ID = Postmodern Creationism

A couple of points, Nick:

1. Although Johnson mentions relativism in the quoted passage, he doesn't imply that he agrees that facts are relative, only that he approves of the kind of analysis that relativists apply to factual claims. I'm not familiar with the methods of relativists, but there is nothing wrong in principle with conducting a sociological analysis of scientific claims. (Such an analysis of creationist claims can be very informative.)

I agree that creationists do adopt a relativist position when they insist on "teaching the controversy", but I don't think this passage is a good example, and it's certainly not the slam-dunk that you say it is.

2. The word "commonplace" can be used as a noun, so your "sic" is inapplicable.

This is ruminated over at length here

The word "commonplace" can be used as a noun, so your "sic" is inapplicable.

I don't think this passage is a good example, and it's certainly not the slam-dunk that you say it is.

I'd say it was more likely that the "a" was accidentally inserted before "commonplace" (or not deleted on editing a previous version of the sentence). It's still an awkward sentence whatever you allow though.

I'd say it was more likely that the "a" was accidentally inserted before "commonplace" (or not deleted on editing a previous version of the sentence). It's still an awkward sentence whatever you allow though.

one can say "it's commonplace to ..." or "it's commonplace for ..."

This is ruminated over at length here

— JK

ts: I don't think Nick's claiming that this shows ID is creationism, but that it shows it's postmodern.

(And, since pedantry seems to be the order of the day in this thread: Nick, not Rick; basketball, not tennis.)

ts: I don't think Nick's claiming that this shows ID is creationism, but that it shows it's postmodern

Nick, not Rick

basketball, not tennis

Well, then, big deal.

the "intelligent design" movement actively obfuscates its creationist origins

if you are looking for slam-dunk proof that ID is just creationism in a postmodern, relativist tuxedo

Google of "a commonplace that" gets 18,200 hits

So I'd say it was an Americanism.

I can't think of a single argument made by ID that wasn't made first by the ICR-ites decades ago. Not a one. Everything from "evolution is atheistic" to "what good is half an eye" to "the odds of this happening by chance are too low" to "the Cambrian explosion".

Can anyone think of any ID arguments that aren't just plagiarized versions of old ICR standards?

I'd have to say that some of the intellectuals of the past century warned us of this. They warned that the trendy abandonment of reason by the left would lead to a resurgence of forms of idiocy long thought vanquished, like the return of some Cthonic horror in a Lovecraft story.

They were right.

Some ideas really are better than others. Got that? Now rewind liberal thought to the 1960s and start re-recording the tape there.

They warned that the trendy abandonment of reason by the left

They warned that the trendy abandonment of reason by the left would lead to a resurgence of forms of idiocy long thought vanquished

Now rewind liberal thought to the 1960s and start re-recording the tape there.

Having been a professor of logic for many years I must say that Philip Johnson's quote does not serve as a premise leading to the conclusion that "ID is just creationism in a postmodern, relativist tuxedo." Johnson's quote addresses his concern (and Plantinga's, et. al.) that Neo-Darwinism is inextricably rooted in methodological naturalism.

After further thought, I'd like to retract my criticism above, and agree with Nick that the quoted passage shows Johnson to be a relativist, or at least to be behaving like one. I just think Nick needs to spell out the reasoning behind this conclusion. Here's my reasoning.

Relativists seem to have difficulty making up their minds whether they believe that all knowledge is merely a social construction, or only some. The former position is easily seen to be absurd, since no-one truly believes that gravity is merely a social construcion, or they would be happy to jump off tall buildings (and I've yet to hear of a relativist doing so). On the other hand, to say that some knowledge is merely a social construction is quite uninteresting. We can probably all agree that children's knowledge of Santa Claus is a social construction. And I for one would be happy to agree that creationism is a social construction. In short, anything that other people believe but which we are convinced is untrue must be a social construction. So relativism ends up just being a device for giving a false appearance of philosophical erudition to criticisms of whatever beliefs one doesn't like.

Johnson's sociological critique of "Darwinism" gains nothing of substance from his linking it to relativism. It stands or falls on whether he really can demonstrate that Darwinism is merely a social construction. (Of course, he can't do so, but that's a separate issue.) He includes the appeal to relativism merely to gain some false authority by association with a position he claims is "a commonplace" among philosophers of science. In this he behaves just like a relativist, regardless of whether he actually considers himelf to be one. (If he does not, then he is guilty of hypocrisy as well as rhetorical trickery.)

Relativists seem to have difficulty making up their minds whether they believe that all knowledge is merely a social construction, or only some. The former position is easily seen to be absurd, since no-one truly believes that gravity is merely a social construcion, or they would be happy to jump off tall buildings (and I've yet to hear of a relativist doing so).

I have a book to be published called The Comprehensible Cosmos in which I claim to show that the laws of physics are human inventions. It is now fully on the web and still under revision. It takes a lot of explaining, and is usually misunderstood. It is not postmodernism! But, check it out and join my list avoid-L where it continues to be under intense discussion. http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/nothing.html

... Some of America's most powerful politicians have a deep hatred for Darwinism. Tom DeLay, the House majority leader, blamed the theory of evolution for the Columbine school shootings. But sheer political power hasn't been enough to get creationism into the school curriculum. ... But what if creationists do to evolutionary theory what corporate interests did to global warming: create a widespread impression that the scientific consensus has shaky foundations? ... The important thing to remember is that like supply-side economics or global-warming skepticism, intelligent design doesn't have to attract significant support from actual researchers to be effective. All it has to do is create confusion, to make it seem as if there really is a controversy about the validity of evolutionary theory. That, together with the political muscle of the religious right, may be enough to start a process that ends with banishing Darwin from the classroom.

I remain unconvinced that ID has very much to do with postmodernism. Guys like Johnson will latch on to anything that might help them--everything's a weapon if you're in a fight. Anyhow, I don't get the impression from the quoted interview segment that Johnson had much understanding of what postmodernism is about. For example, the sociology of knowledge is hardly a postmodern invention--it goes back to the 20s and 30s--but Johnson speaks about it as if it were a French novelty. Maybe somebody could make the connection between ID and significant strains in recent social thought--I for one would be very interested in reading such an effort--but I'm a little concerned that tarring the ID folks as postmodernists in drag will just be a rhetorical tack.

By the way, though it was published two years after the interview, there is a serious treatment of Darwin and politics, Desmond and Moore's biography of Darwin (1992). The kind of questions they raise seem eminently reasonable to me. Trying to understand how a scientific theory develops in its social context hardly commits you to radical skepticism. It may be a stretch to connect the content of high-energy physics or axiomatic mathematics with ideological debates, but geology and biology were obviously controversial topics in Darwin's time and Darwin himself, an extremely well connected man, was always keenly aware of the political angles. Darwin not only availed himself of various economic ideas--Malthus!--but as the grandson of a great industrialist (Wedgewood) and the son of a extremely wealthy private financier of canals and railroads, he was related to the industrial revolution and Manchester liberalism by blood.

Having been a professor of logic for many years I must say that Philip Johnson's quote does not serve as a premise leading to the conclusion that "ID is just creationism in a postmodern, relativist tuxedo." Johnson's quote addresses his concern (and Plantinga's, et. al.) that Neo-Darwinism is inextricably rooted in methodological naturalism.

A little Creation ditty for you from the Buzz Skyline singer's

http://mp3.washingtonpost.com/upload/index.shtml

Here are the lyrics

God made the world in only seven days
And did it all six thousand years ago
Some of the things he made seem pretty strange
But I know it's true, 'cause the bible tells me so

He made Dinosaur bones, and buried 'em in the ground
Then made them all seem really, really old
Most just missed the boat when Noah built the ark
St. George killed the rest, so I'm told

He made stars and put them a trillion miles away
How their light got here is hard to say
The speed of light means stars are billions of years old
But I'll take scripture over physics any day

Chorus: God made . . .

Science says mountains took years and years to form
From the crashing of the Earth's tectonic plates
But I've never seen a mountain grow an inch
I'm pretty sure God made them all that way

The oil in the ground is a gift we can't deny
From heaven's pearly gates to my gas tank
Fossil fuel? That's nonsense, there's no fossils in the pump
It's heavenly intervention we should thank

Chorus: God made . . .

The very fact that nearly all (if not entirely all) current scientific theories are grounded in Philosophical Naturalism (PN) supports what I (and Plantinga et. al.) are saying. PN holds that there is nothing outside of nature. Everything in our experience can be accounted for by pure natural forces.
But PN is not itself a scientific truth. Rather, PN defines the parameters of scientific inquiry. As such, PN functions as a definition. But it itself is not a scientific truth.
PN is something like a philosophical position. PN is often also referred to as Metaphysical Naturalism. That is, PN is a metaphysical claim. As a metaphysical claim the truth or non-truth of PN needs to be established philosophically, not scientifically.
Plantinga explains this: The idea that "human beings and other living creatures have come about by chance, rather than by God's design, is... not a proper part of empirical science. How could science show that God has not intentionally designed and created human beings and other creatures? How could it show that they have arisen merely by chance? That's not empirical science. That's metaphysics, or maybe theology. It's a theological add-on, not part of science itself. And, since it is a theological add-on, it shouldn't, of course, be taught in public schools." (http://newsinfo.nd.edu/content.cfm?topicid=12242)
If, therefore, most current scientific theories are grounded in PN this does not imply that ID is to be dismissed as "science." It only means that much contemporary science is grounded in a certain non-scientific metaphysical claim. Some, like Plantinga and Johnson, wish to question the validity of that claim.

The very fact that nearly all (if not entirely all) current scientific theories are grounded in Philosophical Naturalism

Here is a perfect, textbook example of the informal logical fallacy called "begging the question": "Science can say nothing (and indeed says nothing) about anything outside of nature, because the scientific method is necessarily silent about anything beyond the bounds of what can be observed."

This argument goes as follows:

Premise 1: The scientific method is necessarily silent about anything beyond the bounds of what can be observed.

Conclusion: Therefore science can say nothing about anything outside of nature.

But of course. This argument begs the question (obvious circularity). Therefore, as an argument, it is to be dismissed.

ts: Sorry, I'd failed to notice the "Game, set, match". Apologies for the unjustified snark.

Pippo quotes Plantinga asking how natural science could show that human beings and other creatures have arisen by chance?

Here's one way: human engineers sometimes rationally design systems such as electronic circuits but sometimes they arrive at them through various versions of a genetic algorithm. The results of these constrasting methods have different characteristics, for example, as Andreas Wanger points out in his new book Robustness and Evolvability in Living Systems, "In rationally designed circuits, it is usually easy to decompose the circuit into parts that carry out specific functiions. In contrast, evolved circutis often do not show such a decomposition." Now it seems that natural systems such as energy metabolism and development are indeed more like man-made systems created by the genetic algorithm than like man-made systems created by rational design. They are, in fact, Rube Goldbergesque. Therefore, it is likely that the natural systems were not designed at all.

While this argument is not necessarily decisive, it does appear to be cogent, however, and that's enough to refute Plantinga's assumption that one cannot find empirical evidence against design.

John Pilippo -

These tired arguments have been made before. There is so much wrong with them, it's hard to start.

"The very fact that nearly all (if not entirely all) current scientific theories are grounded in Philosophical Naturalism (PN) supports what I (and Plantinga et. al.) are saying. PN holds that there is nothing outside of nature. Everything in our experience can be accounted for by pure natural forces."

First of all, what is "nature"? Please define "nature". Your claim is utterly meaningless, without such a definition.

Anyway, it's routinely stated that science uses methodological materialism, NOT philosophical naturalism or materialism. -

http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/evolphil/naturalism.html

Plenty of religious leaders have no problem with science as it is now -

http://www.mindandlife.org/hhdl.science_section.html

http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/articles/5025_statements_from_religious_orga_12_19_2002.asp

"It only means that much contemporary science is grounded in a certain non-scientific metaphysical claim. Some, like Plantinga and Johnson, wish to question the validity of that claim."

This is semantic nonsense. Here's the way it works. When I and other people who are interested in science, study science, or do scientific work, we all agree, more or less, to restrict ourselves to looking for potentially testable natural explanations of potentially universally observable phenomenae. That's what "science" means. THE WORD "SCIENCE" IS ALREADY TAKEN. If somebody wants to do something else and call THAT "science", that's tough. It's like discovering a new animal and wanting to call it a giraffe* (*assuming it's not a new species of giraffe, of course). The word "giraffe" already has a meaning. The word "science" already has a meaning. You, Plantinga, and Johnson will have to live with that.

I confess to ignorance of the works of Plantinga, and therefore, it is possible that you are misrepresenting his views.

This argument begs the question (obvious circularity). Therefore, as an argument, it is to be dismissed.

Johnson seems to be acting as a "good lawyer" does when he knows his client has a weak case. He attaches part of his argument to whatever will help. Part comes from more traditional critiques of evolution, but he adds his own adaptation of relativistic ideas to improve his case.

As to the sociological influences and consequences of evolution - I'm sure that Darwin realized this with his encounters with Capt. FitzRoy.

Piipo -

"Premise 1: The scientific method is necessarily silent about anything beyond the bounds of what can be observed.

Conclusion: Therefore science can say nothing about anything outside of nature.

But of course. This argument begs the question (obvious circularity). Therefore, as an argument, it is to be dismissed."

There is nothing the least bit circular about the argument. If you think there is, you must be a very, very poor logician indeed.

It is the exact equivalent of saying "I am counting only white marbles,and ignoring black marbles. Therefore, I can only comment accurately on the number of white marbles, not on the number of black marbles".

harold:

I see a somewhat different logic going on here:

1) My argument requires that science be the way I need it to be.

2) Therefore science IS what I've decided it is. I SAID so (which is how religious doctrine becones "true" - by straight assertion. Isn't this how ALL statements become true? Of course it is. Therefore I can do this.)

3) Science as redefined now oversteps its boundaries just as I wanted it to.

4) Therefore science is no more valid than MY faith. Therefore my faith is correct!

Usually, this form of argument is called "self-justifying rationalization".

Flint -

Yes, I think that's more or less the overall logic going on here.

The claim that it's "circular" to deal with only what you're dealing with was just part of that.

The overall idea is "I get to redefine science to mean whatever I want, so that I can use 'science' (redefined) to justify my own ideas".

Hi Harold - I have taught logic for many years in college. While I may not be the best logician, I can tell you that the following argument begs the question:

"Premise 1: The scientific method is necessarily silent about anything beyond the bounds of what can be observed.

Conclusion: Therefore science can say nothing about anything outside of nature.

It strikes me as a textbook example. Please submit just this argument as here presented to any prof. of logic and ask him what he or she thinks.

It strikes me as a textbook example. Please submit just this argument as here presented to any prof. of logic and ask him what he or she thinks.

I have taught logic for many years in college.

Hi Flint:

Your words were, "Science can say nothing (and indeed says nothing) about anything outside of nature, because the scientific method is necessarily silent about anything beyond the bounds of what can be observed."

These words form, in logic, an argument. This is because the word "because" is a "premise indicator." The word "because" gives a reason as to "why" something is or is not the case. (See Hurley, Intro to Logic, ch. 1)

So, I think you have an argument.

It's logically fallacious because it begs the question. Arguments that beg the question can function as statements of belief; like credos. So it seems clear that you believe that science can say nothing outside of nature? Why? What reasons could you give to support this belief?

I personally find Jim Harrison's rejoinder to me the most helpful. What Harrison is doing, in my mind, is correct. That is, he is presenting an argument that intends to empirically support the belief that science can say nothing outside of nature. I don't agree with it, but I think this is the sort of thing one must do. A lot of the dialogue between ID-ers and Neo-Darwinists find their place in the sort of thing Harrison writes. And so his type of comments must be considered.

Here is one more thing that I think. Circular, question-begging arguments betray, to my mind, dogmatic certitude. They function, I think, as analytic a prior arguments to which one could never appeal via empirical reasoning. I think they betray a pre-thematic commitment to philosophical naturalism that is itself quite independent of scientific thinking.

But hey, I think it is not only fun but helpful to dialogue. Some of the comments have me thinking.

The very fact that nearly all (if not entirely all) current scientific theories are grounded in Philosophical Naturalism (PN) supports what I (and Plantinga et. al.) are saying. PN holds that there is nothing outside of nature. Everything in our experience can be accounted for by pure natural forces.

Here is one more thing that I think. Circular, question-begging arguments betray, to my mind, dogmatic certitude. They function, I think, as analytic a prior arguments to which one could never appeal via empirical reasoning. I think they betray a pre-thematic commitment to philosophical naturalism that is itself quite independent of scientific thinking.

John Pilppo informs me that I intended to present an argument "to empirically support the belief that science can say nothing outside of nature." It's news to me that that's what I intended. Well, live and learn.

I do have a problem with the phrase "outside of nature," not simply because I don't know what that form of words could mean in the context of natural science, but because I don't know what it means in any other context. In the Medieval world picture one can imagine the outside of nature as the region lying on the other side of the sphere of the fixed stars, but not even the heirs of Aquinas are buying that image any more. So what the heck does outside of nature mean? Note I'm not complaining that the notion of "outside of nature" is theological. I'm complaining that whatever it is, it sure isn't getting explained, theologically or otherwise, at least to me. Maybe this outside of nature business is so hard to deal with because the very concept is like the man who wasn't there. "He wasn't there again today. O how I wish he'd go away!"

By the way, it isn't it a bit facile to assume that dissatisfaction with religious thinking necessarily believe that the only kind of thinking with any validity is scientific? One can perfectly well deny the pertinence of the phrase "outside of nature" without thinking that nothing is worth talking about except objects of scientific knowledge. Absent a complete inventory of the contents of Being, who knows what there is to talk about?

Plantinga explains this: The idea that "human beings and other living creatures have come about by chance, rather than by God's design, is... not a proper part of empirical science.

This argument goes as follows: Premise 1: The scientific method is necessarily silent about anything beyond the bounds of what can be observed. Conclusion: Therefore science can say nothing about anything outside of nature. But of course. This argument begs the question (obvious circularity). Therefore, as an argument, it is to be dismissed.

Sigh. Piipo latches onto a misrepresentation of what was said, and steadfastly refuses to even notice EVERY refutation of his actions. Creationists seem to be very consistently guilty of selective hearing: Piipo hears what was not said, and hears nothing else. Which I suppose makes sense, when his original premise was flat wrong, and actually listening to people would require that he defend it.

Then he says he likes "dialogue". Well, blow me down. And I see that after repeated direct challenges, he has lost interest in his "dialogue". Next!

The very fact that nearly all (if not entirely all) current scientific theories are grounded in Philosophical Naturalism (PN) supports what I (and Plantinga et. al.) are saying. PN holds that there is nothing outside of nature.

— Piipo

It is the exact equivalent of saying "I am counting only white marbles,and ignoring black marbles. Therefore, I can only comment accurately on the number of white marbles, not on the number of black marbles".

— Harold

While I may not be the best logician, I can tell you that the following argument begs the question:

— Piipo

The very fact that nearly all (if not entirely all) current scientific theories are grounded in Philosophical Naturalism (PN) supports what I (and Plantinga et. al.) are saying. PN holds that there is nothing outside of nature. Everything in our experience can be accounted for by pure natural forces. This was your question-begging premise used in your first post.

It's true for methodological naturalism

— I

My view on this subject is that "outside of nature" is semantically equivalent to "isn't real". If not, then I simply don't understand what is meant by it.

Let me go back to the beginning. I commented that the original argument by Nick Matzke is non-logical. He concludes that ID is just creationism by using his Philip Johnson quote. Then he thinks this is so obvious that he says "Game. Set. Match."
I think his conclusion in no way follows from the Johnson quote. Does anyone in this discussion really wish to defend that it does?
Then I said what I think Johnson means by this quote; viz., that Neo-Darwinism is grounded in methodological naturalism (also referred to in the literature as philosophical naturalism). For an example of what this means, see Plantinga: http://www.arn.org/docs/odesign/od181/methnat181.htm
Here's Plantinga's Abstract of this article:
"The philosophical doctrine of methodological naturalism holds that, for any study of the world to qualify as "scientific," it cannot refer to God's creative activity (or any sort of divine activity). The methods of science, it is claimed, "give us no purchase" on theological propositions--even if the latter are true--and theology therefore cannot influence scientific explanation or theory justification. Thus, science is said to be religiously neutral, if only because science and religion are, by their very natures, epistemically distinct. However, the actual practice and content of science challenge this claim. In many areas, science is anything but religiously neutral; moreover, the standard arguments for methodological naturalism suffer from various grave shortcomings."
Now please note: I am going back to my original objection, which is that the Johnson quote in no way supports Matzke's conclusion.
What does Johnson mean when he writes, "What is presented as objective knowledge is frequently an ideology that serves the interests of some powerful group. The curious thing is that the sociology-of-knowledge approach has not yet been applied to Darwinism. That is basically what I do in my manuscript." My understanding is that he is arguing a similiar thing to that of Plantinga. So I am simply now trying to explicate Johnson, because I don't see that Matzke understands the quote.

When the reasoning about all these things is like Matzke's then it makes one want to respond and say "that doesn't follow." It's only a very small point, but I made it. It doesn't do anything to either defend ID or refute Darwinism. It' only to say that such reasoning doesn't work to help anything in the debate.
Game. But neither set nor match.
Flank misses the point when he takes my Plantinga quote ("The idea that "human beings and other living creatures have come about by chance, rather than by God's design, is... not a proper part of empirical science") and infers "I see, so ID is just an attempt to get God back into science, and IDers are simply lying to us when they claim otherwise. Got it." No, that is precisely not the point of the Plantinga quote. The quote itself does not logically imply theism. It rather claims that the belief that "human beings... empirical science" is a belief that cannot by justified by empirical science.
When Flint states "the scientific method is capable of addressing ONLY observations of the physical world" people like myself (and Plantinga, Johnson, et.al) ask -- what establishes that as true? Surely not "the scientific method."
Flank's concern that ID be testable is valid. And, it cuts both ways. There are a growing number of actual scientists at real universities who believe the Darwinian mechanism of natural selection just doesn't do the job (as regards macroevolution, not microevolution). In scientific revolutions, as Kuhn has told us, size doesn't matter. See iscid.org for a small but growing list of scientists who are very concerned with testability as regards ID, and honestly wonder about testability as regards natural selection.

Flank's concern that ID be testable is valid. And, it cuts both ways. There are a growing number of actual scientists at real universities who believe the Darwinian mechanism of natural selection just doesn't do the job

It should not be news to Harrison that he intended to present an argument "to empirically support the belief that science can say nothing outside of nature." He himself calls what he is doing an "argument". He states that he wants to show "how natural science could show that human beings and other creatures have arisen by chance?" Then he writes, "Here's how." Then, he gives empirical reasons. I suppose his only objection could be that he really didn't "intend" to do this, and that is why it is "news" to him. To which I have nothing to say.

methodological naturalism (also referred to in the literature as philosophical naturalism)

— Piippo

http://www.talkdesign.org/faqs/naturalism.html Naturalism is the philosophy that states that explanations for all phenomena must be in terms of natural causes. Some usages of "materialism" are similar, and the two terms are sometimes used interchangeably. The main point that naturalism's critics object to is exclusion of the supernatural. Some people distinguish between philosophical naturalism, which states that natural causes are all there are, and methodological naturalism, which says merely that natural causes are all that is available for science to work with.

Flank misses the point when he takes my Plantinga quote ("The idea that "human beings and other living creatures have come about by chance, rather than by God's design, is... not a proper part of empirical science") and infers "I see, so ID is just an attempt to get God back into science, and IDers are simply lying to us when they claim otherwise. Got it." No, that is precisely not the point of the Plantinga quote. The quote itself does not logically imply theism

Flank's concern that ID be testable is valid.

And, it cuts both ways. There are a growing number of actual scientists at real universities who believe the Darwinian mechanism of natural selection just doesn't do the job (as regards macroevolution, not microevolution).

When Flint states "the scientific method is capable of addressing ONLY observations of the physical world" people like myself (and Plantinga, Johnson, et.al) ask �" what establishes that as true? Surely not "the scientific method."

Lenny, could you please stop saying "Shit or get off the toilet."? It's very unpleasant.

See iscid.org for a small but growing list of scientists who are very concerned with testability as regards ID, and honestly wonder about testability as regards natural selection.

When Flint states "the scientific method is capable of addressing ONLY observations of the physical world" people like myself (and Plantinga, Johnson, et.al) ask �" what establishes that as true? Surely not "the scientific method."

Darwinism

Similarly, social conventions have real power and real utility simply because they ARE conventions. Science lies outside the process of defining or modifying these conventions. Is coveting thy neighbor's wife's ass a Bad Thing? Construct an experiment to show this. Be sure not to exclude any of the interested parties in this experiment.

But you have misrepresented what I wrote. My point was that the scientific method is capable of addressing ONLY observations of the physical world. This is a limitation of the method. Because this is the limitation, the scientific method is necessarily silent about any matters beyond its competence. This is not circular, this is how science works.

See iscid.org for a small but growing list of scientists who are very concerned with testability as regards ID, and honestly wonder about testability as regards natural selection.

When Flint states "the scientific method is capable of addressing ONLY observations of the physical world" people like myself (and Plantinga, Johnson, et.al) ask �#8220; what establishes that as true? Surely not "the scientific method."

— John Piippo

Comment #41558 Posted by John Piippo on August 5, 2005 07:25 PM (e) (s) Let me go back to the beginning. I commented that the original argument by Nick Matzke is non-logical.

I for one don't know what scientists will or will not be able to discover by the application of empirical methods. Unlike the religious, who can claim to possess an answer book, I don't claim to know everything or even very much in advance. I don't know whether science can or cannot say anything about the mysterious beyond if there is such a realm. In particular, I don't know any arguments "to empirically support the belief that science can say nothing outside of nature." The argument I did make was intended to show that there is empirical evidence that living things were not designed if "design" in this context refers to something like what engineers call rational design. That's not a theological argument. It cuts against the completely natural theory that aliens from outer space invented living things, for example. And it has nothing but nothing to say about God. I don't belong to the right tribe to give any credit to that concept. (I gather not even Plantinga thinks that his version of the ontological argument is cogent without faith, which I certainly lack.)

Plantinga's religious jabberings are not well respected in philosophy, according to a philosopher blogger girl I talked to once. I'm not saying who that was, because it was a private conversation. His prestige comes from some other thing in analytic philosophy, but I can't remember what it was. The guy's a Calvinist, for pete's sake.

Basically, the problem is Foundationalism, which says that there are a small number of things you can take as true without justification. "I exist" might be one such thing. Here's a good page on it
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/ .
Plantinga argues, over the course of I think three entire volumes, that "God exists" is such a truth. It's a big pile of crap. I think most scientists would prefer the competing school of thought, Coherentism.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/
Plantinga reminds me of Michael Shermer's comment that really smart people will still believe crazy, stupid things, it's just that they're a lot better at coming up with complicated justifications.

Lenny, could you please stop saying "Shit or get off the toilet."? It's very unpleasant.

I know you are. It's very frustrating to deal with such people. Keep asking them the same basic questions. The fact that they can't answer says everything about the intellectual poverty of their movement.

And that whole "I have answered your questions to the satisfaction of the secret email majority" had me laughing til I turned purple, btw. I think if the wackos could see themselves as others see them, they'd die of embarrassment.

His prestige comes from some other thing in analytic philosophy

Someone said:
I can't think of a single argument made by ID that wasn't made first by the ICR-ites decades ago. Not a one. Everything from "evolution is atheistic" to "what good is half an eye" to "the odds of this happening by chance are too low" to "the Cambrian explosion".

Can anyone think of any ID arguments that aren't just plagiarized versions of old ICR standards?

I reply:
I object to your listing of "the odds of this happening by chance are too low" as a bad argument. I think it is part of a line of reflexive and poor reasoning that stretches back to Dawkins, and which if used in any other field of science would be recognized as ridiculous, the argument from incredulity is not in fact a fallacy but perfectly legitmate.

All refutations of scientific theories are based on assignment of low probabilities to theory statements ( it is impossible to disprove completely a scientific theory, auxiliary hypotheses may always be brought in to preserve it, or it could be claimed the sample or experiment is flawed.) This means that "The odds are just too low of organism X evolving thus" is a perfectly good argument, it is of the same structure of all refutations.

As scientists you have two valid methods of response to such would be refutations you may reason;
1- Yes you have got us there, we cannot see how that could evolve, but there is so much evidence for evolution here, here and here that this truth may be accepted as an anomaly
2- That object could have evolved like so.
My point is, after all those bombastic reasonings you cannot simply say "oh, that's an argument from incredulity." or "Oh, the people at the ICR say that all the time." All arguments against theories are in a sense arguments from incredulity, in that they are based on a personal inability to fit a fact into a paradigm. If you block such arguments you make the falsification of evolution impossible, and you know what that means.

All refutations of scientific theories are based on assignment of low probabilities to theory statements ( it is impossible to disprove completely a scientific theory, auxiliary hypotheses may always be brought in to preserve it, or it could be claimed the sample or experiment is flawed.) This means that "The odds are just too low of organism X evolving thus" is a perfectly good argument, it is of the same structure of all refutations.

I agree whole heartedly with you Zarquon, unless creationists and IDists can demonstrate low probabilities, they haven't a prayer ( if you'll forgive the pun.) But sometimes it's seems they make genuine attempts to do this and they are just palmed of with "that's an argument from incredulity by people on this website. I am not saying that's the only answer they get but I believe both sides of the arguement should be far more careful when they use terms like "gaps" and "arguement from ignorance". I am not saying the mere recital of "how could this evolve?" is enough, but rather that such questions deserve answers, or at least sincere explanations of why answers are not avaliable at the moment, but probably will be in the future.

Someone said earlier that scientists would prefer coherentist models of justification, I disagree. The problems are simply to great and involve circularity. While we are on the topic of epistemology, If anyone's intrested I have devolped my own theory, basically we are entitled to believe a statement if it is of a charcter nessceary to learn lanuage or it follows logically from such axioms, plus any emprical data which we can muster. I argue that epistemologies are axiomatic systems which are designed to preserve our intutions about knowledge and should not be based on some desprate attempt to "Prove" all our beliefs "Proved". The only criteria we need in accepting a epistemological system is that it alows us to preserve the bulk of our intutions about knowledge ( i.e that A=A that things that are true by definition are true etc.) If we went for a criteria of "Truth" we would run into the following problem, any evidence for a system would have to be phrased in terms of that very system! Ergo, any truth arguements for epistemological systems are circular.

I object to your listing of "the odds of this happening by chance are too low" as a bad argument.

if used in any other field of science would be recognized as ridiculous, the argument from incredulity is not in fact a fallacy but perfectly legitmate

All refutations of scientific theories are based on assignment of low probabilities to theory statements

This means that "The odds are just too low of organism X evolving thus" is a perfectly good argument

you cannot simply say "oh, that's an argument from incredulity."

[backpedaling furiously] But sometimes it's seems they make genuine attempts to do this and they are just palmed of with "that's an argument from incredulity by people on this website.

— Paulo Cavalcanti

Someone said: I can't think of a single argument made by ID that wasn't made first by the ICR-ites decades ago. Not a one. Everything from "evolution is atheistic" to "what good is half an eye" to "the odds of this happening by chance are too low" to "the Cambrian explosion". Can anyone think of any ID arguments that aren't just plagiarized versions of old ICR standards? I reply: I object to your listing of "the odds of this happening by chance are too low" as a bad argument.

coveting thy neighbor's wife's ass

All refutations of scientific theories are based on assignment of low probabilities to theory statements ( it is impossible to disprove completely a scientific theory, auxiliary hypotheses may always be brought in to preserve it, or it could be claimed the sample or experiment is flawed.) This means that "The odds are just too low of organism X evolving thus" is a perfectly good argument, it is of the same structure of all refutations.

Over the years, I've seen hundreds of creationists and IDers give me "impossibly low" odds for everything from abiogenesis to the evolution of an eye. For some strange reason, though, NONE of these "odds" are ever the same. Which indicates to me that either (1) creationists/IDers can't do sixth grade math, or (2) they are all pulling these numbers right out of their butts. Which is it?

Over the years, I've seen hundreds of creationists and IDers give me "impossibly low" odds for everything from abiogenesis to the evolution of an eye. For some strange reason, though, NONE of these "odds" are ever the same. Which indicates to me that either (1) creationists/IDers can't do sixth grade math, or (2) they are all pulling these numbers right out of their butts. Which is it?

This means that "The odds are just too low of organism X evolving thus" is a perfectly good argument

"What I observe is true because I observe it" is a logical fallacy in that it is only self-serving and, in truth, begs the question. Fundamentally, science progresses by tests repeating leading to a concensus on the nature of something. But so long as people interpret the same thing different, say the "bunny in the clouds" of observations, there will not be a "truth" that is at the least codifiable. Math, for example, works only so well as we accept the criteria in which it operates. Under quantum math, for example, 2 + 2 can equal 87, given the unquantified variables possible in the universe that we simply have no math or name for. This also works by accepting symbology and what each character in the field I am typing actually represents. Truth is inferred, not implicit, by agreeing that it exists. Empricism, by means of actualizing an observation, makes assumptions that we agree with, under which we operate, and through which we interpret further observations.

"What I observe is true because I observe it" is a logical fallacy in that it is only self-serving and, in truth, begs the question. Fundamentally, science progresses by tests repeating leading to a concensus on the nature of something. But so long as people interpret the same thing different, say the "bunny in the clouds" of observations, there will not be a "truth" that is at the least codifiable. Math, for example, works only so well as we accept the criteria in which it operates. Under quantum math, for example, 2 + 2 can equal 87, given the unquantified variables possible in the universe that we simply have no math or name for. This also works by accepting symbology and what each character in the field I am typing actually represents. Truth is inferred, not implicit, by agreeing that it exists. Empricism, by means of actualizing an observation, makes assumptions that we agree with, under which we operate, and through which we interpret further observations.

This is from an article in the WaPo a while back about Phillip Johnson. I had been thinking about the weird connection between ID arguments against ... science, basically, and some of the crazier out there leftist poststructural type philosophers. And then I read this and I was like, well there it is!

He was nudged along by his interest in "critical legal studies," a left-wing movement that holds that the law is prejudice masquerading as objective truth. Asked to contribute a conservative critique for the Stanford Law Review, Johnson embraced the movement -- sort of.

"I disliked intensely their infantile politics," he says. "But their critique of liberal rationalism and the sham neutrality of rationalism helped me become a Christian. I became the entire right wing of critical legal studies."

The relativism thing is CENTRAL to the agenda of the religious right. They actually stand behind cultural relativism and anti rationality as a position from which to make arguments against the possibility and value of a secular multicultural commons. This would be in order to demolish any claims to universal demonstrable humanist truth. Then in its place they would raise up the one revealed truth, which they control, their own particular sectarian interpretation of Christianity. I kind of see this as the real utility of ID to the christian right agenda. Discrediting the idea of demonstrable truth would be the sought after effect of introducing ID into public education.

From here it should be clear how destructive and aggressive this agenda is. They want to destroy the cultural commons that makes possible peaceful coexistence of different religions and traditions. The separation between church and state is meant to protect the churches. But all the churches and this is not okay. They want DOMINION.

(1) what is the scientific theory of ID, and how do we test it using the scientific method? (2) What complaint, specifically, do you have with the scientific method, and how would you alter the scientific method, specifically, to accomodate your complaint (whatever it is).

(1) what is the scientific theory of ID, and how do we test it using the scientific method? (2) What complaint, specifically, do you have with the scientific method, and how would you alter the scientific method, specifically, to accomodate your complaint (whatever it is).

I'm still waiting ... ... ... What seems to be the problem with your answering my simple questions?