The Fieldstead Foundation funds many of the travelling and speaking expenses of the DI's shining stars. So it's no *wonder* that DI is so reluctant to talk about its funding source. Apparently, they are not very anxious to have the public know that nearly all of its money comes from just one whacko billionnaire who advocates a political program that is very similar to that of the Islamic fundies that we are currently dropping bombs on in Afghanistan and Iraq. Particularly since the IDers want to argue (in public, anyway) that they are all about "science" and have NO religious goals, aim or purpose. They are, of course, simply lying to us when they claim that.

Jack Krebs · 4 April 2005

It's been a very interesting discussion, although I haven't kept up on it all, and I assume the information about the DI funding is relevant. However, I, as moderator of this thread, would like to rule off limits comparisons of anyone to the Taliban, Islamic fundamentalists, etc.

So maybe this thread is finished, but if not let's stayed focused on the issues raised in this thread and leave a discussion of the subjects raised in Rev. Lenny's last post to some other place and time.

Thanks.

Great White Wonder · 4 April 2005

Faith, on the other hand, sits there in your mind like a steel clamp.

No it doesn't.

"Rev Dr" Lenny Flank · 4 April 2005

I envy your magic wand.

No magic wand required. Just a functional brain.

I challenge you to become a creationist. NOT a fake one, parroting their lines, but a genuine, sincere, deeply believing creationist. Someone whose heart Jesus has entered never to leave, and who filters every little experience through this deeply certain conviction. I challenge you. If you can't do it, please answer a little bit more honestly next time. You demand it of others.

I *did* answer honestly. You asked, in effect, what I would do if reality contradicted my faith. And my answer was (and still is) I'd change my faith. After all, I make no claims that my religious opinions are eternally correct. My standard disclaimer reads -- My religious opinions are just that, my opinions. They are no more holy or divine or infallible or authoritative than anyone else's religious opinions. No one is obligated in any way, shape, or form to follow my religious opinions, to accept them, or even to pay any attention at all to them. My religious opinions are right for *me*. Whether they are right for *you or anyone else*, I neither know nor care. As for becoming a creationist, I *can't*. Creationism (in all its forms) conflicts with reality. As I said, reality is a stubborn thing.

Flint · 4 April 2005

Sigh. Creationists aren't idiots, they aren't universally ignorant, they have no choice but to recognize the primacy of reality in their normal behavior. But where their faith is challenged, they simply have no choice (if everything they write everywhere is to be acknowledged) but to make reality fit the requirements of their beliefs.

I agree that you couldn't become a sincere creationist if your immortal soul depended on it. I suggest that this has nearly nothing to do with any reality conflict. Reality conflicts are what everyone lives with to one degree or another day by day. It's not that reality is stubborn. Sincere, unbiased eyewitnesses disagree with one another violently, although there was only one reality. They are probably all wrong anyway.

I don't think you really understand what motivates a creationist. He doesn't set out to disagree with reality out of congenital perversity. He KNOWS what reality is. If observations don't agree, something must be wrong with them. And *anyone's* reality consists of their observations, and most of our observations are imperfect. I doubt you are diferent or unique in this.

Creationists aren't trying to frustrate you with terminal dishonesty because they are born liars. They really have little choice but to see the world through the filters of their faith. You are no different, nor am I. We simply have filters that more closely match the outside world. But in this respect, I submit we are lucky. As Dawkins says, religion is a mental parasite. Its first task is to disable its host's defenses. If yours were disabled, you could do nothing to change it. You could not WANT to do anything to change it.

Great White Wonder · 4 April 2005

Creationists aren't trying to frustrate you with terminal dishonesty because they are born liars. They really have little choice but to see the world through the filters of their faith.

An interesting theory. Has any person "of faith" successfully relied on this theory to secure acquittal of a charge of fraud? For example, was that theory used to defend evangelical Christian icon Jim Bakker against charges of fraud? http://www.rotten.com/library/bio/religion/televangelists/jim-bakker/

Paul Flocken · 4 April 2005

Michael Finley, After thinking about it for the last five hours while I was at work, I believe I know what you are looking for. Unfortunately, you can't have it. Fortunately, I think I can tell you why you can't have it, and it's not because nobody here wants to give it to you*, but rather because it isn't there in the first place to be given. I am east coast USA and its 11pm. I want to re-review the last twelve hours of posts or so and I have one start-up question for you. I assume you are down for the night and shortly I will be too. When you answer this question tomorrow I will follow-up. Sincerely, Paul Comment #23281 Posted by Michael Finley on April 4, 2005 04:28 PM (e) (s)

Take causality. Hume has demonstrated that causality cannot be grounded empirically, i.e., a posteriori. It must, therefore, be a priori. Science ("physics," in the classical sense) cannot justify its own principles. It requires metaphysics for that. Attempts to completely eradicate metaphysics, e.g., logical positivism, have failed.

Are you suggesting that metaphysics HAS INDEED rigorously proven(rigorous in the mathematical sense, not necessarily with mathematics) the assumptions(causality, et-al, to include any you may not have listed earlier) that underly science? That seems to be the gist of what you are saying above. As I said, I honestly think I can give you an answer to one of the three arguments you have made in this thread line, and it partially depends on the answer to this question. Sincerely and Good Night, Paul *Although a few probably would rather spit than anything else.

Henry J · 4 April 2005

Experiment to test the supernatural:

If you believe in telekinesis, raise my hand.

----

Michael,

Re "It's difficult to keep up, my apologies."

Now that I'll agree with - trying to keep up with these threads is cutting into my sleep!

Henry

Air Bear · 4 April 2005

Flint keeps trying to explain:

Creationists aren't idiots, they aren't universally ignorant, they have no choice but to recognize the primacy of reality in their normal behavior. But where their faith is challenged, they simply have no choice (if everything they write everywhere is to be acknowledged) but to make reality fit the requirements of their beliefs.

and

Reality conflicts are what everyone lives with to one degree or another day by day. It's not that reality is stubborn. Sincere, unbiased eyewitnesses disagree with one another violently, although there was only one reality. They are probably all wrong anyway.

You're being too hard on observation of reality. Certainly in science, agreement on observation is bedrock of scientific communication. And even in daily life, people draw conclusions from their own observations, even the most philosophical people. (Tell me you don't draw conclusions from your observations because someone else might draw different conclusions from observing the same events.) But you're absolutely right about creationists and other people of faith making reality fit the requirements of their beliefs. Any creationist website is full of Biblicly-oriented explanations for observed phenomena, ranging fromt tortured to the absurd. But you can go to any church (Protestant, at least) on any Sunday and hear the same kind of molding of observations to fit whatever faith they're preaching. The problem is that people of faith don't try to learn from what they observe, as the Rev and I do. I'm constantly testing my beliefs and assumptions against what I observe, and my belilefs change according to my conclusions. Does that mean I have no faith? Well, there are few things I have much faith in. And I also agree that they "have no choice". I've concluded from observations in my 50+ years that most people have some kind of religious impuse, and some have it real strong. The stronger it is, the more it is "faith". But at any level, it's an irrational, gut feeling that no amount of reasonining can penetrate. A little like the minority of people who love airplanes and love flying (hence my screen name). So arguing even with the likes of Michael Finley is ultimately futile except as personal entertainment. The smarter they are, the more elaborate the intellectual frameworks they'll construct to make reality fit their beliefs, including bushwa like metaphysics. I wonder how much this phenomenon is confined to Protestant Christianity. It doesn't seem that members of any other religious group so actively try to subordinate observations of nature to their sacred scriptures or teachings. For example, to Buddhists or Hindus oppose evolution as being contrary to reincarnation? I think not.

sir_toejam · 4 April 2005

IMO, Flint hit the nail on the head, so to speak.

What do you do when:
1) Your faith makes totally non-negotiable demands on your preferences; and
2) The facts unambiguously contradict those preferences?

this is the key issue. when folks have lots of free time to philosophize about what meaning there is to their lives, they reach out towards whatever explanations are given them that best explain, based on their experiences, what their existence really means.

I don't believe Mr. Finley really is about purporting ID as an exclusionary theory. I believe him to be an intelligent person who is simply struggling with reconciling what he has been taught about what gives meaning to his life (his religion) with what the observable realm teaches us.

I don't think he is alone. It is quite probable that as more and more evidence begins to support evolutionary theory both in terms of common descent and natural selection, we will see an actual INCREASE in many of our neighbors reacting in similar fashion to Mr. Finley; that is, reaching out to try to use science to rationalize his faith.

What i have NEVER understood is, why? Why do those who believe in God feel it necessary to have any basic theology explain the world around them? Someone else here pointed out that most folks with strong faith in a religion don't go around trying to challenge quantum theory using theology as a guide. Why is the logic any different when applied to evolutionary theory?

to me, the argument doesn't even make sense.

If you have faith, let your faith give you meaning in and of itself; don't expect to find religious meaning in the world around you, seek your meaning in the faith itself.

If creationists really had true faith, they might remember the lesson of Job. Didn't god ask Job where he was when god created the heavens and earth? the point being, if you believe these were the words of god, then you must also believe that man CANNOT know the will or mechanisms of god. ergo, why try to impose a philosophy on the world that cannot be known?

science is parsimony. that is all. it was never meant to give meaning beyond pure practicality and relative expediency.

Science never has and never will attempt to reveal "absolute" truth.

Science never has and never will attempt to prove or disprove the existence of god. It can't.

If you believe in god, derive your meaning from your faith, and don't confuse the issue. Otherwise you do yourself, and all of us, a grave disservice.

If Mr. Finley wants to do the world a better service, he should attempt to use his faith to STOP creationists from using the law to change basic science.

There is a reason science has become so pervasive in the last 1000 years, it works to pragmatically and beneficially explain the observable universe. simple as that.

Faith was never intended for such a use. it is a mistake to attempt to use it so.

The reason scientists react so defensively on this issue, is they see a betrayal of reason similar to that which led to the dark ages. I know for myself, it is a noticeable and growing fear i have had for the last 20 years, supported by plenty of evidence.

If those who wish to use their faith to explain the observable universe will not at least acknowledge the parsimony that is science, and see that true faith is not affected by science one way or the other, then we truly are headed for a conflict that should never be. The destruction wrought by this inane conflict could take generations to repair.

From the scientists viewpoint, we need to reach out to those who think science threatens their faith, and simply reassure them that it has not and never will.

From the creationists standpoint, they need to reach out and learn what science is really all about.

Fear comes from ignorance, and IMO, the ignorance is just as great on both sides of the issue.

cheers

sir_toejam · 5 April 2005

er, change:

"evidence begins to support evolutionary theory"

to:

evidence continues to support evolutionary theory

Ed Darrell · 5 April 2005

I said (spellings corrected here:

Metaphysics don't mean a thing when the physics don't support it.

Mr. Finley responded:

Please supply a physical "support," i.e., justification, for the principle of causality. And after you do, send it off to the most prestigious philosophy journal you can find for immediate publication.

Regardless whether we understand or approve of the philosophy behind the Earth's rotation and orbit, it does it. So to Mr. Finley's request that I justify the Earth's motion, all I can say is, "it moves; yet, it moves." And the same works for evolution. Claiming that evolution is incorrect to one's metaphysics doesn't change evolution. Descent with modification works for the just and the unjust alike, for the scientist and for the creationist alike. I think the claim that Hume's causality argument is a problem both overlooks the potential errors that Hume introduced (essentially rejeced the possibility of confirming measurement, and closing off the possibility of future scientific advancement), and misunderstands Hume's desire to test things to see if what was assumed about them is accurate. The fact remains that there is nothing testable about intelligent design. It fails all of Hume's tests, as well as our modern understandings that science is worked out on the lab bench. Hume was earlier, but Feynman was right. In the real world, we have real problems. Cancer, other diseases, senescence, hunger, and the quest for knowledge, are all areas where evolution is pragmatically deployed to produce real results. Evolution theory applied helps cure disease and treat others, understand aging, combat hunger, and provides information about creation, whether or not there is an intelligence behind it. Intelligent design does none of those things. As the gum wrapper to a used piece of gum, intelligent design is to incorrect philosophy, and so should be discarded.

PaulP · 5 April 2005

Michael Finlay wrote

If it could be established that a basic similarity of structure among all life was a logical consequence of a common designer

to which I replied

Logically this is not correct. It confuses if/then/else (which it uses) with if-and-only-if/then/else (which it wants to use).

Michael then rejoined:

I am no more guilty of affirming the consequent than science generally. If philosophers of science can get around the problem (and I'm not sure they can; I am trying to get a handle on this beginning with Popper's The Logic of Scientific Discovery), I can follow their lead

From which we can deduce that Michael does not understand the debate about ID. Science tries to find the simplest explanation of all that is known (among other qualities). It has found that the things that the modern synthesis tries to explain can be explained without invoking a designer. (Which says nothing on whether an explanation involving a designer is possible or not). ID disputes this and claims that there are things that cannot be so explained, because of "Irreducible Complexity". Michael is confusing two completely different issues and is therefore not offering any support to the claims of the Iders

Russell · 5 April 2005

OK. I think Mr. Finley conceded that his attempt to frame the "unity of life" observations as equally supportive of ID and evolution won't work. My question(s) now: does that apply to the whole "29+ evidences", or does he want to move on to "nested hierarchies"? And does that happen here, or (might be better) at after the bar closes?

Michael Finley · 5 April 2005

Are you suggesting that metaphysics HAS INDEED rigorously proven ... the assumptions (causality, et al.) that underly science?

— Paul Flocken
With respect to causality, certainly not. What I am suggesting is that these assumptions (e.g., the definition of "cause," whether any event can be known as an instance of causality, etc.) are the rightful province of metaphysics ("metascience," if you like) and not of science. Take our knowledge of causality. Hume famously demonstrates (see A Treatise of Human Nature, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding) that it can never be concluded that one event is the cause of another. Experience only supports the weaker conclusion that an event follows another. Hume's arguments prove that causality cannot be gleaned from experience, i.e., cannot be empirically discovered by science. Science, of course, depends on attributions of causality; without them science would be impossible. Therefore, science assumes a priori the principle of causality, and in doing so makes a metaphysical assumption. Metaphysicians have attempted to solve Hume's problem in a number of ways. The most famous and most dramatic being Kant's transcendental idealism set for in the Critique of Pure Reason. Science does a massive amount of work, but it cannot do everything. It needs help from other disciplines such as logic, mathematics, and metaphysics.

Glen Davidson · 5 April 2005

Please supply a physical "support," i.e., justification, for the principle of causality. And after you do, send it off to the most prestigious philosophy journal you can find for immediate publication.

There is no "principle of causality". Not only did Hume do a good job on it, physics has found it pretty useless as an explanation for what happens in quantum physics. This doesn't prevent physicists from trying to keep "causality" a sensible "explanation", however, because there are a number of energy, information, and interactional issues involved in so-called "causality" in classical mechanics that one has to continue to follow empirically known "causation" in getting to the moon, say, or in explaining what occurs in neuroscience and evolution. But what can "cause" even mean when we say that my hand moving a ball is a cause, and also that moving a magnet in relation to another magnet "causes" a flow of electrical current? Or if I were to "make" a Bose-Einstein condensate, what really "causes" the atomic waves to overlap each other and merge? "Cause" is only a useful category for us to lump a lot of events that conserve energy, and often are fairly conservative of information, into one convenient linguistic/conceptual category. There is no "cause" in the conventional sense for the probabilistic decay of a plutonium atom, but there isn't even a consistent meaning behind "cause" in both the workings of a cathode ray tube, and the "causes" that exist in ecological systems. It would be absurd to look for a physical basis for a "principle of causality", because the empirically discovered physical bases underlying the phenomena that we call "causal" do not involved the same phenomena. One could appeal to the conservation of energy in by far the most cases of what we label as "causal", but it is thought that there are ways around the conservation of energy as well (hence the "cause" of the universe is not obviously an intractable problem for physics). I have mentioned the need to discover "cause" in science, in evolution, not only in the vague past, but also on this thread. However I do not mean "cause" in the Newtonian or Humean sense at all, I simply mean that a "cause" is an empirically discovered set of physics interactions that we interpret in a convenient Western manner in a shorthand term "cause". Indeed, it is because Finley believes in cause in a metaphysical sense that he can suggest a "cause" (such as a "designer qua designer") that has no basis in physics. I can't. I have to consider physics and more contextual matters in order to explain the "cause" of something, for I know that to simply claim that something is a "cause" really tells us nothing at all. The fact is that, starting with Hume (or thereabouts), with useful inputs from Kant and Nietzsche, and finally maturing in modern quantum physics, the concept of "causality" has been wiped out in the metaphysical sense. It is often understood to be little more than a linguistic fiction within the physics community, a concept that helped us to use our faculties to discover modern physics and what actually underlies "causality" and an idea still useful today as a practical concept, but it not only fails to be physics-based, physics actually leaves no room for it in the conventional sense at all. One trouble with metaphysical philosophy is that it rests on the good thinking of Hume, Kant, and others, to note that science was not as solidly based as 18th century thinkers believed it to be, without taking the trouble to notice that the problems of the concept of causality have been greatly expanded and explicated by science. Biologists tend to accept causality as a practical matter (many haven't really thought about it, of course), but biology ultimately rests on physics for explaining most of what happens in phenomena, and physicists don't actually adhere to any "principle of causality". The fact that thinking causally works for most non-physicists has to be explained by actual physics, and not by any a priori belief in the fiction "causality".

Russell · 5 April 2005

6 Ways of dealing with the cognitive dissonance that results from trying to reconcile science and religion:

1. Dismiss science
2. Dismiss religion
3. Redefine science
4. Redefine religion
5. Get really angry and try to damage science
6. Get really angry and try to damage religion

(Need not be mutually exclusive.) As kind of a fun exercise, go back over the comments in this thread, and figure out where each commenter stands with respect to this list. Meaning no disrespect, it seems to me that Mr. Finley is pretty committed to #3.

Uber · 5 April 2005

1. Dismiss science 2. Dismiss religion 3. Redefine science 4. Redefine religion 5. Get really angry and try to damage science 6. Get really angry and try to damage religion

The problem I have never understood with all of this is why anyone tries to jam a belief down your throat. If reality proves your faith wrong, then your reading of the religious doctrine needs modified to reality. You cannot believe fables and fairy tales over reality and then say you search for the truth. Or even that truth has any meaning as you will have relagated any subjective measure of truth to the burn pile.

Michael Finley · 5 April 2005

I simply mean that a "cause" is an empirically discovered set of physics interactions that we interpret in a convenient Western manner in a shorthand term "cause".

— Glen Davidson
Correct me if I'm wrong, but it looks to me that you've snuck in the traditional notion of causality under the name "interaction." Interaction is subject to Hume's criticisms no less than causality. It seems to me that a bare notion of "cause" as a sine qua non ("without which not") is indespensible in physics. (Granted, such a bare notion of cause is more of a necessary than sufficient condition of causality, but it's somewhere to start.) In other words, part of what it means to say that events are caused by other events is to say that without the former, not the latter. Otherwise, we end up with completely uncaused events, i.e., the question "Why did x happen?" becomes scientifically meaningless. Now I'm no expert on quantum mechanics, but is that what you're suggesting - That at the quantum level the question "Why did x happen?" is meaningless?

Michael Finley · 5 April 2005

Indispensible.

Paul Flocken · 5 April 2005

Uber,

Please try to explain that to...

matthew

Sincerely,

Paul

Paul Flocken · 5 April 2005

Comment #23364 Posted by Michael Finley on April 5, 2005 11:59 AM (e) (s)

but is that what you're suggesting - That at the quantum level the question "Why did x happen?" is meaningless?

Ding,Ding,Ding...Mr. Finley wins the brass ring. Sincerely, Paul

Paul Flocken · 5 April 2005

Although meaningless in the present might not mean meaningless in the future. But causality is in a tatters right now (and has been since Einstein's famous dice quote) because of QM.

Sincerely,

Paul

Chance · 5 April 2005

suspect many evolutionists harbor a driving desire to be "intellectually fulfilled atheists."

My reply to that would be, so? What's wrong with being fulfilled as a human? I don't agree that it's necessary but from this statement I would wonder why that would offend someone or change the fact of evolutionary theory.

Uber · 5 April 2005

Paul I read Matthews comments and yes I feel he is incorrect, but I feel he is consistent in his delusion.

I personally prefer his honesty and consistency to those who will often preserve their belief system by rationalizing things they know are not correct. Like the GAP 'theory'.

I respect those more who just admit the bible is not infallible, always correct, and instead is a collection off stories, fables, and such from our ancestors. Valuable for reasons outside this discussion.

IMHO

Michael Finley · 5 April 2005

Ding,Ding,Ding . . . Mr. Finley wins the brass ring.

— Paul Flocken
My response is that, either you are incorrect about QM, or QM has a major conceptual difficulty at its foundations. To say that an event happens for no reason whatsoever is to say nothing at all. I suspect (though, again, I have a layman's understanding of QM) that you are drawing incorrect conclusions from the probabilistic character of quantum events. Isn't von Neuman's "chain" relevant here. As I undertand it, von Neuman attempted to determine the "cause" of the actualization of a quantum probability and traced it to the observer. We might also discuss in this vein the relation between micro and macro events. Causality with respect to QM may not be relevant to the causality of normal-sized objects (cf. the absurdities that result from Schrodinger's micro/macro thought experiments). By the way, you didn't answer my question re: interaction.

Uber · 5 April 2005

hehe, I just wanted to make the 300th post in a ridiculously overlong thread:-)

Glen Davidson · 5 April 2005

but is that what you're suggesting - That at the quantum level the question "Why did x happen?" is meaningless?

No, I'm suggesting that "causality" is highly inadequate to deal with physical phenomena at its most basic level. The "why" is there, in thermodynamics, momentum considerations, in quantum probabilities and descriptions. Rather than dealing with the examples I brought in to show that causality is inadequate, you latched onto the deconstructible word "interaction" that I used--which I used because I must resort to language here. I am more than a little aware of the fact that "interaction" means no more than "cause" or "designer" does ultimately. In science one has to deal with the phenomena in interpretive ways, but any innovative scientist doesn't forget that we're not operating absolute terms when discussing "causality", "designers", or "interactions". The IDist thinks that "designer" means something more than an interpretation of phenomena sensed by us (or in us, whatever, since I don't have any stake in realism), but it doesn't--or can't be shown to do so. Now I know why you went for the word I used instead of considering how to deal with observed phenomena, since the venue of metaphysics is largely words, rationality, and the sense that we must "know" this or that prior to science in order to do science. But we don't, we only need to have a reliably communicable interpretive structures at least somewhat corresponding to observed phenomena in order to do science. Thus we can use (and have used) the concept of "causality" to investigate much scientific phenomena, because such a reductionistic term does convey to the observer that we need to explain what happens. The problem is when this reductionistic term "causality" is taken to be something in itself, as if "design is the cause" means anything beyond the circularity of words. What is said can mean something outside of the circularity of words, and indeed, words need not be circular as long as one realizes that something like "causality" is something that should be in doubt and questioned, just like any other word like "designer". Einstein fell into the Newtonian sense of "causality" (actually, it was kind of a hybrid of Spinozistic causality, Newtonian causality, with a good bit of Kant thrown in) and disagreed with Bohr and other quantum mechanists about "God playing dice". Well, Bohr purportedly asked who made Einstein God's secretary, and his side carried the day with probabilities substituting for causality in quantum matters (in fact quantum mechanics isn't even playing dice, for what it's worth, since dice throws are virtually entirely deterministically calculable). Hume noted that causation cannot be demonstrated, Kant said that it was part of our own thinking and thereby an indelible method of interpretation, and Nietzsche pointed out that causality is largely a psychological/cognitive issue. Quantum theorists took neo-Kantianism and other German philosophical concepts to heart, and indeed did call into question the meaning of causation--and of what "interaction" means, if one wants to get into that. On the other side, phenomenologists and other continental philosophers took Kantian interpretation to heart, without believing that we really think in the set categories that Kant "identified". That is to say, neither in science nor in much of philosophy is causality given credit for being more than a construction out of the observations made by us and the interpretive apparatus with which we are born. As long as this construction is faithful to what is seen, there is no reason to fault it--and yet it is fairly useless in quantum mechanics and thus is fairly well ignored except where one wishes to explain why the "classical world" is as we see it. The crux of the matter really comes down to philosophy, for if you take words to have meaning beyond the empirical usage of language in phenomenal life, you will have to believe that "causality" means something "in itself" when the word is used, and the same for "interaction" and "designer". The whole point those of us on the science side have been trying to make is that "designer" means nothing apart from a certain interpretive context, and I have added that it is the likewise with "interaction" and "causality". The problem with metaphysics is that it doesn't even ask about the evolved terms that we use in speech, and by beginning with a creationistic/metaphysical view of language, they fail to ask the questions proper to science. I myself have run into discussions where it became plain that "causality" was an especially slippery and difficult term in certain situations. One guy on a forum not unlike this one said something to the effect that in quantum mechanics there appear to be situations where energy is not conserved, and therefore the universe doesn't need a "cause". The obvious response that I made is that these situations where energy might not be conserved can nevertheless be thought of as "caused" in the conventional meaning of the word. But of course, at the margins we really don't know what "cause" means, a good indication that it isn't more than a human catch-all reductionism of a number of fairly different phenomena. This brings up the question, what does asking for the "cause of the universe" even mean? In Aquinas' time, the "cause of the universe" was not thought about in terms of conservation of energy at all, but today when someone asks for a "cause" of something, they typically want the "scientific cause" of the universe or what-not (at least when they're not attacking science, like Dembski and Berlinski). One reads Aristotle or Plotinus writing of what we interpret to as "cause", but these writers are typically using the word "aitia", which in many ways is not what we mean by "cause" now. It can mean "responsibility", the "formal cause", the "material cause", well you know, the famous Aristotelian "causes". Even the "efficient cause" in Aristotle is thought of in a significantly different manner than we think of scientific causes at the present time. Since "cause" doesn't even hold a fixed meaning through time, not even Kant's "rescue" is adequate to science. We ask "why?", of course, although some in science don't like "why?" and would prefer to ask "how?" Regardless of the dislike of "why" questions, in the conventional sense of "why" we do ask "why the sky is black with lights in it?" But if we say that there must be a "cause", the biggest "why" question can be, "why do you think in terms of cause?" To be fair, though, if we do think in terms of cause, we can ask what the "cause is". This, however, only throws the question over to what even fits our notion of "cause" or "aitia", and the fact of the matter is that to the degree that we are still able to think of "causes" in "classical" science, only the "efficient cause" is considered even to be a cause, and that only in a manner significantly different than how Aristotle meant it. Getting back to ID, though: If we use the term "efficient cause" for our particular construction of "causality", then we can see exactly what is wrong with ID. There is no efficient cause in ID (despite the engineering and design analogies), there is only an "aitia", responsibility ascribed to one called "designer". Science only cares about efficient cause because that is all that it (and to tell the truth, all that we) can investigate. And even that interpretation of physical phenomena becomes useless, or nearly so, in some areas of physics (though ironically, a quantum experiment demonstrating the lack of classical causality will be nevertheless caused by scientists--but they know what they mean when they use the term "cause"). The fact is that even if you're going to stick with "causality" in science, ID again falls flat, as it has no idea of how this "designer" in fact effects design. I'm willing to use the "causality" interpretation thus far, certainly, for it is still another way in which IDists fail to understand science.

Glen Davidson · 5 April 2005

My response is that, either you are incorrect about QM, or QM has a major conceptual difficulty at its foundations.

This is why scientists often aren't fond of philosophers, for some of the latter will tell the scientists that their considerable achievements fail in the philosophy realm. Of course this isn't true of the better philosophy that I studied (Nietzsche appears prescient now that we have QM, and it is likely that he and other Romantics contributed conceptually to such a successful interpretation), but it is too true of much philosophy. I think we're getting to the point where the bankruptcy of metaphysics has been demonstrated to exhaustion, and there is little more to be said of value.

Michael Finley · 5 April 2005

...there is little more to be said of value.

— Glen Davidson
On this, we are in agreement. Our discussion would quickley devolve in the philosophy of language (e.g., what relation meaning and sense have to the structure of the world) and broader metaphysical issues (e.g., whether Kant's relegation of metaphysical concepts to the rational structure of experience is nothing more than an ad hoc disaster). It seems to me that you have a philosophical position (whether you admit to it or not) that disagrees with mine all the way down. And as a professor of mine once joked, the only thing left for us to do is throw oranges. I would point out that you keep dragging ID and creationism in, and from my perspective this last discussion, though the heir of a discussion on ID, is independent of those considertions.

Great White Wonder · 5 April 2005

I think we're getting to the point where the bankruptcy of metaphysics has been demonstrated to exhaustion, and there is little more to be said of value.

I agree. I propose adding the above quote as a permanant banner to the Pandas Thumb, right below that Pennsylvania preachers remarks about being attacked by the "educated segment of society." As for Mr. Finley, I see that he managed to find his way back to the Pandas Thumb. Did you pray for your browser to open at this website, Mr. Finley, or did you need to use your brain and fingers to get here like the rest of us human beings? Why not try eating some dirt today for lunch (instead of chicken-fried steak -- blech!)? As far as you know, Mr. Finley, the dirt might enable you to travel into another dimension and find the elusive scientific evidence which will prove that evolutionary biologists are deluded materialists trying to force secular humanism down the throats of children who should be allowed to "think critically." Wouldn't it be worth it, Mr. Finley? Just open your mind and reach down and grab some of that good old dirt and throw it down the hatch. This could be the day when dirt has all sorts of wonderful magical properties -- what a shame to waste it! All those people who told you that dirt-eating was bad -- they are just mindlessly reciting the dogma that has been handed to them by others, just like those deluded evolutionary biologists. Go head, Mr. Finley, it's time to put your arguments into action. You might want to add some water from the curbside -- it makes an interesting "gravy".

Paul Flocken · 5 April 2005

Michael Finley,
Thankyou.

If I quote anyone from above without properly citing you, forgive me. There are so very many posts and this morning I came across two sentences from Glen Davidson that say quickly what I am about to say very slowly.

OK. About assumptions. ("Science makes a host of metaphysical assumptions. That is not a bad thing. It is just a fact.") Or as you put it elsewhere, principles. ("Take Hume, who I mentioned. Hume points out that basic principles of science (e.g., causality, probability, that there is a regularity from past to future, etc.) cannot be empirically justified.") You are asking for empirical proof of the principles that science is based on. But the tool of empiricism used by humanity is science and you are setting up the very tautology demonstrated by Jack Krebs at top. You are right, science is based on principles that it can't prove using its own method. But that is irrelevant because science doesn't ASSUME them either.*
Some things are observed(When I kick a soccerball, it moves). Some things are defined(1+1=2). What science chooses to use as its basic principles is entirely up to it. It needs no justification outside of its own criteria, the instance under consideration being metaphysics.

To demonstrate lets take a trip back 2,335 years to ancient Greek society and meet Euclid. His book, the Elements, is very well regarded as one of the greatest textbooks ever. But at its root it is based on assumptions, five of them. Uh-oh there's them assumptions again. Now we have metaphysical problems. Except Euclid didn't call them assumptions, he called them axioms. (Well personally I don't speak Ancient Greek so I don't know what he called them, but today we call them axioms.) Yes this is semantics but I think it is useful semantics. The history of these five axioms is very celebrated precisely because they are not assumptions. The fifth axiom was far to cumbersome for mathematicians and for thousands of years they tried to prove it with the other four. Fast forward to 1697 and meet Girolamo Saccheri. He was the first mathematician to NOT assume the "truth" of the fifth axiom, and did the entire structure of his math disintegrate before his eyes? No, and we'll get to why later. Other gentlemen followed. Lambert and Legendre were two. Then three men came along and discovered that changing axioms did not cause the failure of mathematics. Gauss, Bolyai, and Lobachevsky created whole new geometries by dropping one axiom and inserting another. This culminated in Riemann and Einstein and General Relativity. But why did this work? Because they (and through my analogy modern science) only had one criterian, that the system being worked out be internally consistent. There is no "absolute truth"; there is only "internal consistency". If you use one set of axioms you get one geometry, use another and you get a different geometry. This is very bare bones and if you google Euclid's fifth, Gauss, and Bolyai you can get the whole rich, wonderful story.

Science adds a second criterian to the first one used by geometry above: that it's conclusions correspond to reality.
The basic assumptions or principles of science are more properly called axioms and science can pick and choose any that it desires to create its structure. The only rules of the game are that the structure be internally consistent and correspond to reality. And the axioms that it chooses are as much fair game for science as any of its fields of investigation. Whether or not the axioms are justified metaphysically matters absolutely not at all and in fact the opposite is true. How many times in the history of science have people said something like "well it must be true because it logically makes sense" or "well it must be true, here is my reasoning" only to be smacked down by a reality that doesn't recognize the validity of their all too human reasoning. To quote you "A mildly clever turn of phrase is a poor substitute for abstract thought." I will add that abstract thought is a poor substitute for hard work on the lab bench. Science quite rightly is suspicious of metaphysics and regards it as irrelevant. Science has more than once run right over metaphysics when its discoveries advanced far enough. In a manner of speaking metaphysics is like religion in that it is slowly being boxed in by science.

Because science ascribes no absolute truth to its axioms they can change and have. This does not change science but only affects its applicability (just as one geometry is not invalidated by the existence of another). To use an example from science rather than mathematics: Newton's work rested on certain axioms(for instance the absolute nature of time). When at the turn of the 20th century physics encountered seemingly insurmountable problems Einstien came along and changed the axioms. Out popped a whole new science. But that did not make Newton wrong. It only limited his applicability. Science holds no axioms holy and will challenge and change them at will when the necessity is there. (As an aside this is why science is not a religion. The faith in axioms is contingent. Science recognizes its own fallibility. Religion does not.)

The best example available right now is the one you brought up most frequently above and what Glen Davidson has already explained very well. Causality(or more prosaically Interaction) is an axiom of science that in the realm of QM must be questioned. How it will turn out for science only the future can tell. But unfortunately science will probably not be informed by metaphysics in the process(although it is completely guaranteed that alot of phycisists will engage in alot of metaphysical talk DURING the process.

Lastly, you admitted(perhaps that is too strong a word) in Comment #23354 that metaphysics has not proven anything that could be called a basic principle of science. Doesn't that represent a curve ball thrown right at your own assertian. In Comment #23284 you said "Nevertheless, science depends on metaphysics. We don't want to say that "A causes B" is merely "useful" in an instrumentalist sense (some may, but I find such a position grotesque). We want to say that "A causes B" is correct of the world, i.e., is true." If metaphysics can't prove the principles then metaphysics doesn't "support" or "justify" science anyway. I'll repeat. The only justification that science needs is internal consistency and correspondence to reality.
I can sympathize with your discomfort as a philosopher over the lack of rigorousness in the base of science so I say this with absolutely no hostility, but it is tough that you find the position "grotesque"; science doesn't care.

If this makes sense to you (sometimes I wonder if I'm not completely incoherent) then I can answer one of the other two arguments you asserted in this threadline, but I will save it for another post.

Sincerely,

Paul

*I am about to start parsing like crazy and considering what I said yesterday I owe Mr. Finley an apology for conflating him with parsing creationists. I guess that is the nature of the beast(I am man, hear me roarprevaricate).

Great White Wonder · 5 April 2005

I'll repeat. The only justification that science needs is internal consistency and correspondence to reality.

This is what nearly every human beings asks from their fellow humans on a daily basis. All sane adult human beings respect the scientific method and recognize its utility for most of their waking lives. That is why creationists who loudly and regularly smear scientists nevertheless own medicine cabinets and aren't found in parks eating dirt and tin cans for lunch. Sadly, some human beings refuse to acknowledge this wonderful unifying aspect of human existence and engage instead in strange divisive wordplay (e.g., "worldview" rhetoric) rather than admit what is plain as paint. Why? We need only look so far as other universal aspects of human nature to understand their motivations, e.g., fear, pride and lust for power.

Ed Darrell · 5 April 2005

Mr. Finley said:

Hume's arguments prove that causality cannot be gleaned from experience, i.e., cannot be empirically discovered by science. Science, of course, depends on attributions of causality; without them science would be impossible. Therefore, science assumes a priori the principle of causality, and in doing so makes a metaphysical assumption.

Perhaps right. So what? Is there any other way a sane person doing science would act? It is true that we cannot say for absolute certain that germs cause disease -- scientists know the connection well enough, however, that it is considered a crime in some states to argue otherwise in certain circumstances (consider the laws against spitting on sidewalks). Hume makes an interesting argument in the abstract about what is knowable. That is neither an argument against evolution, nor a firm foundation on which to base an argument against evolution. The enire causality argument, as it relates to Hume, is irrelevant to modern science. Unless one wishes to claim that hot air does not rise, germs do not cause disease, gravity does not cause things to fall toward the center of the Earth, or that evolution is not established way beyond the shadow of a doubt, the argument is best left to philosophers. And if one does wish to make such nonsensical arguments? It is still best left to philosophers. For legal purposes, in court, we abandon Hume's doubt. If it's good enough to figure out who is at fault in the auto accident, it's good enough for most purposes.

Ed Darrell · 5 April 2005

This "overly long" thread is exactly what the Discovery Institute fears. There are no overly long threads at their blog. There isn't any science, either.

Michael Finley · 5 April 2005

Hume makes an interesting argument in the abstract about what is knowable. That is neither an argument against evolution, nor a firm foundation on which to base an argument against evolution. The enire causality argument, as it relates to Hume, is irrelevant to modern science. Unless one wishes to claim that hot air does not rise, germs do not cause disease, gravity does not cause things to fall toward the center of the Earth, or that evolution is not established way beyond the shadow of a doubt, the argument is best left to philosophers.

— Darrell
"In the abstract" meant as "irrelevant to the concrete"? Or are "abstract" reasonings relevant to the particulars? These are rhetorial questions, of course. Obviously its not an argument against evolution. And as anyone who carefully read my posts would know, I never even remotely suggested that it did. Just because you or I or anyone else doesn't expect anything and everything to happen on a whim because we read Hume, doesn't mean the argument is irrelevant to modern science. Of course we all still believe in causality and act accordingly. And that should tell us something, viz., we make metaphysical assumptions in everyday life and in science (either tacitly or explicitly). The whole point has been that there are relevant concerns to a rational person that are not handled by science. Metaphysics is not the home of witch-doctors and snake charmers. It is a legitimate discipline that deals with important questions outside the scope of science.

Michael Finley · 5 April 2005

Hume makes an interesting argument in the abstract about what is knowable. That is neither an argument against evolution, nor a firm foundation on which to base an argument against evolution. The enire causality argument, as it relates to Hume, is irrelevant to modern science. Unless one wishes to claim that hot air does not rise, germs do not cause disease, gravity does not cause things to fall toward the center of the Earth, or that evolution is not established way beyond the shadow of a doubt, the argument is best left to philosophers.

— Darrell
"In the abstract" meant as "irrelevant to the concrete"? Or are "abstract" reasonings relevant to the particulars? These are rhetorial questions, of course. Obviously its not an argument against evolution. And as anyone who carefully read my posts would know, I never even remotely suggested that it did. Just because you or I or anyone else doesn't expect anything and everything to happen on a whim because we read Hume, doesn't mean the argument is irrelevant to modern science. Of course we all still believe in causality and act accordingly. And that should tell us something, viz., we make metaphysical assumptions in everyday life and in science (either tacitly or explicitly). The whole point has been that there are relevant concerns to a rational person that are not handled by science. Metaphysics is not the home of witch-doctors and snake charmers. It is a legitimate discipline that deals with important questions outside the scope of science.

Koly · 5 April 2005

I'll jump in very lately, as is my bad habit, but I cannot resist as the discussion has come close to science priciples and physics (again). Michael, I have a bad message for you. Philosophy, Hume, Aristotle and whoever else don't have anything to do with science. Science is what scientists do, not what philosophers think it is. Hume's opinion is completely irrelevant, whether he had some influence on scientist several hundred years ago or not. The scientific method is a practical list of steps how to approach unknown phenomena. Lenny Flank has summarized it very nicely:

1. Observe some aspect of the universe. 2. Invent a tentative description, called a hypothesis, that is consistent with what you have observed. 3. Use the hypothesis to make predictions. 4. Test those predictions by experiments or further observations and modify the hypothesis in the light of your results. 5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 until there are no discrepancies between theory and experiment and/or observation.

I would only add: 4.5) Summarize your knowledge into a theory, where you clearly state the assumptions (postulates) and conlude consequences (predictions). Because of practical reasons, the theory should be general enough, so it can give specific predictions for a variety of situations and falsifiable, so it can be tested and in principle discovered to be wrong. This has very little to do with metaphysics. A list of practical steps. The result is that you can give specific prediction how the phenomenon behaves, which is very valuable for practical reasons, e.g. in engineering, medicine etc. The consequences are everywhere around you. People usually call this, when you can describe, predict and use it practically, understanding. Michael, you seem to have very little knowledge about science in general, but especially about physics. Causality in physics is a completely different thing from what you think. In physics in general, there is no such thing as a "cause".

Now I'm no expert on quantum mechanics, but is that what you're suggesting - That at the quantum level the question "Why did x happen?" is meaningless?

— Michael Finley
Not only in QM, it's meaningless in physics in general. The question answered is "What did/will happen". In QM, you cannot even answer that question completely, or better said, you have to answer it differently, because what you expect as answer classically does not make sense.

My response is that, either you are incorrect about QM, or QM has a major conceptual difficulty at its foundations. To say that an event happens for no reason whatsoever is to say nothing at all.

— Michael Finley
No, you have a problem with your concepts. They are irrelevant as most of philosophical handwaving. What does the second sentence even mean? It's a bald claim and does not make any sense. For example, Quantum electrodynamcis gives predictions which agree with experiments to astonishing precision. So, according to you, to predict the value of magnetic moment of a muon is to say nothing at all? You rely on prediction of physics in your everyday life, because of all the engineering. Knowledge made by physics allows you to post here, is that "nothing"? Where can I see the results of the philosophers you like so much?

Paul Flocken · 5 April 2005

Uber and Ed Darrell,
And this thread became ridiculously overly long without any input from DS, DK, or JAD. ;)

Rupert Goodwins · 5 April 2005

Please supply a physical "support," i.e., justification, for the principle of causality. And after you do, send it off to the most prestigious philosophy journal you can find for immediate publication.

And with this, the novice was enlightened. As has been pointed out (and as you must know), causation does not have a fundamental proof in physics. In fact, the lack of this causes no little discussion and what-iffery among the theoretical physicists: there are published papers (one quoted previously, many others available) which pick away at the threads of this part of the tapestry. Moreover, there are events which occur without causation. Whatever causation is, it is not a sine qua non of physics. However. Taking causation as a massively attested given in much of physics, it is massively useful. We have thrown machines to the very edges of the solar system, to astonishing degrees of precision, and they have worked in ways predicable enough to return new knowledge. (I can conceive no way of doing this under an alternative philosophy, but would be delighted to learn of one). We conduct millions of experiments in the expectation of causality working, and they return information that fits (or does not fit) expectations and helps build (or tear down and rebuild) a consistent framework of knowledge that can be used. You are using a computer composed (if it is reasonably current) of billions of individual parts created, co-mingled and operated according to strict causal principles. In California, they make many times more transistors per year than raindrops fall. If causality as we experience it is not correct, it does a very good job of hiding itself beyond the reach of overwhelming statistics. Furthermore, it operates outside our belief system to the point at which we can make very precise predictions about areas of which we have no direct experience, only to find them confirmed when we get there. Or when the magnetometer on Voyager II started to report activity when the spacecraft passed Uranus, was that some group delusion in operation? It is certainly possible that what we perceive as causation is in fact intervention by an unknown intelligence which could at any time act differently: indeed, I don't know of a way of disproving this. Yet we are certainly justified in assuming causality to reflect truth, to a certain and not insignificant extent, and in rejecting any number (and there are any number existing beyond testability) of alternative theories positing intelligent intervention in the way causality appears to operate. These theories do not appear to reflect truth, even to an insignificant extent. Should evidence to the contrary appear, then it will bear examination. Causality operates in useful ways. I think this is beyond dispute, but you presumably do not - otherwise why bring it up? And if you're prepared to hold as important to science the fact that causation is unproven, then of course you're not going to bother considering evolution as somehow more worthy. You are free to introduce the hand of a designer at any point - and, since you are not enamoured of causation, that hand can move in undetectable ways. You appear to have two core beliefs: one, that a designer operates on the world; and two, that it does so in a manner untouchable by empirical science. Fine. This is not incompatible with evolution, any more than astrology is incompatible with planetary physics, because it does not impact on it in any way. It does leave one question, though. Why are you here? R

Michael Finley · 5 April 2005

I give up. It's like talking to a relentless herd of ADD children:

"Philosophy isn't science." Eureka!

"Hume doesn't disprove Darwin." Strike two.

"Creationism, a/k/a, metaphysics...." You're outa there.

Just call me the straw man. Until the next thread, farewell.

Michael Finley · 5 April 2005

Like a moth to a flame, I cannot resist one more comment. Undoutedly the comment will be misunderstood and taken to mean all sorts of things that it manifestly does not mean, but that seems to be the price of admission.

Concerning QM, causality has been juxtaposed to probability with the latter being offered as some sort of non-causal replacement.

As any reader of Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding knows (which means most readers here don't know), probability is a derivative concept from causality. Any criticism of causality is also a criticism of probability. I won't bother explaining it. As is often said around here to non-scientists, go find the source and read.

Jack Krebs · 5 April 2005

I'm not sure that Hume knew much about quantum mechanics. :-)

Michael Finley · 5 April 2005

Jack Krebs,

I'm guessing the post marathon has come to an end. And I'm quite sure you had no intention of giving birth to such a monster. Nevertheless, I enjoyed the melee. Let's do it again some time.

Sincerely,
MF

Koly · 5 April 2005

Michael, one more time. What Hume thinks about causality or probability is completely and utterly irrelevant. It's only his philosophical speculation, a couple of hundred years old, which is absolutely nonrelated to reality. It's not the Truth. He even could not come with anything valuable on the topic as he didn't have the available data we have today.

It's similar to other speculations of other philosophers. None of them was doing any real scientific work, like comparing their speculations with reality or observations. Herakleitos thought that fire is somehow important, well it isn't. Maybe if he cared to look at the world before speculating, he would know it. And that's a common problem with philosophy and that's why it's not science. It's a speculation without any base in reality, in 99% of cases without any value. The fact that you repeatedly cite philosophers as authorities does not make you look smart in my eyes, completely the opposite is true.

I'll tell you what causality means in physics. We observe that some events are causaly linked. That means that one event can be influenced by another one in the sense, that if it happened differently, the other one would be different two. It was not observed that one event would "cause" another one, there is no such thing as a "cause" of an event. That's only a simplification people use in everyday life.

In direct contrast to what many laymen think, QM does not redefine causality. Causality is determined by the structure of space-time, but I won't go into any more details on that. The probabilistic nature of QM has nothing to do with causality. The evolution of the state is deterministic in QM, what causes the probabilistic character of QM is the definition of the state, which is completely different from classical physics. One gets a probabilistic distribution when tries to get such information from the state which is not there.

nmorin · 5 April 2005

My response is that, either you are incorrect about QM, or QM has a major conceptual difficulty at its foundations.

— Michael Finley
Reminds me of the economist who wouldn't pick up the $20 bill he saw on the sidewalk because if it were really a $20 bill, someone would have already picked it up.

brooksfoe · 6 April 2005

What I can't figure out is why you guys have spent days discussing the intersection between the philosophy of knowledge and physics, but no one has mentioned a single philosopher other than Hume. A lot has happened in the philosophy of knowledge since the 18th century. (See e.g. Dewey, Wittgenstein, Popper.)

Paul Flocken · 6 April 2005

Michael Finley,

Thank you for the chat and I apologize for the swipes I took at you. I'll apologize, too, for three others who seemed overly hostile(I don't care if it is not my place). I wish we could continue this though, and thanks to Les Lane I just found something you may get a great deal out of.

http://www2.uwsuper.edu/rseelke/CRSNOTES/TRUTH.doc

Sincerely,

Paul

Michael Finley · 7 April 2005

Paul,

No need to apologize, though I accept.

Perhaps we could continue some version of this discussion over at antievolution.org's discussion board. On the discussion board there's a page titled "after the bar closes" created (evolved?) just for that purpose. Start a thread and I'll participate best I can.

Sincerely,
MF

Stuart Weinstein · 10 April 2005

Michael Finley writes:
"I endorse the notion that supernatural causes should not, in principle, be rejected as unscientific."

Michael, can you enlighten us as to how one measures the supernatural?

Stuart Weinstein · 10 April 2005

Michael Finley writes:
"Mr. Flank,

How dreadful; you don't seem to recognize a philosophical discussion when you see it."

Philisophical discussion didn't invent the transistor...

Stuart Weinstein · 10 April 2005

Loghorn writes:

"Stuart, what do you mean by "outside of science?"

Can't be interrogated by the scientific method.

sir_toejam · 14 April 2005

I'm curious to see just how many posts this thread will get to.