A little more than a week ago, Mike Syvanen posted an article on Panda’s Thumb that discussed a real controversy within the field of evolutionary biology: the role of horizontal gene transfer in early evolution. Today, Paul Nelson misinterpreted that article in a post over on ID: The Future. The specifics of this incident have been covered in more detail both by at Evolving Thoughts, and at Evolutionblog. I’m going to look at this incident from a slightly different perspective: how it illustrates some of the communications issues that scientists are forced to face when dealing with creationists.
Communications and Science
↗ The current version of this post is on the live site: https://pandasthumb.org/archives/2005/09/communications.html
98 Comments
'Rev Dr' Lenny Flank · 8 September 2005
Stuart Weinstein · 8 September 2005
Well, we should've taken up a pool as to how long it would take for creationists to abuse Syvanen's comments.
Lets remember that for next time. May be we can sell raffles or something..
'Rev Dr' Lenny Flank · 8 September 2005
Paul Nelson · 8 September 2005
steve · 8 September 2005
Mike Dunford · 8 September 2005
'Rev Dr' Lenny Flank · 8 September 2005
RBH · 8 September 2005
'Rev Dr' Lenny Flank · 8 September 2005
Well, Nelson emailed me privately and generously offered to buy me a beer if I met him at his upcoming sermon in Miami.
Alas, I'd prefer that he just answer my damn questions, right here in front of the whole world.
'Rev Dr' Lenny Flank · 8 September 2005
'Rev Dr' Lenny Flank · 8 September 2005
I'm still a bit ambivilent about the whole no-LUCA thingie. Sure, there may indeed be different ancestors for different genes. But still, it appears that there was only one line that begged, borrowed or stole all those genes from the other lines, and then itself went on (utilizing them) to produce all of life as it exists today. So while there might not be a genetic LUCA, it certainly still looks like there was a geneological LUCA, even if it appeared AFTER the various genes first appeared separately.
How any of this helps the ID/creationists in any way, shape or form, though, baffles me. I guess the ID/creationists just operate on the Wickramasinghe strategy --- anyone who disagrees with mainstream science must, by definition, agree with them ---- even if, like Wickramasinghe, they think ID/creationists are nuts. (shrug)
qetzal · 8 September 2005
Ginger Yellow · 9 September 2005
"But climatologists and atmospheric scientists weigh the effects of intelligent agency all the time. Consider global warming and its possible causes. To be sure, humans aren't "supernatural," at least in the sense that I think you mean, but disentangling atmospheric effects due to intelligent agency (e.g., gas emissions from industrial activity) from so-called "natural" causes is an important area of ongoing research. If agency is suggested by evidence, science takes up the question. "
Hahahahahahaha. I don't think I was around when that was originally, posted, but that's got to be the worst analogy-as-justification-for-ID I've ever seen, and I've seen some pretty terrible ones. If IDiots tried to apply the same techniques as climatologists in the context of their supernaturalistic pseudo-theory, they'd have to come to the conclusion that God has been dead since at least abiogenesis. I doubt they want that.
bcpmoon · 9 September 2005
Ed Darrell · 9 September 2005
"LUCA?" One of the things that tends to mark those whose reason has been sapped from them is the use of jargon that confuses the hell out of anyone unfamiliar with the stuff, and often confuses the issues as well.
Alas for Dr. Nelson, if the idea of one common ancestor dies, intelligent design is in even worse shape. There are at least two, wholly natural explanations that would merit exploration before resorting to a search for the Wilber Force (the technical name for the "intelligent designer"). One possibility is that all the one-celled critters, separate species that they were, arose from one common ancestor and mutated. A second possibility is that when conditions were ripe for life to spring up, life sprang up in several forms technically unrelated by ancestry, though similar in form and chemistry. In either case, then there was lateral gene transfer, and then branches sprouted in the ancestral bushes.
Intelligent design has more science to deny if "LUCA" is not exactly accurate, not less.
The last universal common ancestor idea provides a clear explanation for why we have DNA and why it pervades all life with just four little proteins to code. In short, it's a solid explanation, and nothing in intelligent design offers any serious challenge. No matter how the controversy works out that Syvanen noted, it's just one more series of body blows to the rapidly deflating notion of a hypothesis of intelligent design.
Reporters, even those unfamiliar with biology, can report on it and get it right. The sin is still the inaccurate spin put on the reporting by creationists, including IDists.
ts (not Tim) · 9 September 2005
ts (not Tim) · 9 September 2005
'Rev Dr' Lenny Flank · 9 September 2005
One Brow · 9 September 2005
Unsympathetic Reader · 9 September 2005
"My name is LUCA. I live on the second floor..."
Michael Behe, Michael Denton and possibly even, Michael Bolton seem to have no trouble accommodating a LUCA in their ID "theories" for the evolution of life. ID theory "overlaps" with so much that there is no positive theory there in the first place.
SEF · 9 September 2005
Paley's Ghost · 9 September 2005
Evilutionists (especially at The Panda's Bum) have a communication problem because informed thinkers like Nelson expose their amoral ontology for the sham that it is. Not even Darwinists themselves can consistently believe such a mountain of lies as evolutionism, so they inevitably commit gaffes in their papers--and small islands of truth emerge from the river of excrement in their tree-hugging literature. When independent critical thinkers like Nelson or myself demonstrate this, they go into a towering rage and accuse their critics of "misrepresentation" or "quote-mining." The analysis offered in the quoted paper is a similar, but much more simplistic version of Dembski's design inference. It chops down the evolutionist tree structure at the root. If even "orthologous" genes not subject to duplication/horizontal transfer don't lead to one "true" tree, then whence chimeric genes? A nice example of circular reasoning guys: if the genes give different trees, it must be due to gene swapping. How do we ascertain gene transfer? The genes give discordant trees!
I am doing more research on this myself. I will use Monfort's algorithm (as a special case of Dembski's CSI) to disprove evolutionism at the protein domain/chemical level. Molecules are no different than the probelm of a bunch of party-goers throwing their hats in the ring and then drawing at random to see if they will pick the correct one. For evolutionism to work, all of the molecules must be matched with all of the other molecules thay are supposed to be attatched to to make the vital force of life function. However, I will go one step more with the evolutionist
Paul Nelson · 9 September 2005
Paul Nelson · 9 September 2005
PvM · 9 September 2005
[quote author="Paul Nelson"]Skepticism about LUCA is one area, among many, where ID and heterodox evolutionary theory overlap.[/quote]
But 'heterodox evolutionary theory' actually provides hypotheses, theories and is not based on 'see we have found something evolutionary theory did not yet explain' must have been intelligent design...
You yourself observed that intelligent design is lacking scientifically. I would argue that intelligent design by its own nature has chosen to remain scientifically vacuous.
If all ID is can be described as 'skepticism' then ID has nothing new to offer.
One Brow · 9 September 2005
Jim Wynne · 9 September 2005
Mythos · 9 September 2005
steve · 9 September 2005
Mythos · 9 September 2005
How about the Great Sphinx?
Who: Who knows?
What: The Great Sphinx.
When: No telling.
Where: Giza.
Why: Your guess is as good as mine.
How: I don't know.
Paul Nelson · 9 September 2005
Jim,
Try answering the questions yourself, and you'll see their relevance to what Lenny was asking.
Btw, I do like Peewee Herman movies. He knew how to escape a beating in a biker's bar.
Jim Wynne · 9 September 2005
Andrea Bottaro · 9 September 2005
Paul Nelson · 9 September 2005
One Brow,
Touch your right index finger to the tip of your nose.
Now, starting with any neuron in your brain, explain how you just did that. Provide the "method of interaction" (i.e., the physical pathway from specific neuron to the observed effect).
Jim Wynne · 9 September 2005
Randy · 9 September 2005
Paul,
A) Methodological Naturalism (or even Ontological Naturalism) does not equal reductionism.
b) Without starting with single neuron in the brain, explain the observed effect. Provide the "method of interaction" (including any non-physical pathway if you wish) from desire to touch nose to touching ones nose.
C) I believe one can offer such a detailed explanation in C. elegans.
steve · 9 September 2005
Mythos · 9 September 2005
Well, recent research based on geology (as opposed to Egyptology) has concluded that the Sphinx was built around 10,000 B.C. which calls into question your answers to 'who' and 'when'. And 'carved' is too generic. I want to know what tools, mechanisms, etc. they used.
Jim Wynne · 9 September 2005
Joseph O'Donnell · 9 September 2005
Moses · 9 September 2005
One Brow · 9 September 2005
steve · 9 September 2005
One Brow · 9 September 2005
James Taylor · 9 September 2005
steve · 9 September 2005
Maybe "Paley's Ghost" is really Pasquale Vuoso. About a year ago, he claimed he was going to "mathematically disprove Darwin." Since Lenny wasn't around then, it fell to me to hound him for a week or so about that, at which point he disappeared.
Moses · 9 September 2005
Joseph O'Donnell · 9 September 2005
CJ O'Brien · 9 September 2005
Paley's Ghost is Cerutti.
He got me once recently.
I felt dumb.
Bruce Thompson GQ · 9 September 2005
Ed Darrell · 9 September 2005
Paul,
Yes, please do consider global warming. Can ID offer anything to determine what human effects are? If not, why do you bring it up?
In answer to your other two questions: Sure, science could discover God, if God were not supernatural. Certainly evolution theory and the methods used in studying evolution would get much closer to identifying supernatural influence than intelligent design hypotheses, which seem to run to, "if it's awesome, somebody must have intended that it be awesome." (In fact, brain researchers have made more progress in determining why our brains regard things with awe than ID has made in any field.) There is no hope intelligent design can do better, or as well.
Yes, Darwin was doing science when he noted his observations that tend to refute the Paleyesque ideas of what a designer would do. If nothing else, it was a methodical (and therefore scientific) Fisking of Paley's work. Among other results of Darwin's writing was the understanding that merely being awestruck is not science. That latter point appears to be lost on everyone affiliated with intelligent design. Darwin was pointing out that there were many more questions to be asked, and that we'd have a better chance of finding the questions if we actually observed nature. Actually observing creation must be frustrating for intelligent design advocates, since nothing in creation does what ID advocates claim it must.
In law we discovered Potter Stewart's standard, "I can't tell you what obscenity is, but I know it when I see it," was inadequate to telling what obscenity is. The same standard, given a gloss of respectability by inserting "design" in place of the word "obscenity," works no better in science, for exactly the same reasons it doesn't work in law.
In law it turned out, among other things, that too often, decision makers called "obscene" anything that was sexually arousing. I am unconvinced that this is not exactly the same error ID advocates make when they claim to know something is "designed" when there is not a whit of evidence that any intelligence ever intervened in any way after the fertilization of the egg, and sometimes even not then.
ts (not Tim) · 9 September 2005
ts (not Tim) · 9 September 2005
Russell · 9 September 2005
Paul Nelson · 9 September 2005
ts (not Tim) · 9 September 2005
CJ O'Brien · 9 September 2005
the id, or the ego?
ts (not Tim) · 9 September 2005
ts (not Tim) · 9 September 2005
P.S. And, of course, if you have grounds for inferring intelligence in the design of biodiversity, then you have grounds for positing pixies as agents of your motor actions. This argument by analogy to touching your nose is utterly nonsensical and idiotic.
guthrie · 9 September 2005
Maybe I'm just getting confused, but I cant follow Paul nelson's post above. (Its probably just because its past my bed time.)
What if I went to sleep with a dirty hand, and woke up to find a smudge of dirt on my nose? How did it get there? Can it be demonstrated that unequivocally that I touched my nose when I was asleep, or what if someone else came along and moved my hand to touch my nose? How can you distinguish between these occurences and one where I rolled over in my sleep and touched my nose?
James Taylor · 9 September 2005
ts (not Tim) · 9 September 2005
Paul Nelson · 9 September 2005
'Rev Dr' Lenny Flank · 9 September 2005
'Rev Dr' Lenny Flank · 9 September 2005
'Rev Dr' Lenny Flank · 9 September 2005
Moses · 9 September 2005
Joseph O'Donnell · 9 September 2005
Joseph O'Donnell · 9 September 2005
'Rev Dr' Lenny Flank · 9 September 2005
Paul, quit changing the subject, and just answer my damn questions, please.
'Rev Dr' Lenny Flank · 9 September 2005
'Rev Dr' Lenny Flank · 9 September 2005
'Rev Dr' Lenny Flank · 9 September 2005
steve · 9 September 2005
Philosophers like Paul Nelson can sit around and complain that scientific theories would be better if they included supernatural explanations. They have done this for years. What they have never done, is produce a single useful result of their expanded notion of science. So scientists correctly ignore them.
Russell · 9 September 2005
'Rev Dr' Lenny Flank · 9 September 2005
Randy · 9 September 2005
paul, why do you conflate naturalism and reductionism?
McE · 9 September 2005
'Rev Dr' Lenny Flank · 9 September 2005
'Rev Dr' Lenny Flank · 9 September 2005
steve · 9 September 2005
Stuart Weinstein · 9 September 2005
Paul writes "But climatologists and atmospheric scientists weigh the effects of intelligent agency all the time. Consider global warming and its possible causes. To be sure, humans aren't "supernatural," at least in the sense that I think you mean, but disentangling atmospheric effects due to intelligent agency (e.g., gas emissions from industrial activity) from so-called "natural" causes is an important area of ongoing research.
They also have ways to test this, for example how does sea-level rise track estimates of Human greenhouse gas production over the last 150 years. While correlation doesn't mean causation, its a place to start.
Furthermore, the "intelligent" part of intelligent agency is incidental in this case. Human "intelligence" has nothing to do with it. With repect to greenhouse gas production we are no more using "intelligence" than flatulating bovines, which also contribute to global warming.
Your example fails on several levels, not the least of which, neither "intelligence" nor "design" have anything to do with it. It is as incidental to human activity, as it would be to flatulating bovines.
Or are you claiming that humans are warming the planet by design?
Given the nutters and nincompoops runing Washington right now, you might actually have a case there.
But then you'd have to call it "SD" Stupid Design.
"If agency is suggested by evidence, science takes up the question.
Well, that is subtle.. now we go from "intelligent agency" to just plain old "agency". Isn't that special?
The "intelligence" of this agency in your example has nothing to do with it, nor is there any "design" involved.
"ID theorists think biological evidence suggests the role of intelligent agency;"
What biological evidence?
"most biologists disagree; and so we find ourselves with a vigorous dispute."
The only reason it is "vigorous" is because poor thinkers like yourself have a lot of money and time to waste polluting newspapers and blogs with quater-baked nonsensical gibberish.
Not to mention your immortal soul may be at stake.
ts (not Tim) · 10 September 2005
Lurker · 10 September 2005
Linksy's illustration of agency being irreducible to physics, or rather Paul's anectode of Linksy providing the example, is a flawed intuition pump. Here's why:
Look up in the sky. Observe a cloud move across the sky. Now exclaim, "Let's have it. Tell me how the cloud did that." The implicit argument is that if one cannot provide a complete causal history of the cloud moving itself across the sky, then one must accept the argument of a substantive agency in the cloud.
But is that reasonable? Do we actually have a complete causal history of the cloud moving across the sky? For instance, given the known complexities of the meteorological system of Earth, do we know what that particular cloud was doing, say a day before it appeared to the naked eye? What was the individual water molecules or other particulates composing the cloud doing 24 hours before?
Now, return to Linsky's example. First order of business is to figure out whether it makes any more sense to ask how Linksy moved himself around the room than to ask how the cloud in the sky moves itself around the room. If you think that the latter is a poorly phrased, leading question (does the cloud move itself as an active agent?), then I think you are in the majority. But if you reject the notion of clouds moving themselves, under what logical pleading should you accept it for Linsky?
Theories of mental causation are weak... so much more for the substantive dualist that it is absurd to hear Paul declare it necessarily true with such confidence.
But, let's be charitable. Suppose dualism is true. Paul still has not answered Lenny Flank's question. How do we explore mental causation? For instance, suppose it is true that there is a Mind behind the moving clouds. How does one understand it? Forget exploring it empirically or even scientifically, for the sake of argument. I want Paul to show us a consistent epistemology that reveals the properties of Minds and their roles in causation.
Russell · 10 September 2005
'Rev Dr' Lenny Flank · 10 September 2005
steve · 10 September 2005
Ed Darrell · 10 September 2005
Paul,
Your example with Linsky confuses "how" with "why." The late Bill Hanley had a brilliant introduction for his live lectures to freshmen in Biology 101 at the University of Utah, in which he spent nearly ten minutes in excruciating detail of the how of things such as you proposed -- in Hanley's case, describing how a sound wave came to be inscribed on a piece of paper. He described the chemical and biological processes of a student taking notes at a lecture. In 1970, that was no mystery, so I've been puzzled for a couple of days about why you think it's a mystery now.
But you confessed it was a set up. Hanley's lecture in 1971 still meets your challenge -- he described the how of the action exactly. He could do it for Linsky, too.
What he can't describe is why the lump of grey matter that thinks itself Linsky wished to walk around the room. [At this point the smart alecky red-head kid in the back row puts his hand up -- "Linsky wanted to make a point, that's why." The red-head kid sees through your philosophical ploy, and she doesn't buy it.]
Science deals with proximate causes, understanding that proximate causes often lead to a penultimate cause originally unnoticed. The study of proximate causes can very ably explain the processes by which Linsky got up out of the chair and walked about the room, but it doesn't touch what motivated Linsky to get up and do it.
For another example, consider that studying proximate causes revealed that "common colds" are caused by viruses, not by cold air. Intelligent design might (does?) argue that the cold researcher should never dismiss cold air as a causative agent, because that's what seems to be the cause -- after all, aren't colds much more common in winter? Science doesn't want to know what seems to be the cause; it seeks what is the cause. It's unfair to argue that biology doesn't answer the question of why God created anthrax; the "how" of anthrax is what we need to know to fight it. (Intelligent design cannot explain anything about anthrax, including why we should fight against it, by the way.)
The chain of proximate causes discovered by science is good enough that it may get close to the "why" as well, in your hypothetical. I think that, deep down, that is what really troubles most ID advocates with advanced degrees, that science may indeed come across a few answers to the "why" questions.
Scientists are not unhappy with the ambiguity at the end of Linsky's challenge. It means there is more area for research, a clear manifestation of the science maxim that the more we know, the more we know that we don't know. In science, one is always wise to be wary of the guy who claims to have an answer when the question is either unclear or the answer already well understood otherwise. One may be rather certain that the guy who claims to have the answer probably missed the asking of many important questions.
And that's where you guys are with ID. It is my opinion that you've closed your minds to questions in science, not to mention social policy. (You might begin to ask, for example, "What is the moral value of ID advocates' approval of academically dishonest publications?")
Behe came close when he noted the concept of irreducible complexity -- a very good restatement or refinement (take your pick) of Darwin's noting what would disprove evolution (Darwin posed something that benefited a second, unrelated species, and which could not have benefited an ancestor in any form). The next question should have been, "What do we know that is irreducibly complex?" Behe didn't seek answers far, and he described some things in his book that turn out not to be irreducible nor inexplainable by evolution. At that point, ID's science path would be to return to nature and the lab and try to find structures that are, in fact, irreducibly complex.
Instead, as with your Linsky example, ID has insisted that evolution cannot tell us why the non-irreducibly complex systems arose (but then you disclaim any such knowledge when we pose reasonable hypotheses, and YOU claim the questions are then unfair!).
But do you see the chief problem with your Linsky example, Paul? Intelligent design can't explain the proximate causes of any of the actions, AND it also cannot explain the "why" of Linsky's stroll. So not only is ID just as helpless to answer your question, it is also helpless in answering those questions that science can probe.
You don't believe me? Ah, then by all means, lay out for us here the "causal pathways" that ID research has determined for Linsky's stroll. Be sure not to leave any gaps in the links . . .
Lurker · 10 September 2005
"But climatologists and atmospheric scientists weigh the effects of intelligent agency all the time. Consider global warming and its possible causes. To be sure, humans aren't "supernatural," at least in the sense that I think you mean, but disentangling atmospheric effects due to intelligent agency (e.g., gas emissions from industrial activity) from so-called "natural" causes is an important area of ongoing research."
Now, this is an interesting illustration of "agency". Is Paul ready to argue that global warming and its possible causes were intended results of men? Or could effects of agency refer to accidental, unintended outcomes. Consider a comparison between evidence of human beings manufacturing atomspheric pollutants and evidence of primordial microorganisms releasing toxic oxygen into the early atmosphere. What makes one more unnatural or more intelligent than the other?
I think Paul has swung a large double-sided sword here. If ID detects global warming as an example of an unintended, unplanned effect of intelligent agency, then there is nothing to stop ID from detecting life as an unintended, unplanned effect of an intelligent agent. Once again, we are then back to asking how ID increases our understanding of purported design phenomena. Apparently, intent is not something that ID can reliably explore.
Timothy Chase · 10 September 2005
ts (not Tim) · 10 September 2005
Timothy Chase · 10 September 2005
ts (not Tim) · 10 September 2005
Russell · 10 September 2005
Tim: The distinction between past and future is largely irrelevant.
Not Tim: No, it absolutely is not...
I'm going with Not Tim on this one. Behe's "irreducible complexity" is based on the notion that disassembling a system is retracing the steps of its evolution. This idea is so... (I'm trying to think of a diplomatic euphemism for dumb, but it's late, and I can't) that it's hard for me to believe that Behe sincerely entertains it.
Timothy Chase · 10 September 2005
ts (not Tim) · 11 September 2005
Simply considering truly, not just so-called, irreducibly complex systems in the abstract, an IC system could have had a component removed from a functional predecessor, but cannot have a component removed to produce a functional successor. And it can have a component added to it resulting in a functional successor, but it cannot result from adding a component to a predecessor. The time sequence is essential to whether IC is relevant to evolution. This is true regardless of whether Behe is honest, regardless of what he is counting on, and regardless of whether Behe's examples are really IC or whether any system is really IC.
As for "other approaches beside the removal of parts" ... a puff of smoke?
Timothy Chase · 11 September 2005
ts (not Tim) · 12 September 2005