On the Origins of Methodological Naturalism

"The University of Paris cleric Jean Buridan (a. 1295-ca. 1358), . . . contrasted the philosopher's search for "appropriate natural causes" with the common folk's erroneous habit of attributing unusual astronomical phenomena to the supernatural."

So, in the 14th Century we had the common folk's erroneous habit of attributing unusual astronomical phenomena to the supernatural.

While in the 21st Century, we have the uncommon folk's erroneous habit of attributing unusual biological phenomena to the supernatural.

Ha!

Clever play on words Chris, all those uncommon dissenting folk..

I'm going to bet that the term and distinction predates this. Someone should go through Francis Schaeffer's and Hermann Dooyeweerd's writings and see if it pops up there in the early 70s and 60s.

The following comes from Ron Numbers, prof of the history of science/medicine at Wisconsin and the leading historian of American religion/science. I use it with his permission.

In my essay "Science without God: Natural Laws and Christian Beliefs" (which will finally appear next month in When Science and Christianity Meet, Univ. of Chicago Press), I have the following note (based on extensive, if not exhaustive, research):

The phrase "methodological naturalism" seems to have been coined by the philosopher Paul de Vries, then at Wheaton College, who introduced it orally at a conference in 1983 in a paper subsequently published as "Naturalism in the Natural Sciences," Christian Scholar's Review 15 (1986), 388-96. De Vries distinguished between what he called "methodological naturalism," a disciplinary method that says nothing about God's existence, and "metaphysical naturalism," which "denies the existence of a transcendent God."

I talked with de Vries, and he thinks he coined the term.

******** I consider this definitive, unless someone is able to produce an earlier passage they can quote at length in which the term "methodological naturalism" is explicitly used and implicitly or explicitly defined. ted

I'm sorry to disappoint but offering criticisms of methodological naturalism - however poor you may consider them - does not make me part of the "ID Movement at large", whatever that is. I don't see how bifurcations like this are helpful.

Thanks for reading, though.

Steve Fuller, have been asserting that methodological naturalism is an arbitrary, recently invented constraint --- Fuller has even gone so far as to say it was constructed as an anti-creationism tool in the 1980's.

This guy would say pretty much anything if he thought it helped his "argument."

Fuller is to philosophy what Anna Nicole Smith is to pop culture.

But that's par for the course for all the creationist "leaders," isn't it?

Re Judge Jones' conclusion that:

ID violates the centuries-old ground rules of science by invoking and permitting supernatural causation

one might argue that Jones is merely shifting the "debate" to the issue: "What is supernatural?" That is, one might raise this point if one were stupid and inclined to engage in creationist apologetics or if one were paid to engage in such behavior.

ID shillers love to make the bizarre claim that the "designers" could be a "mere" race of aliens (assuming your parents and/or community leaders allow you to entertain such thoughts).

Are aliens necessarily supernatural?, the ID promoter asks, scanning his 3 x 5 card for the next "debate point".

The answer, of course, if "hell yes" -- if the key feature of the aliens is the ability to do the things that the ID proponent insists can not be done without the aliens.

Game. Set. Match.

I wonder how long it took Judge Jones to figure this out. I'm guessing about five minutes.

Nick,

"... Numbers makes it clear that methodological naturalism goes back to Galileo and before."

This is false. Numbers clearly says on p. 272 that "...natural philosophers had often expressed a preference for natural causes, but few, if any, had ruled out appeals to God." He goes on to say that "by the latter nineteenth century" scientists came to agree that "God talk lay beyond the boundaries of science."

HH

I'm sorry to disappoint but offering criticisms of methodological naturalism - however poor you may consider them - does not make me part of the "ID Movement at large", whatever that is.

Wait a minute -- is HH that the arrogant "philosopher" dude Hugo Holbling?

Surely it must be. Even in the two lines comment, the signature elements are all there!

What makes Lord Hugo part of the problem is not that he "offers criticisms" of methodological naturalism. It's that -- like Steve Fuller and other halfwit idealogues -- Hugo plays politics but pretends to be "above it all." Like Fuller, when called on to defend obvious creationist biases in his rambling screeds, Hugo kicks up dust and whimpers about being persecuted and misunderstood.

Yes, it's pathetic when adults behave like Holbling and Fuller and other so-called "philosophers."

Below is a link to a classic example of Hugo "at work." Warning: the condenscension on display may sicken those who haven't developed resistance to Holbling's "style."

http://www.galilean-library.org/blog/?p=90

Macht

Numbers clearly says on p. 272 that "...natural philosophers had often expressed a preference for natural causes, but few, if any, had ruled out appeals to God."

How many is "few, if any"?

I don't think it matters, really. If we have written evidence of substantial numbers of "natural philosophers" expressing a preference for natural causes, it's pretty much guaranteed that some "natural philosophers" "dared to be different" and chucked the God fallback position entirely.

Human nature.

The idea of solving a problem efficiently by not wasting a lot of time praying over it is an old old idea, almost certainly older than the problem of creating an ink that won't fade so people can permanently record ideas about how to solve problems.

But the problem is that atheists and materialists go beyond "methodological" naturalism to promote philosophical naturalism.

Dawkins, Dennet, Harris are probably the most well known propagandists for this view and it is subltly pushed on students in my area by "recommending" the above authors to students while not "requiring" their reading.

Who do you all think you are kidding?

But the problem is that atheists and materialists go beyond "methodological" naturalism to promote philosophical naturalism.

In case you didn't know, Wheaton is a conservative evangelical school where the faculty and staff must agree with a detailed statement of faith.

— Nick Matzke

Who do you all think you are kidding?

— Emanuel Goldstein

And just think: despite all these lengthy philosophical ruminations, all it would take to conclusively prove that "methodological naturalism" is not only not a common-sense tenet and a useful practical guideline for science, but in fact a "hamstringing" limitation (as Plantinga claims), would be for Plantinga, Holbling & C to come up with one (1) specific supernatural causal explanation that can be empirically tested by science. Just one.

Until then, all supernatural explanations will be heuristically equivalent to and indistinguishable from "I don't have a clue". This whole discussion seems to be a torrent of words that scientists do well by ignoring.

Goldstein wrote:

But the problem is that atheists and materialists go beyond "methodological" naturalism to promote philosophical naturalism.

And non-atheist scientists don't. So what's the "problem?"

A minor quibble: from the title of the post, it's unclear whether the concept of MN is being referred to, or the origin of the phrase. If the latter was the intent, "methodological naturalism" should be in quotes.

[quoting Numbers] The University of Paris cleric Jean Buridan (a. 1295-ca. 1358), described as "perhaps the most brilliant arts master of the Middle Ages," contrasted the philosopher's search for "appropriate natural causes" with the common folk's erroneous habit of attributing unusual astronomical phenomena to the supernatural.

— Matzke

Tracy Hamilton: You are discovering why good history and philosophy of science can be useful to scientists. Of course, they can be disasterous when bad ...

Registered User, I think it's sad that you have so little respect for reason that you have to indulge in character abuse. I think that probably explains why you believe Hugo is playing politics. The question stands, however: How are bifurcations like you've been assuming useful? I think you should consider that there are plenty more sides to this issue than for or against.

Dawkins, Dennet, Harris are probably the most well known propagandists for this view and it is subltly pushed on students in my area by "recommending" the above authors to students while not "requiring" their reading.

Back in RE* class in secondary school, I was required to read chunks of the Bible for study purposes (I think we also covered the Koran). It's only problematic if it's presented as truth rather than as an interesting opinion that you should be aware of. Was this in fact the case when these books were recommended?

* Religious Education, for those non-Brits who have no idea what I'm talking about

Who do you all think you are kidding?

Keith Miller has a another earlier use of the term on the ASA list
http://www.calvin.edu/archive/asa/200603/0501.html

Ted Davis put me onto the Paul de Vries article, and indicated that Ronald Numbers thought it to be the first use of the term. The article itself suggests that de Vries thought it to be his original term.

I do know of an earlier paper in which the term was used. It was pointed out to me by a new philosophy of science hire at Kansas State. The article is -- Edgar Sheffield Brightman, 1937, "An empirical approach to God", The Philosophical Review, Vol. 46, No. 2, p. 147-169. The paper is rather philosophically dense for me, and I don't entirely follow all of his argument. However, his real focus is "metaphysical naturalism," which he usually just refers to as "naturalism." He introduces "methodological naturalism" only to distinguish it from this "metaphysical naturalism" and does not really develop the idea.

Below is a partial quote of the paragraph in which the term is given --

"Every thinking experient will, in some sense, reach the stage of naturalism. He will accept nature as the space-time order described by the sciences. .... Such a universal naturalism -- common to idealists and realists, to naturalists and theists alike -- may be called scientific or methodological naturalism. But methodological naturalism is sharply to be distinguished from metaphysical naturalism. The latter takes the incomplete description and heuristic methods of the former to be either final truth about reality or at least the limits of present human knowledge." (p. 157-158)

The author then goes on to argue that theology and philosophy are valid ways to knowledge and address aspects of human experience that naturalism cannot. Examples discussed include mystical experience, purpose and meaning, teleology, and values. He is essentially laying out his philosophical argument for the existence and study of God.

While there are elements of de Vries argument in Brightman's essay, the meaning and significance of MN is not really developed. It is not clear, at least to me, what exactly Brightman had in mind.

So, I would say that it is de Vries who first lays out the full meaning of MN for both science and faith.

However, I should also stress that I have made no independent literature search on this term myself.

Dawkins, Dennet, Harris are probably the most well known propagandists for this view and it is subltly pushed on students in my area by "recommending" the above authors to students while not "requiring" their reading.

So who came up with methodological naturalism --- the idea, as well as the term? It turns out it was those notorious atheists, the Christians.

Schools should not be teaching the Bible-based version of the origins of the world, the Archbishop of Canterbury has said. ... Dr Williams said: "I think creationism is, in a sense, a kind of category mistake, as if the Bible were a theory like other theories. ...

"Methodological naturalism" is the default method humans have always employed when trying to understand the world around them. Nobody with a shred of common sense accepts "God did it" as a proximal cause until they have tried to think of a mundane explanation and failed.

Even someobody gullible enough to believe that the Virgin Mary made a miraculous appearance on his grilled cheese sandwich still mostly practices methodological naturalism. A disbeliever in methodological naturalism would have to wonder if every grilled cheese sandwich was due to the direct intervention of God.

PaulC Said:
"Methodological naturalism" is the default method humans have always employed when trying to understand the world around them

And when they cross a road.

Its a pity "True Believers" could not practice what they preach and use the "supernatural" method to cross a road.. there would be a lot less of them.

That's why I like Sundays ...Christians are off the streets.

Ooh, the levels of irony. In the Roman era, Christians were indeed considered atheists by the Romans because they would not accept the gods of the Roman pantheon.

— wamba

A disbeliever in methodological naturalism would have to wonder if every grilled cheese sandwich was due to the direct intervention of God.

Or a third version: The most ardent bible thumper becomes a methodological naturalist when there's money at stake.

Or another:
How many Bibles could a bible thumper thump if a bible thumper got hit by a bus?

A followup to PaulC's point. I ask those who claim that science limits itself by excluding non-naturalistic explanations to give me an example of a everyday phenomenon within our common experience whose best explanation could be argued to be non-naturalistic. So far, all I've gotten in response is crickets chirping.

I'd argue this was not always so. In the 14th century, if I asked for an explanation of the Great Plague and was told it was the wrath of God on us for our sins, I would have been hard pressed to come up with a better explanation.

I'd argue this was not always so. In the 14th century, if I asked for an explanation of the Great Plague and was told it was the wrath of God on us for our sins, I would have been hard pressed to come up with a better explanation.

Good Day:

I am a christian and a creationist (Take it easy, I'm a nice and reasonable guy - despite all the pleasure I get out of listening to your characterizations). As to your question, there would be no dispute with you concerning the concepts of methodological naturalism and its origin. I have taken classes on the History of Science and ID. We spent a lot of time reading books by Ron Numbers and the original writings of scientists who made these distinctions. Another great resource is Danielson's "Book of the Cosmos." Making philosophical distinctions is critical to understanding our world, especially within a Christian worldview. These debates about primary and secondary causes go all the way back to philosophers before Plato and Aristotle. Moreover, Christians such as Issac Newton and Samuel Clarke debated these ideas with deists like Gottfried Lebintz. The deists believed God set the world in motion and never intervened again. Arguing Christian ignorance to these facts is simply creating a straw man argument. ID proponents are incredibly well versed in handling these distinctions since they think and write about them every day.

"Methodological naturalism" is a much stronger concept than "primary and secondary causes." For example: In the Christian worldview, God would be strong candidate for establishing the physics of the universe. He is the primary cause. This does not mean that there won't be natural explanations for physics, but that all the mathematics and particles and order ultimately have a primary cause (That is not an accident). The further back one takes this argument - the more philosophical it becomes. Gravity and other physics are secondary causes that help to explain planetary motion. A true methodological naturalist however will argue against God being the one who established anything (like physics) since all things must have a naturalistic explanation.

Christians also have a much broader worldview that incorporates miracles such as the Ressurection, Creation, and the parting of the Red Sea. In these instances, God intervenes to alter the course of nature to accomplish His will. Methodological naturalists assign these things to fiction and mythology - without knowing the history behind them. Anyways, I digress.... Call me if you want to chat. I am always open. 714-420-6772.

Take Care,

Dan

Anyways, just some thoughts to those whom I know think differently. Call me if anyone wants to chat. 714-420-6772

In Christ,

Dan

A true methodological naturalist however will argue against God being the one who established anything (like physics) since all things must have a naturalistic explanation.

Wrong: a "true methodological naturalist" will merely argue that divine agency cannot be objectively PROVEN, by material means; that's different from arguing against the agency itself.

A true methodological naturalist however will argue against God being the one who established anything (like physics) since all things must have a naturalistic explanation. Wrong: a "true methodological naturalist" will merely argue that divine agency cannot be objectively PROVEN, by material means; that's different from arguing against the agency itself.

Daniel said:

Christians also have a much broader worldview that incorporates miracles such as the Ressurection,[sic] Creation, and the parting of the Red Sea. In these instances, God intervenes to alter the course of nature to accomplish His will. Methodological naturalists assign these things to fiction and mythology - without knowing the history behind them. Anyways, I digress...

Au contraire my son. Daniel you need to bone up on semiotics for beginners of folk tales and classes of literature The Hebrew Folktale: History, Genre, Meaning and its imagined history.

Trying to read so called miracles as historical fact may be satisfying a need, but poetry uses allusion as you MN well know.

What do you want to bet Larry calls this guy?

Nick, "...Numbers makes it clear that methodological naturalism goes back to Galileo and before." This is false. Numbers clearly says on p. 272 that "...natural philosophers had often expressed a preference for natural causes, but few, if any, had ruled out appeals to God." He goes on to say that "by the latter nineteenth century" scientists came to agree that "God talk lay beyond the boundaries of science."

— Macht

No single event marks the transition from godly natural philosophy to naturalistic modern science, but sometime between roughly the mid-eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries students of nature in one discipline after another reached the conclusion that, regardless of one's personal beliefs, supernatural explanations had no place in the practice of science. As we have seen, natural philosophers had often expressed a preference for natural causes, but few, if any, had ruled out appeals to God. In contrast, virtually all scientists (a term coined in the 1840s but not widely used until the late nineteenth century), whether Christians or non-Christians, came by the latter nineteenth century to agree that God talk lay beyond the boundaries of science. (Numbers 2003, p. 272)

As a practical rule of thumb, I'm all for naturalism. I don't want angels pushing my planets around, or Poseidon stirring up hurricanes. I want completely natural accounts of just about everything I can imagine.

But "methodological naturalism" sounds to much like an inviolable principle. And I can imagine some far-fetched (but logically possible) scenarios in which I would want to violate it. If, for example, a shining figure descends from the sky on a cloud accompanied by trumpets and a lot of winged guys in white, I going to consider the supernatural (whatever that word may mean).

There are many many such scenarios. What is the naturalist (methodological or otherwise) to say about them? That a completely natural account must be held out for come what may?

I tend to think that a "preference for natural causes" is methodological naturalism, and it is clearly found in natural philosophers back to Galileo and before.

— Nick Matzke

...sometime between roughly the mid-eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries students of nature in one discipline after another reached the conclusion that, regardless of one's personal beliefs, supernatural explanations had no place in the practice of science.

— Ronald Numbers

...but here is Ronald Numbers, not some amateur, giving basically what most science fans see as the standard picture.

— Nick Matzke

If, for example, a shining figure descends from the sky on a cloud accompanied by trumpets and a lot of winged guys in white, I going to consider the supernatural (whatever that word may mean). There are many many such scenarios. What is the naturalist (methodological or otherwise) to say about them? That a completely natural account must be held out for come what may?

What's all this fuss about methodical naturism?

"specific supernatural causal explanation that can be empirically tested by science. Just one."

Visible faeries with magical powers live in the bottom of my garden in a mushroom city.

Game set and match for a posteriori methodological naturalists.

What is the naturalist (methodological or otherwise) to say about them? That a completely natural account must be held out for come what may?

I'm as atheist as it gets. I think religion is positively stupid. But obviously there are concievable scenarios in which I'd change my mind.

Flint's basically saying anything supernatural is inconcievable. I disagree.

I was bemused to read here (as an occasional lurker) that my predecessor in this department plausibly takes credit for coining the term "MN." To set the record straight regarding the target of ID's polemics: Phillip Johnson has been very critical of Christians and Christian Liberal Arts Colleges like Wheaton (IL) who continue to resist ID on the grounds of a procedural commitment to MN. I published a piece in Perspectives, the Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation (Vol. 49.1, March 1997) in defense of MN in response to Steve Meyers' argument against demarcation criteria (in Moreland's The Creation Hypothesis). My claim there (not, by any means, original to me) is simply that scientists have come to exclude explanation by appeal to supernatural agency because of their ongoing success in providing accounts in terms of natural mechanisms, processes, powers, properties and the like. So the question of how long this notion, or term, has been around is really immaterial to the claim that science, as presently practiced, justifiably, non-arbitrarily, abides by this restriction. In any case, I've come to regard discussion of MN a bit of a distraction in the debate between Darwinian evolution and ID. The historical argument says that scientists are warranted in restricting their craft by MN because science, when so restricted, has proven it ability to provide plausible, natural, accounts. Evidence for this claim that science can account for natural phenomena in terms of natural phenomena is provided in no small part by the ascendency of the Darwinian explanation by natural selection. So, one's justification for MN includes the success of Darwinin accounts. It would seem to beg the question, then, to prefer a Darwinian explanation over ID on the grounds that ID violates MN. There are, or so it seems to me now, more fundamental reasons for regarding the design inference as fundamentally a metaphysical, rather than scientific, argument.
-bob oconnor
Philosophy, Wheaton College

steve s:

I'm curious. You're certainly welcome to disagree, but I'd like to know how you would go about distinguishing between something supernatural, and something you simply lacked any clue about. How would you violate Clarke's Law?

(apologies to those who have alreafdy seen this at least a dozen times)

Time once again for my standard response to the oft-repeated "science unfairly rules out the supernatural" ID crapola:

The scientific method is very simple, and consists of five basic steps. They are:

1. Observe some aspect of the universe

2. Form a hypothesis that potentially explains what you have observed

3. Make testible predictions from that hypothesis

4. Make observations or experiments that can test those predictions

5. Modify your hypothesis until it is in accord with all observations and predictions

NOTHING in any of those five steps excludes on principle, a priori, any "supernatural cause". Using this method, one is entirely free to invoke as many non-material pixies, ghosts, goddesses, demons, devils, djinis, and/or the Great Pumpkin, as many times as you like, in any or all of your hypotheses. And science won't (and doesn't) object to that in the slightest. Indeed, scientific experiments have been proposed (and carried out and published) on such "supernatural causes" as the effects of prayer on healing, as well as such "non-materialistic" or "non-natural" causes as ESP, telekinesis, precognition and "remote viewing". So ID's claim that science unfairly rejects supernatural or non-material causes out of hand on principle, is demonstrably quite wrong.

However, what science DOES require is that any supernatural or non-material hypothesis, whatever it might be, then be subjected to steps 3, 4 and 5. And HERE is where ID fails miserably.

To demonstate this, let's pick a particular example of an ID hypothesis and see how the scientific method can be applied to it: One claim made by many ID creationists explains the genetic similarity between humans and chimps by asserting that God --- uh, I mean, An Unknown Intelligent Designer --- created both but used common features in a common design.

Let's take this hypothesis and put it through the scientific method:

1. Observe some aspect of the universe.

OK, so we observe that humans and chimps share unique genetic markers, including a broken vitamin C gene and, in humans, a fused chromosome that is identical to two of the chimp chromosomes (with all the appropriate doubled centromeres and telomeres).

2. Invent a tentative description, called a hypothesis, that is consistent with what you have observed.

OK, the proposed ID hypothesis is "an intelligent designer used a common design to produce both chimps and humans, and that common design included placing the signs of a fused chromosome and a broken vitamin C gene in both products."

3. Use the hypothesis to make predictions.

Well, here is ID supernaturalistic methodology's chance to shine. What predictions can we make from ID's hypothesis? If an Intelligent Designer used a common design to produce both chimps and humans, then we would also expect to see ... ?

IDers, please fill in the blank.

And, to better help us test ID's hypothesis, it is most useful to point out some negative predictions --- things which, if found, would FALSIFY the hypothesis and demonstrate conclusively that the hypothesis is wrong. So, then --- if we find (fill in the blank here), then the "common design" hypothesis would have to be rejected.

4. Test those predictions by experiments or further observations and modify the hypothesis in the light of your results.

5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 until there are no discrepancies between theory and experiment and/or observation.

Well, the IDers seem to be sort of stuck on step 3. Despite all their voluminous writings and arguments, IDers have never yet given ANY testible predictions from their ID hypothesis that can be verified through experiment.

Take note here --- contrary to the IDers whining about the "unfair exclusion of supernatural causes", there are in fact NO limits imposed by the scientific method on the nature of their predictions, other than the simple ones indicated by steps 3, 4 and 5 (whatever predictions they make must be testible by experiments or further observations.) They are entirely free to invoke whatever supernatural causes they like, in whatever number they like, so long as they follow along to steps 3,4 and 5 and tell us how we can test these deities or causes using experiment or further observation. Want to tell us that the Good Witch Glenda used her magic non-naturalistic staff to POP these genetic sequences into both chimps and humans? Fine â€"- just tell us what experiment or observation we can perform to test that. Want to tell us that God --- er, I mean The Unknown Intelligent Designer --- didn’t like humans very much and therefore decided to design us with broken vitamin C genes? Hey, works for me â€" just as soon as you tell us what experiment or observation we can perform to test it. Feel entirely and totally free to use all the supernaturalistic causes that you like. Just tell us what experiment or observation we can perform to test your predictions.

Let's assume for a moment that the IDers are right and that science is unfairly biased against supernaturalist explanations. Let's therefore hypothetically throw methodological materialism right out the window. Gone. Bye-bye. Everything's fair game now. Ghosts, spirits, demons, devils, cosmic enlightenment, elves, pixies, magic star goats, whatever god-thing you like. Feel free to include and invoke ALL of them. As many as you need. All the IDers have to do now is simply show us all how to apply the scientific method to whatever non-naturalistic science they choose to invoke in order to subject the hypothesis "genetic similarities between chimps and humans are the product of a common design", or indeed ANY other non-material or super-natural ID hypothesis, to the scientific method.

And that is where ID "theory" falls flat on its face. It is NOT any presupposition of "philosophical naturalism" on the part of science that stops ID dead in its tracks ---- it is the simple inability of ID "theory" to make any testible predictions. Even if we let them invoke all the non-naturalistic designers they want, intelligent design "theory" STILL can't follow the scientific method.

Deep down inside, what the IDers are really moaning and complaining about is NOT that science unfairly rejects their supernaturalistic explanations, but that science demands ID's proposed "supernaturalistic explanations" be tested according to the scientific method, just like every OTHER hypothesis has to be. Not only can ID not test any of its "explanations", but it wants to modify science so it doesn't HAVE to. In effect, the IDers want their supernaturalistic "hypothesis" to have a privileged position â€"- they want their hypothesis to be accepted by science WITHOUT being tested; they want to follow steps one and two of the scientific method, but prefer that we just skip steps 3,4 and 5, and just simply take their religious word for it, on the authority of their own say-so, that their "science" is correct. And that is what their entire argument over "materialism" (or "naturalism" or "atheism" or "sciencism" or "darwinism" or whatever the heck else they want to call it) boils down to.

There is no legitimate reason for the ID hypothesis to be privileged and have the special right to be exempted from testing, that other hypotheses do not. I see no reason why their hypotheses, whatever they are, should not be subjected to the very same testing process that everyone ELSE's hypotheses, whatever they are, have to go through. If they cannot put their "hypothesis" through the same scientific method that everyone ELSE has to, then they have no claim to be "science". Period.

Flint's basically saying anything supernatural is inconcievable. I disagree.

— steve s

I'm curious. You're certainly welcome to disagree, but I'd like to know how you would go about distinguishing between something supernatural, and something you simply lacked any clue about. How would you violate Clarke's Law?

— Flint

well, Flint for instance if a bunch of crazy Revelation nonsense started happening, the rapture, plagues, a chick on a dragon, seals, trumpets, vials, etc, people rising from the dead, the antichrist starts slaughtering christians, I have to get a mark on my hand, for a long time I'll presume I'm dreaming or hallucinating, but after a while, I would probably figure the supernatural biblical crazytalk was accurate.

Let's not forget that science is neither a search for the truth nor a tool to explain everything that has been or concievebly could be observed or discovered by an experiment in some aspect of the observable universe. Science is a search for what works and has a primary task of predicting the outcome of an experiment or observation not yet made but could concievebly be made given the tools currently available. It is possible to concieve of an experiment to test the theory of common descent; a key feature of evolutionary biology as currently conceptualized. As far as I can tell Intelligent Design "theory" is capable of explaining anything so far found but makes no claim to a not-yet performed experiment. Any finding is compatible with supernatural intervention which is what makes that concept scientifically useless. Not wrong, not false, not metaphysically untruthful: scientifically useless. Science has a purpose way beyond being the enemy of fundamentalist religion or any religion for that matter. This purpose is the development of technology and hopefully the appropriate utility of it. In short it creates jobs, good high paying ones with a future and the potential for entreprenurial activity. There is a lot at stake here for the economic future of America. Into which century should we be educating our high school students to compete in a global biotech market? Hearing about how religious Newton was as a reason to derail scientific education is sickening.

In practice (have I mentioned this before?) methodological naturalism simply means following the evidence. As a corrolary, you do not make the argument from ignorance.

All this going on about 'supernatural' amounts to is this: you call a conclusion 'supernatural' if it is arrived at by the arg from ig. If you followed evidence exclusively, you call it natural. Keep in mind that intelligent causes (human for instance) can be concluded. Supernatural is not the same as artificial.

I'm curious, since Bob O'Connor is posting here, what his take on the Dover opinion is?

Also, I agree that MN is something of a side distraction. Regardless of the precise merits of MN, there are a plethora of reasons that ID is not science.

Not the least of which, to me, is the fact that they haven't produced any, you know, science.

I think it boils down to this: supernatural explanations are unconstrained, and without constraints, you cannot derive empirical expectations, which are what science relies on to proceed.

Specifically, this is a barrier to introducing two well-known cases of proposed explanations into science:

1. God. How can you put constraints on an all-powerful, all-knowing, immaterial being, especially one that might have some whimsy? Empirical observations can't rule God out of any phenomenon.

2. Vague entities that don't rule out God. Notably "intelligent design" and other legally convenient constructs.

One can imagine situations where something we culturally call "supernatural" is discovered -- like a vampire -- but typically such entities are well defined and follow a large number of rules (constraints), which means, I think, that in practice the phenomena would become naturalized if they were actually discovered.

And I can imagine some far-fetched (but logically possible) scenarios in which I would want to violate it. If, for example, a shining figure descends from the sky on a cloud accompanied by trumpets and a lot of winged guys in white, I going to consider the supernatural (whatever that word may mean).

for a long time I'll presume I'm dreaming or hallucinating, but after a while, I would probably figure the supernatural biblical crazytalk was accurate.

Dan has the parties to the dispute between Newton and Leibniz almost exactly backwards. Newton was certainly no orthodox Christian, and although Leibniz was also heterodox, he at least was closer to being such. Newton was an arian, after all.

Mythos, what would count as evidence for it being supernatural, rather than a hallucination, a very powerful extraterrestrial, etc.? (Incidentally, it is for this reason that I disavow the "methodological" label altogether. If you don't rule it out, in every case you are vulnerable to being "caught out". Conclusion: take your pick, science or supernaturalism [religious or otherwise]. You cannot have both consistently.)

Bob O'Connor, you are assuming a scientific metaphysics is itself impossible, which is debatable to say the least. In a consistent scientific world view, metaphysics is simply the most general of scientific fields. (See work of, e.g., Mario Bunge, Paul Churchland, David Armstrong, etc.)

you are assuming a scientific metaphysics is itself impossible, which is debatable to say the least. In a consistent scientific world view, metaphysics is simply the most general of scientific fields. (See work of, e.g., Mario Bunge, Paul Churchland, David Armstrong, etc.)

So, I do assume a domain of inquiry distinct from science, in subject matter if not in method.

CJ O'Brien commented: The problem there is that there are no a priori limitations as to which domains science can legitimately concern itself with. The "immateriality of mind" is an example. As the mind falls under scientific inquiry, "non-reductive dualism" is false, and no amount of metaphysical gerrymandering will make it true.

Flint,

If you watch Star Trek (and I can't imagine why anyone wouldn't), you're familiar with the character Q (an omnipotent, but completely natural being). If I understand you, you're saying that any bizarre happenings could be natural phenomena, e.g., caused by Q. Therefore, we have no reason to look beyond nature.

If we're ever able to understand Q, that understanding is likely a ways off (he's way beyond the grasp of those in the 24th century). And we may never be able to understand him (perhaps human understanding has limits). Either way, we're presently completely ignorant of Q as a natural cause (to the extent that we don't even know if he exists). Why, then, is more reasonable, more scientific, to postulate such causes than to consider supernatural ones (again, assuming for the sake of argument that the "supernatural" is meaningful)?

In short, why accept methodological naturalism? The practial response to that question is, "it's worked really well in the past." But we are here postulating bizarre happenings with completely unknown natural causes. Will that answer work?

In short, why accept methodological naturalism?

It seems that if a god existed, he would find it impossible to convince Flint of that fact.

I like Star Trek too, but it is decidedly not a good source of info on science. Granted it's sometimes better than some other shows have been (e.g., Lost in Space), but the few episodes that touched on evolution were way wrong.

Henry

In summation, Young does not reckon with the distinction between operation science, which always involves a recurring pattern of events in nature against which a theory can be tested, and origin science which does not. Failing to acknowledge this distinction, he (wrongly) assumes that all science should be defined the way operation science is defined, namely, naturalistically. Taking this naturalistic definition of science and applying it to origins, Young employs a form of methodological naturalism which would seem to be contrary to his Christian beliefs about the origin of the universe.

37. For instance, Boyle, in his 1688 Disquisition writes: a Naturalist [scientist], who would Deserve the Name, must not let the Search for Knowledge of First Causes, make him Neglect the Industrious Indagation of Efficients [emphasis his]

For the handling of final causes in physics has driven away and overthrown the diligent inquiry of physical causes, and made men to stay upon these specious and shadowy causes without actively pressing the inquiry of those which are really and truly physical, to the great arrest and prejudice of science.