Understanding creationism, VII:<br/> An insider's guide by a former young-Earth creationist

Posted 9 July 2014 by Matt Young

By David MacMillan. 7. The religion of evolution. The final set of creationist misconceptions about evolution surrounds its supposed religious, moral, and ethical implications. These objections prove difficult to address, simply because they have little or no objective basis and are almost purely philosophical or religious. This section will concentrate mostly on explaining the relationships and connections between these arguments, as systematically refuting them would delve deep into philosophy and theology and is far beyond the scope of a single post. Many creationists assume as self-evident that evolution precludes the existence of God, not because of any qualities intrinsic to evolution, but because their concept of God is dependent on creationism. Officially, creationists usually teach that the Bible is our only infallible revelation of God's existence, but in practice the "fact" of special creation is treated as a primary basis for belief in God. The "testimony of nature" is implicitly held up as proof of God's existence. Every time a particular piece of purportedly creationist evidence is described, the underlying implication is that God's existence depends on six-day special creation. Thus, to even propose that evolution could be true is automatically a "challenge to the evidence" for God's existence. The assumption that "evolutionism" and "secular science" denies God's existence applies not only to the suggestions that evolution might be possible, but more generally to any challenge to creationist arguments. While some creationists take pains to discard the more outlandish arguments, others will fiercely defend obsolete and ridiculous theories simply because of their perceived apologetics value. This stubbornness is the source of animosity and division between the various creationist movements; each group points to "concessions" and "compromises" the other groups make, because any compromise is considered a tacit admission that maybe the evidence for God isn't quite as strong as it would otherwise be. Such arguments are all God-of-the-gaps arguments, of course, but this fact goes unnoticed. Creationists often make this argument more explicit by quoting Romans 1:20, the atheism/agnosticism clobber text:

...since the creation of the world His invisible attributes are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead, so that [men] are without excuse.

To a creationist, this verse means that the testimony of nature is sufficient to establish God's existence, God's attributes, and God's nature even without revelation. Thus, it is claimed, atheists and agnostics have no excuse for unbelief. Embarrassingly, I once hosted a (short-lived) Internet radio show called "Without Excuse" predicated on this idea. Creationists believe that if common descent is even a remote possibility, then God's existence is no longer demonstrated by nature. Even the discussion of whether evolution is possible challenges their "testimony of nature", so it challenges their certainty about the existence of God. Certainty is a major theme in much creationist theology. A false dichotomy is set up: either you are absolutely certain about God and the Bible and the gospel, or you are doomed to wallow in doubt and probably end up lost. This dichotomy combines personal pride with fear of the unknown. Creationists will typically admit doubt about their own salvation long before they will dream of admitting doubt about special creation. Because their narrative of absolute certainty is something science obviously doesn't offer (science embraces and depends on doubt and questions), they must preserve it at all costs. If a person's primary reason for believing in God is special creation, then it is a tenuous faith at best. The majority of Christians accept that God could have used common descent to bring about life on Earth without any hazard to their faith. More importantly, Romans 1:20 is not a polemic against atheism at all; it is rather a polemic against Roman idol-worship. Reading on in the chapter:

Professing to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like corruptible man--and birds and four-footed animals and creeping things. [Romans 1:22-23]

Modern atheistic humanism obviously did not exist in Rome, and this passage did not, in fact, address atheism. It was warning against something else entirely: using the natural world as a basis for religion, making gods patterned on men and birds and animals. Worshiping these sorts of gods, argued the author, effectively replaces the Creator with the creation, reversing the proper order of things. In spreading out of Judea and into Rome, fledgling Christianity sought to overcome the perception that Jesus was nothing more than another regional deity. So they preached a Creator God who was not known based on imagery taken from creation, as with the many gods worshiped in Rome, but through the revelation they had received from Jesus. Ironically, creationists who define their God's existence as dependent on the doctrine of special creation are tying their theology to their perceptions of nature, committing the very mistake this passage warns against. Of course, they won't recognize this irony. They'll insist that merely admitting the possibility of evolution goes against the Bible. In pursuit of further confirmation of this prejudice, they dream up moral problems with evolution and common descent. One objection to the idea of God's using evolution is that it would somehow be inconsistent with God's nature to use any process depending on "chance". As we've already seen, this objection depends on misconceptions about evolution being a "chance" process. Creationists suppose that "natural processes" are random and chaotic, and are thus somehow "beneath" the ways of a God who they argue must order everything perfectly. A more common, strident objection is that God would not use death or suffering as part of his creative process, therefore excluding evolution. To propose evolution as a possibility is to associate death and suffering with God's intent for the world, something young-earth creationists argue should be immediately rejected. This view may seem incongruous; after all, creationists have no difficulty believing that God sent a global flood to wipe out nearly every living thing on the planet. But the objection to the process of evolution should be understood as coming from a particular theological doctrine, not a generalized opposition to struggle and suffering. These creationists believe (based on Genesis 1:31 and Romans 5, along with other passages) that physical death could not have existed during the six days during which God completed the creation of the world. Obviously, this objection begs the question whether the six days are literal days: theistic evolutionists already see the six-day creation week as metaphorical. Moreover, even in periods of church history where a six-day creation week was universally considered historical, the theological significance of Genesis was still primarily spiritual. The assignment of physical theological significance to creation, the fall, the flood, and so forth -- the idea that death itself is a physical abnormality resulting directly from a single physical human action in history -- is only a very recent and very sectarian doctrine. The Church has historically interpreted the Curse and Original Sin in many different ways, only a handful of which bear any resemblance at all to the YEC dogma. Insistence on specific physical events as necessary for spiritual or theological models is rampant throughout evangelicalism. Some denominations insist on various spiritual signs like healings or speaking in tongues. Others attach vital significance to the event of baptism or to the verbalization of a particular prayer. Virtually all evangelical denominations insist that the Crucifixion achieved its purpose by meeting some predetermined set of physical conditions for sacrifices. This practice of assigning essential spiritual significance to particular physical events has been around for a long time. It is the basic pattern of religion: making certain rituals and events and beliefs necessary components of salvation offers a more tangible object of faith, strengthening religious fervor. In the case of creationism, faith in the "scientific evidence" of a young planet and a global flood bolsters faith in the doctrines supposedly defined by those events. Of course, this practice inevitably backfires; when the faithful realize that the "science" is a con, they lose their sole basis for belief in the doctrines and jump ship. Rather than recognizing that they are responsible for creating this problem, creationists and other evangelicals take offense at the doubt and start insisting all the more strongly on the very arguments that are disillusioning their followers. Additional objections remain. Creationists may argue that without God, we have no reason to trust logic or science. Of course, this claim begs the question as well, as it presupposes that God is the source of logic. And since evolution is not intrinsically atheistic, it's not really relevant; the antagonism comes from the creationist theology. Finally, we don't use logic because we have faith that it's true; we use logic because it provides useful results. Often, scientists suggest evolutionary explanations for the genesis of certain behaviors or traits. Some creationists erroneously assume that, in consequence, evolution can be used to justify any sort of behavior. This, too, comes from their theology; they believe that all sin and death and suffering arise from a series of physical events in history - the Fall - so they naturally assume that an evolutionary history would give rise to an evolutionary morality. On the contrary, derivations of morality from evolutionary history are idiosyncratic; evolution is a description of what happens, not what ought to happen. Supposed "evolutionary morality" comes from the application of an essentialist philosophy, not from the study of natural history itself. The final area of philosophical objection to evolution deals with the supposed implications of natural selection: that it supposedly demands "survival of the fittest" and thus leads people to commit selfish or immoral acts. Similarly, other creationists allege that the idea of higher or lower animals will prompt racism or lead us to treat other people "like animals". Yet this accusation only goes back to the creationist mindset that historical events dictate present moral imperatives - a view which is specific to that particular Christian group. Likewise, there are no higher or lower animals in properly understood evolutionary theory; all extant species are equally modern because they have all adapted to their present modern environments. The notion of treating people differently because they are related to animals comes not from evolutionary ideas, but from the creationist belief that animals and humans are separated by essential physical differences, humans being in the "image of God". Creationist moral frameworks are so ingrained that they end up being applied illegitimately to the evolutionary model. Such essentialist philosophies are the reason things like eugenics were taught and believed: eugenics originated with the idea that, because survival of the fittest got us here, we ought to continue the process and cull out the weak. Creationists suppose that such ideas are somehow intrinsic to evolutionary theory, when in fact they require broad philosophical leaps that in no way derive from evolution itself. All of these religious and ethical objections are, of course, problematic at the outset. Even if they were accurate (and they aren't), they wouldn't change the truth value of evolutionary theory. They are examples of argumentum ad consequentiam, a logical fallacy in which a proposition is deemed true or false because of its purported implications. Creationists suppose that evolution is accepted because of its philosophical implications and argue against it on the basis that it has immoral implications, but neither of those things are true. Evolution is accepted because it accurately describes reality. No more, no less.

589 Comments

https://me.yahoo.com/a/JxVN0eQFqtmgoY7wC1cZM44ET_iAanxHQmLgYgX_Zhn8#57cad · 9 July 2014

Were you there?

Actually, I repeat Ham's question because it, along with its purported answer that they have the witness of one who was there, appears contrary to that other common claim of creationists (and of Ham himself), that creation is just obvious, just read Roman 1:20 (really, read the Bible to know that creationism is obvious from nature?).

You need the Bible because supposedly historic science can't prove anything, but no one has any excuse because you don't need the Bible to know that the world was created. "The Bible says so."

Well, when making sense is clearly not the goal nor the result, rather, your aim is merely rubbishing science to make room for your own a prioris, you're not likely to make sense.

Glen Davidson

mattdance18 · 9 July 2014

A great final installment, David. I'll just single out one tiny passage for comment:

...the idea that death itself is a physical abnormality resulting directly from a single physical human action in history – is only a very recent and very sectarian doctrine.

This is true, and it also represents what has long struck me as just an abominable view of the deity. They literally believe that because Adam and Eve sinned, God punished everyone. Every future human being, even every other animal on earth, was punished with pain and suffering and death despite bearing no responsibility at all for the sin in question. It's like imprisoning not only a convicted thief but his children and grandchildren, or executing not only a convicted murderer but a hummingbird and a honeybee two hundred miles away. The idea that such would be the conduct of a "just" god, even merely a "benevolent" or "rational" god, is -- not to mince words -- completely insane. And that people would worship and praise such a being is completely terrifying.

eric · 9 July 2014

Creationists believe that if common descent is even a remote possibility, then God’s existence is no longer demonstrated by nature. Even the discussion of whether evolution is possible challenges their “testimony of nature”, so it challenges their certainty about the existence of God.

The generalized form of this problem is not limited to YECs. It afflicts OECs, non-creationist evangelical, even liberal mainstream sects too. We might call it the clarity problem: 1. If God's message isn't perfectly clear, then it would be evil to send people to hell (or let them go to hell) for not understanding it correctly. 2. Also, our God is tri-omni. If the message is unclear, that means he either couldn't, didn't know how to, or didn't want to make it clear. Any of those answers undermines one of the omnis (with the third being basically a restatement of #1 above), so none of them are acceptable. 3. If some interpretation contradicting our sect's interpretation of scripture is "even a remote possibility," that means the message isn't clear. 4. So, no other interpretations can even be remotely possible; all believers-in-other-interpretations must know the truth deep down, and not accept it because they want to live a life of sin (or whatever). Any other possibility runs into one of the problems given above. *** As I see it, there's three general responses to the clarity problem. Two substantive but relatively rare, one common but not very intellectually satisfying. The first is to go full-on Calvinist and just say salvation is predestined, predetermined, and not a matter of anyone's choice or actions at all. How you "interpret the message" is irrelevant because you were saved or hellbound before you ever heard it. The second is to go full-squishy-liberal and say God doesn't send any 'honest truth seekers' to hell at all, regardless of whether they are wrong sect, wrong religion, or even atheist. The liberal christian God gives out A's for effort, so it's okay if the message isn't perfectly clear. The most common and least satisfying response is the punt, the argument from ignorance: "I don't know how to reconcile lack of clarity with all this theodicy and tri-omni stuff, but I have faith they are reconcilable by God, even if they seem contradictory to me."

phhht · 9 July 2014

mattdance18 said: The idea that such [mass murder] would be the conduct of a "just" god, even merely a "benevolent" or "rational" god, is -- not to mince words -- completely insane.

Absolutely right on the money.

TomS · 9 July 2014

One thing which strikes me is the complaint of the creationist that evolution makes "man" to behave "like an animal".

While otherwise, we are told that the reason that the human body is so much like bodies of chimps and other apes is that there is a common design to them. The creationists cannot go so far as to deny the common features.

Of course, evolution only says that the reason is that humans and chimps share common ancestry. It means no more for how we should behave than the fact that we are related to Torquemada.

On the other hand, creationists tell us that there is a "common plan". That the designer used a common plan shows that the designer had common purposes. And doesn't that mean, if we are going follow the designer's goals, that creationism says that we ought to behave like apes?

Just Bob · 9 July 2014

TomS said: And doesn't that mean, if we are going follow the designer's goals, that creationism says that we ought to behave like apes?

Being apes, we cannot behave other than 'like apes'.

Henry J · 9 July 2014

If we share common ancestry with creationists, does that mean we should behave like them? :D

ashleyhr · 9 July 2014

I think the relevant section of Romans 1 IS partly a polemic against unbelief/atheism as well as sin/wickedness such as idolatry. Verses 19-20 (New International Version): "Since what may be known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them. For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities—his eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that people are without excuse".

david.starling.macmillan · 9 July 2014

ashleyhr said: I think the relevant section of Romans 1 IS partly a polemic against unbelief/atheism as well as sin/wickedness such as idolatry. Verses 19-20 (New International Version): "Since what may be known about God is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them. For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities—his eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that people are without excuse".

I don't deny that Romans 1:20 can be used as a polemic against atheism; obviously it is used in this fashion quite often. But is that what it originally was? I would say no. I don't think the author or any of the original readers thought of atheism in connection with this verse. We may be inclined to see anti-atheism in this verse, but that's just our modern perspective. As Matt pointed out when he was editing this installment, some varieties of atheism did exist in first-century Rome, but that wasn't what this verse was about. The whole following discussion provides context: this isn't saying "See, nature is amazing so it must have been created by God." This is saying, "See, nature is amazing; the only God that could be big enough to create all of this must transcend nature." The verse doesn't say that God's existence is "clearly seen" from nature. It says that God's attributes are clearly seen. The author and the audience of this passage assumed God's existence as a given. Romans 1 is saying "The creation was see around us is inconsistent with a god that is borrowed from images inside creation; God must be eternal and all-powerful and outside of nature." At least, that's my take on it. I could be wrong, but I don't think I am. That's what my understanding of first-century culture would tend to imply, anyway.

Ray Martinez · 9 July 2014

This comment has been moved to The Bathroom Wall.

phhht · 9 July 2014

Ray Martinez said: Creationists, of course, CLAIM that special creation is based on evidence

Oh boy, testable, plausible evidence at last! Don't keep us in suspense, Ray, by all means tell us what this evidence is! Unless, of course, it isn't evidence at all. You know, like Flawd's claim that we must have been created because we have eyes. You really need to do better than that.

Verse 20 says God created the world in such a way that everyone can come to the conclusion that an invisible Designer exists---that's why deniers are "without excuse."

But the bible is fiction, Ray, not fact. What it says doesn't matter here in reality.

Evolution says verse 20 is not true:

No it doesn't. It never mentions verse 20.

God did not create the visible to reflect His invisible power; rather, according to evolutionary theory, we descend from previously living animals (= the idols of Romans 1).

Nope, gods did not create anything, and we do indeed descend from previously living animals.

david.starling.macmillan · 9 July 2014

Ray Martinez said: After reading the 7th installment by Evolutionist David MacMillan, I think it obvious that he has not represented his foes (Creationists or Bible) fairly or accurately.

Who said "Bible" was a foe for me? I'm a Christian.

MacMillan then quotes Romans 1:22,23. In the quotation above MacMillan represents special creation as a belief not based on evidence. Creationists, of course, CLAIM that special creation is based on evidence. So he should have addressed why the explanation of evidence in favor of special creation is wrong...

Try the first six installments. My choice to completely dismantle creationist pseudoscience before addressing the religious objections was entirely intentional.

Concerning his handling of the Romans 1 verses. Verse 20 says God created the world in such a way that everyone can come to the conclusion that an invisible Designer exists---that's why deniers are "without excuse." Then MacMillan offers verses 22 and 23 as somehow contradicting or refuting this interpretation---that these verses only speak of Roman idol worship. No, these verses are not limited in their application to ancient idol worship, but any idol worship in any age.

But the verse never says God's existence is evident from nature. It says God's attributes are evident from nature. It says, "Given the existence of a creator, we can tell from creation that he must be eternal, omniscient, and transcendent." A far cry from a polemic against agnosticism. Indeed, I daresay most people (Christian and non-Christian) would agree with this: if there is a creator, he's not part of the creation, and images of God taken from within nature are clearly false. Ray very clearly illustrates the classic fundamentalist hermeneutic. The actual intention and meaning of a passage isn't nearly so important as what he can represent the passage as meaning in his own cultural context. The Bible must always be about Ray, about Ray's problems are the really truly important ones. This verse had a special meaning -- antievolutionism -- that never could have ever been unearthed until Ray and his pals came along and explained what it really meant. Ray and his pals really are special people. And they're the ones who insist I don't accept that the Bible "just means what it says". Amazing. A quick note: Ray's claptrap is not, as one might suppose, an example of postmodernism. Rather, postmodernism is the very sort of critical thinking which allows us to identify the fallacies in Ray's thinking.

Mike Elzinga · 9 July 2014

Question: Why are there so many versions of the bible in just English alone; not to mention other languages.

Answer: Because hermeneutics, exegesis, etymology, and generalized word-gaming are needed in order to extract the desired rationalizations that prop up thousands of different sectarian dogmas so that each of them can be "The One True Dogma" even though they disagree – often violently – among themselves.

Religion is a game of words to determine who is on top; especially among fundamentalists.

Henry J · 9 July 2014

Or, as somebody once put it:

It's not about good. It's not about evil. It's about power.

Carl Drews · 9 July 2014

Translating the Bible into English is such a huge task that most charlatans and power-seekers never complete a publishable version. Bible translation takes expert knowledge of Hebrew, Greek, and Aramaic. The difficulty of translation weeds out most flakes.

From the Bible Forewards I have read, most translators are motivated by the same reasons that motivated William Tyndale in 1525. He wanted the common people to read the Word of God for themselves in their own language, such that the plow boy out in the field would know as much of the Holy Scriptures as the bishop.

I don't dispute that King James I of England had some political reasons to commission a new translation. This is recounted in Alistair McGrath's book from 2002:

In the Beginning: The Story of the King James Bible and How It Changed a Nation, a Language, and a Culture

Nevertheless, the King James translators worked on their task diligently, adopting a kind of "code review" for completed passages. They produced a literary masterpiece, an edition that is revered today. (Perhaps revered too much.) They transcended the King's original intent.

I also know that Archbishop Bancroft made 14 unauthorized changes to the final version after the translators were complete. Those changes probably involved strengthening the role of the wider church at the expense of the local congregations (the Greek word in question was ecclesia).

The KJV would have been better off without those changes. And yet somehow the Bible got out to English-speaking people despite man's mischief and private agendas. The Good Book inspires people to feed the hungry and care for widows and orphans. The Bible tells us not to feed the trolls, and the majority of Pandas can agree with that. Jesus of Nazareth gave us words that argue strongly against grabbing power, and talk of Christian service instead. All the sectarian dogma and word-gaming has not been able to wipe out those valuable words.

Rolf · 9 July 2014

Hear, hear!

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 9 July 2014

Ray Martinez said: Creationists, of course, CLAIM that special creation is based on ~~evidence~~ revelation.

Fixed it for you Ray.

Scott F · 9 July 2014

we don’t use logic because we have faith that it’s true; we use logic because it provides useful results.

This seems to me to be key. The same can be said of Evolution, and of all science. We don't "have faith" in science. We use the scientific process because it provides useful results. Period.

Scott F · 9 July 2014

Officially, creationists usually teach that the Bible is our only infallible revelation of God’s existence

The “testimony of nature” is implicitly held up as proof of God’s existence.

It has always seemed to me that YEC appears to put these two statements into conflict. After all, wasn't the later the primary motivation of most "natural philosophy" in western culture? That the work of early scientists (even Darwin) was to investigate the "testimony of nature" in order to understand how God created the world? The problem came about when the "testimony of nature" attested to a "truth" that was different than what was related by a literal reading of the Bible. I still don't understand how a YEC can believe in both the "testimony of nature" and a literal reading of the Bible. It seems to me that the YEC must not believe in a "literal reading" of the "testimony of nature".

FL · 10 July 2014

David wrote,

Who said “Bible” was a foe for me? I’m a Christian.

A Christian, or an Agnostic? That's a separate issue for another time, but there's enough information on the table by now, to make clear that merely saying "I'm a Christian" isn't really accurate in your case. There is an asterisk, an explanation, that needs to be placed there. And the asterisk is tied in to what you believe and don't believe regarding the Bible's historical and doctrinal claims. Same for me of course, and really (regardless of one's label), same for all of us. Harold recently wrote that he is a "Christian Atheist." Always worth exploring. (Another asterisk.) Again however, that's a separate issue for another discussion time. We simply live in a world of asterisks. FL

Dave Lovell · 10 July 2014

From the original post Creationist moral frameworks are so ingrained that they end up being applied illegitimately to the evolutionary model. Such essentialist philosophies are the reason things like eugenics were taught and believed: eugenics originated with the idea that, because survival of the fittest got us here, we ought to continue the process and cull out the weak

The process of survival of the fittest continues whether we like it or not. The essence of eugenics is that (some) humans get the power to decide who is fit and who is weak: human selection displaces natural selection. Otherwise "fitness" is defined by reproductive success. Being the Alpha Male does not result in the opportunities it might have once done, and childless Olympians and Nobel Laureates are left behind in the evolutionary race by a man who dies young because of genetic defects, but has nontheless managed to father scores of illigitimate children that somebody else will ennsure achieve reproductive success.

eric · 10 July 2014

FL said: A Christian, or an Agnostic? That's a separate issue for another time, but there's enough information on the table by now, to make clear that merely saying "I'm a Christian" isn't really accurate in your case. There is an asterisk, an explanation, that needs to be placed there.

Every self-proclaimed Christian is some other Christian's "asterisked" believer. That's the way sectarianism works: he doesn't believe what you think is the correct form of Christianity, and vice versa. Personally, I feel no need to asterisk anyone. Doing that is an attempt to sneak in sectarian exceptionalism. When you refer to yourself as Christian and him as Christian*, that's just a poorly hidden way to send the message "I'm the real thing, his is just a variant offshoot." I'm not buying it.

60187mitchells · 10 July 2014

classic "No true Scotsman" fallacy that we've all seen before.

also by definition - if EVERYONE needs an asterisk, no one does! "*" are for exceptions not the rule

Rolf · 10 July 2014

FL is not an arbiter of who is a Christian and who is not. The message of Christendom is not about believing but about a state of mind. A savage may well be more of a Christian than FL. A preoccupation with the Bible reveals an immature mind. The Bible may, at best, be a roadsign, pointing the way. Mistaking the pointer for the goal is nothing but a comfortable headrest. (John 5:39-40) What good are sweet words on the lips if absent from the heart?

The true religion of the future will be the fulfilment of all the religions of the past-the true religion of humanity, that which, in the struggle of history, remains as the indestructible portion of all the so-called false religions of mankind. There never was a false god, nor was there ever really a false religion, unless you call a child a false man. All religions, so far as I know them, had the same purpose; all were links in a chain which connects heaven and earth, and which is held, and always was held, by one and the same hand. -F. MAX MULLER, in a letter to the Rev. M. K. Schermerhorn, 1883.

mattdance18 · 10 July 2014

FL said: David wrote,
Who said “Bible” was a foe for me? I’m a Christian.
A Christian, or an Agnostic? That's a separate issue for another time, but there's enough information on the table by now, to make clear that merely saying "I'm a Christian" isn't really accurate in your case. There is an asterisk, an explanation, that needs to be placed there. And the asterisk is tied in to what you believe and don't believe regarding the Bible's historical and doctrinal claims. Same for me of course, and really (regardless of one's label), same for all of us. Harold recently wrote that he is a "Christian Atheist." Always worth exploring. (Another asterisk.) Again however, that's a separate issue for another discussion time. We simply live in a world of asterisks. FL

And Floyd gets to declare whose asterisks "accurately" line up with the phrase "I am a Christian" and whose don't. There's more than enough information on the table by now to make clear that Floyd is an incorrigibly arrogant sociopath.

mattdance18 · 10 July 2014

Carl Drews said: From the Bible Forewards I have read, most translators are motivated by the same reasons that motivated William Tyndale in 1525. He wanted the common people to read the Word of God for themselves in their own language, such that the plow boy out in the field would know as much of the Holy Scriptures as the bishop.

I've always thought this is part of the problem. Because while the plow boy in the field might thus be able to read the scriptures as well as the bishop, it doesn't follow that he will know them or understand them remotely as well. Don't get me wrong, Catholicism certainly has its own problems with authoritarianism. I just wonder whether the Reformation made much of an improvement, given that so much of what has come out of it is ill-informed literalistic nonsense.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawld6XjD30FmqzNIw3L9LHbR4rkKphzUAn0 · 10 July 2014

Henry J said: Or, as somebody once put it:
It's not about good. It's not about evil. It's about power.

Whilst I agree with the sentiments, it was the First Evil that was speaking there....

ksplawn · 10 July 2014

David MacMillan said: Often, scientists suggest evolutionary explanations for the genesis of certain behaviors or traits. Some creationists erroneously assume that, in consequence, evolution can be used to justify any sort of behavior. This, too, comes from their theology; they believe that all sin and death and suffering arise from a series of physical events in history - the Fall - so they naturally assume that an evolutionary history would give rise to an evolutionary morality.

I've always seen this as more of an extension of the fundamentalist belief that anybody not subscribing to The Right Religion, especially The Right Version of The Right Religion, is somehow not able to recognize moral acts and will find all kinds of justifications to support their immorality (which they must have, because they aren't worshipping The Same Thing The Same Way As Me.) Mostly in our familiar Christian circles, this is manifested in non-evolution contexts as "without (our kind of) belief in God, you can't have a basis for morality and anything goes!" If you don't have the same view of the same God, you are wandering in darkness (as they see it). Even non-fundamentalist thinkers sometimes subscribed to a version of this, though without always being particular about WHICH religion people were supposed to follow as long as they followed one of them. The structure and moral guidelines provided by religion was the important part. The Creationist context for the fundamentalist thinking simply notices that scientists try to peer into human behavior through the lens of evolution and takes that as a search to justify immoral behavior. It goes back to even the earliest objections to human evolution from apes; that it "reduces" humans to "just" an ape, who then have no obligations but to act accordingly.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 10 July 2014

The most important part of this post and reiterated by Ray Martinez is that when a creationist says he or she bases his or her belief on evidence - it is not scientific evidence. It is that the Bible was revealed by a god called by Christians God to presumably Moses. Nothing else matters. The evidence is solely the Bible and its status as the truth - as the bumper sticker says" The Bible says it, I believe it, and that settles it."

The whole enterprise of "creation science" is a sham, a lie, an unsubtle ploy to subvert the good status of science for evangelism and apologism.

FL · 10 July 2014

David also wrote,

The majority of Christians accept that God could have used common descent to bring about life on Earth without any hazard to their faith.

**** "No hazard", eh? That sounds like a baseless assertion to me, especially in light of former Christians who, by their own public testimony, ran into such hazards. Check out these examples, yes?

British TV interviewer Howard Condor: "And was there a particular point, or something you read, or an experience you had that said, ‘Yes this is it, God does not exist’?" Evolutionist Richard Dawkins: "Oh well, by far the most important was understanding evolution. "I think the evangelical Christians have really sort of got it right in a way, in seeing evolution as the enemy. "Whereas the more, what shall we say, sophisticated theologians are quite happy to live with evolution, I think they are deluded. "I think the evangelicals have got it right, in that there is a deep incompatibility between evolution and Christianity, and I think I realized that about the age of sixteen." -- 2011 interview, quoted in Ken Ham's blog via AIG

****

“Evolving out of Eden: Christian Responses to Evolution” (Tellectual Press, March 2013) is co-authored by biblical scholar Robert M. Price and Edwin A. Suominen. "When we first started on this book, I was a struggling Christian," Suominen said. "I had accepted the reality of evolution, but could not see a way to resolve the conflict between science and my inherited faith. And now that the last page is written, I know that there isn’t one." The book began as a collaboration between Robert M. Price, a biblical scholar and atheist, and Suominen, who was a believing Christian at the start. Both accepted the reality of evolution, and agreed to research its theological implications and the various ways that Christian writers have tried to smooth over the conflict between science and faith. --duncancrary.com

**** Regarding this author Edwin Suominen (an electrical enginner and former registered patent agent), Salon Magazine's Valerie Tarico asked him a most interesting question; it's very timely for this thread.

Salon: "Out of all of the ways in which believers have tried to reconcile evolutionary biology and the Christian tradition, which seem to you the most robust or credible?" Suominen: "That’s an insightful and difficult question, because the plausibility of these writers in the realm of theology seems to be inversely proportional to their acceptance of the science. "You can head in one direction or the other, but you can’t have it both ways, despite their protests that they can. One of the most eloquent and level-headed about the scientific findings and issues for traditional theology is John F. Haught. Yet his tedious appeals to the “drama” and “aesthetic intensity” of evolution are so far off our credibility meter that it would be difficult to summarize our conclusions without sounding uncharitable. "Our view of all these sorts of evolutionary apologetics, his included, might be apparent from the title of one of our subheadings, "Shoveling After the Parade.”

Just something to think about. When you travel the evolution road, you DO run into road hazards, it seems. Later on, I'd like to check out that Bible verse which David called a "clobber text" -- the unavoidable, razor-sharp Romans 1:20. FL

FL · 10 July 2014

Rolf says,

FL is not an arbiter of who is a Christian and who is not.

Absolutely true, Rolf. However, it's not difficult for either you OR me to rationally prove that you cannot be a Christian and an Agnostic at the same time (or a Christian and an Atheist at the same time.) This isn't some 25-cent sectarianism (say, Methodists and Baptists putting unnecessary asterisks on each other), but actual incompatible belief systems that ANY of us here could rationally demonstrate to be incompatible. So yes, in David's case (agnosticism issue), it DOES bring on an asterisk, unless you're not a rational person. It would also bring on an asterisk for Harold ("Christian Atheism.") My belief is that all of us, as sinners needing a Savior, have got asterisks in our own life-stories and current belief systems. Me too. But Christianity is NOT compatible with everything in the grocery store, and we might as well be honest about it. FL

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 10 July 2014

Anecdotes are just that - they don't tell you much. I am sure if I tried, I could find people whose faith was retained by being able to accept the evidence for evolution - being able to explain to themselves the contradictions between the "Book of Nature" and the "Book of God." Also I am sure that, I could find people whose faith was lost due to taking the Bible literally without evolution or even science being involved. There are plenty of other things one could fault the Bible on morally, for instance.

Matt Young · 10 July 2014

Apologies to everyone - I missed a comment by the Martinez troll. I have sent that comment to the BW. I have not bothered to send responses to the BW, but please do not comment or respond to that troll further.

Please comment if you are or are not getting tired of FL.

phhht · 10 July 2014

FL said: My belief is that all of us, as sinners needing a Savior, have got asterisks in our own life-stories and current belief systems. Me too. But Christianity is NOT compatible with everything in the grocery store, and we might as well be honest about it.

You are mistaken. I am neither a sinner nor in need of a saver, Flawd. I don't sin because there are no gods, and without gods, there can be no sin. I don't need a saver because I don't fear being dead. And your christianity, Flawd, is not compatible with anything in the grocery store of reality. Just go to the zombie shelf. It's empty, as is the gods shelf, the devils display, the talking snake department, etc. Only you could come up with such a clumsy metaphor.

mattdance18 · 10 July 2014

FL said: Check out these examples, yes?

Who cares, Floyd? Seriously: who cares? Do you ever make arguments that aren't just flagrant appeals to authority? Do you ever look beyond the mere fact that "x said y" to consider the logical or evidential justification for saying y? Speaking as an atheist, I think Dawkins is wrong about the necessary incompatibility of evolution and Christianity. Why is he right? Don't appeal to anyone's authority. Explain to me why I should believe this claim on its own conceptual merits.

Just Bob · 10 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Also I am sure that, I could find people whose faith was lost due to taking the Bible literally without evolution or even science being involved.

Hell, I've got one. I had a great aunt who was at least as committed to fundamentalist religion as FL. She would have considered HIM as being in immediate need of 'saving'. She was WAY more conservative than he is on just about everything. She took the Bible literally (as much as anyone can), and thus was sure that God was on Barry Goldwater's side in the 1964 presidential campaign. When he lost by a landslide, she KNEW then that the Bible was false and there was no god. At age 80-something she became a proselytizing atheist, and died free of the fear of hell. And regretting that she'd wasted so much of her time, energy, and emotions on fundamentalist Christianity.

Henry J · 10 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawld6XjD30FmqzNIw3L9LHbR4rkKphzUAn0 said:
Henry J said: Or, as somebody once put it:
It's not about good. It's not about evil. It's about power.

Whilst I agree with the sentiments, it was the First Evil that was speaking there....

Details, details!

Ray Martinez · 10 July 2014

This comment has been moved to The Bathroom Wall.

phhht · 10 July 2014

I have replied to this post at the Bathroom Wall.

ksplawn · 10 July 2014

I know it's ridiculous, but bear with me folks: Some fundamentalists will insist that if you accept and defend a worldview that atheists also accept, you can't be a Christian.

This kind of thinking, which only afflicts SOME fundamentalists (at least openly), obviously leads us to silly conclusions. Atheists also accept gravity for example.

"You know, I shouldn't have to explain this, but sharing one attribute with Nazis doesn't make you one!" - Jon Stewart

Fortunately we don't have any such maroons around here, right?

mattdance18 · 10 July 2014

Ray Martinez said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Who said "Bible" was a foe for me? I'm a Christian.
Imagine that; a "Christian" who accepts and vehemently defends an explanation of nature that all Atheists accept and rabidly defend! One can be sure that you are not following Christ.

Ayn Rand was an atheist and a capitalist. Are you a capitalist? Then clearly you are a poor excuse for a Christian. Guilt by association cuts both ways. Fun, eh?

FL · 10 July 2014

Mattdance18 asked,

Do you ever make arguments that aren’t just flagrant appeals to authority? Do you ever look beyond the mere fact that “x said y” to consider the logical or evidential justification for saying y? Speaking as an atheist, I think Dawkins is wrong about the necessary incompatibility of evolution and Christianity. Why is he right? Don’t appeal to anyone’s authority. Explain to me why I should believe this claim on its own conceptual merits.

We mostly agree concerning the need to explain the conceptual merits, Mattdance. The answer to your first two questions is a definite Yes, not only in this forum but elsewhere too. For me, it's a good thing to FIRST present people's own life stories, (brief anecdotes), and THEN present the specific arguments, merits, and justifications. (The first part gets the attention of readers. People want to hear other people saying what actually happened in their lives. Then the second part gives readers the specific arguments/merits/justifications.) Anyway, let's go ahead and give you what you asked for. The first explanatory article will be my own stuff that I've written. After that, I will offer explanatory stuff from other folks who agree that evolution is incompatible with Christianity. **** Okay, here's my incompatibility article (from "Genesis Station"). Please take a look: http://pandasthumb.org/archives/2014/07/understanding-c-6.html#comment-329011 Then I wrote another article at "GS", which was based on the incompatiblity argument of former Christian pastor Mike Aus. Dr. Jerry Coyne responded to this particular article at his blog. So here is Coyne's response; you may find it quite interesting. http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2013/05/16/newspaper-readers-asked-to-defend-religion-against-sciences-no-adam-and-eve-finding/ **** And now here's atheist Bart Klink's detailed (and well written) 2009 article, appropriately titled:

The Untenability of Theistic Evolution http://infidels.org/library/modern/bart_klink/evolution.html

**** Now, I'm not trying to overwhelm you with articles. But since my participation in this thread may be curtailed at any time, (and I'm not complaining if it happens, I think Dr. Young has been reasonably fair to me), I want to be a bit thorough in this one post. So maybe I can offer you just one more article, that's all. I picked this one because it's Dr. Albert Mohler, it's fairly short, and it features THE summary statement that I fully agree with. "

"The theory of evolution is incompatible with the gospel of Jesus Christ even as it is in direct conflict with any faithful reading of the Scriptures." http://www.albertmohler.com/2010/10/01/evolution-when-atheists-and-baptists-agree/

He's right, you know. That's the heart of this issue. FL

FL · 10 July 2014

I have to apologize, Mattdance. Somehow the wrong link was given for my Genesis Station article. Please disregard the link that says pandasthumb.org.

Instead, please go to THIS link. This is my explanation of why evolution is incompatible with Christianity.

http://cjonline.com/interact/blog/contra_mundum/2010-05-22/two_religions_part_two

phhht · 10 July 2014

I have responded to this post at the Bathroom Wall.

DS · 10 July 2014

phhht said: I have responded to this post at the Bathroom Wall.

Me to.

Carl Drews · 10 July 2014

mattdance18 said:
Carl Drews said: From the Bible Forewards I have read, most translators are motivated by the same reasons that motivated William Tyndale in 1525. He wanted the common people to read the Word of God for themselves in their own language, such that the plow boy out in the field would know as much of the Holy Scriptures as the bishop.
I've always thought this is part of the problem. Because while the plow boy in the field might thus be able to read the scriptures as well as the bishop, it doesn't follow that he will know them or understand them remotely as well. Don't get me wrong, Catholicism certainly has its own problems with authoritarianism. I just wonder whether the Reformation made much of an improvement, given that so much of what has come out of it is ill-informed literalistic nonsense.

A new topic, but interesting. Is it better to crowd-source Bible study across a literate population, or have one authoritarian leader (with training) tell everyone else how to interpret Scripture? The Lutheran Church generally follows the crowd-source model with their tradition of individual reading of the Bible. In the Lutheran Church, a hundred little heresies bloom. With proper teaching from seminary-trained pastors, the worst of those errors are corrected. It's an ongoing process. The Roman Catholic Church generally follows the authoritarian leader model. Catholics look to their priest, bishop, and pope for theological leadership. But when that leader makes a mistake, it puts a huge number of people in error. For example, when Albert Mohler commits heresy by declaring (without Scriptural support) that evolution is incompatible with Christianity, he pulls the entire Southern Baptist Convention into sin. If this is just a numbers game, I'm not sure which option is better. I prefer the crowd-source model for a theological reason. I understand that our Salvation is based on our personal faith, not on something the priest does for us. Every Christian is responsible for reading the Bible and applying it to their own life as well as they can.

phhht · 10 July 2014

I have responded to the latest post by FL at the
Bathroom Wall.

Carl Drews · 10 July 2014

Carl Drews said: For example, when Albert Mohler commits heresy by declaring (without Scriptural support) that evolution is incompatible with Christianity, he pulls the entire Southern Baptist Convention into sin.

Here is the link from 2007: Edwards on Evolution

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 10 July 2014

How would anyone ever know if an error in interpreting scripture were made?

Ray Martinez · 10 July 2014

This comment has been moved to The Bathroom Wall.

mattdance18 · 10 July 2014

Given the topic of the David's post this time around, I'll address Floyd here, this time anyway. It seems on topic. But my patience is wearing quite thin, for reasons that I will make clear.

FL said: Mattdance18 asked,
Do you ever make arguments that aren’t just flagrant appeals to authority? Do you ever look beyond the mere fact that “x said y” to consider the logical or evidential justification for saying y? Speaking as an atheist, I think Dawkins is wrong about the necessary incompatibility of evolution and Christianity. Why is he right? Don’t appeal to anyone’s authority. Explain to me why I should believe this claim on its own conceptual merits.
We mostly agree concerning the need to explain the conceptual merits, Mattdance. The answer to your first two questions is a definite Yes, not only in this forum but elsewhere too. For me, it's a good thing to FIRST present people's own life stories, (brief anecdotes), and THEN present the specific arguments, merits, and justifications. (The first part gets the attention of readers. People want to hear other people saying what actually happened in their lives. Then the second part gives readers the specific arguments/merits/justifications.) Anyway, let's go ahead and give you what you asked for. The first explanatory article will be my own stuff that I've written. ...

Sorry, Floyd, but your "article" about "the big five" consisted, in its entirety, of appeals to authority. A quick declaration, without argument, about this or that scriptural or conceptual point. Then a series of quotations from this or that atheist or evolutionist. There is exactly zero consideration of how to interpret things on their merits. No scrutiny is used at all on the various people you quote. It's just supposed to be obvious, I guess. Except that it's not so obvious to me, insofar as I disagree with those claims you quoted -- at least as you quoted them, devoid of any further context. You have singularly failed to do what I requested. No one is disputing that evolution is compatible with atheism. There are, obviously, atheist evolutionists. No one is arguing that some of those atheist evolutionists also consider evolution incompatible with Christianity and/or theism, either. It's a fact that some do. But the issue is whether they're right. Quoting them doesn't make it so! You get this, yes? Not quoting those evolutionists who believe that evolutionism and theism can be compatible (whether they are personally theists or not) doesn't make them wrong, either! You get this, too, yes? Maybe not, I suppose. Regardless, I shan't address further appeals to authority here. Frankly, you're illustrating perfectly the kind of attitude toward religion and morality that David spent this last installment of his series discussing. It's rather absurd to see you respond to the criticism by instantiating it.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 10 July 2014

Ray Martinez said:
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: How would anyone ever know if an error in interpreting scripture were made?
This comment says words that appear in the Scriptures are meaningless. Yet very many theological dictionaries exist in abundance.

So? Do they all agree? If not, how do you choose?

Yardbird · 10 July 2014

Ray Martinez said:
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: How would anyone ever know if an error in interpreting scripture were made?
This comment says words that appear in the Scriptures are meaningless. Yet very many theological dictionaries exist in abundance.

Word gaming in spades!

phhht · 10 July 2014

I have responded to Ray's comment at the Bathroom Wall.

Mike Elzinga · 10 July 2014

My comment above may have been taken as being a bit facetious; but it is a fact that churches come to blows about which version of their holy book is to be taken seriously. I have known some of these people personally; and they have very severe views about the “rightness” of certain versions of their bible in support of their sectarian beliefs.

Acrimonious splits in congregations and the formations of new churches are often justified on the basis of “the proper version” of the holy book. I have known Lutheran congregations that have split over “proper adornment” in regard to buttons, belts, suspenders, length of hair, etc., and over “vanity issues” such as how far window shades are supposed to be pulled down in the daytime.

It is interesting to click through the links to the various versions referenced at the bottom of that Wikipedia link about various versions of the bible. You discover some rather interesting information about the groups doing it and the reasons they give.

If one has any doubts about how serious and obsessive/compulsive sectarian groups are about hermeneutics, exegesis, etymology, and word gaming in getting at “THE proper interpretation” of their holy book, all one has to do is look at some extended debates like the one that took place between Ken Ham and Hugh Ross over the meaning of “yom” on the John Ankerberg show.

Anyone here can Google any number of debates between OECs and YECs - especially between Ham and Ross - to see what is involved. And this is just the tip of the “proper interpretation” iceberg.

And then we have the example of our resident fundamentalist troll who derives his “scientific proofs” of faith healing from TV programs like Unsolved Mysteries. They will draw on any and all “authority” as "proof" as long as it conforms to already preconceived notions of what their bible is supposed to be saying.

TomS · 10 July 2014

Ray Martinez said:
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: How would anyone ever know if an error in interpreting scripture were made?
This comment says words that appear in the Scriptures are meaningless. Yet very many theological dictionaries exist in abundance.

There is more to understanding a text than knowing the meaning of the words.There is more than knowing the grammar,

prongs · 10 July 2014

Ray Martinez said: Imagine that; a "Christian" who accepts and vehemently defends an explanation of nature that all Atheists accept and rabidly defend! One can be sure that you are not following Christ.

Ray thinks he gets to decide who is a "true follower of Christ" and who is not? Imagine that! Someone famous once said something about 'judge not, that ye be not judged.' He must have been mistaken. Ray is surely correct. Ya think?

mattdance18 · 10 July 2014

For those who would be interested in seeing why Thomists tend not to think Intelligent Design is either scientifically or theologically sound, here you go. http://www.catholic.com/magazine/articles/aquinas-vs-intelligent-design Obviously, for those who are atheists and/or secularists (myself included), there will be points of disagreement. Nonetheless, there will also be points of agreement, and it should explain at least one option for making sense of evolution from within a theistic framework. The mere fact that the official philosophy of Catholicism is seen by its own practitioners as consistent with evolution but not with ID puts paid to Floyd's BS. (And hey, if he can appeal to authorities that he doesn't accept to demonstrate the incompatibility of evolution with Christianity, I can appeal to an authority I don't accept to show that he's full of it. At least my appeal will actually involve the representative of said authority making a damn argument, instead of just a quick quote.) A trio of quick paragraphs as teasers, illustrating the depth of Thomism's disagreement with ID:

Now, a Thomist might agree with Behe’s knowledge claim that no current or foreseeable future attempt at explanation for certain biological complexities is satisfactory. Yet, a Thomist will reject Behe’s ontological claim that no such explanation can ever be given in terms of the operations of nature. This ontological claim depends on a "god of the gaps" view of divine agency. This is the view that nature, as God originally created it, contains gaps or omissions that require God to later fill or repair. Given the Thomistic understanding of divine agency, such a "god of the gaps" view is clearly inconsistent with a proper conception of the nature of creation and, therefore, is cosmogonically fallacious.

...

The insights of Aquinas also provide an answer to the recent challenge to Darwinian evolution from ID theory. God’s Creation of the world from nothing is not the same as a natural cause. Unlike the causes at work within nature, God’s act of Creation is a completely non-temporal and non-progressive reality. God does not intervene into nature nor does he adjust or "fix up" natural things. God is the divine reality without which no other reality could exist. Thus, the evidence of nature’s ultimate dependency on God as Creator cannot be the absence of a natural causal explanation for some particular natural structure. Our current science may or may not be able to explain any given feature of living organisms, yet there must exist some explanatory cause in nature. The most complex of organisms have a natural explanation, even if it is one that we do not now, or perhaps never will, know.

...

But to show that nature’s contingency and dependency requires God as its ultimate cause is not to argue for the existence of yet another natural cause within nature. In contrast, articulating the details of how the nature that God has created works is the task of natural science. So, Thomism provides a corrective to the ID theorists who claim that the lack of certain kinds of explanation in natural science shows the necessity of divine intervention into nature as a substitute for natural cause. According to Thomism, God is indeed the Author of nature, but as its transcendent ultimate cause, not as another natural cause alongside the other natural causes.

But hey, what do Thomists know about Christianity?... Enjoy.

Mike Elzinga · 10 July 2014

TomS said: There is more to understanding a text than knowing the meaning of the words.There is more than knowing the grammar,

Indeed. There is also the notion of historical context. When trying to get the “best” translation or “reading” of ancient texts, we also need to have additional information about the broader historical context in which such texts were written. But given all that information – even if we are capable of pulling together a reasonably complete historical context as well as getting into the minds of the people writing the texts – we learn about how those people thought about things in those times and in the light of their experiences. But the question about why such writings should be seen as somehow “more wise” or “more knowledgeable” about the world in which we exist depends on how a society has evolved – or devolved – in the intervening centuries. People emerging out of a “dark age” may see “the wisdom of the ancients” as being profound. Societies that have developed science and have learned to make better laws and societal regulations based on long experiences with religious wars and bloodshed might very well have advanced far beyond “the wisdom of the ancients.” And we might also learn that there are many human experiences that are fairly common across history; at least within the recorded history of humans. What humans thought and did in prehistory has to be ferreted out from the artifacts left over from prehistory; and even then we have a murky picture. But to take the writings of ancient texts as being somehow “deity given” or somehow “superior” to current knowledge – especially against the background of the history we already know – is childish and dangerous. There is little reason to listen to someone who does not have any contact with the real universe but instead spends his entire obsessive/compulsive life reading the same book over and over again. People stuck in those loops have little, if anything, to offer no matter how “wise” they believe themselves to have become. They simply cannot know what other people have learned.

xubist · 10 July 2014

Given that FL thinks Richard Dawkins is utterly, totally wrongity-wrong-wrong-wrong about the truth of Xtianity, it is curious that FL would cite Dawkins as support for FL's contention that Xtianity is incompatible with evolution.

One wonders why a sincere, devout Believer like FL would take an atheist's word about the religious significance of a scientific theory.

One also wonders if there are any other religious issues regarding which FL would accept the opinion of an atheist over the opinions of his fellow Xtians.

Ray Martinez · 10 July 2014

This comment has been moved to The Bathroom Wall.

Just Bob · 10 July 2014

xubist said: One also wonders if there are any other religious issues regarding which FL would accept the opinion of an atheist over the opinions of his fellow Xtians.

Well, if they agree with him on something, they are 'authorities,' and we must pay attention to their wise words. If they disagree, they're damned atheists, so what does it matter what they say?

Ray Martinez · 10 July 2014

This comment has been moved to The Bathroom Wall.

mattdance18 · 10 July 2014

The Ray-Hole said: Perhaps David MacMillan will create an 8th installment and explain the logic of Christ leading a person to accept the exact same biological production theory that Richard Dawkins accepts, defends, and promotes?

He'll probably get around to it sometime after you explain the logic of Christ leading a person to accept the exact same economic ideology (capitalism) that Ayn Rand (an atheist) accepted, defended, and promoted. Pot, kettle, black, O hypocritical one. (Your inability to respond has been duly noted.)

phhht · 10 July 2014

mattdance18 said:
The Ray-Hole said: Perhaps David MacMillan will create an 8th installment and explain the logic of Christ leading a person to accept the exact same biological production theory that Richard Dawkins accepts, defends, and promotes?
He'll probably get around to it sometime after you explain the logic of Christ leading a person to accept the exact same economic ideology (capitalism) that Ayn Rand (an atheist) accepted, defended, and promoted. Pot, kettle, black, O hypocritical one. (Your inability to respond has been duly noted.)

It's like shooting fish in a barrel, isn't it.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 10 July 2014

Ray Martinez said:
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said:
Ray Martinez said:
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: How would anyone ever know if an error in interpreting scripture were made?
This comment says words that appear in the Scriptures are meaningless. Yet theological dictionaries exist in abundance.
So? Do they all agree? If not, how do you choose?
Does any discipline enjoy unanimous or near unanimous agreement? Of course not. One must engage research, ever heard of it? Why are you making an exception for the Bible? Your original point implied that the Bible is somehow incomprehensible. Yet it has been the object of scholarly research for over a thousand years without any signs of slowing. What does that tell you? If the Bible was nonsense, as you implied, scholars would not have the slightest interest. Of course you're an Evolutionist with an ax to grind against the Book that says your theory is nonsense.

Great non-answer Ray. I never said it was nonsense, but perhaps you can explain how one does settle theological disputes - even if the Bible were straightforward to interpret, it is not the only book considered holy, is it? Theology you will agree is different than science, no? People are still studying the Iliad and Beowulf - so what?

mattdance18 · 10 July 2014

The Ray-Hole also said: Specifically, are we to believe, as David suggests, that Christ leads His people to accept an evolution theory that expressly disallows His Father any place in the production of living thing, past or present?

Evolution does not make this disavowal. It is possible to see "the production of living things, past [and] present" both as a natural process, explicable via the natural-scientific theory of evolution, and also as a divine act, explicable via theological ideas about creation ex nihilo. Read the thomism materials I posted a bit ago. Possible does not mean necessary, of course. One can view evolution this way, but one need not -- evolution doesn't require faith in God. Nonetheless it can be understood as accommodating it, and certainly does not intrinsically disallow it. But it's the non-requirement that sticks in your craw, isn't it? O ye of soooooo little faith.

Yardbird · 10 July 2014

Ray Martinez said: Why are you making an exception for the Bible? Your original point implied that the Bible is somehow incomprehensible. Yet it has been the object of scholarly research for over a thousand years without any signs of slowing. What does that tell you?

Tells me they can't figure it out either.

If the Bible was nonsense, as you implied, scholars would not have the slightest interest.

You don't have much experience with scholars, do you, Ray?

Of course you're an Evolutionist with an ax to grind against the Book that says your theory is nonsense.

The Bible isn't saying it, Ray. YOU are. Weasel.

https://me.yahoo.com/a/JxVN0eQFqtmgoY7wC1cZM44ET_iAanxHQmLgYgX_Zhn8#57cad · 10 July 2014

Ray Martinez said:
Ray Martinez said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Who said "Bible" was a foe for me? I'm a Christian.
Imagine that; a "Christian" who accepts and vehemently defends an explanation of nature that all Atheists accept and rabidly defend! One can be sure that you are not following Christ.
Perhaps David MacMillan will create an 8th installment and explain the logic of Christ leading a person to accept the exact same biological production theory that Richard Dawkins accepts, defends, and promotes? Specifically, are we to believe, as David suggests, that Christ leads His people to accept an evolution theory that expressly disallows His Father any place in the production of living thing, past or present?

And a ninth to explain how Christ leads His people to accept a Relativity Theory that disallows His Father any place in making things fall. And a tenth to explain how Christ leads His people to accept a germ theory that disallows His Father any place in making children sicken and die (Behe tries to save the Designer a role in malaria, however. How great is that?). An eleventh to explain how Christ leads His people to accept quantum mechanics that disallows His Father any place in making particles tunnel through matter. A twelfth to explain how Christ leads His people to accept meteorological theories that disallows His Father any place in explaining lightning strikes and hurricanes. Etc., etc. For the theist, did God make (in whatever manner) humans to think, or to mouth mindless tripe, like the Rays, Roberts, and Floyds found on this forum? Either they must explain why God wants Christians to act stupid, or they should cease to act stupid. Yes, no problem with explaining things without God, unless it's evolution or cosmology. The dishonesty of these people is disgusting. Glen Davidson

Henry J · 10 July 2014

ds_Q said: How would anyone ever know if an error in interpreting scripture were made?

If the copy says "thou shalt commit adultery", there was probably an error in there somewhere...

Rolf · 11 July 2014

phhht said:

I don’t sin because there are no gods, and without gods, there can be no sin.

Wikipedia:

The Biblical terms that have been translated from Greek and Hebrew as “sin” or "syn" originate in archery and literally refer to missing the "gold" at the centre of a target, but hitting the target, i.e. error.[12]

I left the reference "[12]" because it is "The Gnostic Gospels" by Elaine Pagels, a book that I really like. Sin is not about an afterlife in heaven or hell, but about your own, personal heaven or hell - or anything in between, here, today.

Rolf · 11 July 2014

Yardbird said:
Ray Martinez said: Why are you making an exception for the Bible? Your original point implied that the Bible is somehow incomprehensible. Yet it has been the object of scholarly research for over a thousand years without any signs of slowing. What does that tell you?
Tells me they can't figure it out either.
If the Bible was nonsense, as you implied, scholars would not have the slightest interest.
You don't have much experience with scholars, do you, Ray?

BINGO! I suspect Ray's burst of interest in debating theology at PT is due to his frustration at inability to get his book of grand demolishment of "the foundation laid by Darwin - to make everything built on top fall" ready for publication. His stubborn disrespect of science and scholars is mind-boggling.

TomS · 11 July 2014

https://me.yahoo.com/a/JxVN0eQFqtmgoY7wC1cZM44ET_iAanxHQmLgYgX_Zhn8#57cad said:
Ray Martinez said:
Ray Martinez said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Who said "Bible" was a foe for me? I'm a Christian.
Imagine that; a "Christian" who accepts and vehemently defends an explanation of nature that all Atheists accept and rabidly defend! One can be sure that you are not following Christ.
Perhaps David MacMillan will create an 8th installment and explain the logic of Christ leading a person to accept the exact same biological production theory that Richard Dawkins accepts, defends, and promotes? Specifically, are we to believe, as David suggests, that Christ leads His people to accept an evolution theory that expressly disallows His Father any place in the production of living thing, past or present?
And a ninth to explain how Christ leads His people to accept a Relativity Theory that disallows His Father any place in making things fall. And a tenth to explain how Christ leads His people to accept a germ theory that disallows His Father any place in making children sicken and die (Behe tries to save the Designer a role in malaria, however. How great is that?). An eleventh to explain how Christ leads His people to accept quantum mechanics that disallows His Father any place in making particles tunnel through matter. A twelfth to explain how Christ leads His people to accept meteorological theories that disallows His Father any place in explaining lightning strikes and hurricanes. Etc., etc. For the theist, did God make (in whatever manner) humans to think, or to mouth mindless tripe, like the Rays, Roberts, and Floyds found on this forum? Either they must explain why God wants Christians to act stupid, or they should cease to act stupid. Yes, no problem with explaining things without God, unless it's evolution or cosmology. The dishonesty of these people is disgusting. Glen Davidson

Is that 8th installment supposed to cover reproductive biology? That same biological production theory that every atheist that I know of endorses? The denial of Scientific Storkism, and its Big Top derivative, Intelligent Delivery?

FL · 11 July 2014

Good morning! Mattdance18 wrote,

Sorry, Floyd, but your “article” about “the big five” consisted, in its entirety, of appeals to authority. A quick declaration, without argument, about this or that scriptural or conceptual point. Then a series of quotations from this or that atheist or evolutionist. There is exactly zero consideration of how to interpret things on their merits. No scrutiny is used at all on the various people you quote. It’s just supposed to be obvious, I guess.

Okay, understood. But I won't lie to you: the many readers who responded (either pro or con) to the Genesis Station article, DID seem quite okay with the clarity, the veracity -- and especially the brevity! -- of the Biblical positions cited and the positions of the evolution authorities cited. You see, when you're writing for a newspaper audience, they really do want Readers Digest, not Journal of Computer Science. Newspaper readers are a very mixed and wonderful company who need their information on the quick. The readers have already effectively told a couple of C-J bloggers to shorten their long essays OR ELSE. So sharing the Big Five Incompatibilities with the readers, means keeping everything simple. Hence a short descriptor, "evolutionist Richard Dawkins", works just fine. (If readers want Dawkins' resume, bibliography and momma's name, they know how to do Wiki.) Now, if you believe I have mis-represented any of the five biblical positions, if you believe that the Bible does NOT teach what I said it does in the article, then just say so; tell me why it doesn't. We can check the Scriptures. If you believe I have mis-quoted or mis-represented any statements of the evolutionists that were cited in the article, just say so and let's check it out. Or not, if you prefer. I am happy with the article anyway, and the spirited conversation (35 comments) that was generated. **** As you say, "the issue is whether they're right." So I invite you to take your best shot. I'd love to see your disproof of those clear evolutionist positions. But I would point out that I've yet to see any evolutionist anywhere publicly criticizing Dr. Futuyma's No-Teleology-No-Conscious-Forethought statement in his evolution textbooks. I've yet to see anyone publicly calling on the Univ. of Tennessee - Martin to stop saying "Evolution has no goal" in its Biology 390 online class. And as an aside, I've yet to see any evolutionist anywhere come up with a rational way to justify what evolutionist Dr. Rosenhouse called the "theological bloodsport" of God allowing a gazillion years of nonstop bloody cruel sadistic animal suffering and deaths merely to evolve a coupla humans. Btw, it is NOT possible to sidestep his incompatibility merely by saying that a sadistic God murdered a buncha people in the Flood. First, the humans brought that judgment on themselves. Second, if all you can say is "God's a sadistic cruel murderer," then you have done nothing more than pour more gasoline on Rosenhouse's fire. The task is to ELIMINATE the incompatibility, not INCREASE it! **** So those are my thoughts this morning. Evolution is incompatible with Christianity. Meanwhile, thanks for checking the article out, and also your response. FL

DS · 11 July 2014

So that would be a no. He has no evidence, never had any evidence, never will have any evidence. All he has is authorities who don't know anything and can't agree with each other. But they do so very concisely, so I guess they must know what they are talking about. And of course they have no evidence of any kind either.

No one needs to eliminate any imaginary incompatibilities. You either accept reality or you don't. Your choice. Choose wisely.

Carl Drews · 11 July 2014

Henry J said:
ds_Q said: How would anyone ever know if an error in interpreting scripture were made?
If the copy says "thou shalt commit adultery", there was probably an error in there somewhere... (emphasis added)

Ha! So says The Wicked Bible. Henry J knows this already, but for other lurkers: The Wicked Bible contained a printing error that proved rather embarrassing and expensive for the publisher. If you happen to have one of the surviving copies, hang onto it - it's very rare, and it serves as a good example when discussing biblical inerrancy.

Yardbird · 11 July 2014

FL said: But I won't lie to you:

Promises. Promises. And then you turn around and immediately...

FL said: And as an aside, I've yet to see any evolutionist anywhere come up with a rational way to justify what evolutionist Dr. Rosenhouse called the "theological bloodsport" of God allowing a gazillion years of nonstop bloody cruel sadistic animal suffering and deaths merely to evolve a coupla humans.

Whose idea is this, yours, Rosenhouse's, your misunderstanding of Rosenhouse's? Whatever, there's no evidence to support it. As far as is known, evolution has no goal, no intention. Yes, some animals kill other animals to live. Yes, it seems very likely that human beings evolved, at least in part, from that selective pressure. But that does not mean that the selection INTENDED to produce us. Such an intention is a religious concept, particularly a Judeo-Christian one, stemming from the image of humans as the "Crown of Creation". It has no scientific basis. Why can't you at least try to understand and clearly state the position you say you oppose? This is why I say that you are dishonest and revile you. Not because of your religious beliefs. Those just make you appear stupid.

david.starling.macmillan · 11 July 2014

The 8th installment will indeed deal in some detail with the question of compatibility, but mostly from the perspective I had as I extricated myself from creationism. A sneak peek:

Installment 8 will say: I still maintained that even if evolution could work, it wasn't fact, because the planet wasn't old enough. Granted, I could see how the planet could be billions of years old -- flood geology was wearing a little thin -- but I was still constrained by religious belief to a 6,000 year old universe. I think I really did know the truth at this point, deep down, but I didn't feel like I could admit it. Then I started learning about the history of creationism, and that's where things started to crack. I learned that the age of the earth had never been a dividing issue in Christianity, not until the Morris and Whitcomb plagiarized Flood Geology from the Seventh Day Adventists in the 1960s. I realized that not even the church fathers saw Genesis 1 as speaking of six actual days. Martin Luther was one of the only six-day creationists in church history, and he also believed geocentrism for the same reasons, so that wasn't very encouraging. I began to see how there might be problems with the "historical-grammatical" approach to interpreting Genesis. If the creationist leaders were so far wrong about science, why should I expect their treatment of the Bible to be reliable?

I have a lot of respect for Dawkins and others like him, but it's unfortunate that he has chosen to accept authoritarian fundamentalism as a valid form of biblical criticism. YEC exegesis is just as flawed as YEC science. It amuses me greatly that FL is consistently incapable of defending his most basic claim: that Christianity really does require creationism. All he can do is cite quotes from people he deems more intelligent than himself.

Carl Drews said: Translating the Bible into English is such a huge task that most charlatans and power-seekers never complete a publishable version. Bible translation takes expert knowledge of Hebrew, Greek, and Aramaic. The difficulty of translation weeds out most flakes.

This is true. Of course, there are notable exceptions, like the New World Translation cooked up by the Jehovah's Witnesses. But, honestly, the biggest reason for new translations is because language is constantly changing, and so you have to update your translations or the meaning is going to be obscured. Plus, there's always the issue of unconscious bias: traditional language that the translator doesn't realize needs to be challenged. That needs to be corrected too.

Scott F said: The problem came about when the "testimony of nature" attested to a "truth" that was different than what was related by a literal reading of the Bible. I still don't understand how a YEC can believe in both the "testimony of nature" and a literal reading of the Bible. It seems to me that the YEC must not believe in a "literal reading" of the "testimony of nature".

Precisely. You can't just let the evidence lead you; you have to view it through the "lens" of a predefined system.

FL said: David wrote,
Who said “Bible” was a foe for me? I’m a Christian.
A Christian, or an Agnostic? That's a separate issue for another time, but there's enough information on the table by now, to make clear that merely saying "I'm a Christian" isn't really accurate in your case.

Oh, bother. You're trying to be clever again, aren't you? Are you saying that in your view of things, you can't be a Christian if you have doubt? You have to know the existence of God for certain, without any question, or you're not a True FL Christian? Why don't you tell that to Paul, hmm? "For now we see only a reflection as in a mirror; then we shall see face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know fully, even as I am fully known." I am agnostic; I do not know whether God exists. I am Christian; I believe God exists. 'Nuff said.

mattdance18 said:
Carl Drews said: From the Bible Forewards I have read, most translators are motivated by the same reasons that motivated William Tyndale in 1525. He wanted the common people to read the Word of God for themselves in their own language, such that the plow boy out in the field would know as much of the Holy Scriptures as the bishop.
I've always thought this is part of the problem. Because while the plow boy in the field might thus be able to read the scriptures as well as the bishop, it doesn't follow that he will know them or understand them remotely as well.

There's nothing wrong with the plow boy reading the scriptures. The plow boy should have every right to challenge the dogmas and doctrines claimed by the bishop. The problem, however, arises when it is supposed that the plow boy's interpretation ought to be equally reliable and accurate, simply by virtue of the Bible's magical properties. This was the great fallacy of (primarily) American fundamentalism. The Bible is supernatural, so obviously everyone should get the exact same answer. If they don't, then clearly someone is being led astray by greed or avarice or pride...and so the "noble savage" plow boy must be right and the bishop must be wrong. Until the plow boy becomes the next bishop and is supplanted by the next plow boy. No wonder there are so many denominations. This is biblical Docetism, a form of mysticism wherein merely opening the Bible magically confers the ability to acquire propositional truth without requiring any consideration of historical or literary context. It stems from exceptionalism and the noble savage fallacy.

FL said: David also wrote,
The majority of Christians accept that God could have used common descent to bring about life on Earth without any hazard to their faith.
**** "No hazard", eh? That sounds like a baseless assertion to me, especially in light of former Christians who, by their own public testimony, ran into such hazards.

Well, what I said is self-evidently true, because most Christians DO accept this. Are there hazards? Yes, but those hazards are solely the result of fundamentalist dogma. The fundamentalists claim that you can't have Christianity without creationism. They're the ones creating the hazard.

FL said: Good morning! The many readers who responded (either pro or con) to the Genesis Station article, DID seem quite okay with the clarity, the veracity -- and especially the brevity! -- of the Biblical positions cited and the positions of the evolution authorities cited.

To be honest, FL, I don't feel like picking through an accumulated selection of quotes in a post you've written somewhere else. Please tell us here and now why the natural history observed and modeled by evolutionary theory and deep time is incompatible with Christianity. Don't quote anyone else. Don't assume self-evidence. Do the work.

I've yet to see any evolutionist anywhere come up with a rational way to justify what evolutionist Dr. Rosenhouse called the "theological bloodsport" of God allowing a gazillion years of nonstop bloody cruel sadistic animal suffering and deaths merely to evolve a coupla humans.

See, here we have a fantastic example of how fundamentalists apply their own sectarian worldviews to science. Their whole approach is that they are the crowning jewels of creation; that the whole cosmos exists solely for them. So of course it would seem incongruous that God would employ billions of years of natural selection in bringing them to existence when he could just "poof" and take care of it instantly. This is nothing more than the problem of evil itself, and FL's pretense that fundamentalist YEC doesn't have this problem -- "the humans brought that judgment on themselves" -- is hogwash. I don't know the answer to the problem of evil. I may never have an answer. But Christianity as I understand it seems to be working toward a solution to the problem of evil, and that's good enough for me.

Yardbird · 11 July 2014

Carl Drews said:
Henry J said:
ds_Q said: How would anyone ever know if an error in interpreting scripture were made?
If the copy says "thou shalt commit adultery", there was probably an error in there somewhere... (emphasis added)
Ha! So says The Wicked Bible. Henry J knows this already, but for other lurkers: The Wicked Bible contained a printing error that proved rather embarrassing and expensive for the publisher. If you happen to have one of the surviving copies, hang onto it - it's very rare, and it serves as a good example when discussing biblical inerrancy.

That's humorous. I knew about the adultery error but not the "great arse" one. Taking both into account, it seems more like someone playing a joke, and a dangerous one at that, seeing as how Charles I was always losing his head over one thing or another.

mattdance18 · 11 July 2014

FL said: Mattdance18 wrote,
Sorry, Floyd, but your “article” about “the big five” consisted, in its entirety, of appeals to authority. A quick declaration, without argument, about this or that scriptural or conceptual point. Then a series of quotations from this or that atheist or evolutionist. There is exactly zero consideration of how to interpret things on their merits. No scrutiny is used at all on the various people you quote. It’s just supposed to be obvious, I guess.
Okay, understood. But I won't lie to you: the many readers who responded (either pro or con) to the Genesis Station article, DID seem quite okay with the clarity, the veracity -- and especially the brevity! -- of the Biblical positions cited and the positions of the evolution authorities cited. You see, when you're writing for a newspaper audience, they really do want Readers Digest, not Journal of Computer Science. Newspaper readers are a very mixed and wonderful company who need their information on the quick. The readers have already effectively told a couple of C-J bloggers to shorten their long essays OR ELSE. So sharing the Big Five Incompatibilities with the readers, means keeping everything simple.

And this is not a newspaper. It's a blog and discussion forum, where people aren't restricted to just snippets. Moreover, please not that the argumentum ad populum, to which you have just appealed in deferring the responsibility for your article's format, is itself a form of appealing to authority!

Now, if you believe I have mis-represented any of the five biblical positions, if you believe that the Bible does NOT teach what I said it does in the article, then just say so; tell me why it doesn't. We can check the Scriptures. If you believe I have mis-quoted or mis-represented any statements of the evolutionists that were cited in the article, just say so and let's check it out.

Floyd, you did not "represent" anything! All you did was quote people! You didn't explain why you quoted them, rather than anybody else. You did not explain how or why you thought the quotations themselves indicate what you seem to think they do. So you can hardly be accused of "mis-representing" them, insofar as literally none of your own words "represented" anything that was quoted. It was just "Here's my claim. Here's a quote by somebody." No argument.

As you say, "the issue is whether they're right." So I invite you to take your best shot. I'd love to see your disproof of those clear evolutionist positions.

I've already offered my claims about the compatibility of evolution and theism, on this thread and others, multiple times. Note in particular my explanation (in discussion with Eric on page 5 of the Presbyterian thread) of why I think the "strong incompatibilist" atheists (e.g. Dawkins or Coyne or Myers) are wrong. In addition to discussing my own views, I've even discussed how I interpret JPII as saying that evolutionary science and theism are compatible, even if not every philosophy linked to evolutionary science is compatible with theism. And I've linked another Thomist thinker's views as an example of someone who presents an argument for the compatibility of evolution and theism. You have largely ignored this material, and when you do respond it's simply a repetition of the very claim that's been challenged. I present a case for the compatibility of evolution and theism, you just repeat, as if I hadn't argued anything, "Evolution is incompatible with theism," followed by "See, here's what so-and-so says." And you did it again in this very post. See, Floyd, this is the point. No one is disputing that these people have said these things. But what these people have said doesn't matter: there are also people like Ken Miller or Francis Collins or Pope John Paul II or virtually any Thomist who say quite different things -- so why are the people who you chose to quote any more authoritative with respect to the issue than the people you chose not to? It's easy to claim that evolution is not compatible with theism when you quote ONLY the people who think that it isn't, and you NEVER quote the people who think that it is. Easy -- but not intellectually honest. The matter is ultimately not going to boil down to appeals to authority. What you need to do is make your argument, independently of what this or that atheist did or didn't say, for why the natural science of evolution and the religious concept of theism are necessarily incompatible. Until you make that argument, I don't really have much interest in discussing the issue further with you.

mattdance18 · 11 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
mattdance18 said:
Carl Drews said: From the Bible Forewards I have read, most translators are motivated by the same reasons that motivated William Tyndale in 1525. He wanted the common people to read the Word of God for themselves in their own language, such that the plow boy out in the field would know as much of the Holy Scriptures as the bishop.
I've always thought this is part of the problem. Because while the plow boy in the field might thus be able to read the scriptures as well as the bishop, it doesn't follow that he will know them or understand them remotely as well.
There's nothing wrong with the plow boy reading the scriptures. The plow boy should have every right to challenge the dogmas and doctrines claimed by the bishop. The problem, however, arises when it is supposed that the plow boy's interpretation ought to be equally reliable and accurate, simply by virtue of the Bible's magical properties. This was the great fallacy of (primarily) American fundamentalism. The Bible is supernatural, so obviously everyone should get the exact same answer. If they don't, then clearly someone is being led astray by greed or avarice or pride...and so the "noble savage" plow boy must be right and the bishop must be wrong. Until the plow boy becomes the next bishop and is supplanted by the next plow boy. No wonder there are so many denominations. This is biblical Docetism, a form of mysticism wherein merely opening the Bible magically confers the ability to acquire propositional truth without requiring any consideration of historical or literary context. It stems from exceptionalism and the noble savage fallacy.

Very well said. I've actually seen this described in terms of being "indwelt by the Holy Spirit." If you are a believer, then -- per this or that passage of Acts, I believe -- this is because, as a matter of divine grace, God in the person of the Spirit comes to dwell within you. Then, and only then, can you read the scriptures and truly comprehend them. And of course, since at that point your reading is literally guided by God, almost seen through God's eyes, there will be no disagreement among the truly faithful. So if someone disagrees -- with "us" -- it's because she is not indwelt by the Holy Spirit and not truly one of the faithful, ergo her disagreement can be dismissed out of hand. The theological arrogance is just astounding. For all that fundamentalists like to accuse scientists and secularists and humanists of wanting to occupy the place of God, nobody takes a better stab at it than the fundamentalists themselves. And the social and political ramifications of the view are simply frightening. Basically a form of authoritarian and totalitarian theocracy. Spooky stuff.

FL said: I've yet to see any evolutionist anywhere come up with a rational way to justify what evolutionist Dr. Rosenhouse called the "theological bloodsport" of God allowing a gazillion years of nonstop bloody cruel sadistic animal suffering and deaths merely to evolve a coupla humans.
This is nothing more than the problem of evil itself, and FL's pretense that fundamentalist YEC doesn't have this problem -- "the humans brought that judgment on themselves" -- is hogwash. I don't know the answer to the problem of evil. I may never have an answer. But Christianity as I understand it seems to be working toward a solution to the problem of evil, and that's good enough for me.

Exactly! I've got to say that I agree with Michael Ruse on this one. The Problem of Evil is a difficulty for any theistic view -- so how does evolution make it any more difficult? There's plenty of suffering in the world, with or without evolution, thanks to non-biological natural phenomena like earthquakes or hurricanes. I can understand disbelieving in God on the basis of being unable to reconcile this suffering to the existence of an omnipotent and benevolent deity, from personal experience. But if someone thinks that suffering and God's existence can be reconciled in a cognitively or at least therapeutically satisfying way, then it doesn't seem like biologically caused suffering presents some deeper challenge to theism than all the rest.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 11 July 2014

Henry J said:
ds_Q said: How would anyone ever know if an error in interpreting scripture were made?
If the copy says "thou shalt commit adultery", there was probably an error in there somewhere...

Given that the biblical god had no problem with the "chosen" people killing, stealing, and taking war widows as concubines, how would that be an error?

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 11 July 2014

I am also wondering why more Christian men aren't eyeless and armless?

27 “You have heard that it was said, ‘Do not commit adultery.’ 28 But I say to you that whoever looks at a woman to desire her has already committed adultery with her in his heart. 29 If your right eye causes you to sin, tear it out and throw it away! It is better to lose one of your members than to have your whole body thrown into hell. 30 If your right hand causes you to sin, cut it off and throw it away! It is better to lose one of your members than to have your whole body go into hell (Matthew 5:27-30).

david.starling.macmillan · 11 July 2014

mattdance18 said: I've actually seen this described in terms of being "indwelt by the Holy Spirit." If you are a believer, then -- per this or that passage of Acts, I believe -- this is because, as a matter of divine grace, God in the person of the Spirit comes to dwell within you. Then, and only then, can you read the scriptures and truly comprehend them. And of course, since at that point your reading is literally guided by God, almost seen through God's eyes, there will be no disagreement among the truly faithful. So if someone disagrees -- with "us" -- it's because she is not indwelt by the Holy Spirit and not truly one of the faithful, ergo her disagreement can be dismissed out of hand.

A more mild basis for dismissal is "contamination". Perhaps the dissident is a True Christian, but has been blinded by sinful desires or peer pressure or emotion or Not Being A White Middle-Class Cisgender Male or Corrupt Church Authority any other contaminating deficiency. This explains why ad hominem attacks are so prevalent. The ability to rightly interpret scripture is not based on evidence, but on Divinely Provisioned Authority. So attacking the messenger is the easiest to cast aspersions on the value of the message. Find a difference your audience won't like and hammer your opponents with it.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said:
Henry J said: If the copy says "thou shalt commit adultery", there was probably an error in there somewhere...
Given that the biblical god had no problem with the "chosen" people killing, stealing, and taking war widows as concubines, how would that be an error?

Well, correction: given that the people who wrote about their encounters with God had no problem claiming divine justification for killing, stealing, and taking war widows as concubines....

I am also wondering why more Christian men aren't eyeless and armless?
27 “You have heard that it was said, ‘Do not commit adultery.’ 28 But I say to you that whoever looks at a woman to desire her has already committed adultery with her in his heart. 29 If your right eye causes you to sin, tear it out and throw it away! It is better to lose one of your members than to have your whole body thrown into hell. 30 If your right hand causes you to sin, cut it off and throw it away! It is better to lose one of your members than to have your whole body go into hell (Matthew 5:27-30).

Mostly because no one is willing to take this "literally". But also because "looks at a woman to desire her" is probably better translated "looks at a woman to take her", with the implication of something a little more serious than arousal.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 11 July 2014

Mostly because no one is willing to take this "literally". But also because "looks at a woman to desire her" is probably better translated "looks at a woman to take her", with the implication of something a little more serious than arousal.

Why not? Plenty of real adultery among Christians, no? It is nonsense like that passage that made me reject Christianity. Why take anything seriously in the Bible when it is full of so many ludicrous statements? It goes back to the original question, how is anyone supposed to know when to take the Bible at face value? When it's convenient? When it corresponds with what we already want?

Just Bob · 11 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: It goes back to the original question, how is anyone supposed to know when to take the Bible at face value? When it's convenient? When it corresponds with what we already want?

Yes, and yes. That's easy. Witness FL as a sterling example.

david.starling.macmillan · 11 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said:
Mostly because no one is willing to take this "literally". But also because "looks at a woman to desire her" is probably better translated "looks at a woman to take her", with the implication of something a little more serious than arousal.
Why not? Plenty of real adultery among Christians, no? It is nonsense like that passage that made me reject Christianity. Why take anything seriously in the Bible when it is full of so many ludicrous statements? It goes back to the original question, how is anyone supposed to know when to take the Bible at face value? When it's convenient? When it corresponds with what we already want?

Well, this subtly begs the question (and I mean that in the logical sense) of whether "taking the Bible at face value" is a goal at all. It isn't. Face value is a nebulous and meaningless term, subject to endless redefinition and warping. We should instead ask the question of what the given text meant to its original audience in its original historical context, and what we can learn from that. It's not hard to identify the hyperbole in Jesus's words to this audience. And we can take other things Jesus taught about men and women to recognize the implication: it's wrong to reduce women to pieces of property to be taken and used by men.

Just Bob · 11 July 2014

Oh, and if it doesn't correspond with what we want -- make it.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 11 July 2014

Face value is a nebulous and meaningless term, subject to endless redefinition and warping.

So we shouldn't take statements of Jesus' divinity to be true? Hyperbolic rhetoric, are they? His death and resurrection is just a metaphor for turning over a new leaf where live for others? Why not just be a secular humanist?

phhht · 11 July 2014

I have responded to Flawd's comment at the Bathroom Wall.

ksplawn · 11 July 2014

I think I am tired of FL clogging up the thread.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 11 July 2014

Well, correction: given that the people who wrote about their encounters with God had no problem claiming divine justification for killing, stealing, and taking war widows as concubines.…

So why is the Old Testament full of these actions? To show us that they're wrong? I must have missed that chapter. A modern book on ethics would be a much better source for how to be a good human.

FL · 11 July 2014

David M wrote,

Oh, bother. You’re trying to be clever again, aren’t you? Are you saying that in your view of things, you can’t be a Christian if you have doubt?

No, no cleverness on this one. However, "Not being a Christian" IS rationally possible, David, depending on where those doubt(s) are located, and how far those doubts have really gone in a person's life. A slippery slide exists, and there's plenty of good Internet "ex-Christian" testimonies that make clear how far things can go. On paper, the term "Doubts" sound a lot better than "Unbelief", but doubts that get pampered or even allowed to stay on the back porch, (instead of getting resolved in some way through the power of Christ), can gradually mutate into something far worse than doubts. Doubts and unbelief can become one's Lord instead of Christ being one's Lord. All of us are susceptible to doubts, but notice that in the Gospels, Jesus never pampered anybody's doubts, but instead He said whatever that person needed to start moving from doubts to believing. Jesus was NOT neutral towards people's doubts, even though they were sincere doubts and He fully loved the people who had them. You say, "I am agnostic; I do not know whether God exists. I am Christian; I believe God exists." That's severe dissonance, not just a little bit. As I said to Rolf, ANY of us in this forum, regardless of labels, can rationally show that Agnosticism and Christianity are incompatible. In fact, your own public position that Jesus's Resurrection is a historical fact, would be sufficient to build the rational case for incompatibility against Agnosticism. Or, conversely, an atheist or agnostic could use your own statement "I don't know whether God exists" and build a rational case that John 3:16 must therefore be equally uncertain, and hence NOT a requirement for humans. So this is a genuine issue. Oil and water don't mix, sand and ice don't mix, and most of all Heaven and Hell don't mix. There is an incompatibility here. **** You referred to Paul's writings, who indeed said "For now we see only a reflection as in a mirror; then we shall see face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know fully, even as I am fully known." And that's true, exactly as written. That's part of life in Christ But that's the very same Paul of Romans 1:20, the Paul of "without excuse." Exactly as written. And don't forget Paul's reason for the "without excuse" statement: because God has revealed Himself to everybody via creation. So in the Bible, whether it's Rom. 1:20 or Ps. 14:1, the existence of God is NOT a "your mileage may vary" gig for any person, period. And even Jesus said out loud that God DOES exist (John 17:3 and many more places), which again means following Jesus as correct or following Agnosticism as correct but not following both at the same time. (You also say that Rom. 1:20 only says "attributes", not existence. But that argument is three shades past lame. For who is being described by the attributes of "eternal power and divine nature" EXCEPT God? Nobody else fits the description anyway. No way to escape that one.) FL

david.starling.macmillan · 11 July 2014

FL seems to think Agnosticism is a...thing. Like, a belief system. Or a religion. Or a practice. I wonder if he thinks there is an Agnosticism Church where all the Agnostics get together and preach sermons about Not Knowing Anything and have fellowship nights where they talk about All The Things They Don't Know. Sigh.

own public position that Jesus’s Resurrection is a historical fact, would be sufficient to build the rational case for incompatibility against Agnosticism.

I have determined based on evidence that Jesus's Resurrection as being historically and logically possible. I do not know whether Jesus's Resurrection is a historical fact. I have chosen to believe that Jesus's Resurrection took place. No one but a raving fundie would suggest that this position is "severe dissonance".

Oil and water don’t mix

Have you ever heard of an emulsion, FL? When you eat lobster and they give you that nice little ramekin of flavored dipping sauce, that's an emulsification of butter oil, butterfat solids, and water. Oil and water mix quite well. Oh, wait, you wouldn't know...because you don't eat lobster, right? Lobster is prohibited to you because you take the Bible at face value, right?

You also say that Rom. 1:20 only says “attributes”, not existence. But that argument is three shades past lame. For who is being described by the attributes of “eternal power and divine nature” EXCEPT God?

This passage presumes the existence of God. "Given the existence of a creator, the following attributes can be determined from creation." That is valid logic. But you're twisting it into something different. "Given the existence of nature, the existence of a creator with certain attributes can be determined." That is neither valid logic nor a valid representation of the text.

FL · 11 July 2014

Meanwhile, the poster at the location of https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/[…]zWpyVj8bds_Q wrote:

"It goes back to the original question, how is anyone supposed to know when to take the Bible at face value? When it’s convenient? When it corresponds with what we already want?"

As for me, I have similar questions. How is anyone supposed to know when to REJECT Bible historical claims? Which ones do I get to reject as historically untrue, and on what basis? If I can reject the supernatural Bible historical claims in Genesis and other biblical books as untrue, why do I have to accept the supernatural historical claims of Jesus' Atonement and Resurrection in the Gospels as true? If there's a God out there, why would He give me a free pass on rejecting the historicity of Genesis while sending me to Hell for rejecting the historicity of the Gospels? FL

david.starling.macmillan · 11 July 2014

FL said: Meanwhile, the poster at the location of https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/[…]zWpyVj8bds_Q wrote:
"It goes back to the original question, how is anyone supposed to know when to take the Bible at face value? When it’s convenient? When it corresponds with what we already want?"
As for me, I have similar questions. How is anyone supposed to know when to REJECT Bible historical claims? Which ones do I get to reject as historically untrue, and on what basis? If I can reject the supernatural Bible historical claims in Genesis and other biblical books as untrue, why do I have to accept the supernatural historical claims of Jesus' Atonement and Resurrection in the Gospels as true?

You're treating the Bible as a Source Of Authority rather than a Source Of Evidence. You're also begging the question. You have provided no arguments in defense of your assumption that the book of Genesis -- particularly the first few chapters -- is actually making historical claims. Finally, you don't have to accept the entirety of the Gospels as 100% accurate in order to accept the reality of the Resurrection.

FL · 11 July 2014

David M wrote,

I wonder if he thinks there is an Agnosticism Church where all the Agnostics get together and preach sermons about Not Knowing Anything and have fellowship nights where they talk about All The Things They Don’t Know.

I hate to say this, but...it's called the Unitarian Universalist Church. And yes, I've visited there. Good ordinary people, and I knew/know a few of them personally. Even tried my best to sing their congregational songs with them, from their official UU hymnal on one of their Sunday morning services. Unfortunately, their hymns are an exercise in watered-down politically correct blandness. (I could've gotten more inspiration from Emerson Lake & Palmer's "Karn Evil 9" !) But yes, the UU church is pretty much the place to go if you're an agnostic. But not for Christians, quite honestly. Once again, a choice becomes necessary. FL

mattdance18 · 11 July 2014

FL said: If there's a God out there, why would He give me a free pass on rejecting the historicity of Genesis while sending me to Hell for rejecting the historicity of the Gospels?

If there's a God out there, Floyd, why would he send people to Hell for rejecting the historicity of either one? Indeed, if he is "just," and if the term "just" has any discernible meaning, why would he given an infinite punishment for a finite sin, anyway? You certainly haven't done anything to dissuade me of the view that the creationist version of "God" is a morally repulsive narcissistic celestial tyrant.

FL · 11 July 2014

You’re treating the Bible as a Source Of Authority rather than a Source Of Evidence.

Actually, you might be doing so as well, when it comes to the key issue of Jesus' Atonement. But that's assuming that you view the biblical claim of Jesus' Atonement on the Cross as a historical fact. You might not actually believe that it is, just as other Pandas do not. I would need to ask you if you do or do not. **** Btw, there is another Resurrection issue that should be mentioned. In one post, you say that "I do not know whether Jesus’s Resurrection is a historical fact." But then shortly thereafter, you use the phrase "the reality of the Resurrection." For me, the word "reality" is synonymous with the phrase "historical fact." For me, historical falsehoods do not dovetail with the term "reality." So is Jesus' Resurrection a reality, or is it not a reality? FL

mattdance18 · 11 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: You're treating the Bible as a Source Of Authority rather than a Source Of Evidence.

Wow, that is the entire problem with all forms of religious fundamentalism in a nutshell. The point you're making is not exactly new to me, but I'm surprised that I can't recall ever seeing such a concise statement of it. It's possible that I'm just dense or forgetful, of course. Regardless, thank you!

mattdance18 · 11 July 2014

FL said: So is Jesus' Resurrection a reality, or is it not a reality?

I'm not answering for David here, but I do have one question, Floyd: Do you understand the difference between "belief" and "knowledge?" and between statements like "I believe x to be true" and "I know x to be true?" Is it really that difficult to grasp how someone could believe that something is real, without knowing that it is? For pity's sake, I believe there is life beyond earth, and I think there are good reasons for believing that -- but I certainly wouldn't claim to know that there is. Is that really so strange to you?

FL · 11 July 2014

Is it really that difficult to grasp how someone could believe that something is real, without knowing that it is?

You're right about one thing, Mattdance -- you didn't answer the specific question I gave to David at all. David said, "the reality of the Resurrection", not "my reality of the Resurrection." That wording implies that the Resurrection is a historical fact for all people to deal with as RATIONAL reality, not some private delusional baseless belief like Invisible Pink Unicorns. So that's why I am asking David that previous question. **** Agnosticism 101: Maybe God exists, but your mileage may vary. Maybe he created plants, animals, and humans, but your mileage may vary. Maybe it's all just an illusion, the Earth, its contents, and the entire universe all just an illusion, as a Buddhist man once told me over a cup of hot coffee (which he also said was an illusion). But your mileage may vary. Maybe God loves and cares for you (from out there somewhere), but your mileage may vary. Maybe the Deists were right all along, God's on a permanent vacation. Maybe Jesus actually paid the price and took the actual punishment for all your sins and mine on the Cross, but your mileage may vary. Maybe Jesus rose from the dead after being crucified, but your mileage may vary. Dr. Dominic Crossan, who's an expert on the historical Jesus, wrote that the local wild dogs might have just eaten Jesus up after the crucifixion, just like they ate up so many other ordinary plop-to-the-ground crucifixion victims. So it don't really matter what David affirms or fails to affirm about Atonement or Resurrection or anything, 'cause your mileage may vary. Purina Jesus Chow, just right for your puppy's health and stamina. Maybe Paul said in Romans 1:20 that God has revealed himself to everybody in such as way that NO EXCUSE can be had for choosing atheism and agnosticism. But...your mileage may very. **** And that's the great religion of Agnosticism. Shrugging your shoulders ad-infinitum whenever anyone asks you, (the reader), to say out loud what is specifically real, and specifically not real, concerning God, Jesus, Bible, Humans, Salvation, Heaven, and Hell. YMMV. But agnosticism ain't compatible with the Lord Jesus Christ. HIS mileage don't vary. On that note, let me stop and work on other writings. This is my last post I will write for this thread, though I will keep on reading other posters' posts. FL

phhht · 11 July 2014

I have replied to Flawd's post at the Bathroom Wall.

W. H. Heydt · 11 July 2014

FL said: On that note, let me stop and work on other writings. This is my last post I will write for this thread, though I will keep on reading other posters' posts.

Is that a promise we can hold you to? And if you break it, will you own to having lied?

Scott F · 11 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: FL seems to think Agnosticism is a...thing. Like, a belief system. Or a religion. Or a practice. I wonder if he thinks there is an Agnosticism Church where all the Agnostics get together and preach sermons about Not Knowing Anything and have fellowship nights where they talk about All The Things They Don't Know.

That seems to be the YEC view of Atheism, and Science in general.

Scott F · 11 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: You're treating the Bible as a Source Of Authority rather than a Source Of Evidence.

Actually, it appears that FL does the same for anything that is written or even spoken. If the statement agrees with or supports his point, he uses that statement as a Source of Authority. Witness how he often uses Dawkins as a "Source of Authority" on what Christianity is and isn't compatible with. Note also how most YEC's use Darwin, Dawkins, or others as a "Source of Authority" on what Evolution is or isn't. That's all the Authoritarian knows how to do. For the Authoritarian, it's never a question of "evidence" or "logic" or "reasoning" or even "ideas". It's always a question of who has the best Authority to quote. AFAIK, FL has never (or at least seldom) ever used quotes to "explain" anything. He has simply presented the quote (or misquote), and proclaimed victory because Authority "X" said it.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 11 July 2014

Which is more hyperbolic - gouge out your eye to avoid adultery or I am God incarnate or I died and came back to life three days later? Perhaps none of these things are over the top for 2000 years ago in Judea, but now they are a bit dated.
The problem I have is nothing in the Bible convinces me that a God is behind the text compared to millions of other literary sources available. Any status Jesus grants women is erased by Paul - in fact the the post Gospel NT is one of the reasons I gave up on it. I can see few redeeming qualities in any of it.

Scott F · 11 July 2014

FL said: Meanwhile, the poster at the location of https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/[…]zWpyVj8bds_Q wrote:
"It goes back to the original question, how is anyone supposed to know when to take the Bible at face value? When it’s convenient? When it corresponds with what we already want?"
As for me, I have similar questions. How is anyone supposed to know when to REJECT Bible historical claims? Which ones do I get to reject as historically untrue, and on what basis? If I can reject the supernatural Bible historical claims in Genesis and other biblical books as untrue, why do I have to accept the supernatural historical claims of Jesus' Atonement and Resurrection in the Gospels as true? If there's a God out there, why would He give me a free pass on rejecting the historicity of Genesis while sending me to Hell for rejecting the historicity of the Gospels? FL

Sigh… so few words, so much ignorance. Even the questions are wrong.

How is anyone supposed to know when to REJECT Bible historical claims?

1. When there exists evidence that contradicts what the Bible claims. Also, your Authoritarianism is showing through. Science isn't about Black or White, Accept or Reject. Science is about shades of gray. Science is about conditional acceptance, pending sufficient evidence. Or, conditional rejection pending sufficient explanation of the apparent discrepancies.

Which ones do I get to reject as historically untrue, and on what basis?

2a. You don't "get" to reject them as historically untrue. You are "forced" to conditionally or tentatively reject them until better evidence is presented to support the claims. 2b. See answer #1.

If I can reject the supernatural Bible historical claims in Genesis and other biblical books as untrue, why do I have to accept the supernatural historical claims of Jesus' Atonement and Resurrection in the Gospels as true?

3a. Hmm… "If I can reject…" You seem to feel that there is a human choice being made. "I can arbitrarily choose to accept or reject claim "X" ". There is no "choice". There is evidence. Either the evidence is sufficient to support a claim, or it isn't sufficient, or (third option) the evidence is ambiguous or inconclusive, and no conclusion about whether "X" is true or false can yet be rendered. 3b. Again, with your form of "choice": "why do I have to accept X as true"? You don't "have" to accept or reject. Either the evidence supports a particular conclusion, or the evidence is inconclusive. In the first case, the physical evidence available to us today flatly contradicts most of the "supernatural" stories in Genesis, where those claims make predictions about how the world is expected to function. Further, there is no physical evidence to support the "supernatural" stories in Genesis. To continue to "believe" something when the entirety of the physical evidence rejects it, is simply perverse. In contrast, there is no physical evidence one way or the other regarding the life, ministry, death, or resurrection of Jesus. For example, there is no fossil evidence for his resurrection, nor would anyone reasonably expect there to be. There are few written contemporary records of the times and places in which Jesus lived, and the ones we do have do not mention Jesus by either name or reputation. (IANA-Historian, so there may be such evidence of which I'm not currently aware.) And so, we thus have David's statement. The miracles of Jesus may or may not have happened, as described. We have no direct evidence one way or the other. If a "miracle" did occur, then it would have violated all that is currently known about the universe. Such miracles could have happened. Science doesn't say that they can't. Science simply says that they are exceedingly unlikely. If such minor "personal" (or "local") miracles did occur, they did not leave any physical evidence, nor would we expect them to. Thus, one is free to say (as David says), "I believe that the claims about Jesus could have been true, though I can't know them to be true".

If there's a God out there, why would He give me a free pass on rejecting the historicity of Genesis while sending me to Hell for rejecting the historicity of the Gospels?

4. See #3a and #3b above. All the physical evidence that we currently have leads us to (tentative) rejection of the historicity of the miracles of Genesis, because all of the physical evidence directly contradicts all of the historicity of the miracles of Genesis. In contrast, the physical evidence that we have does support much (though not all) of the historicity of the geo-political claims of Genesis; specifically the place names of various geographic features and various nations and city-states. We have no physical evidence supporting or contradicting the historicity of the Gospels, other than all of Scientific evidence which would contradict specific claims of miracles. The rest is a variation on Pascal's Wager. What "your" "god" would or would not do, and whether "hell" exists or not, are "religious" questions that you will have to take up with "your" "god", when, or if you ever meet him/it/her.

Frank J · 12 July 2014

Scott F said:
david.starling.macmillan said: You're treating the Bible as a Source Of Authority rather than a Source Of Evidence.
Actually, it appears that FL does the same for anything that is written or even spoken. If the statement agrees with or supports his point, he uses that statement as a Source of Authority. Witness how he often uses Dawkins as a "Source of Authority" on what Christianity is and isn't compatible with. Note also how most YEC's use Darwin, Dawkins, or others as a "Source of Authority" on what Evolution is or isn't. That's all the Authoritarian knows how to do. For the Authoritarian, it's never a question of "evidence" or "logic" or "reasoning" or even "ideas". It's always a question of who has the best Authority to quote. AFAIK, FL has never (or at least seldom) ever used quotes to "explain" anything. He has simply presented the quote (or misquote), and proclaimed victory because Authority "X" said it.

As you know it's not just YECs, but IDers who concede ~4 billion years of common descent do the same thing. And not just fundamentalist Christians, but Jews like Klinghoffer and (a few) agnostics like Berlinski. The key word is "Authoritarian." And it's great to hear someone besides Harold or me use it. Anyway, it's bad enough coming home from a great vacation, but now I read that this is David's final installment. :-( Oh well, at least there's a lot to catch up on.

Rolf · 12 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
I have determined based on evidence that Jesus's Resurrection as being historically and logically possible. I do not know whether Jesus's Resurrection is a historical fact. I have chosen to believe that Jesus's Resurrection took place.
What historic evidence? What logic? Possibilities. It is possible to believe anything possible, but that looks like cheating to me, eating your cake and having it too. Historically there isn't anything to suggest a character like Jesus or anyone else survived crucifiction and three nights in a cave - unless he never died in the first place. That has in fact been suggested by some as a solution to the problem. A more probable explantaion is that to begin with, the myth was consistent with its origins as a myth - the dying and resurrection was not a historical event. But when somebody had invented a new myth based on the old myths and maybe incorporating elements from the OT scriptures, it wouldn't take much for others to make the changes required to make it a Sunday paper feature. The problem is that people do not want to know, do not understand, they want the myth to be true because they believe their own religion and what it means to them depend on the reality of a man dying and returning to life after three nights as dead. That the trueness of this man's miraculous resurrection is the cause of salvation of all and everyone - but you have to belive it to reap the benefits. To me the resurrection event as written show all the sign of a doctored story, that it originally was about a spiritual resurrection that had to be made more effctive by making it real. There is a fundamental problem with creating a story like that - requiring multiple "return's" - the first in flesh - the second in spirit - and the third sometimes in the future, but soon enough to happen in the lifetime of "some standing here." (Generations have waited and the wait still goes on; when wil they realize they've been fooled?) From TJM:
Our new account of the origins of Christianity only seemed improbable because it contradicted the received view. As we pushed farther with our research, the traditional picture began to unravel completely all around us. We found ourselves embroiled in a world of schism and power struggles, of forged documents and false identities, of letters that had been edited and added to, and of the wholesale destruction of historical evidence. We focused forensically on the few facts we could be confident of, as if we were detectives on the verge of cracking a sensational "whodunit," or perhaps more accurately as if we were uncovering an ancient and unacknowledged miscarriage of justice. For, time and again, when we critically examined what genuine evidence remained, we found that the history of Christianity bequeathed to us by the Roman Church was a gross distortion of the truth. Actually the evidence completely endorsed the Jesus Mysteries Thesis. It was becoming increasingly obvious that we had been deliberately deceived, that the Gnostics were indeed the original Christians, and that their anarchic mysticism had been hijacked by an authoritarian institution which had created from it a dogmatic religion - and then brutally enforced the greatest cover-up in history. One of the major players in this cover-up operation was a character called Eusebius who, at the beginning of the fourth century, compiled from legends, fabrications, and his own imagination the only early history of Christianity that still exists today. All subsequent histories have been forced to base themselves on Eusebius' dubious claims, because there has been little other information to draw on. All those with a different perspective on Christianity were branded as heretics and eradicated. In this way falsehoods compiled in the fourth century have come down to us as established facts. Eusebius was employed by the Roman Emperor Constantine, who made Christianity the state religion of the Empire and gave Literalist Christianity the power it needed to begin the final eradication of Paganism and Gnosticism. Constantine wanted "one God, one religion" to consolidate his claim of "one Empire, one Emperor." He oversaw the creation of the Nicene creed - the article of faith repeated in churches to this day-and Christians who refused to assent to this creed were banished from the Empire or otherwise silenced. This "Christian" Emperor then returned home from Nicaea and had his wife suffocated and his son murdered. He deliberately remained unbaptized until his deathbed so that he could continue his atrocities and still receive forgiveness of sins and a guaranteed place in heaven by being baptized at the last moment. Although he had his "spin doctor" Eusebius compose a suitably obsequious biography for him, he was actually a monster-just like many Roman Emperors before him. Is it really at all surprising that a "history" of the origins of Christianity created by an employee in the service of a Roman tyrant should turn out to be a pack of lies? Elaine Pagels, one of the foremost academic authorities on early Christianity, writes: It is the winners who write history-their way. No wonder, then, that the traditional accounts of the origins of Christianity first defined the terms (naming themselves "orthodox" and their opponents "heretics"); then they proceeded to demonstrate - at least to their own satisfaction - that their triumph was historically inevitable, or, in religious terms, "guided by the Holy Spirit." But the discoveries [of the Gnostic gospels] at Nag Hammadi reopen fundamental questions.

Though Christ a thousand times in Bethleham be born And not within thyself, Thy soul will be forlorn The Cross on Golgotha Thou lookest to in vain, Unless within thine heart It be set up again (http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Angelus_Silesius)

mattdance18 · 12 July 2014

FL said:
Is it really that difficult to grasp how someone could believe that something is real, without knowing that it is?
You're right about one thing, Mattdance -- you didn't answer the specific question I gave to David at all. David said, "the reality of the Resurrection", not "my reality of the Resurrection." That wording implies that the Resurrection is a historical fact for all people to deal with as RATIONAL reality, not some private delusional baseless belief like Invisible Pink Unicorns. So that's why I am asking David that previous question.

As your "answer" here indicates, you're asking David the question because you clearly don't understand the distinction between believing x and knowing x. Your whole epistemology is a mess. It's like you can't entertain second-order thoughts about thoughts: distinctions like "believing x is true while acknowledging not to know x is true" therefore seems like "severe dissonance" to you, since you're just putting every claim on the same epistemic level. You're not making any distinction between (a) substantive claims and (b) claims about the epistemic status of substantive claims. That's exactly the distinction David is using, however, and so your criticisms of him miss the mark. So thoroughly do they miss the mark, in fact, that you can't truly be said to offer criticisms of David at all: you're not criticizing his position, but your mistaken understanding of it. A classic straw man, albeit an apparently unintentional one. Enjoy your time away. Maybe study some introductory philosophy in the meantime.

TomS · 12 July 2014

FL said: Meanwhile, the poster at the location of https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/[…]zWpyVj8bds_Q wrote:
"It goes back to the original question, how is anyone supposed to know when to take the Bible at face value? When it’s convenient? When it corresponds with what we already want?"
As for me, I have similar questions. How is anyone supposed to know when to REJECT Bible historical claims? Which ones do I get to reject as historically untrue, and on what basis? If I can reject the supernatural Bible historical claims in Genesis and other biblical books as untrue, why do I have to accept the supernatural historical claims of Jesus' Atonement and Resurrection in the Gospels as true? If there's a God out there, why would He give me a free pass on rejecting the historicity of Genesis while sending me to Hell for rejecting the historicity of the Gospels? FL

There are no special rules for historical claims and for other factual claims. What are the rules for accepting heliocentrism, despite the Bible's endorsement of geocentrism? The rule is: Use one's reason in examining the evidence.

Helena Constantine · 12 July 2014

...In contrast, there is no physical evidence one way or the other regarding the life, ministry, death, or resurrection of Jesus. For example, there is no fossil evidence for his resurrection, nor would anyone reasonably expect there to be. There are few written contemporary records of the times and places in which Jesus lived, and the ones we do have do not mention Jesus by either name or reputation. (IANA-Historian, so there may be such evidence of which I'm not currently aware.)...

I'll write this because there is a general misconception about the evidence for Jesus in the atheist community (thanks partly to crackpots like Richard Carrier). The attestation for Jesus is remarkably good compared to most other ancient figures. Beginning with the Gospels themselves, they are obviously literary compositions that were written a generation or two after Jesus lived, and incorporate all of the most fantastic legends that had grown up about him in the meantime, and contain outright fabrications (the nativity stories, are an obvious instance). Yet they clearly contain the story of an itinerant Jewish peasant who had a career preaching against the temple and the aristocratic interests it supported, a perfectly plausible character. there is no special reason to doubt their core representation of Jesus' career as an itinerant preacher. You may say that this is switching the burden of proof, but actually arguing against the existence of Jesus, one would take on the enormous burden of providing an explanation of why and how the author of Mark would have fabricated such a thing. One can see a mythology similar to that of Gospels growing up now over Menachem Scheersohn, but it can only grow because Scheersohn was an actual person with an important effect on his community. There is also Josephus. The so-called Testimonium Flavianum is obviously a Christian interpolation into the text, but it was occasioned by an authentic part of the text. Josephus mentions the execution of James and describes him as the leader of the movement founded by his brother Jesus, which is more documentation than we might expect for such an obscure figure. Finally there is Paul. As the official in charge of persecuting Chrisitans, Paul must have known very well whether not Jesus existed (In the same way I know whether or not Richard Nixon existed without ever having met him). Also, later he met Peter and James on friendly terms. Who could James and Peter have been in the Church without their special relationships to Jesus? Surely, if the only Jesus that ever existed was the one that visited Paul in his visions, Paul would have disputed with them for leadership of the church. And if Christianity was something created out of Paul's visions, then how could there have been Churches in Antioch and Jerusalem that he did not found, with their own leaders that he was ready to defer to? While Jesus is not as well attested as Augustus (for whom there is epigraphic evidence), the evidence for his existence is overwhelming compared to most of the 50 million or so people living the Empire at the time, and much better than people like Judas the Zealot (who gets a one line mention in Josephus), or Alexander of Abonouteichos who made a career representing his stage magic show as real miracle workings about a century after Jesus (and has his own anti-Gospel by Lucian). But no one doubts that they were real persons. It makes one think that there is some special motivation in Atheists wanting to to doubt the historicity of Jesus.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 12 July 2014

These are not either/or stories, but a mix of truth and fiction. There is history, but it is embellished with symbolism. They are meant to impart a moral much like other tales and even biographies up until very recently (see for instance Cavendish's "Life and Death of Cardinal Wolsey"). To claim Genesis is all allegory or metaphor is no more legitimate than claiming it is a literal history of the earth and its evolution.

I am just wondering, what Helen thinks about the historicity of other ancient figures - Herakles?, Odin? (did you know there are claims of his sighting in 12th c Scandinavia?), Odysseus? Could someone have fabricated those stories? Why couldn't "Jesus" be an amalgam of itinerant preachers wrapped up in the Messiah legends?

tomh · 12 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: I have determined based on evidence that Jesus's Resurrection as being historically and logically possible.

What an odd sentence. It is possible only if one redefines the word "evidence" to include any and all ancient maunderings as facts. It is possible only if one redefines the word "logically" to include miracles, such as returning from the dead, that are impossible by natural means. Only then is a Resurrection logically possible.

mattdance18 · 12 July 2014

tomh said: It is possible only if one redefines the word "logically" to include miracles, such as returning from the dead, that are impossible by natural means. Only then is a Resurrection logically possible.

There is no redefinition of "logically" involved. Something that is logically possible may very well be physically impossible. Because all that "logically possible" means is, the idea doesn't contain or imply any logical contradictions. I don't ordinarily cite Wikipedia entries, but this one is brief and effective: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logical_possibility As to historical possibility, I don't know what exactly David had in mind, but it seems to me that it could be similar to logical possibility: as long as something can be claimed without contradicting the historical evidence, it's historically possible. This isn't to say that one should believe that the Resurrection happened, necessarily. It's just to say that, logically and historically, there's nothing incoherent about believing that it did.

Scott F · 12 July 2014

Helena Constantine said:
...In contrast, there is no physical evidence one way or the other regarding the life, ministry, death, or resurrection of Jesus. For example, there is no fossil evidence for his resurrection, nor would anyone reasonably expect there to be. There are few written contemporary records of the times and places in which Jesus lived, and the ones we do have do not mention Jesus by either name or reputation. (IANA-Historian, so there may be such evidence of which I'm not currently aware.)...
I'll write this because there is a general misconception about the evidence for Jesus in the atheist community (thanks partly to crackpots like Richard Carrier).

Ah, thank you Helena. I stand corrected. While the existence of the Bible (and as you point out the Church itself and its leaders, for that matter) is certainly "evidence" of the existence of Jesus, the choice and nature of the Gospel stories tend to have a certain bias (one which you are certainly more capable of parsing than I am). I had been thinking about extra-biblical "evidence": actual physical evidence, or contemporaneous third-party accounts. I'd forgotten about Josephus. Despite the words I used ("life, ministry, death, or resurrection") which were perhaps hyperbolic, the point I wanted to make was the distinction between what I think of as "personal" or "local" miracles (turning water into wine, walking on water, personal resurrection, etc), and "global" miracles (ex nihilo Creation, a global flood, the Tower of Babel, etc). The latter would be expected to leave their mark on the world, with large amounts of physical evidence that should be visible even today. The former would not be expected to have been noticed by people outside the visual range of the event, or to leave any lasting evidence. The point was to attempt to answer the question, "Why can I disregard the claims of miracles in Genesis, yet accept the claims of miracles in the Gospels?" The distinction I was trying to make was the expectation of evidence of the "global" miracles, versus the expected lack of evidence of the "local" miracles. The former would be sufficient to contradict the claims of "global" miracles. The latter is ambiguous and leaves open the possibility (however remote) that the "local" miracles might have happened.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 12 July 2014

How much energy do you think it would take to bring someone back from the dead after three days? This would surely leave a mark, no?

Scott F · 12 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: How much energy do you think it would take to bring someone back from the dead after three days? This would surely leave a mark, no?

Leave a mark? Hardly. How much energy does it take to bring someone back who's been dead 3 minutes? Millivolts? If you want to talk about energy, Meteor Crater left a mark. Besides. Raising a body from the dead would probably require an actual miracle. Who knows what a supernatural event would entail? Such an act could have been either exothermic, endothermic, or neither. The YEC claims that raising the global water level several miles, and moving continents at a running pace required no energy expenditure at all. Raising a single body from the dead is trivial by comparison. No. I would not expect any physical evidence to remain of a single divine resurrection.

david.starling.macmillan · 12 July 2014

FL said: David M wrote,
I wonder if he thinks there is an Agnosticism Church where all the Agnostics get together and preach sermons about Not Knowing Anything and have fellowship nights where they talk about All The Things They Don’t Know.
I hate to say this, but...it's called the Unitarian Universalist Church.

And again, FL discourses at length about the things he doesn't know. Is there such a thing as unconscious agnosticism?

Agnosticism 101: Maybe God exists, but your mileage may vary. Maybe he created plants, animals, and humans, but your mileage may vary. Maybe it’s all just an illusion, the Earth, its contents, and the entire universe all just an illusion, as a Buddhist man once told me over a cup of hot coffee (which he also said was an illusion). But your mileage may vary. Maybe God loves and cares for you (from out there somewhere), but your mileage may vary. Maybe the Deists were right all along, God’s on a permanent vacation. Maybe Jesus actually paid the price and took the actual punishment for all your sins and mine on the Cross, but your mileage may vary. Maybe Jesus rose from the dead after being crucified, but your mileage may vary. Dr. Dominic Crossan, who’s an expert on the historical Jesus, wrote that the local wild dogs might have just eaten Jesus up after the crucifixion, just like they ate up so many other ordinary plop-to-the-ground crucifixion victims. So it don’t really matter what David affirms or fails to affirm about Atonement or Resurrection or anything, ‘cause your mileage may vary. Purina Jesus Chow, just right for your puppy’s health and stamina. Maybe Paul said in Romans 1:20 that God has revealed himself to everybody in such as way that NO EXCUSE can be had for choosing atheism and agnosticism. But…your mileage may very. **** And that’s the great religion of Agnosticism. Shrugging your shoulders ad-infinitum whenever anyone asks you, (the reader), to say out loud what is specifically real, and specifically not real, concerning God, Jesus, Bible, Humans, Salvation, Heaven, and Hell. YMMV.

And here we have FL's caricature strawman of agnosticism. Which, I might add, is not so far from the all-too-common caricature strawman of postmodernism, but that's another discussion. Isn't it obvious? FL is incapable of thinking about ideas on an abstract level. He is incapable of evaluating things like belief, certainty, and evidence. He hears "agnostic" and can only frame it in terms of an authoritarian structure that controls its adherent's modes of thought. He's forced to an invent an entire fictitious "Agnosticism" system just to address my mention of epistemic uncertainty. This is your brain on fundamentalism, "folks".

FL said:
You’re treating the Bible as a Source Of Authority rather than a Source Of Evidence.
Actually, you might be doing so as well, when it comes to the key issue of Jesus' Atonement.

Nope. Don't need to. The theological framework of Christianity makes specific claims about the nature of man, the purpose of creation, the universality of sin, the solution to evil, and more. I don't ever need to assume a source of authority; I can simply evaluate these claims against reality and determine consistency with my own experiences. It's really not that difficult.

...there is another Resurrection issue that should be mentioned. In one post, you say that "I do not know whether Jesus’s Resurrection is a historical fact." But then shortly thereafter, you use the phrase "the reality of the Resurrection." For me, the word "reality" is synonymous with the phrase "historical fact." For me, historical falsehoods do not dovetail with the term "reality."

Well, for one thing, you've got the words all mixed up. The "reality" of a particular event is a question, not a statement. Saying "the reality of the Resurrection" is roughly synonymous with saying "the question of whether the Resurrection is real". More importantly, you don't seem to understand the relationship between evidence, conclusions, and beliefs. I have concluded, based on evidence, that the Resurrection is logically and historically possible but not historically evidenced beyond reasonable doubt. At the same time, I have chosen to believe that the Resurrection did, in fact, take place even though I don't know, because I feel its place within the larger Christian theological framework makes more sense than the alternative. That's agnostic, and that's Christian. But to FL, incomprehensible and inconceivable.

On that note, let me stop and work on other writings. This is my last post I will write for this thread, though I will keep on reading other posters’ posts.

Ooh, did you suddenly realize that your BS had piled so high that not even you would be able to keep trying to hold it up?

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Which is more hyperbolic - gouge out your eye to avoid adultery or I am God incarnate or I died and came back to life three days later?

Depends, I suppose, on whether either is being seriously advanced as best common practice.

Any status Jesus grants women is erased by Paul - in fact the the post Gospel NT is one of the reasons I gave up on it.

Well, on the one hand, there's no reason to suppose that Paul was perfect. If the Old Testament writings were given to us that we might learn from them, the same can be assumed of the New Testament writings. Why would Paul be any more perfect in his elucidation of divine will or immune to cultural prejudice than his Old Testament counterparts? The falsely dichotomic insistence by fundamentalists that either every verse of the Bible is propositionally true as they read it or there's no way God could intend for us to learn from any of it...it's frustrating. Yet, even aside from all that, Paul's writings aren't necessarily so damning as I had once assumed. There's fairly good textual evidence that most well-known misogynistic text -- talking about women being silent -- is actually a quotation from one of the churches that had written to Paul, a quotation he immediately distances himself from and denounces.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 12 July 2014

Scott F said:
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: How much energy do you think it would take to bring someone back from the dead after three days? This would surely leave a mark, no?
Leave a mark? Hardly. How much energy does it take to bring someone back who's been dead 3 minutes? Millivolts? If you want to talk about energy, Meteor Crater left a mark. Besides. Raising a body from the dead would probably require an actual miracle. Who knows what a supernatural event would entail? Such an act could have been either exothermic, endothermic, or neither. The YEC claims that raising the global water level several miles, and moving continents at a running pace required no energy expenditure at all. Raising a single body from the dead is trivial by comparison. No. I would not expect any physical evidence to remain of a single divine resurrection.

Then, you don't have a clue.

david.starling.macmillan · 12 July 2014

I would argue that a single divine resurrection wouldn't be expected to leave any evidence at all, almost tautologically. The whole point of supernaturally reversing a death is to undo what has been done. Of course, in the case of Jesus, the account asserts that scars remained in his hands and side, so I suppose that's the only evidence we could reasonably expect to exist.

Of course, Jesus's body isn't exactly available for testing or observation.

callahanpb · 12 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: How much energy do you think it would take to bring someone back from the dead after three days? This would surely leave a mark, no?

Well, that is one of the explanations for the Shroud of Turin. It's certainly not one I've ever taken seriously. I agree with the other comments that there's no obvious way to measure the energy requirements and they wouldn't apply to a miracle anyway.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 12 July 2014

So magic doesn't require energy, who knew? This just shows how idiotic this whole thing is - it is not even possible. You don't want to think about it because it would burst the tiny little bubble of unreality you inhabit.

callahanpb · 12 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: So magic doesn't require energy, who knew? This just shows how idiotic this whole thing is - it is not even possible. You don't want to think about it because it would burst the tiny little bubble of unreality you inhabit.

I don't really follow your logic. I agree that a bodily resurrection after three days is implausible. Are you saying that it would be more plausible if associated with specific energy requirements? It seems like a red herring to me.

tomh · 12 July 2014

mattdance18 said: Because all that "logically possible" means is, the idea doesn't contain or imply any logical contradictions.

Well, if a person dying and coming back to life is not a logical contradiction, then anything one can dream up is logically possible, flying to the moon by flapping your arms, or whatever. Which makes your definition not only useless but incoherent.

Just Bob · 12 July 2014

I'm sure it's been posited many times before, but is it not possible the 'resurrection' was, in fact, some other guy, an impostor, capitalizing on Jesus' minor fame and rumors that he was a 'son of God', and therefore just might be death-proof? Did not his closest associates fail to recognize him? If wounds were presented for inspection, might they not have been faked by a fanatic with some superficial cuts?

It seems curious that one capable of miraculous reanimation (Wow!) would not have A) healed the wounds that killed him (Huh?), and B) not have been immediately recognized by his buddies.

Actually, the 'coming out of the grave with fatal wounds' makes phhht's "zombie" seem quite appropriate.

Helena Constantine · 12 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: .... I am just wondering, what Helen thinks about the historicity of other ancient figures - Herakles?, Odin? (did you know there are claims of his sighting in 12th c Scandinavia?), Odysseus? Could someone have fabricated those stories? Why couldn't "Jesus" be an amalgam of itinerant preachers wrapped up in the Messiah legends?

To answer the last question first--because he seem to have been an actual itinerant preacher. We know about a lot of such figures, none of them very significant, from Josephus. The connection from Jesus through Peter and James to Paul's texts 10 or 15 years after Jesus's death is persuasive. Herakles and Odin are gods, and are obviously part of Indo-Euroepan myth (lots of parallels with Indian myth etc). Epic poetry is very different from history (each performance of the poet was essentially a new literary creation, among other factors), and with 600 years separating Homer from its subject, I don't see Odysseus as being much more than an aristocratic name form the period. I suppose there was a king of Ithaca in the mid 12th century, but he's unlikely to have much to do with the character in Homer.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 12 July 2014

Did you know the last time I was in King's Cross Station in London I saw Platform 9 and 3/4 so I can only conclude that Harry Potter is a true story.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 12 July 2014

Jesus wasn't a god? Wait what planet am I on?

david.starling.macmillan · 12 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Jesus wasn't a god? Wait what planet am I on?

The gospels most definitely depict a human being. He can die, after all. Not a deity, not in the typical sense.

tomh said:
mattdance18 said: Because all that "logically possible" means is, the idea doesn't contain or imply any logical contradictions.
Well, if a person dying and coming back to life is not a logical contradiction, then anything one can dream up is logically possible, flying to the moon by flapping your arms, or whatever. Which makes your definition not only useless but incoherent.

Well, no. Flying to the moon by flapping your arms is not logically possible, because flapping your arms to fly requires air, and there is not enough air between here and the moon. It is a logical contradiction. On the other hand, it is not a logical impossibility to posit that an alien spacecraft could transport someone from the Earth to the moon and back. The possibility of such an event actually having taken place is vanishingly remote, of course, and one may make arguments about alien hiddenness that could conceivably abut logical impossibility, but that's a side issue. Logical possibility is a very specific sort of formal epistemic concept.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: So magic doesn't require energy, who knew? This just shows how idiotic this whole thing is - it is not even possible. You don't want to think about it because it would burst the tiny little bubble of unreality you inhabit.

The typical concept of a miracle is an event in which the state(s) of a physical system are altered by a nonphysical cause. While we can certainly place limits on the end products of such an event -- for instance, no physical systems may emerge from a miraculous event with energies below their ground states -- it is nonsensical to suppose that some minimum energy expenditure can be associated with a nonphysical cause. A "miracle" is tautologically unbound by the laws describing physical systems.

tomh · 12 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Flying to the moon by flapping your arms is not logically possible, because flapping your arms to fly requires air,

Of course it is logically possible, in the same way it is logically possible for a man to be dead for three days and come back to life. All it requires is a miracle, God's intervention, and it is obviously logically possible. If one can posit a miracle for Resurrection, surely one can posit a miracle for flying to the moon.

phhht · 12 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Jesus wasn't a god? Wait what planet am I on?
The gospels most definitely depict a human being. He can die, after all. Not a deity, not in the typical sense.

The gospels most definitely depict a non-human being. He can return from the dead, after all. Not a person, not in the typical sense.

tomh said:
mattdance18 said: Because all that "logically possible" means is, the idea doesn't contain or imply any logical contradictions.
Well, if a person dying and coming back to life is not a logical contradiction, then anything one can dream up is logically possible, flying to the moon by flapping your arms, or whatever. Which makes your definition not only useless but incoherent.
Well, no. Flying to the moon by flapping your arms is not logically possible, because flapping your arms to fly requires air, and there is not enough air between here and the moon. It is a logical contradiction.

And no, impregnating your mother with yourself is not logically possible, because fucking your own mom requires that you be already born and you haven't been. It is a logical contradiction.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 12 July 2014

I just went to the Magritte exhibition at the Art Institute in Chicago - much less surreal than anything in the comments here.....

Normal humans turn water into wine, walk on water, bring people back from the dead, drive demons into pigs, wither trees with their voice, multiply loaves and fishes - I rest my case.

phhht · 12 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: I just went to the Magritte exhibition at the Art Institute in Chicago - much less surreal than anything in the comments here..... Normal humans turn water into wine, walk on water, bring people back from the dead, drive demons into pigs, wither trees with their voice, multiply loaves and fishes - I rest my case.

Exactly. The demigod of the gospels is a superhero. He has powers far beyond those of mortal men! He can bend steel with his - oh wait, sorry, wrong gospel.

david.starling.macmillan · 12 July 2014

Just Bob said: I'm sure it's been posited many times before, but is it not possible the 'resurrection' was, in fact, some other guy, an impostor, capitalizing on Jesus' minor fame and rumors that he was a 'son of God', and therefore just might be death-proof? Did not his closest associates fail to recognize him? If wounds were presented for inspection, might they not have been faked by a fanatic with some superficial cuts? It seems curious that one capable of miraculous reanimation (Wow!) would not have A) healed the wounds that killed him (Huh?), and B) not have been immediately recognized by his buddies. Actually, the 'coming out of the grave with fatal wounds' makes phhht's "zombie" seem quite appropriate.

The whole "he was there but he was not recognized" business is, iirc, a literary trope common in this genre. Not to say that it couldn't have happened, mind you. But the account doesn't seem to indicate an imposter, not from a literary perspective.

tomh said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Flying to the moon by flapping your arms is not logically possible, because flapping your arms to fly requires air,
If one can posit a miracle for Resurrection, surely one can posit a miracle for flying to the moon.

Certainly, one can suppose a miracle wherein someone is supernaturally transported to the moon, supernaturally sustained from suffocation, and supernaturally returned. Such a supposition is a logical possibility. But the concept of flying to the moon by flapping one's arms, unaided by an outside force, is a logical impossibility. It proposes interaction (flapping) with a medium (atmosphere) that is implicitly admitted to not exist (at least, not in the intervening space between here and Luna). That's the logical contradiction.

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Jesus wasn't a god? Wait what planet am I on?
The gospels most definitely depict a human being. He can die, after all. Not a deity, not in the typical sense.
The gospels most definitely depict a non-human being. He can return from the dead, after all. Not a person, not in the typical sense.

Well, the gospels don't say it explicitly, but other portions of the New Testament say it was the Father who raised Jesus from the dead; Jesus was still just a man.

...impregnating your mother with yourself is not logically possible, because fucking your own mom requires that you be already born and you haven't been. It is a logical contradiction.

Yes, apart from logically consistent time-travel (which, depending on your view of causality, may or may not exist), physically impregnating your own mother with your own conceptus is definitely a logical impossibility. Not sure what relevance that has here, though.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Normal humans turn water into wine, walk on water, bring people back from the dead, drive demons into pigs, wither trees with their voice, multiply loaves and fishes - I rest my case.

I quote: Jesus said to them, "Truly, truly, I say to you, the Son can do nothing of his own accord, but only what he sees the Father doing. For whatever the Father does, that the Son does likewise. [...] The Father raises the dead and gives them life. [...] I can do nothing on my own." And I rest in turn.

phhht · 12 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
Just Bob said: I'm sure it's been posited many times before, but is it not possible the 'resurrection' was, in fact, some other guy, an impostor, capitalizing on Jesus' minor fame and rumors that he was a 'son of God', and therefore just might be death-proof? Did not his closest associates fail to recognize him? If wounds were presented for inspection, might they not have been faked by a fanatic with some superficial cuts? It seems curious that one capable of miraculous reanimation (Wow!) would not have A) healed the wounds that killed him (Huh?), and B) not have been immediately recognized by his buddies. Actually, the 'coming out of the grave with fatal wounds' makes phhht's "zombie" seem quite appropriate.
The whole "he was there but he was not recognized" business is, iirc, a literary trope common in this genre. Not to say that it couldn't have happened, mind you. But the account doesn't seem to indicate an imposter, not from a literary perspective.
tomh said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Flying to the moon by flapping your arms is not logically possible, because flapping your arms to fly requires air,
If one can posit a miracle for Resurrection, surely one can posit a miracle for flying to the moon.
Certainly, one can suppose a miracle wherein someone is supernaturally transported to the moon, supernaturally sustained from suffocation, and supernaturally returned. Such a supposition is a logical possibility. But the concept of flying to the moon by flapping one's arms, unaided by an outside force, is a logical impossibility. It proposes interaction (flapping) with a medium (atmosphere) that is implicitly admitted to not exist (at least, not in the intervening space between here and Luna). That's the logical contradiction.
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Jesus wasn't a god? Wait what planet am I on?
The gospels most definitely depict a human being. He can die, after all. Not a deity, not in the typical sense.
The gospels most definitely depict a non-human being. He can return from the dead, after all. Not a person, not in the typical sense.
Well, the gospels don't say it explicitly, but other portions of the New Testament say it was the Father who raised Jesus from the dead; Jesus was still just a man.
...impregnating your mother with yourself is not logically possible, because fucking your own mom requires that you be already born and you haven't been. It is a logical contradiction.
Yes, apart from logically consistent time-travel (which, depending on your view of causality, may or may not exist), physically impregnating your own mother with your own conceptus is definitely a logical impossibility. Not sure what relevance that has here, though.
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Normal humans turn water into wine, walk on water, bring people back from the dead, drive demons into pigs, wither trees with their voice, multiply loaves and fishes - I rest my case.
I quote: Jesus said to them, "Truly, truly, I say to you, the Son can do nothing of his own accord, but only what he sees the Father doing. For whatever the Father does, that the Son does likewise. [...] The Father raises the dead and gives them life. [...] I can do nothing on my own." And I rest in turn.

But I thought you guys were monotheists. Please explain to me how the same god - one and the same - can both do those miracles of the Son and not do them, because the doer is the Father. Nope, that's a logical impossibility there, David. And a laughable one.

callahanpb · 12 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: But the concept of flying to the moon by flapping one's arms, unaided by an outside force, is a logical impossibility. It proposes interaction (flapping) with a medium (atmosphere) that is implicitly admitted to not exist (at least, not in the intervening space between here and Luna). That's the logical contradiction.

I may be nitpicking, but the phrase "flying to the moon by flapping one's arms" doesn't suggest any particular mechanism for the arm flapping, so the lack of air is not really relevant. I agree that if you said "using the aerodynamic properties of space between earth and the moon" it would begin to look more like a contradiction in terms, but I don't see all that implied in "flapping one's arms." E.g., if I believed in "arm flapping magic" I would not have to attribute the flying to an outside force, but I also wouldn't have to concede that the flapping stopped working because of the lack of air. I would just say "Yes, some people are able to fly as far as the moon by flapping their arms. The power to fly arises from the movement of their arms and they cannot fly without actually flapping." Obviously, most people reject this statement, but not because it is a logical contradiction. They reject it because there is no empirical evidence for such an ability (and that it sounds ridiculous). Fantasy fiction makes assumptions about abilities that are not present in reality, but need not be obvious logical contradictions (though it's hard to avoid in some cases, e.g. with time travel stories). The fact that a statement is not a logical contradiction is setting a pretty low bar. I think the main distinction between accounts of miracles and arbitrary ridiculous claims is primarily the existence of a large constituency accustomed to hearing about the miracle rather than any intrinsic property of the claim itself.

callahanpb · 12 July 2014

BTW, I'm aware that arm flapping magic would contradict physics, notably conservation of momentum. That still doesn't make it a logical contradiction, just a special case not covered by Newton's laws. The most common logical contradictions I can think of are paradoxes of omnipotence (colorfully expressed in Homer Simpson's "Could Jesus microwave a burrito so hot that He Himself could not eat it?"). But think most claims of miracles are refuted what we know about reality rather than by logic alone.

Rolf · 13 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: So magic doesn't require energy, who knew? This just shows how idiotic this whole thing is - it is not even possible. You don't want to think about it because it would burst the tiny little bubble of unreality you inhabit.

IANAS but I have for a long time been intrigued by the problem of consolidating energy and magic. Could God perform miracles without using energy? Isn't there a reciprocity to the use of energy? If God is limited by the properties of the universe he created, what does that tell us about his omnipotence? How could he perform anything in the universe unless he is inside the universe - and therefore also subject to the rules and required to perform accordingly? There's only one method available to "break the rules of gravity" - use energy. (I am not certain about superfluid helium that, according to R. B. Laughlin can "crawl up the walls of a beaker all of its own and escape.") Without energy? The problem of course vanishes into thin air when we understand and accept what is obvious even by reading the Bible: His domain is not the manifest, manufactured, material world. The Kingdom of Heaven is not of this world, it is the world of spirit. For whatever man may be - man's got a soul, a world of spirit. It is blowing in the wind and there's nothing we can do about it. It is there, as near as your own breath, but not within "reaching distance".

Rolf · 13 July 2014

David Sterling MacMillan wrote:

But the account doesn’t seem to indicate an imposter, not from a literary perspective.

IMHO we can't be certain about anything of the "account" unless we can interview the author. That applies to most religious scripture.

Dave Lovell · 13 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: I would argue that a single divine resurrection wouldn't be expected to leave any evidence at all, almost tautologically. The whole point of supernaturally reversing a death is to undo what has been done. Of course, in the case of Jesus, the account asserts that scars remained in his hands and side, so I suppose that's the only evidence we could reasonably expect to exist. Of course, Jesus's body isn't exactly available for testing or observation.

I agree, and even if we had the body God would have ensured it had only the evidence he wanted us to find. But even as recorded, the "evidence" we have of the resurrection does not require a reversal of death, merely the temporary re-animation of a corpse. No need to re-boot the chemistry in every cell in it or even heal its wounds. The stories would be no different even if the resurrected Jesus could have been described as walking like Scott Tracey, with a sallow complexion and a whiff of formaldehyde. Pre-crucifixion treatment with a potion similar to the one administered in the film Death Becomes Her would be more than adequate to achieve the desired result.

harold · 13 July 2014

Helena Constantine said:
...In contrast, there is no physical evidence one way or the other regarding the life, ministry, death, or resurrection of Jesus. For example, there is no fossil evidence for his resurrection, nor would anyone reasonably expect there to be. There are few written contemporary records of the times and places in which Jesus lived, and the ones we do have do not mention Jesus by either name or reputation. (IANA-Historian, so there may be such evidence of which I'm not currently aware.)...
I'll write this because there is a general misconception about the evidence for Jesus in the atheist community (thanks partly to crackpots like Richard Carrier). The attestation for Jesus is remarkably good compared to most other ancient figures. Beginning with the Gospels themselves, they are obviously literary compositions that were written a generation or two after Jesus lived, and incorporate all of the most fantastic legends that had grown up about him in the meantime, and contain outright fabrications (the nativity stories, are an obvious instance). Yet they clearly contain the story of an itinerant Jewish peasant who had a career preaching against the temple and the aristocratic interests it supported, a perfectly plausible character. there is no special reason to doubt their core representation of Jesus' career as an itinerant preacher. You may say that this is switching the burden of proof, but actually arguing against the existence of Jesus, one would take on the enormous burden of providing an explanation of why and how the author of Mark would have fabricated such a thing. One can see a mythology similar to that of Gospels growing up now over Menachem Scheersohn, but it can only grow because Scheersohn was an actual person with an important effect on his community. There is also Josephus. The so-called Testimonium Flavianum is obviously a Christian interpolation into the text, but it was occasioned by an authentic part of the text. Josephus mentions the execution of James and describes him as the leader of the movement founded by his brother Jesus, which is more documentation than we might expect for such an obscure figure. Finally there is Paul. As the official in charge of persecuting Chrisitans, Paul must have known very well whether not Jesus existed (In the same way I know whether or not Richard Nixon existed without ever having met him). Also, later he met Peter and James on friendly terms. Who could James and Peter have been in the Church without their special relationships to Jesus? Surely, if the only Jesus that ever existed was the one that visited Paul in his visions, Paul would have disputed with them for leadership of the church. And if Christianity was something created out of Paul's visions, then how could there have been Churches in Antioch and Jerusalem that he did not found, with their own leaders that he was ready to defer to? While Jesus is not as well attested as Augustus (for whom there is epigraphic evidence), the evidence for his existence is overwhelming compared to most of the 50 million or so people living the Empire at the time, and much better than people like Judas the Zealot (who gets a one line mention in Josephus), or Alexander of Abonouteichos who made a career representing his stage magic show as real miracle workings about a century after Jesus (and has his own anti-Gospel by Lucian). But no one doubts that they were real persons. It makes one think that there is some special motivation in Atheists wanting to to doubt the historicity of Jesus.

Exactly. I'd expand on this comment, but I'm not interested in a flame war. Suffice to say, a bad argument is a bad argument, regardless of the motivation of the argument.

harold · 13 July 2014

callahanpb said:
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: So magic doesn't require energy, who knew? This just shows how idiotic this whole thing is - it is not even possible. You don't want to think about it because it would burst the tiny little bubble of unreality you inhabit.
I don't really follow your logic. I agree that a bodily resurrection after three days is implausible. Are you saying that it would be more plausible if associated with specific energy requirements? It seems like a red herring to me.

No, he's saying something different. Allow me to translate his comments. I note in advance that I myself am totally non-religious. Here is the translation of his comments - "I am about thirteen years old, physically and/or in terms of maturity. Either I was terribly afraid of hell as a child and have just gotten over it, or I was raised by upper class atheist parents to think of religion as something for poor people in 'trailer parks'. Either way I have a strong bias against what I call 'religion'. Because I am culturally biased and arrogant overall, what I call 'religion' is the narrow group of religious sects which I, personally, am familiar with. My discovery that I am an 'atheist', combined with my cultural arrogance and immaturity, creates an impulse to sneer and insult in a juvenile way. But I'm a bit afraid to do it. What I'll do is find the least threatening venue I can - I'll attack other, more polite atheists for 'not being atheist enough' or something of that nature. I'll find some atheist who doesn't declare that some past claim of a miracle is 'impossible', and I'll nitpick - in very nasty language - about whether or not such a thing is 'impossible' or merely 'very unlikely'. If they won't say 'impossible' I'll jeer at them as not atheist enough. In order to guarantee conflict, I'll use illogical arguments but pretend not to see the illogic. And I'll also create straw man distortions of what others say." Sometimes it's important to read what others are actually saying. Cutting to the point saves time.

david.starling.macmillan · 13 July 2014

phhht said: I thought you guys were monotheists. Please explain to me how the same god - one and the same - can both do those miracles of the Son and not do them, because the doer is the Father.

Nah, traditional Christianity isn't really monotheistic, not in any strict sense.

callahanpb said: BTW, I'm aware that arm flapping magic would contradict physics, notably conservation of momentum. That still doesn't make it a logical contradiction, just a special case not covered by Newton's laws.

Yeah, it depends on how rigorously one defines "flapping". essentially, I had taken it to mean "Certain people can fly by interacting with air without interacting with air" which is indeed a logical impossibility.

Rolf said:
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: So magic doesn't require energy, who knew? This just shows how idiotic this whole thing is - it is not even possible. You don't want to think about it because it would burst the tiny little bubble of unreality you inhabit.
IANAS but I have for a long time been intrigued by the problem of consolidating energy and magic. Could God perform miracles without using energy? Isn't there a reciprocity to the use of energy? If God is limited by the properties of the universe he created, what does that tell us about his omnipotence? How could he perform anything in the universe unless he is inside the universe - and therefore also subject to the rules and required to perform accordingly? There's only one method available to "break the rules of gravity" - use energy. (I am not certain about superfluid helium that, according to R. B. Laughlin can "crawl up the walls of a beaker all of its own and escape.") Without energy?

Physics sidebar time! Most liquids stay in a cohesive "pile" (e.g. water droplets, beads) because of surface tension caused by intermolecular attraction. Without surface tension, a drop of water would just spread out and out and out infinitely due to the momentum of the molecules. The surface of a cup of water is held in place because tension is balanced against the internal momentum of the molecules. Liquid helium has no tension, so the momentum of its atoms will cause it to spread out aggressively in every direction, even climbing walls. But the energy for this comes from the existing momentum of the atoms, so conservation of energy is preserved. Back on topic: is God bound by the laws of physics in interaction with physical reality? I answered this earlier: a miracle must leave the a physical system in a physically possible state. At the end of a miracle, the system will pick up the Standard Model wherever it left off. But the miracle itself may alter the state(s) of the system without requiring all the intermediary steps that would be physically required to reach that goal. As far as God being forced to be inside the physical universe in order to interact with it, thus limiting his abilities, that's nonsense. It's The Matrix analogy. If Neo can see the code, the code can't control him.

Rolf said: David Starling MacMillan wrote:
But the account doesn’t seem to indicate an imposter, not from a literary perspective.
IMHO we can't be certain about anything of the "account" unless we can interview the author. That applies to most religious scripture.

Certain? No, of course we can't claim certainty. But we can absolutely judge one explanation as being more probable than another, based on what we know about ancient literature. In this case, the "it was actually an imposter" explanation is not nearly as probable as the "author was using a common, well-understood literary device" explanation.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 13 July 2014

Harold, sneering at others for sneering at others is so more mature than just sneering at others, no? Keep working on the ESP - maybe it will work for you some day.

If something is logically possible, then all it needs is for the conclusion to match the premises. It says nothing about the premises being true. If I allow for magic or gods acting outside the universe, then just about anything is logically possible. It really explains nothing.

David, can you perform miracles? Have you? Do you know others who can or have also? Next time I am at a party, should I ask a Christian to turn my water in to a nice Zin? Can I expect anything more than this being logically possible given the premises?
If what you say is true, then Christians seem to have very little faith.

I must also note that quoting Bible verses is using the Bible as authority unless you have evidence it works, no?

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 13 July 2014

Oh and David, which is more hyperbolic - chopping your arm off or gouging your eye out to avoid adultery or having the faith the size of a mustard seed allowing you to move mountains?

See even the devil can quote scripture.

david.starling.macmillan · 13 July 2014

A Masked Panda said: If something is logically possible, then all it needs is for the conclusion to match the premises. It says nothing about the premises being true. If I allow for magic or gods acting outside the universe, then just about anything is logically possible.

True. But the opposite is not allowing for the possibility of nonphysical causes, which means you’ve established an a priori commitment to metaphysical naturalism as your starting presupposition: precisely what creationists typically accuse all scientists of doing. If you're going to reject the possibility of supernatural action right out of the gate, then you've already established your conclusion before you've even examined the premises. Of course, we don't presume that nonphysical causes are at work. That would be committing the same fallacy from the opposite side. But we can't make the mistake of disallowing the logical possibility of such causes, or we lose our ability to test our presuppositions. A presupposition which cannot be tested is not a presupposition worth holding.

David, can you perform miracles? Have you?

Of course I can. I turn water into wine ALL the time. Ever since I became a Christian, I've been drunk pretty much 24/7. It's awesome. In all seriousness, though, your argument is a non sequitur. The possibility of a transcendent being altering the physical states of its creation does not imply that Christians would be able to magically manipulate reality at will.

I must also note that quoting Bible verses is using the Bible as authority unless you have evidence it works, no?

There are a lot of reasons someone might quote the Bible. You can quote the Bible as a source of authority, sure. You can also quote the Bible as an example of a particular mode of thought, or as evidence of what particular people believed at a particular time, or as a step in the process of deconstructing prevailing social norms. You can quote the Bible in order to articulate a particular worldview or argument. You can quote the Bible in order to compare its claims about human nature to observed realities. You can even quote the Bible in an effort to discredit it.

Oh and David, which is more hyperbolic - chopping your arm off or gouging your eye out to avoid adultery or having the faith the size of a mustard seed allowing you to move mountains?

All seems like rhetorical hyperbole to me.

Jimpithecus · 13 July 2014

"the idea that death itself is a physical abnormality resulting directly from a single physical human action in history – is only a very recent and very sectarian doctrine. The Church has historically interpreted the Curse and Original Sin in many different ways, only a handful of which bear any resemblance at all to the YEC dogma"

What is your source for this?

tomh · 13 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: If you're going to reject the possibility of supernatural action right out of the gate, then you've already established your conclusion before you've even examined the premises.

Does this mean you give equal weight to the possibility of natural or supernatural action? In spite of all evidence pointing towards natural action, and zero evidence pointing towards supernatural action? And what are these premises for supernatural action that one can examine? Perhaps if you listed a few it would make your position less nebulous.

Matt Young · 13 July 2014

I’m sure it’s been posited many times before, but is it not possible the ‘resurrection’ was, in fact, some other guy, an impostor, capitalizing on Jesus’ minor fame and rumors that he was a ‘son of God’, and therefore just might be death-proof? Did not his closest associates fail to recognize him? If wounds were presented for inspection, might they not have been faked by a fanatic with some superficial cuts?

My own pet theory is that Jesus was released or escaped – and everyone knew it. Consequently, they made up a cover story about the release of a thief. Somewhat unimaginatively, they called their thief Barabbas or, in some manuscripts, Jesus Barabbas. Barabbas is a Greek adaptation of the Hebrew Bar-Abba, or Son of Abba. Abba is a Hebrew name (I do not know whether it was then), but it also means father. I claim that there can be only one Jesus Son of Father in the so-called New Testament. Thus, Barabbas was Jesus, and there was no Resurrection because he did not die on the cross. That his close associates failed to recognize him, even after he had been known to be prowling, can easily be explained (explained it away, if you prefer) by arguing that they met someone else and later convinced themselves that it had been Jesus.

Matt Young · 13 July 2014

Curses! Hit Submit by mistake. That should be "explained away," not "explained it away."

callahanpb · 13 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: There are a lot of reasons someone might quote the Bible. You can quote the Bible as a source of authority, sure. You can also quote the Bible as an example of a particular mode of thought, or as evidence of what particular people believed at a particular time, or as a step in the process of deconstructing prevailing social norms. You can quote the Bible in order to articulate a particular worldview or argument. You can quote the Bible in order to compare its claims about human nature to observed realities. You can even quote the Bible in an effort to discredit it.

You can also quote the Bible not just to illustrate a worldview, but because it resonates with the Western worldview, which has been influenced by it. This would have gone without saying a hundred years ago, when there was a general expectation that most Westerners had encountered the Bible directly. Today it's less common, and many people might not get a reference like "sold his birthright for a mess of pottage." Even an expression like "prodigal son" might be widely understood without being able to place it as a specific parable. For the most part, I don't think the Bible is great literature even by standards of ancient writing (e.g. compared to Homer). However, it does have some vivid images that I don't feel I should have to shun just to avoid being called a religious wacko. To give some examples: I like the image of Moses holding up his arms to insure victory, and particularly that having other people hold up his arms for him was also effective. I like the image of Jesus making a mud of dirt and his own spit to cure a blind person (and the contrast with the centurion's servant healed remotely just by the faith of the centurion). I was (only recently for some reason) made aware of the expression "I tell you if they keep quiet, the stones will cry out." and I just made a mental note of this, not even sure what I like about it, but for lack of a better word, it resonates. The literary/cultural view of the Bible will not satisfy either the fundamentalist or (usually) the atheist, and the idea is not original to me. I just find that a lot of the focus of rationality and empiricism tends to ignore the richness of human thought (Walt Whitman's "multitudes"), which is not all about applying deductive logic to the available evidence. I agree that it is scandalous for anything other than sound scientific reasoning to find its way into a peer-reviewed science paper or (worse) a high school science classroom. But beyond that, I think we all have the freedom to think what we want and express ourselves the way we want. As I grow older, and less likely to feel any actual faith, I also feel less inclined to shun religious language if it fits. There is no moral or legal obligation to be "correct" about anything or reach the "correct" conclusion by a sound method. Obviously, our actions shouldn't be harmful, and when other people depend on us, our actions should be driven by the best methods of decision-making available (generally rational, but often heuristic when fast decisions are need). What actually matters is the consequences of decisions, not insuring that these decisions have a sound philosophical basis.

W. H. Heydt · 13 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: ...impregnating your mother with yourself is not logically possible, because fucking your own mom requires that you be already born and you haven't been. It is a logical contradiction.

Robert A. Heinlein solved that one rather neatly. Perhaps you missed reading All You Zombies since, as has been noted before, the "Golden Age of Science Fiction" is "about 13" and at that time you were deeply enmeshed in Fundamentalism.

david.starling.macmillan · 13 July 2014

Jimpithecus said: "the idea that death itself is a physical abnormality resulting directly from a single physical human action in history – is only a very recent and very sectarian doctrine. The Church has historically interpreted the Curse and Original Sin in many different ways, only a handful of which bear any resemblance at all to the YEC dogma" What is your source for this?

Church history. The church has, at various times and in various places, viewed Original Sin as a biologically inherited predisposition to sin, as a spiritually inherited predisposition to sin, as mortality itself, as an inherited culpability for Adam's sin, as a concupiscence born of the lust wherein humans are conceived (e.g. a byproduct of sexual congress), and more. Those are only the more fundamentalist explanations. "The Curse" has been variously identified with labor, with hunger, with disease, with aging, with sexual desire, with natural disasters, and even with marital conflict. How the Curse and Original Sin fit together has differed across numerous theologies. YECs would have us believe that their union between sectarian doctrines and pseudoscience is an essential characteristic of Christian theology, but that's flatly false.

tomh said: Does this mean you give equal weight to the possibility of natural or supernatural action? In spite of all evidence pointing towards natural action, and zero evidence pointing towards supernatural action?

Equal weight? Certainly not. Given the glaring lack of empirical evidence for supernatural action, one would need to demand at least a very large amount of coherent testimony before considering the supernatural would be at all reasonable. But if you disallow it at the outset, as our masked friend seems intent on doing, then it wouldn't matter if you DID have irrefutable empirical evidence, because you'd still be blocked from inquiry.

And what are these premises for supernatural action that one can examine? Perhaps if you listed a few it would make your position less nebulous.

Well, the only way of learning about any event for which direct empirical evidence is unavailable -- such as most of human history -- is to compare the available accounts and propose the most reasonable explanation.

Matt Young said:
I’m sure it’s been posited many times before, but is it not possible the ‘resurrection’ was, in fact, some other guy, an impostor, capitalizing on Jesus’ minor fame and rumors that he was a ‘son of God’, and therefore just might be death-proof? Did not his closest associates fail to recognize him? If wounds were presented for inspection, might they not have been faked by a fanatic with some superficial cuts?
My own pet theory is that Jesus was released or escaped – and everyone knew it. Consequently, they made up a cover story about the release of a thief. Somewhat unimaginatively, they called their thief Barabbas or, in some manuscripts, Jesus Barabbas. Barabbas is a Greek adaptation of the Hebrew Bar-Abba, or Son of Abba. Abba is a Hebrew name (I do not know whether it was then), but it also means father. I claim that there can be only one Jesus Son of Father in the so-called New Testament. Thus, Barabbas was Jesus, and there was no Resurrection because he did not die on the cross. That his close associates failed to recognize him, even after he had been known to be prowling, can easily be explained (explained it away, if you prefer) by arguing that they met someone else and later convinced themselves that it had been Jesus.

I've heard it suggested among evangelicals that the Pharisees took advantage of the similarities between "Jesus Bar Abbas" (Son of the Father) and "Jesus Bar Adam" (Son of Man) to trick the crowd into railroading Jesus over Pilate's objections. I don't find it particularly likely, as it doesn't really fit with the rest of the story, but it's an interesting source of speculation. I confess that I do find a certain appeal in Matt's explanation...something going on behind the scenes, with only traces of the coverup showing through. I'm sure Rolf and his Jesus Mysteries would have a whole big explanation there. But the problem I see is the complete lack of any claim, even in the most fringe sects maligned at length by Martyr and Clement and others, that Jesus had stuck around on Earth for any appreciable time. If he'd really survived, then surely he would have been mentioned by someone in some sect somewhere.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 13 July 2014

Can't answer a simple question, can you David? I love when Christians try to out-Bible someone else only to end up not knowing as much as they think they do. Lovely ploy with the reasons too bad you are covering for using the Bible as authority, nice try though. I can agree with you on science, but too bad your religious arguments are so weak, but then they all are.

david.starling.macmillan · 13 July 2014

A Masked Panda said: Can't answer a simple question, can you David? I love when Christians try to out-Bible someone else only to end up not knowing as much as they think they do. Lovely ploy with the reasons too bad you are covering for using the Bible as authority, nice try though. I can agree with you on science, but too bad your religious arguments are so weak, but then they all are.

Uhm...what? What question are you referring to? When did I quote the Bible as an authority? And whatever happened to grammar and diction?

phhht · 13 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Jesus wasn't a god? Wait what planet am I on?
The gospels most definitely depict a human being. He can die, after all. Not a deity, not in the typical sense.
The gospels most definitely depict a non-human being. He can return from the dead, after all. Not a person, not in the typical sense.
Well, the gospels don't say it explicitly, but other portions of the New Testament say it was the Father who raised Jesus from the dead; Jesus was still just a man.

No, no, no, David. You must not deny the divinity of Jesus! That's a big Holy No-No!

...impregnating your mother with yourself is not logically possible, because fucking your own mom requires that you be already born and you haven't been. It is a logical contradiction.
Yes, apart from logically consistent time-travel (which, depending on your view of causality, may or may not exist), physically impregnating your own mother with your own conceptus is definitely a logical impossibility. Not sure what relevance that has here, though.

So how many gods are there, then, if more than One God? Three? Four? Thousands?

Rolf · 14 July 2014

Glad to help with that: From the Upanishads:

How Many Gods? THEN Vidagdha Sakalya asked him: "How many gods are there, O Yajnavalkya?" He replied with this formula: "As many as are mentioned in the formula of the hymn of praise addressed to the Visvedevas, viz., three and three hundred, three and three thousand." "Yes," he said, and asked again: "How many gods are there really, O Yajnavalkya?" "Thirty-three," he said. "Yes," he said,and asked again: "How many gods are there really, O Yajnavalkya? " " Six," he said. " Yes," he said, and asked again: "How many gods are there really, O Yajnavalkya? " " Three," he said. "Yes," he said, and asked again: "How many gods are there really, O Yajnavalkya?" " Two," he said. " Yes," he said, and asked again: "How many gods are there really, O Yajnavalkya ? " " ane and a half (adhyardha)," he said. " Yes," he said, and asked again: "How many gods are there really, O Yajnavalkya?" " ane," he said. "Yes," he said, and asked: "Who are these three and three hundred, three and three thousand ? " Yajnavalkya replied: "Theyare only the various powers."

Rolf · 14 July 2014

Oops, scanner error: ane should be one...

TomS · 14 July 2014

Rolf said: Oops, scanner error: ane should be one...

And I was thinking that Yajnavalkya was a Scotsman.

Rolf · 14 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Jesus wasn't a god? Wait what planet am I on?
The gospels most definitely depict a human being. He can die, after all. Not a deity, not in the typical sense.
The gospels most definitely depict a non-human being. He can return from the dead, after all. Not a person, not in the typical sense.
Well, the gospels don't say it explicitly, but other portions of the New Testament say it was the Father who raised Jesus from the dead; Jesus was still just a man.
No, no, no, David. You must not deny the divinity of Jesus! That's a big Holy No-No!

...impregnating your mother with yourself is not logically possible, because fucking your own mom requires that you be already born and you haven't been. It is a logical contradiction.
Yes, apart from logically consistent time-travel (which, depending on your view of causality, may or may not exist), physically impregnating your own mother with your own conceptus is definitely a logical impossibility. Not sure what relevance that has here, though.
So how many gods are there, then, if more than One God? Three? Four? Thousands?

Ah, theology... IMHO, 'regular' scientists and atheism-light proponents are not too good at theology. God is not inside the universe but may be outside of the universe? There goes omnipresence. Isn't the universe all we know? A riddle for the 21st century: Do we (how could we?) find God inside black holes? Dying and resurrecting. DSM may have whatever ideas about that subject, AFAIK it is well documented that the concept of birth and rebirth predate the Gospels with several thousand years. The Mosaic and Christian religions of course evolved from the earlier fertility religions (Kings 18:26-29), Pagan Origins We find a stage in the development of the Jesus myth described in a book I made a translation of many years ago: Religion or Psychology That’s my argument today.

david.starling.macmillan · 14 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: The gospels don't say it explicitly, but other portions of the New Testament say it was the Father who raised Jesus from the dead; Jesus was still just a man.
No, no, no, David. You must not deny the divinity of Jesus! That's a big Holy No-No!

Who says I'm denying the preexistence or divinity of Jesus? In the Incarnation, Jesus was just a man. He didn't know the future. He had to pray to the Father and depend on the Spirit. That's the whole point of the Incarnation: God becoming Man, not God becoming God-pretending-to-be-an-ordinary-dude-but-really-not.

Rolf said: God is not inside the universe but may be outside of the universe? There goes omnipresence. Isn't the universe all we know? A riddle for the 21st century: Do we (how could we?) find God inside black holes?

Again, Matrix analogy here.

Dying and resurrecting. DSM may have whatever ideas about that subject, AFAIK it is well documented that the concept of birth and rebirth predate the Gospels with several thousand years.

It's not ideas that I have so much as an understanding of the evidence and historical background.

Henry J · 14 July 2014

So how many gods are there, then, if more than One God? Three? Four? Thousands?

Seven billion and something. ;)

Rolf · 14 July 2014

It’s not ideas that I have so much as an understanding of the evidence and historical background.

Relaxing criteria for counting as evidence for evolution to that level we might as well abandon ship. If there actually had been evidence of the quality that such astounding events would leave there should not have been such dearth of incontrovertible evidence. They didn't even manage to create credible evidence.

david.starling.macmillan · 14 July 2014

Henry J said:
So how many gods are there, then, if more than One God? Three? Four? Thousands?
Seven billion and something. ;)

I like this.

Rolf said:
It’s not ideas that I have so much as an understanding of the evidence and historical background.
Relaxing criteria for counting as evidence for evolution to that level we might as well abandon ship. If there actually had been evidence of the quality that such astounding events would leave there should not have been such dearth of incontrovertible evidence. They didn't even manage to create credible evidence.

Right, absence of evidence is evidence of absence. As usual, though -- why? Which extant extrabiblical sources would you have expected to mention (or have more mention) of Jesus and the events described in the Gospels?

phhht · 14 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
Who says I'm denying the preexistence or divinity of Jesus? In the Incarnation, Jesus was just a man. He didn't know the future. He had to pray to the Father and depend on the Spirit. That's the whole point of the Incarnation: God becoming Man, not God becoming God-pretending-to-be-an-ordinary-dude-but-really-not.

I'm not fully conversant with the details of your religious beliefs. Does that mean Jesus was a god, or "just a guy?" I don't blame you for dodging the question of how many gods there are. Of course you do not know; no one does. Why not just say so? All we know for sure it that there is no empirical evidence for the existence of even a single god. So how many gods do you believe in? I ask because you attempt to resolve the question of who (what?) impregnated Mary with whom (what?) by implying that it wasn't the same god that she bore. Some other god did it. Or have I misunderstood?

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 14 July 2014

What I find interesting is how theists believe in magic, but refuse to admit they do and avoid any systematic study of magic. Magic has played an enormous role in human history and yet modern theists act as if that history never happened. They believe their magic is not really magic at all. How many evangelicals do you know that refused to let their kids read Harry Potter?

Dan Dennett talks about how his friend Lee Siegel was writing a book on magic - to which people ask real magic or stage magic? Dennett replies stage magic is real magic, the other kind is not real magic it is make believe.

Also the idea that one can use magic without any other consequences is odd - as if a god in his super-secret exo-universal home trots down to the wine cellar grabs a few gallons of red, pops over to the wedding feast, drinks up all the water, refills the vats, deftly covers his tracks, and pops back outside the universe to relieve is aching bladder. I am sure people will concentrate on my parody and not on any substance. Will it be that god has no bladder or that his home doesn't have a wine cellar - we shall see.

callahanpb · 14 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Right, absence of evidence is evidence of absence.

I agree, but I think the confusion results from making claims without specifying a standard of reasoning. In mathematics, it is reasonable, conventional, and absolutely correct to point out that absence of evidence of a counterexample to (for instance) Goldbach's conjecture is not a proof of Goldbach's conjecture ("Every even integer greater than 2 can be expressed as the sum of two primes"). This doesn't mean that mathematics results in a separate set of facts, distinct from other human endeavors. The absence of counterexamples (even integers greater than 2 expressible as the sum of two primes) was sufficient evidence for Goldbach to let himself be associated with the conjecture. He would not have conjectured something if he expected it to be refuted easily. Today a much larger range of prospective counterexamples has been tested computationally. There may be some other reasons as well for thinking the conjecture to be true. None of this is a mathematical proof, but it is certainly reason to hold the claim provisionally and even to act on this belief (e.g. in setting odds, announcing awards, making wagers etc.). I'm much more comfortable thinking as a mathematician then as an experimental scientist, and I'm not totally clear on what it means for a claim to be a "fact." The closest I would come to this is to assert a provisional belief. I also don't believe that there is any need to maintain just one provisional belief as much as an ordering in terms of plausibility. By analogy, if I am in my house, desperately looking for my car keys, I may rapidly formulate and test provisional beliefs. If I haven't found my car keys, and I haven't looked in the back of the freezer, I don't feel I can rule out the possibility that my car keys are in the back of the freezer. But without any good reason to think I will find them there, I will probably check other places first. After failing to find the keys in other places, I may eventually look in the back of the freezer. This is more likely than proposing that they fell into a micro-blackhole produced by the large hadron collider. There is an infinity of possible explanations, and my personal take on Occam's razor is not that it determines truth but that it provides an effective strategy for deciding which hypotheses are worth testing. When it's all done, and I place my keys in the ignition, starting the car, even this isn't necessary dispositive. Instead, I may suddenly awake, find that this was a dream and I still don't know where my keys are. But rigorous epistemology is less of a concern to me than getting to work on time, so I act on my provisional belief that the keys are real, and the car is real. In connection to science, absence of evidence is certainly a good reason for dismissing a provisional belief as meriting further discussion. It is simply too easy to generate new beliefs consistent with available evidence. However you wish to classify these consistent-but-unsupported claims, they cannot be placed on the same footing with scientific fact.

callahanpb · 14 July 2014

I also have to admit that David's beliefs about monotheism are very confusing to me. The explanation of the trinity I was taught seemed much simpler than David's detailed analysis, and I was told in no uncertain terms that it was consistent with monotheism. On the other hand, I don't feel a need to place detailed requirements on Christian belief.

Far from FL's claim that evolution is the "universal acid" I would counter that thinking too hard about theology is at least as corrosive to faith.

callahanpb · 14 July 2014

callahanpb said: counterexamples (even integers greater than 2 expressible as the sum of two primes)

That should be "even integers greater than 2 not expressible as the sum of two primes."

eric · 14 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Who says I'm denying the preexistence or divinity of Jesus? In the Incarnation, Jesus was just a man. He didn't know the future. He had to pray to the Father and depend on the Spirit. That's the whole point of the Incarnation: God becoming Man, not God becoming God-pretending-to-be-an-ordinary-dude-but-really-not.

Dude, you don't know how many times I've wanted my tap water to turn into beer, but it never does at my command. The person who can do that is not "just a man." Now there's clearly people past and present who believe he was just a man. Jefferson being a famous example, literally cutting all the miraculous bits out of his NT. However, I would argue that any view of Jesus approaching a mainstream version of Christianity does not think of him as 'just a man.' He was at the very least a man who had the power to work miracles that just-a-men don't. Don't really care to get into the "was/wasn't a real historical figure behind the stories" argument. Doesn't much matter to me. Completely off topic, but did you all know that Daffy Duck was based on a real person? Chuck Jones (et al.'s) real boss has a lisp and a bad temper, so they used that and then just added some fictive elements (like being a duck) to make the character more interesting.

david.starling.macmillan · 14 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
Who says I'm denying the preexistence or divinity of Jesus? In the Incarnation, Jesus was just a man. He didn't know the future. He had to pray to the Father and depend on the Spirit. That's the whole point of the Incarnation: God becoming Man, not God becoming God-pretending-to-be-an-ordinary-dude-but-really-not.

I'm not fully conversant with the details of your religious beliefs. Does that mean Jesus was a god, or "just a guy?" I don't blame you for dodging the question of how many gods there are. Of course you do not know; no one does.

The orthodox Christian view of the Incarnation is that there are three divine individuals which can nonetheless be represented as a single collective deity because they share the same properties and coexistence, which is atypical in polytheism. In this view, one of the three individuals relinquished his divine attributes in order to become a human being. Going from outside the universe to inside the universe is the mysterious part, I suppose. As it would ostensibly be unnecessary and downright creepy to sexually impregnate a human mother, it is generally believed that the embryo which would become Jesus was created ex nihilo in Mary's womb.

david.starling.macmillan · 14 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: What I find interesting is how theists believe in magic, but refuse to admit they do and avoid any systematic study of magic. Magic has played an enormous role in human history and yet modern theists act as if that history never happened. They believe their magic is not really magic at all. How many evangelicals do you know that refused to let their kids read Harry Potter?

Well, my family, for one. But there's a simple reason why "magic" is not the usual term used in reference to miracles. Most of the time, magic is used to refer to "natural" abilities that are possessed either by specific individuals or specifically trained individuals. The use of magic is portrayed as the use of abilities which arise as part of the properties of the universe, not abilities which arise from a transcendent entity. Proposing that the transcendent creator can alter physical states through nonphysical causes is quite a different proposition.

The idea that one can use magic without any other consequences is odd - as if a god in his super-secret exo-universal home trots down to the wine cellar grabs a few gallons of red, pops over to the wedding feast, drinks up all the water, refills the vats, deftly covers his tracks, and pops back outside the universe to relieve is aching bladder.

It's unclear why you think a change in the state of physical systems which does not follow physical processes would somehow be subject to physical processes. Isn't that illogical?

callahanpb said: I also have to admit that David's beliefs about monotheism are very confusing to me. The explanation of the trinity I was taught seemed much simpler than David's detailed analysis, and I was told in no uncertain terms that it was consistent with monotheism.

I'll admit Christian theology is a monotheistic theology, but I knew that phhht was using monotheism to mean something different.

eric said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Who says I'm denying the preexistence or divinity of Jesus? In the Incarnation, Jesus was just a man. He didn't know the future. He had to pray to the Father and depend on the Spirit. That's the whole point of the Incarnation: God becoming Man, not God becoming God-pretending-to-be-an-ordinary-dude-but-really-not.
Dude, you don't know how many times I've wanted my tap water to turn into beer, but it never does at my command. The person who can do that is not "just a man."

But if you prayed that your tap water turned into beer, and a supernatural entity granted your request, you would still be a man. In other words, even orthodox Christianity will typically admit that Jesus was depending on the Spirit to work miracles; he wasn't doing them himself.

phhht · 14 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
Who says I'm denying the preexistence or divinity of Jesus? In the Incarnation, Jesus was just a man. He didn't know the future. He had to pray to the Father and depend on the Spirit. That's the whole point of the Incarnation: God becoming Man, not God becoming God-pretending-to-be-an-ordinary-dude-but-really-not.

I'm not fully conversant with the details of your religious beliefs. Does that mean Jesus was a god, or "just a guy?" I don't blame you for dodging the question of how many gods there are. Of course you do not know; no one does.
The orthodox Christian view of the Incarnation is that there are three divine individuals which can nonetheless be represented as a single collective deity because they share the same properties and coexistence, which is atypical in polytheism.

So how many gods is that, three or one? Can't be both, not unless you assert the counterfactual.

In this view, one of the three individuals relinquished his divine attributes in order to become a human being. Going from outside the universe to inside the universe is the mysterious part, I suppose. As it would ostensibly be unnecessary and downright creepy to sexually impregnate a human mother, it is generally believed that the embryo which would become Jesus was created ex nihilo in Mary's womb.

In my view, it would be downright creepy to make a human mother pregnant in any way other than sexually. Implanting an alien embryo by magic goes well beyond creepy. That's horror-movie stuff. The term "embryo" implies that the egg and a sperm have already fused, so whose male genetic material did they use for this divine homunculus? I presume they somehow magically utilized one of Mary's own eggs - otherwise she'd have a pretty tenuous hold on the title of Mother of God - but where did they get the male stuff? Let me guess. Poof. Shazam. Ex nihilo.

david.starling.macmillan · 14 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
Who says I'm denying the preexistence or divinity of Jesus? In the Incarnation, Jesus was just a man. He didn't know the future. He had to pray to the Father and depend on the Spirit. That's the whole point of the Incarnation: God becoming Man, not God becoming God-pretending-to-be-an-ordinary-dude-but-really-not.

I'm not fully conversant with the details of your religious beliefs. Does that mean Jesus was a god, or "just a guy?" I don't blame you for dodging the question of how many gods there are. Of course you do not know; no one does.
The orthodox Christian view of the Incarnation is that there are three divine individuals which can nonetheless be represented as a single collective deity because they share the same properties and coexistence, which is atypical in polytheism.
So how many gods is that, three or one? Can't be both, not unless you assert the counterfactual.

Depends on your definition of God. If you're defining "God" as a divine person, there are three gods. If you're defining "God" as transcendent divinity, there is one. When the term you're using has no simple, singular, agreed definition, you can't pin something like that down. It's like asking "Is there one physics or many physics"? Well, there are many different physical forces, and we currently understand there to be at least two separate sources of those forces, and we don't know whether they will be unified, but we accept that whatever model we arrive at is still "physics".

In this view, one of the three individuals relinquished his divine attributes in order to become a human being. Going from outside the universe to inside the universe is the mysterious part, I suppose. As it would ostensibly be unnecessary and downright creepy to sexually impregnate a human mother, it is generally believed that the embryo which would become Jesus was created ex nihilo in Mary's womb.
In my view, it would be downright creepy to make a human mother pregnant in any way other than sexually.

I presume you have a problem with artificial insemination, then?

The term "embryo" implies that the egg and a sperm have already fused, so whose male genetic material did they use for this divine homunculus? I presume they somehow magically utilized one of Mary's own eggs - otherwise she'd have a pretty tenuous hold on the title of Mother of God - but where did they get the male stuff? Let me guess. Poof. Shazam. Ex nihilo.

I find your lack of faith amusing. Why is creation ex nihilo any more or less fantastic than any other sort of miracle?

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 14 July 2014

But if you prayed that your tap water turned into beer, and a supernatural entity granted your request, you would still be a man.

Assertion alert, assertion alert. No evidence, assertion alert. Wooooo, wooooo, woooo. Like I said Christians just don't study magic - your answer proves that point.

david.starling.macmillan · 14 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said:
But if you prayed that your tap water turned into beer, and a supernatural entity granted your request, you would still be a man.
Assertion alert, assertion alert. No evidence, assertion alert. Wooooo, wooooo, woooo. Like I said Christians just don't study magic - your answer proves that point.

A common trait within fundamentalism is the inability to evaluate hypotheticals.

phhht · 14 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said: So how many gods is that, three or one? Can't be both, not unless you assert the counterfactual.
Depends on your definition of God. If you're defining "God" as a divine person, there are three gods. If you're defining "God" as transcendent divinity, there is one. When the term you're using has no simple, singular, agreed definition, you can't pin something like that down. It's like asking "Is there one physics or many physics"? Well, there are many different physical forces, and we currently understand there to be at least two separate sources of those forces, and we don't know whether they will be unified, but we accept that whatever model we arrive at is still "physics".

So you've got the father god. That's one god, right? You've got the demigod, and the ghost god. That's two more gods, to make three gods, not one god. Right?

In this view, one of the three individuals relinquished his divine attributes in order to become a human being. Going from outside the universe to inside the universe is the mysterious part, I suppose. As it would ostensibly be unnecessary and downright creepy to sexually impregnate a human mother, it is generally believed that the embryo which would become Jesus was created ex nihilo in Mary's womb.
In my view, it would be downright creepy to make a human mother pregnant in any way other than sexually.
I presume you have a problem with artificial insemination, then?

Artificial insemination corresponds to coitus, not impregnation. That is still sexual: a sperm, an egg, etc.

The term "embryo" implies that the egg and a sperm have already fused, so whose male genetic material did they use for this divine homunculus? I presume they somehow magically utilized one of Mary's own eggs - otherwise she'd have a pretty tenuous hold on the title of Mother of God - but where did they get the male stuff? Let me guess. Poof. Shazam. Ex nihilo.
I find your lack of faith amusing. Why is creation ex nihilo any more or less fantastic than any other sort of miracle?

I find it amusing that you do not see that is exactly my point. Creation ex nihilo is not one whit less fantastic, less counterfactual, than any other sort of miracle.

david.starling.macmillan · 14 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said: So how many gods is that, three or one? Can't be both, not unless you assert the counterfactual.
Depends on your definition of God. If you're defining "God" as a divine person, there are three gods. If you're defining "God" as transcendent divinity, there is one. When the term you're using has no simple, singular, agreed definition, you can't pin something like that down. It's like asking "Is there one physics or many physics"? Well, there are many different physical forces, and we currently understand there to be at least two separate sources of those forces, and we don't know whether they will be unified, but we accept that whatever model we arrive at is still "physics".
So you've got the father god. That's one god, right? You've got the demigod, and the ghost god. That's two more gods, to make three gods, not one god. Right?

You have evidently defined "God" as "a divine person". Under that definition, you are correct: there are three gods. And I can define "squirrel" as "items which hold staples", in which case there are dozens of squirrels in my office right now, but I don't see how that gets us any further than you got us.

In this view, one of the three individuals relinquished his divine attributes in order to become a human being. Going from outside the universe to inside the universe is the mysterious part, I suppose. As it would ostensibly be unnecessary and downright creepy to sexually impregnate a human mother, it is generally believed that the embryo which would become Jesus was created ex nihilo in Mary's womb.
In my view, it would be downright creepy to make a human mother pregnant in any way other than sexually.
I presume you have a problem with artificial insemination, then?
Artificial insemination corresponds to coitus, not impregnation. That is still sexual: a sperm, an egg, etc.

Hey, sex it up then.

I find your lack of faith amusing. Why is creation ex nihilo any more or less fantastic than any other sort of miracle?
I find it amusing that you do not see that is exactly my point. Creation ex nihilo is not one whit less fantastic, less counterfactual, than any other sort of miracle.

Right. All logically possible and internally consistent miracles are equally fantastic, equally counterfactual, and so forth. Which doesn't actually say that they are or aren't fantastic or counterfactual. So, again, I'm not sure what you're trying to prove here. You seem to like tautologies.

phhht · 14 July 2014

phhht said: I find it amusing that you do not see that is exactly my point. Creation ex nihilo is not one whit less fantastic, less counterfactual, than any other sort of miracle.

Indeed, why should anyone believe your fanciful tales of a miraculous god implanted in the womb, your jizm ex nihilo, your water into wine, your resurrection from the dead, etc. etc? They all seems childish and fantastic and palpably untrue to me. Why do you believe them?

david.starling.macmillan · 14 July 2014

This is actually a great example of how postmodern analysis functions. Phhht is subconsciously advancing a sort of definitional essentialism, in which case the term "god" must have some essential definition which he can word-game to prove some obscure point. This essentialism is nonsense; "god", like all semantic units, is a grammatically functional term which has precisely the meaning which we use it for. It is a basic principle of postmodern analysis to acknowledge that words do not have meaning beyond the function for which we employ them.

And phhht really should recognize this. After all, he is certain that gods do not exist! If anyone should recognize that the word "god" has a definition which is completely determined by usage, it should be phhht. But he is unfortunately constrained to definitional essentialism, and it leads to these endless, fruitless word games.

phhht · 14 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said: So how many gods is that, three or one? Can't be both, not unless you assert the counterfactual.
Depends on your definition of God. If you're defining "God" as a divine person, there are three gods. If you're defining "God" as transcendent divinity, there is one. When the term you're using has no simple, singular, agreed definition, you can't pin something like that down. It's like asking "Is there one physics or many physics"? Well, there are many different physical forces, and we currently understand there to be at least two separate sources of those forces, and we don't know whether they will be unified, but we accept that whatever model we arrive at is still "physics".
So you've got the father god. That's one god, right? You've got the demigod, and the ghost god. That's two more gods, to make three gods, not one god. Right?
You have evidently defined "God" as "a divine person". Under that definition, you are correct: there are three gods.

And there are no other divine persons (i.e. gods) under discussion here, are there? There is no fourth god, somehow the mystical fusion or union or magical uniting of the other three gods? See David, in the case of the trinity, the miracle disappears entirely when you banish the vagueness. You cling to your assertion that the answer of whether there are three gods or one god depends on what you mean by god. I have tried to banish that imprecision. I bet it didn't work with you, did it?

david.starling.macmillan · 14 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: You have evidently defined "God" as "a divine person". Under that definition, you are correct: there are three gods.
And there are no other divine persons (i.e. gods) under discussion here, are there? There is no fourth god, somehow the mystical fusion or union or magical uniting of the other three gods?

That is correct. Under a definition of "God" as "divine persons", there are only three gods, and there are no other gods.

See David, in the case of the trinity, the miracle disappears entirely when you banish the vagueness. You cling to your assertion that the answer of whether there are three gods or one god depends on what you mean by god. I have tried to banish that imprecision.

I recognize that you really really want words to have concrete objective meanings that are prescriptive rather than descriptive, but that's just not the universe we live in.

phhht · 14 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: After all, he [phhht] is certain that gods do not exist!

I'm sorry, David, but your claim is not correct. I am not certain that gods do not exist. Indeed, I would be charmed and delighted to see any unambiguous empirical evidence for the existence of gods, no matter how you dislike my use of the word (BTW, if you care to define the word, we can discuss that). But nobody has any. As far as I can see, there simply is no reason to believe that gods do exist, so I conclude - conclude, tentatively and with an open mind - that gods are just like other fictional characters: they do not really exist. I may well be mistaken, but I see no reason to think so. Can you say as much, David? Can you honestly characterize your religious faith as possibly mistaken?

phhht · 14 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: I recognize that you really really want words to have concrete objective meanings that are prescriptive rather than descriptive, but that's just not the universe we live in.

And I recognize that you really really want gods to have concrete objective existences that are tangible rather than fictional, but that's just not the universe we live in.

callahanpb · 14 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Well, my family, for one [refused to let me read Harry Potter]

Have you read it since then? J. K. Rowling is an excellent writer. The series has a strong moral message, mostly consistent with Christian ethics, and I do not understand why it was any more controversial than other children's fantasy, such as the work of E. Nesbit a hundred years earlier. (Rick Riordan could pose more serious problems, but by the same token so could "The Mighty Hercules" 1960s kids' cartoon.)

But there's a simple reason why "magic" is not the usual term used in reference to miracles. Most of the time, magic is used to refer to "natural" abilities that are possessed either by specific individuals or specifically trained individuals.

This is tangential, but I'm curious how you would come down on biblical episodes that look like "magic", notably the Egyptian priests who challenge Moses. I can think of many resolutions, such as: (a) It didn't happen. Is it allegory or corrupted text. (b) The Egyptian priests were court conjurers who only appeared to turn staffs into snakes, etc. (c) The Egyptian priests were vehicles of Satan's power. or (d) The Egyptian priests were adepts of a lesser magic that was no match for the power of Yahweh. I have certainly heard (b) suggested, and I can imagine someone preferring the other explanations. But assuming I read this account the way I would read any other story (like Harry Potter), I would have to settle on (d) as the closest match to what the author is trying to say. We even have the phrase "magicians of Egypt" (Exodus 7:22) in most English translations I can find. These are "specifically trained individuals" and if they're something else instead, it's a terrible failure as a story. So I think it's not the case that all theists refuse to admit they believe in magic (I was going to respond directly to ds_Q but I don't expect a very enlightening reply). It may be that 21st century Christians are reluctant to use the term, but historically belief in magic was prevalent. (I agree it would normally not be applied to miracles though.) Note that I believe strongly that magic does not exist. But if there were reproducible rules determined by "systematic study" it would cease to be magic and would be a form of natural science. Any line of argument that demands a systematic understanding of magic seems to be presupposing what the magic entails. Magic poses a particular problem in fiction, because you do need to walk a fine line between something that looks systematic and something that is clearly not just an extension of natural science. (And failures result in unsatisfying contrivances like "midi-chlorians" in Star Wars). However, there is no reason to believe that every act of magic leaves a specific physical trace. I don't understand where this idea would even come from. It is not present in religious belief or fantasy fiction.

callahanpb · 14 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: As it would ostensibly be unnecessary and downright creepy to sexually impregnate a human mother, it is generally believed that the embryo which would become Jesus was created ex nihilo in Mary's womb.
In my view, it would be downright creepy to make a human mother pregnant in any way other than sexually.

I don't think "too creepy" has any bearing on matters of religious belief. While not canonical, The Pilgrim's Progress (Bunyan) was certainly an influential work on Christian thought. I had to read it in a literature class way back, and vaguely remembered something, which I was able to find online:

So he had them into the slaughter-house, where the butcher was killing a sheep; and, behold, the sheep was quiet, and took her death patiently. Then said the Interpreter, "You must learn of this sheep to suffer, and to put up with wrongs without murmurings and complaints. Behold how quietly she takes her death; and, without objecting, she suffereth her skin to be pulled over her ears. Your King doth call you His sheep."

For my money, this is about the creepiest take on the "Good Shepherd" that I have ever read. I do give Bunyan credit for taking an idea to its logical conclusion. I also think it says something about changes in sensibilities that he could write something like this.

mattdance18 · 14 July 2014

tomh said:
mattdance18 said: Because all that "logically possible" means is, the idea doesn't contain or imply any logical contradictions.
Well, if a person dying and coming back to life is not a logical contradiction, then anything one can dream up is logically possible, flying to the moon by flapping your arms, or whatever. Which makes your definition not only useless but incoherent.

Gee, that's a really great point. Why distinguish the logical from the physical? Just an incoherent, useless waste of time. I mean, it's not like careful distinctions are important for rigorously reasoning our way through these problems.... Seriously?!?... Never mind.

mattdance18 · 14 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
tomh said:
mattdance18 said: Because all that "logically possible" means is, the idea doesn't contain or imply any logical contradictions.
Well, if a person dying and coming back to life is not a logical contradiction, then anything one can dream up is logically possible, flying to the moon by flapping your arms, or whatever. Which makes your definition not only useless but incoherent.
Well, no. Flying to the moon by flapping your arms is not logically possible, because flapping your arms to fly requires air, and there is not enough air between here and the moon. It is a logical contradiction.

This is actually not correct. Despite tomh's protestations, flying to the moon by flapping your arms IS possible, LOGICALLY speaking. All that the notion of "logical possibility" means is that we can think it without contradiction. That said, it is of course impossible for us to do this, for easily explainable PHYSICAL reasons, like the aerodynamics of human arms and, as you note, the lack of air between here and the moon. It's an important distinction, because there are some things that are literally inconceivable (logically impossible), such as four-sided circles or being your own father, while others are perfectly conceivable but which run afoul of how nature actually works (physically impossible), such as Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics as the driving force behind biological adaptation. Conflating the two leads to all manner of weirdness and trouble, such as metaphysical attempts to demonstrate that every fact of nature is derivable from reasoning from first principles, or lazy dismissals of nonphysically based arguments merely because they are, after all, nonphysical. Just clarifying.

mattdance18 · 14 July 2014

phhht said: And no, impregnating your mother with yourself is not logically possible, because fucking your own mom requires that you be already born and you haven't been. It is a logical contradiction.

Please explain to me how the same god - one and the same - can both do those miracles of the Son and not do them, because the doer is the Father. Nope, that's a logical impossibility there, David.

Exactly! These are actually logically impossible, in the strict sense, because the very terms involved cannot be put together in a logically coherent way. It's why, I would argue, that if Christianity is to make any rational sense at all, the doctrine of the Trinity simply must be construed non-literally. Take it literally and it violates basic logic. And if one isn't interested in making rational sense, then why bother arguing the point, anyway? I mean, it's one thing to believe in things that cannot be known. It's another thing entirely to believe in things about which one cannot even coherently think -- because then it's not even clear what the "things" in question are, for one ostensibly to "believe."

mattdance18 · 14 July 2014

callahanpb said: I may be nitpicking, but the phrase "flying to the moon by flapping one's arms" doesn't suggest any particular mechanism for the arm flapping, so the lack of air is not really relevant. I agree that if you said "using the aerodynamic properties of space between earth and the moon" it would begin to look more like a contradiction in terms, but I don't see all that implied in "flapping one's arms."

Exactly. Logic has no Principle of Aerodynamics or Principle of the Need for Air. It's just about what can be coherently thought. And anything that will turn it to be physically possible will of course be logically possible, too. It's just that merely because something is logically possible, that doesn't make it physically possible.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 14 July 2014

callahanpb said: So I think it's not the case that all theists refuse to admit they believe in magic (I was going to respond directly to ds_Q but I don't expect a very enlightening reply). It may be that 21st century Christians are reluctant to use the term, but historically belief in magic was prevalent. (I agree it would normally not be applied to miracles though.)

This is my point exactly - magic was commonly referred to in the past in Christian societies, the Bible is full of magic, yet today Christians who strongly believe in magic deny that it is actually magic. Why doesn't magic apply to miracles? Isn't turning water into wine a magic trick like turing a staff into a snake?

Magic poses a particular problem in fiction, because you do need to walk a fine line between something that looks systematic and something that is clearly not just an extension of natural science. (And failures result in unsatisfying contrivances like "midi-chlorians" in Star Wars). However, there is no reason to believe that every act of magic leaves a specific physical trace. I don't understand where this idea would even come from. It is not present in religious belief or fantasy fiction.

Once again an assertion without any evidence - fiction is not real (just in case you are unclear on that point). - we are talking about magic that humans claim happened. I am just curious why you think using magic wouldn't have multiple consequences. I am trying to live in the world as we know it, not in one of the imagination - what possible relationship could fictional magic have to that?

Just Bob · 14 July 2014

phhht said: In my view, it would be downright creepy to make a human mother pregnant in any way other than sexually. Implanting an alien embryo by magic goes well beyond creepy. That's horror-movie stuff.

What has always bothered me about the 'pregnant Virgin Mary' myth is the fact that (in the story) no one asked her permission to make her pregnant! If a human male made her pregnant without so much as a by-your-leave, that would unequivocally be a RAPE. More biblical morality, I guess. Have your way with any girls you want, if you're the Guy In Charge.

callahanpb · 14 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: I am just curious why you think using magic wouldn't have multiple consequences.

Do you understand the logical distinction between these two statements: "It is not necessary that we have a drink with our dinner." and "It is necessary that we do not have a drink with our dinner."? Just want to make sure. If you can puzzle out that these are distinction assertions, you might also figure out that I never said "magic must not have multiple consequences."

I am trying to live in the world as we know it, not in one of the imagination - what possible relationship could fictional magic have to that?

I am trying to ascertain the expectations English speakers associate with the word "magic." Identical expectations will (usually) hold for the same word in fiction as non-fiction. Fiction provides more abundant examples of magic than non-fiction (which provides precisely zero as far as I know) so it seems like a more fruitful point of departure in discussing what people mean by the word.

Just Bob · 14 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Depends on your definition of God. If you're defining "God" as a divine person, there are three gods. If you're defining "God" as transcendent divinity, there is one. When the term you're using has no simple, singular, agreed definition, you can't pin something like that down.

How's this for a definition (World English Dictionary): a supernatural being, who is worshipped as the controller of some part of the universe or some aspect of life in the world or is the personification of some force. My layman's definition: a supernatural being with magical or miraculous powers beyond those attainable by human beings. Now, by either definition (or pick your own), why isn't Satan a god?

callahanpb · 14 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: magic was commonly referred to in the past in Christian societies, the Bible is full of magic, yet today Christians who strongly believe in magic deny that it is actually magic.

Who are you talking about? Can you give a specific example? I can't really help you, since I'm not a believer, but sure, the Bible is full of magic. So what? The most David gave was an explanation of why it is not the preferred term for miracles attributed to the Christian God, but I didn't see him actually say that the word could not be applied. Did I miss something? As I already pointed out, English translations of Exodus refer the Egyptian priests as "magicians." I am curious how David in particular works through this, but I would imagine that at least some 21st century Christians would be comfortable referring to their acts as magic.

mattdance18 · 14 July 2014

Just Bob said:
phhht said: In my view, it would be downright creepy to make a human mother pregnant in any way other than sexually. Implanting an alien embryo by magic goes well beyond creepy. That's horror-movie stuff.
What has always bothered me about the 'pregnant Virgin Mary' myth is the fact that (in the story) no one asked her permission to make her pregnant! If a human male made her pregnant without so much as a by-your-leave, that would unequivocally be a RAPE. More biblical morality, I guess. Have your way with any girls you want, if you're the Guy In Charge.

See Genesis 19. Lot, the righteous man saved from Sodom, offers his daughters to the lusty mob. And the daughters, after the escape, get their dad drunk in order to trick him into having sex with them. This was not much discussed in Sunday School.

callahanpb · 14 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: I am trying to live in the world as we know it, not in one of the imagination - what possible relationship could fictional magic have to that?

I already replied, but to be more concise, suppose we were arguing over the meaning of the word "unicorn"? In that case would it be more effective to refer to examples from fiction or non-fiction?

mattdance18 · 14 July 2014

Just Bob said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Depends on your definition of God. If you're defining "God" as a divine person, there are three gods. If you're defining "God" as transcendent divinity, there is one. When the term you're using has no simple, singular, agreed definition, you can't pin something like that down.
How's this for a definition (World English Dictionary): a supernatural being, who is worshipped as the controller of some part of the universe or some aspect of life in the world or is the personification of some force. My layman's definition: a supernatural being with magical or miraculous powers beyond those attainable by human beings. Now, by either definition (or pick your own), why isn't Satan a god?

See Psalm 82. http://www.biblestudytools.com/nrs/psalms/82.html It's clearly a remnant of the time before the Israelites had developed monotheism. And there are plenty of translations that don't translate it nearly so honestly as the link here. For reasons of theological propriety as opposed to scriptural fidelity, many place scare quotes around any mention of "gods," despite the lack of any such punctuation marks in ancient Hebrew. "Monotheism" is a complicated theological issue in Christianity. But then, it had a complicated historical development in Judaism to begin with.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 14 July 2014

Look I can't see what you are arguing about then. If the stuff in the Bible is not magic, then nothing is. My point is that Christians like David don't want it to be magic, but redefining it as miracles changes nothing. The Catholic Church believes that some words will change water and bread in blood and wine - that it was once spoken in Latin made it all the more "magical."

You still can't explain why magic should or would have no effect - I live in a world where actions have consequences. Perhaps you live somewhere else.

W. H. Heydt · 14 July 2014

phhht said: So how many gods is that, three or one? Can't be both, not unless you assert the counterfactual.

Wave-particle duality?

callahanpb · 14 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: You still can't explain why magic should or would have no effect - I live in a world where actions have consequences. Perhaps you live somewhere else.

Look, I get it. You don't believe in magic. That's quite understandable. I just don't see how you think it strengthens your argument to insist that "magic" means something specific (that in fact it does not). Yes, speaking tautologically, if a magic act requires energy, and some amount of that energy must leave a trace on surroundings that are not the target of that magic, then again, tautologically speaking, it follows that the lack of such an energy trace refutes the possibility that said magic occurred in that case. But isn't it a simpler argument just to assert the non-existence of any kind of magic than to postulate one particular type?

Scott F · 14 July 2014

Rolf said: Ah, theology... IMHO, 'regular' scientists and atheism-light proponents are not too good at theology. God is not inside the universe but may be outside of the universe? There goes omnipresence. Isn't the universe all we know? A riddle for the 21st century: Do we (how could we?) find God inside black holes?

Just playing devil's advocate here (so to speak), but if God is "outside of the universe", I don't see how that effects "omnipresence". Might that not that depend on the "shape" of the universe, as seen from "outside"? I can imagine that being "outside" the universe might mean that one could be right "next to" every point "in" the universe. Let's reduce the number of dimensions to make my point easier to see. Let's say that the "universe" is a two-dimensional circle. I can be "outside" that circle either in the plane of the circle, or perpendicular to the plane of the circle. If I were to lay my hand over the circle (in a manner of speaking), my hand could be an infinitesimal distance from every point inside the circle at the same time, yet not be "in" the circle itself. Not sure if that would qualify as "omnipresence" or not. Sure, the universe is all we know, because we're stuck in the dimensions defined by the universe itself. Could we find God inside a black hole? Don't know. Could we find God on the other side of a black hole? :-)

W. H. Heydt · 14 July 2014

(Sort of a disclaimer...like phttt, given the lack of evidence despite all those that have diligently looked for some, I provisionally conclude that there are no gods. However, since I cannot categorically demonstrate or prove that gods do not exist--the problem of proving a negative--I remain agnostic.)

Some of the problem I see here is an "us/our culture/our religion" vs. "them/their culture/their religion", for some values of "us" and "them".

*our* religion documents miracles in our holy scripture.
*Their* "religion" makes magic claims in their mythology.

Bear in mind that a fair amount of the OT is documenting (for some value of "documenting") the tribal history and the conflicts with neighboring tribes. We are seeing the "history" written by the winners without access to the literature of the losers.

callahanpb · 14 July 2014

Just Bob said: Now, by either definition (or pick your own), why isn't Satan a god?

David may have a better answer, but my reading would be that the 1st Commandment is pretty clear about not worshiping other gods, and significantly less clear about their existence or classification as gods. But on the other hand, it's also a matter of doctrine that "all power comes from God" (citation?) so it would follow that Satan's power is not actually his (and would presumably apply to Baal or other "false gods" from the Old Testament).

Scott F · 14 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Look I can't see what you are arguing about then. If the stuff in the Bible is not magic, then nothing is. My point is that Christians like David don't want it to be magic, but redefining it as miracles changes nothing. The Catholic Church believes that some words will change water and bread in blood and wine - that it was once spoken in Latin made it all the more "magical." You still can't explain why magic should or would have no effect - I live in a world where actions have consequences. Perhaps you live somewhere else.

I'm no theologian, but my limited understanding is that a "miracle" is defined as what God does; as the Will of God. By definition. AFAIK, "magic" is typically defined by The Church as some lesser act, performed by lesser artists, typically in defiance of God's will, often with or using the power of lesser beings. That is, those "other gods" or "lesser gods" may grant the power for people to do "magic", but that's just "evil", since only God can do "miracles". Now, if you can come up with an actual procedural difference between how a "miracle" is performed versus how "magic" is performed, or (conversely) if you can show that a "miracle" is procedurally identical to "magic", then you're a better conjurer (or lexicographer) than I am. :-)

phhht · 14 July 2014

W. H. Heydt said:
phhht said: So how many gods is that, three or one? Can't be both, not unless you assert the counterfactual.
Wave-particle duality?

My criticism of the trinity doctrine is not, as David thinks, based in any way on a definition of "god." "God" is just a place-holder, a pointer into the otherwise-unspecified set of gods, whatever those may be. We don't need to care what gods are because the apparent trinity miracle depends on the louche enforcement of some common rules of discourse, independently of subject. One is an axiom of identity: a thing is recognizably itself, distinguishable from anything else, and uniquely specifiable by using an arbitrary designator like "the father god." Another is an axiom of atomicity: a thing made up of constituent things is not itself a member of the set of constituent things. Another is that when you put the set of gods into one-to-one correspondence with the integers (1: father god; 2: demigod; 3: ...) we can unambiguously count their number, and it is unambiguously three, not one. I am sure there are other logical problems, but I don't remember what they are.

Scott F · 14 July 2014

callahanpb said:
Just Bob said: Now, by either definition (or pick your own), why isn't Satan a god?
David may have a better answer, but my reading would be that the 1st Commandment is pretty clear about not worshiping other gods, and significantly less clear about their existence or classification as gods. But on the other hand, it's also a matter of doctrine that "all power comes from God" (citation?) so it would follow that Satan's power is not actually his (and would presumably apply to Baal or other "false gods" from the Old Testament).

That's always the one that troubled me. IIRC, nowhere does God (or the Bible) claim that there are no other gods. It's just that you're not supposed to worship them first. "Thou shalt have no other gods before me" "I … am a jealous God". If the other gods don't exist, how could God be jealous of them? If even God acknowledges their existence, how is a mere mortal to argue?

Scott F · 14 July 2014

phhht said:
W. H. Heydt said:
phhht said: So how many gods is that, three or one? Can't be both, not unless you assert the counterfactual.
Wave-particle duality?
My criticism of the trinity doctrine is not, as David thinks, based in any way on a definition of "god." "God" is just a place-holder, a pointer into the otherwise-unspecified set of gods, whatever those may be. We don't need to care what gods are because the apparent trinity miracle depends on the louche enforcement of some common rules of discourse, independently of subject. One is an axiom of identity: a thing is recognizably itself, distinguishable from anything else, and uniquely specifiable by using an arbitrary designator like "the father god." Another is an axiom of atomicity: a thing made up of constituent things is not itself a member of the set of constituent things. Another is that when you put the set of gods into one-to-one correspondence with the integers (1: father god; 2: demigod; 3: ...) we can unambiguously count their number, and it is unambiguously three, not one. I am sure there are other logical problems, but I don't remember what they are.

You're trying to run circles around arguments that theologians even today don't know how to deal with. Just like "miracle" is defined to be what God does, God is defined to be "three-in-one", separate but equal, and all that. Whoever came up with that notion had obviously ingested too many mushrooms, but The Church is now stuck with it whether it ever made any sense or not. You can't argue with it because it is simply true by definition.

Just Bob · 14 July 2014

"1: father god; 2: demigod; 3: …" 4: Satan

If any other mythology had a character with the powers attributed to Satan, we (westerners) would not hesitate to categorize him as among the gods of that mythology.

Greek mythology, for instance, had a fair number of gods with lesser powers than those regularly ascribed to Satan (especially by evangelicals).

callahanpb · 14 July 2014

Just Bob said: "1: father god; 2: demigod; 3: …" 4: Satan If any other mythology had a character with the powers attributed to Satan, we (westerners) would not hesitate to categorize him as among the gods of that mythology. Greek mythology, for instance, had a fair number of gods with lesser powers than those regularly ascribed to Satan (especially by evangelicals).

In fairness, the usual assumption is that God could pull the plug on Satan at any time because Satan is simply using God's power for evil. In Greek mythology, by contrast, the gods have independent powers, so Zeus might win a fight against a less powerful god, but could not deprive him of power at will. It seems ambiguous in the Old Testament (e.g. what does it mean to worship Baal?) but the Nicene creed is clear on God as "maker of all things seen and unseen" and that includes the angels, which includes Satan. So while I agree that you could attribute godlike powers to Satan, I think this point is covered reasonably well by Christian theology (i.e., is not a logical contradiction).

Just Bob · 14 July 2014

I still say it's a case of "we're only supposed to have one god, so we won't call all these other powerful supernatural beings 'gods'". They're 'angels' and 'demons' and 'saints' (wink, wink).

Dave Lovell · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Depends on your definition of God. If you're defining "God" as a divine person, there are three gods. If you're defining "God" as transcendent divinity, there is one. When the term you're using has no simple, singular, agreed definition, you can't pin something like that down.

phhht said: So you've got the father god. That's one god, right? You've got the demigod, and the ghost god. That's two more gods, to make three gods, not one god. Right?
You have evidently defined "God" as "a divine person". Under that definition, you are correct: there are three gods.

But a word like "Monotheism" is completely redundant unless it defines a very specific type of Theism. So is a Monotheist someone who believes in one divine person, or someone who believes one single transcendent divinity?

prongs · 15 July 2014

phhht said: So how many gods is that, three or one? Can't be both, not unless you assert the counterfactual.

Three gods in one god - it's a miracle! Right under your nose. What more proof do you need? (Works for the likes of FL) That's the trouble with imaginary deities - they can do impossible things.

Rolf · 15 July 2014

My argument today:

St. Epiphanius tells us that in Alexandria the birth of Osiris-Dionysus as Aion was celebrated on January 6. The previous night the temple was alive with the sound of flutes and singing, reaching its height at cockcrow. Those taking part then went by torchlight into an underground sanctuary from which they brought an image of the god carved in wood and marked with "the sign of a cross on hands, knees, and head." The highlight of this Mystery celebration was the announcement: "Today at this hour the virgin Kore has given birth to Aion." St. Epiphanius ..., along with many other early Christians, he celebrated the same date, January 6, as the birthday of Jesus - as does the Armenian Church to the present day. There was quite a dispute in early Christianity about whether the birth of Christ was December 25 or January 6. Was this because no one could remember? Or could it be simply because early Christians were unsure whether to synchronize it with the birth of Mithras or with the birth of Aion, both of whom were different representations of the perennial Mystery godman? These dates were not arbitrarily chosen. Both were once the dates of the winter solstice, the shortest day, which signals the turning point of the year and the returning of the life-giving sun. Due to the precession of the equinoxes this date changes slightly over time. So, although the solstice moved progressively from January 6 to December 25, some traditions continued to celebrate it on the familiar night. Today it falls around December 22. The annual celebration of the nativity of the Mystery godman celebrated the death of the old year and its miraculous rebirth as the new year on the date of the solstice. Osiris-Dionysus represented and was represented by the sun, as was Jesus, whom the Church father Clement of Alexander calls "The Sun of Righteousness."

Not much about God but more interesting. What shall we make of it?

david.starling.macmillan · 15 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: After all, he [phhht] is certain that gods do not exist!
I'm sorry, David, but your claim is not correct. I am not certain that gods do not exist. Indeed, I would be charmed and delighted to see any unambiguous empirical evidence for the existence of gods, no matter how you dislike my use of the word (BTW, if you care to define the word, we can discuss that). But nobody has any. As far as I can see, there simply is no reason to believe that gods do exist, so I conclude - conclude, tentatively and with an open mind - that gods are just like other fictional characters: they do not really exist. I may well be mistaken, but I see no reason to think so. Can you say as much, David? Can you honestly characterize your religious faith as possibly mistaken?

I stand corrected, then. I had recalled several statements which seemed to indicate fairly unequivocal certainty, but if my conclusions proved too much and I misrepresented your position, then please accept my apologies. As concerns the question of whether I could admit to possible mistake...I'm surprised you need to ask. Haven't you noticed FL constantly blasting me for admitting agnosticism? I don't know. I'm not certain.

callahanpb said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Well, my family, for one [refused to let me read Harry Potter]
Have you read it since then?

Oh, most definitely. It's some of my favorite fiction. I consider myself a firm Slytherin, though I have strong Ravenclaw tendencies. It became vogue in evangelical circles to take a hard line against all fantasy, thanks in part to the popular media coverage of the ridiculous Satanic Abuse scandals in the early 90s. This, of course, fell on the heels of the well-established evangelical angst over alarming cultural trends like rock and roll, Dungeons and Dragons, and so forth. Evangelicals believed witchcraft was real and active as a manifestation of demonic power, and that anything remotely resembling "the occult" could be used by Satan to entice Christian teenagers into worshiping demons through the practice of witchcraft. Sometimes, exceptions were made for stereotypically "Christian" fantasy like Lewis and Tolkien, usually with the (phony) excuse that the only "good magic" in these books is performed by angels or angelic beings, and all other magic is rightfully depicted as "bad magic". Others banned all fantasy without exception.

But there's a simple reason why "magic" is not the usual term used in reference to miracles. Most of the time, magic is used to refer to "natural" abilities that are possessed either by specific individuals or specifically trained individuals.
This is tangential, but I'm curious how you would come down on biblical episodes that look like "magic", notably the Egyptian priests who challenge Moses. I can think of many resolutions, such as: (a) It didn't happen. Is it allegory or corrupted text. (b) The Egyptian priests were court conjurers who only appeared to turn staffs into snakes, etc. (c) The Egyptian priests were vehicles of Satan's power. or (d) The Egyptian priests were adepts of a lesser magic that was no match for the power of Yahweh. The most David gave was an explanation of why it is not the preferred term for miracles attributed to the Christian God, but I didn’t see him actually say that the word could not be applied. Did I miss something? As I already pointed out, English translations of Exodus refer the Egyptian priests as “magicians.” I am curious how David in particular works through this, but I would imagine that at least some 21st century Christians would be comfortable referring to their acts as magic.

Personally, I would presume it to be an instance of a). I'm inclined to think of the Exodus as being largely epic fiction, a triumphant origin story for the Hebrews. I have no trouble with this, nor with Judaism emerging slowly from polytheism. The Jews, just like everybody else, were "feeling and groping their way" toward God a la Acts 17. There's a possibility that there could be a kernel of historicity in the Exodus account. Jewish historian Richard Elliot Friedman makes an intriguing case that a small Semitic tribe, identified now as the Levites, did make their way out of Egypt to join the larger, established group of Jews already settled in Canaan. Of course, a kernel of historicity doesn't mean everything in the account is fully accurate. In terms of the mythic account itself, it would certainly seem that the original story features magicians who are simply less powerful than Moses, whose power comes not from magic but from the Creator. Christianity and Judaism both retconned the Egyptian magic into "unwitting use of satanic powers", of course. I don't have a problem with that either way.

Note that I believe strongly that magic does not exist. But if there were reproducible rules determined by "systematic study" it would cease to be magic and would be a form of natural science. Any line of argument that demands a systematic understanding of magic seems to be presupposing what the magic entails.

This is an excellent point, and a clear foil to Masked's line of reasoning. Magic, as it is typically depicted in culture, follows reproducible rules that can be systematically studied and manipulated. In this sense, it is little more than a new layer of science. That is conceptually distinct from the proposition that a transcendent deity can alter the state of physical systems via nonphysical means. If magic did exist, divine miracles would still be something quite different.

mattdance18 said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Flying to the moon by flapping your arms is not logically possible, because flapping your arms to fly requires air, and there is not enough air between here and the moon. It is a logical contradiction.
This is actually not correct. Despite tomh's protestations, flying to the moon by flapping your arms IS possible, LOGICALLY speaking. All that the notion of "logical possibility" means is that we can think it without contradiction. That said, it is of course impossible for us to do this, for easily explainable PHYSICAL reasons, like the aerodynamics of human arms and, as you note, the lack of air between here and the moon.

I suppose it depends on how we are taking the definition of "flapping". If we take "flying to the moon by flapping your arms" as a specific instance of "flying through space by flapping", then we are getting closer to logical impossibility. If we reduce it further to "flying through a vacuum by pushing against air", we are at the cusp of logical impossibility; reducing it to "flying by pushing against air without pushing against air" clearly pushes us over the edge. But if you don't take "flapping" as a specific case of "pushing against air", then all bets are off and it's merely physically impossible, not logically impossible.

A Masked Panda said: ...magic was commonly referred to in the past in Christian societies, the Bible is full of magic, yet today Christians who strongly believe in magic deny that it is actually magic.

Because they either argue that: A) what the ancients believed was magic was actually the working of supernatural agents (fundamentalist view), B) the accounts are embellished (liberal view), or C) some combination of the two.

Just Bob said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Depends on your definition of God. If you're defining "God" as a divine person, there are three gods. If you're defining "God" as transcendent divinity, there is one. When the term you're using has no simple, singular, agreed definition, you can't pin something like that down.
How's this for a definition (World English Dictionary): a supernatural being, who is worshipped as the controller of some part of the universe or some aspect of life in the world or is the personification of some force. My layman's definition: a supernatural being with magical or miraculous powers beyond those attainable by human beings. Now, by either definition (or pick your own), why isn't Satan a god?

By these definitions, there could be any number of gods, including Satan (if he exists at all, which I'm not entirely sold on). At least three, obviously.

A Masked Panda said: If the stuff in the Bible is not magic, then nothing is.

Why is your definition of what you believe to be a fictitious concept the only viable one?

You still can't explain why magic should or would have no effect - I live in a world where actions have consequences. Perhaps you live somewhere else.

Of course "magic"/"miracles"/"supernatural acts" are presumed to have effects; they are effects. We're just not sure why you seem to insist that they would have side effects determined by conservation of energy and the laws of entropy.

Scott F said: Could we find God inside a black hole? Don't know. Could we find God on the other side of a black hole? :-)

Black holes don't have sides...they're spheres, unless you're talking about Kerr black holes, which are oblate spheroids. Or are you talking about the inside? Or another spatial dimension? I find Hawking's recent conjectures about black holes -- that quantum fluctuations extend through the event horizon and remove the whole concept of a firewall -- to be quite intriguing.

phhht said: My criticism of the trinity doctrine is not, as David thinks, based in any way on a definition of "god." "God" is just a place-holder, a pointer into the otherwise-unspecified set of gods, whatever those may be. We don't need to care what gods are because the apparent trinity miracle depends on the louche enforcement of some common rules of discourse, independently of subject. One is an axiom of identity: a thing is recognizably itself, distinguishable from anything else, and uniquely specifiable by using an arbitrary designator like "the father god."

I would challenge your application of the axiom of identity in this instance. Words are polysemic. If you talk about "David MacMillan", there are many things you can mean. You can mean my physical body. Though, if I were to suffer multiple amputations and become more than 50% prosthetic, the referent of "David MacMillan" would not change; under this conception, you're not talking about my physical body, but about my brain and all it controls. This definition would have to be revised even further if I had a brain tumor which necessitated the removal of part of my brain but left my consciousness and reasoning abilities intact. On top of all this, one could refer to the corpus of writing I have done as "David MacMillan", e.g. "If we consult David MacMillan, we find such-and-such." You must specify definitions to avoid polysemic equivocation. Citing the law of identity doesn't get you around this responsibility.

Another is an axiom of atomicity: a thing made up of constituent things is not itself a member of the set of constituent things.

Obviously. The doctrine of the trinity is not a doctrine of recursively nested matryoshka dolls. For virtually all commonly encountered purposes, the doctrine of the trinity is a doctrine of three gods. Not one, three. The "one god" of the trinity is only useful in comparison to various polytheisms.

Just Bob said: I still say it's a case of "we're only supposed to have one god, so we won't call all these other powerful supernatural beings 'gods'". They're 'angels' and 'demons' and 'saints' (wink, wink).

It's not so much that -- more "okay, we want a term that describes a transcendent, omniscient, omnipotent creator...let's use "God" with capitalization to refer to that."

Dave Lovell said: A word like "Monotheism" is completely redundant unless it defines a very specific type of Theism. So is a Monotheist someone who believes in one divine person, or someone who believes one single transcendent divinity?

I suppose it depends on which monotheist you ask. :)

Rolf said: My argument today:
St. Epiphanius tells us that in Alexandria the birth of Osiris-Dionysus as Aion was celebrated on January 6. The previous night the temple was alive with the sound of flutes and singing, reaching its height at cockcrow. Those taking part then went by torchlight into an underground sanctuary from which they brought an image of the god carved in wood and marked with "the sign of a cross on hands, knees, and head." The highlight of this Mystery celebration was the announcement: "Today at this hour the virgin Kore has given birth to Aion."

Indeed. And this was, let's see...three centuries after the birth of Christ? Yeah. I'm not sure why we should be surprised that mystery cults co-opted the story from the gospels.

eric · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said: I am not certain that gods do not exist. ...But nobody has any [evidence of gods]. As far as I can see, there simply is no reason to believe that gods do exist, so I conclude - conclude, tentatively and with an open mind - that gods are just like other fictional characters: they do not really exist. I may well be mistaken, but I see no reason to think so.
I stand corrected, then. I had recalled several statements which seemed to indicate fairly unequivocal certainty, but if my conclusions proved too much and I misrepresented your position, then please accept my apologies.

I believe I know what happened, David, because it's one of my pet peeves. When someone makes a statement like "tomorrow the sun will rise" or "there's no dragon in my garbage can," everyone interprets this statement to be a 'normal belief'. By normal, I mean a belief that is tentative, based on evidence, and subject to revision should better evidence come along. Even though such statements are completely without caveat, we mentally insert the caveats, because we do not think anyone making those claims would be silly enough to be making a claim of absolute, philosophical certanity in those cases. But when people like Phhhht make uncaveated atheistic statements - statements about God - believers do not mentally insert the caveats. They interpret the lack of caveats as a claim of absolute, philosophical certainty. This, of course, is wrong from an "interpret your opponent's words consistently, the way they probably mean them" perspective. It's a subtle version of exceptionalism, because what the believer is doing is treating their belief in God as if it needs special linguistic care. 'If it's dragons or future sunrises, you don't have to include the caveats, but when you start talking about MY God, you'd better include them!' Its an unconscious or unintended form of strawmanning. So what probably happened is Phhht said something like "there are no Gods." And your mind interpreted that as a claim of absolute philosophical certainty, even though a similarly worded claim about just about any other subject would be interpreted by your mind as a normal knowledge claim of tentative, reasonable certainty. So, the summation/TL:DR version: 1. Believers treat their beliefs linguistically exceptionally. 2. For entities and future claims not their God, no caveats = normal belief. 3. Claims against their God, no caveats = claim of philosophical certainty My advice, and I've said this before, is this: NEVER interpret an opponent's knowledge claim as one of absolute philosophical certainty unless they tell you explicitly that they are claiming absolute philosophical certainty. Not for God. Not against God. Not if it's Dawkins speaking, or Harris, or Ken Ham. Not for anything else. Not for a mouse. Not for a house. Not on a box. Not with a fox. That choice is rationally consistent, and it also has the benefit of being charitable to the person you're arguing with.

david.starling.macmillan · 15 July 2014

eric said:
David MacMillan said: I had recalled several statements which seemed to indicate fairly unequivocal certainty, but if my conclusions proved too much and I misrepresented your position, then please accept my apologies.
What probably happened is Phhht said something like "there are no Gods." And your mind interpreted that as a claim of absolute philosophical certainty....

Not exactly, no. I was thinking of the numerous times when phhht has explicitly stated that theism is intrinsically counterfactual. That's different from simply saying "there is no God" -- it's asserting an absolute basis for philosophical certainty. At least, that's how I interpreted it. If phhht is now saying that he doesn't consider theism to be explicitly and intrinsically counterfactual such that absolute philosophical certainty is justified, then I stand corrected. Basically, phhht has made a habit of making extremely specific, extremely absolute claims about the impossibility of theism which are much stronger than the typical "I don't believe God exists" or "there is no God" or even "I know God doesn't exist" claims we're accustomed to.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 15 July 2014

This is an excellent point, and a clear foil to Masked’s line of reasoning. Magic, as it is typically depicted in culture, follows reproducible rules that can be systematically studied and manipulated. In this sense, it is little more than a new layer of science. That is conceptually distinct from the proposition that a transcendent deity can alter the state of physical systems via nonphysical means. If magic did exist, divine miracles would still be something quite different.

Bullshit! You tell me how exactly what Moses did or Jesus did or what a Catholic priest does is any different than "following reproducible rules that can be systematically studied and manipulated." Magicians call on supernatural powers (not stage magicians, but if you do read about people who thought they were doing magic, they of course rely on the supernatural)- why do you insist on discussing something you know nothing about?

Of course “magic”/”miracles”/”supernatural acts” are presumed to have effects; they are effects. We’re just not sure why you seem to insist that they would have side effects determined by conservation of energy and the laws of entropy.

Why the hell would expect that they didn't? - everything else in the universe does. You seem to think you can define something into existence because this how you want the world to be. Why is that?

phhht · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: I don't know. I'm not certain.

Thanks.

david.starling.macmillan · 15 July 2014

A Masked Panda (ds Q) said:
This is an excellent point, and a clear foil to Masked’s line of reasoning. Magic, as it is typically depicted in culture, follows reproducible rules that can be systematically studied and manipulated. In this sense, it is little more than a new layer of science. That is conceptually distinct from the proposition that a transcendent deity can alter the state of physical systems via nonphysical means. If magic did exist, divine miracles would still be something quite different.
Bullshit! You tell me how exactly what Moses did or Jesus did or what a Catholic priest does is any different than "following reproducible rules that can be systematically studied and manipulated."

Is it really so difficult to understand? Magic: Taking certain physical actions which predictably and deterministically lead to desired physical effects through the action of impersonal forces not described by the Standard Model of physics. Miracle: Changes in the state of physical systems brought about by nonphysical causes through the willful actions of transcendent personal entities; these actions need not be in response to any action or petition by any person. Do you see the difference? Magic, as it is defined in common parlance, is deterministic. Magic is your control and manipulation of reality through predictable forces. A miracle, on the other hand, is not deterministic. It is something that may or may not happen, dependent solely on the choice of a nonphysical entity. Please tell me you understand that distinction.

Of course “magic”/”miracles”/”supernatural acts” are presumed to have effects; they are effects. We’re just not sure why you seem to insist that they would have side effects determined by conservation of energy and the laws of entropy.
Why the hell would expect that they didn't? - everything else in the universe does.

Because they would be effects which by definition do not come about through the operation of thermodynamics. It's magic. Why would magic follow nonmagical rules?

phhht · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
eric said:
David MacMillan said: I had recalled several statements which seemed to indicate fairly unequivocal certainty, but if my conclusions proved too much and I misrepresented your position, then please accept my apologies.
What probably happened is Phhht said something like "there are no Gods." And your mind interpreted that as a claim of absolute philosophical certainty....
Not exactly, no. I was thinking of the numerous times when phhht has explicitly stated that theism is intrinsically counterfactual. That's different from simply saying "there is no God" -- it's asserting an absolute basis for philosophical certainty. At least, that's how I interpreted it. If phhht is now saying that he doesn't consider theism to be explicitly and intrinsically counterfactual such that absolute philosophical certainty is justified, then I stand corrected. Basically, phhht has made a habit of making extremely specific, extremely absolute claims about the impossibility of theism which are much stronger than the typical "I don't believe God exists" or "there is no God" or even "I know God doesn't exist" claims we're accustomed to.

By "counterfactual," I mean "relating to or expressing what has not happened or is not the case." Gods have not happened and their existence is not the case. As far as I can tell.

david.starling.macmillan · 15 July 2014

phhht said: By "counterfactual," I mean "relating to or expressing what has not happened or is not the case." Gods have not happened and their existence is not the case. As far as I can tell.

Ah, I see. Perhaps this is part of the source of our confusion. I've always only ever heard "counterfactual" used to mean "contrary or contradicted by clear fact" -- e.g., a statement which can be trivially disproven. I don't think I've ever heard it used the way you're using it. But now that I know, I'll take that into account.

phhht · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said: By "counterfactual," I mean "relating to or expressing what has not happened or is not the case." Gods have not happened and their existence is not the case. As far as I can tell.
Ah, I see. Perhaps this is part of the source of our confusion. I've always only ever heard "counterfactual" used to mean "contrary or contradicted by clear fact" -- e.g., a statement which can be trivially disproven. I don't think I've ever heard it used the way you're using it. But now that I know, I'll take that into account.

My usage is so common that it is the default definition Google gives when you say "define counterfactual."

david.starling.macmillan · 15 July 2014

It's the "as far as I can tell" caveat which gives rise to the distinction.

On its own, "relating to or expressing what has not happened or is not the case" is still consistent with my understanding. Which is why your constant claims that theism is "clearly counterfactual" just seem like begging the question. "Why do you believe theism when theism is not the case?" Doesn't really get us anywhere.

callahanpb · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said: By "counterfactual," I mean "relating to or expressing what has not happened or is not the case." Gods have not happened and their existence is not the case. As far as I can tell.
Ah, I see. Perhaps this is part of the source of our confusion.

The main context in which I've seen the word used is in discussion of "what would have happened" if history had been different? E.g., "If Viking explorers had made it as far South as Massachusetts." or "If the ancient Greeks had observed that sound could be recorded as grooves in physical media." To be a counterfactual, it should contradict what is actually known, but there should be some reasonable way to replace it "all others things equal" in which is actually known to be true. Of course, the result is going to be pure speculation, but it can be an instructive way of thinking about why things happened the way they did, and what could have been different. What you generally can't do with a counterfactual is simply say "I know 'A' to be true. Therefore 'not A' contradicts 'A' and by deductive logic, this implies the truth of any other assertion." This is what makes it distinct from a contradictory claim. I don't think I followed this part of this discussion well enough to understand how it fits here.

david.starling.macmillan · 15 July 2014

Perhaps phhht is saying that theism is counterfactual in the sense that it is inconsistent with history as we understand it?

phhht · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Perhaps phhht is saying that theism is counterfactual in the sense that it is inconsistent with history as we understand it?

No, I mean that theism is counterfactual in the sense that it relates to or expresses what has not happened or is not the case. As far as I can tell.

david.starling.macmillan · 15 July 2014

phhht said: I mean that theism is counterfactual in the sense that it relates to or expresses what has not happened or is not the case. As far as I can tell.

I submit that "as far as I can tell" doesn't fit with "relates to or expresses what has not happened or is not the case". This usage of "counterfactual" is really only useful in dealing with things where everyone already agrees on what has happened and what is the case, as in callahanpb's example of "What if the Vikings had made it to Massachusetts". We all agree that the Vikings didn't make it to Massachusetts, so we can reasonably discuss the proposed counterfactual. The existence or nonexistence of God is obviously not something we all agree on here, so it's useless and indeed question-begging to call it "counterfactual".

phhht · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: The existence or nonexistence of God is obviously not something we all agree on here, so it's useless and indeed question-begging to call it "counterfactual".

Yet theism is counterfactual in the sense that it relates to or expresses what has not happened or is not the case. As far as I can tell.

david.starling.macmillan · 15 July 2014

So in other words, your use of "counterfactual" to describe theism is nothing more than a reiteration of your lack of theism. Which is something we already were well-appraised of.

callahanpb · 15 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Why the hell would expect that they didn't? - everything else in the universe does. You seem to think you can define something into existence because this how you want the world to be. Why is that?

I'm not sure if you're being deliberately obtuse or actually missing some capacity for abstract thought. Imagine an argument about unicorns. I start by saying "The unicorns I'm talking about drink the pure essence of rainbows as their sole source of nutrition." My opponent counters "No. Unicorns are like horses. They have to eat hay, or possibly graze in a pasture." I try to explain "Well, these unicorns don't." I would refer to various descriptions of unicorns and the fact that there is no general agreement about what they eat. Finally, my opponent looks at me like I'm crazy and says "You idiot. Of course unicorns eat hay, or at least something like hay. Why wouldn't you think that?" Now if I referred to "unicorns that look like lizards with butterfly wings" there would be grounds to dispute that the things I was describing were unicorns. That is, whatever commonly understood meaning you choose for unicorns, it would probably exclude lizards with butterfly wings. Moreover, if I insisted that "unicorns that drink the pure essence of rainbows" actually exist you could dispute that on the grounds that there is no evidence for such things, and it is ridiculous to suppose they could exist. What you can't do is insist that I cannot refer to "unicorns that drink the pure essence of rainbows" on the ground that they are not unicorns. Of course they're unicorns. Provided they have just one horn, look something like horses, and meet a few other defining criteria, they're as valid as any other kind of unicorn.

phhht · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: So in other words, your use of "counterfactual" to describe theism is nothing more than a reiteration of your lack of theism. Which is something we already were well-appraised of.

Why did you ever think otherwise? And your tales of miracles are counterfactual too. Not just theism per se.

david.starling.macmillan · 15 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: So in other words, your use of "counterfactual" to describe theism is nothing more than a reiteration of your lack of theism. Which is something we already were well-appraised of.
Why did you ever think otherwise? And your tales of miracles are counterfactual too. Not just theism per se.

Correction: you believe miracles to be counterfactual.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 15 July 2014

So Jesus didn't perform miracles he performed magic. Now I do understand.

phhht · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Correction: you believe miracles to be counterfactual.

No, David. See Eric's explanation, above, about why it is not incorrect to omit the qualifier you seem to insist on. But yes, of course, miracles are counterfactual as far as I can tell. In exactly the same way, will you agree to append "as far as I can tell" to your miracle stories, stories you relate as if they were indeed factual?

eric · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Not exactly, no. I was thinking of the numerous times when phhht has explicitly stated that theism is intrinsically counterfactual.

The notion of a black swan was thought to be intrinsically counterfactual by philosophers before those Aussies proved them wrong. People changed their minds in response to evidence. Even saying a belief is "intrinsically counterfactual" does not denote that person is claiming absolute certainty. You can think something is intrinsically counterfactual based on the evidence you have at hand, discover you are wrong, and revise your conclusion in response, right?

It’s the “as far as I can tell” caveat which gives rise to the distinction.

But why should Phhht - or anyone else - need to add "as far as I can tell" only when it relates to your God? If he says "fairies in my garden are counterfactual" you're probably not going to accuse him of unwarranted certainty. So why get up in arms when he uses an uncaveated phrase about Yahweh? Why require us to "include the small print" for this entity when you neither use nor require anyone else to use the small print when talking about other entities? Why the priviledged treatment?

eric · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said: And your tales of miracles are counterfactual too. Not just theism per se.
Correction: you believe miracles to be counterfactual.

See, you just did it again. I bet if someone says 'tales of elves repiring shoes are counterfactual' you wouldn't insist they add "you believe" to it. You'd add the "he believes" or "as far as he can tell" in automatically, in your own mind. But when it comes to Yahweh's or Jesus' reputed miracles, you don't. You insist the caveat be stated. Why the different treatment?

Carl Drews · 15 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: How much energy do you think it would take to bring someone back from the dead after three days? This would surely leave a mark, no?

There is a peculiar detail included with Jesus' miracle of changing water into wine: John 2:1-11

6 Nearby stood six stone water jars, the kind used by the Jews for ceremonial washing, each holding from twenty to thirty gallons.

Why does John include the number of water jars and their capacity? Does John think that turning more water into wine is harder than transmuting just one cup of water? Are supernatural miracles made harder, or more impressive, by the amount of mass involved? There is a glimmer of scientific curiosity in the account, somewhat similar to the original poster's question.

callahanpb · 15 July 2014

Carl Drews said: There is a glimmer of scientific curiosity in the account, somewhat similar to the original poster's question.

Maybe, but I think the intent is mostly rhetorical--to convey to the reader that it was a significant miracle, not to establish any particular physical parameters. Another example of this would be the account of the number of baskets left over after the miracle of the loaves and fishes (also establishing that they weren't just cutting up the original food into tiny pieces). Whatever else you think of either account, they are supposed to be an engaging stories, and story-telling requires details. But as I initially responded, you can find people who claim that the resurrection was accompanied by a burst of energy, and that explains the image on the shroud of Turin. I think it should be clear by now that I don't believe any of this, but I don't see how adding extraneous details about energy bursts would actually enhance the plausibility rather than simply add unneeded complication. I personally consider simple statements of faith to be less problematic than elaborate pseudoscientific explanations. Neither are rational, but at least the former is not attempting to fool anyone.

Rolf · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Indeed. And this was, let's see...three centuries after the birth of Christ? Yeah. I'm not sure why we should be surprised that mystery cults co-opted the story from the gospels.

Aha, so the Pagans co-opted the date January 6th from the Christians? Next time I'll show how to find the story of the Gospels co-opted in the OT.

Carl Drews · 15 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Did you know the last time I was in King's Cross Station in London I saw Platform 9 and 3/4 so I can only conclude that Harry Potter is a true story.

I was at King's Cross Station in London six weeks ago and I can confirm the reported observation. Here's a photo of the shopping cart (complete with owl and cage) half-way through the brick wall: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Platform934-2014.JPG There was a representative of the British Tourist Board on site, managing a long line of teenagers wanting to have their pictures taken. Pretty funny! But seriously, how about a lesser conclusion: JK Rowling spent enough time in London to become familiar with the train stations. And since trains from King's Cross depart to the north of England and Scotland, she probably took some trips in that direction. Even a fictional story leaves some truth behind.

callahanpb · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: I consider myself a firm Slytherin, though I have strong Ravenclaw tendencies.

Interesting. I would have thought of Hufflepuff as the most Christ-like of houses. Gryffindor also exhibits a lot of virtue. I'm surprised to hear anyone actually admitting an affinity with Slytherin. I'm not sure where I would fit. It seems pretentious to claim to be brave enough for Gryffindor or smart enough for Ravenclaw.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 15 July 2014

Callahan, when you are talking about unicorns, do you believe unicorns really exist and they really drink pure essence of rainbows? If you don't, your example is beside the point; David believes miracles really occur and his god is the perpetrator of said miracles. Now if miracles are fiction, then of course you can attribute any characteristics you want to them and of course I can make my miracles different from yours and it won't matter one bit. It is like arguing over whether the magic in J K Rowling is more correct than that in Edward Eager. You do see the difference?

callahanpb · 15 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: It is like arguing over whether the magic in J K Rowling is more correct than that in Edward Eager. You do see the difference?

Yes, I do, and I'm happy to see that you do as well, because it wasn't clear. My point is that it's completely fair to dismiss the possibility of magic until some evidence is provided for it. The problem I have with your line of reasoning is that you seem to think there should be some very specific kind of evidence ("energy ... would surely leave a mark"). I don't see how you think this strengthens your argument.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 15 July 2014

Whatever, we aren't discussing anything real - so who cares?

david.starling.macmillan · 15 July 2014

A Masked Panda (ds_Q) said: So Jesus didn't perform miracles he performed magic. Now I do understand.

No, see above again. "I can do nothing apart from my father." Miracles, not magic, by the stated distinction between the two. Look at the feeding of the five thousand. "He directed the people to sit down on the grass. Taking the five loaves and the two fish and looking up to heaven, he gave thanks and broke the loaves. Then he gave them to the disciples, and the disciples gave them to the people. 20 They all ate and were satisfied, and the disciples picked up twelve basketfuls of broken pieces that were left over." That's not magic. That's a miracle. Jesus prays and a miracle happens. I'd argue that this is the mechanism implied by the text for all of Jesus's miracles...and, in fact, for all the miracles recorded in the Bible.

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Correction: you believe miracles to be counterfactual.
No, David. See Eric's explanation, above, about why it is not incorrect to omit the qualifier you seem to insist on.

I disagree. By stating that they are counterfactual, you are stating that they should be treated as nonevents for the purposes of this discussion. In other words, you're telling us what we ought to assume about them.

eric said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Correction: you believe miracles to be counterfactual.
See, you just did it again. I bet if someone says 'tales of elves repiring shoes are counterfactual' you wouldn't insist they add "you believe" to it. You'd add the "he believes" or "as far as he can tell" in automatically, in your own mind. But when it comes to Yahweh's or Jesus' reputed miracles, you don't. You insist the caveat be stated. Why the different treatment?

The difference is that counterfactuality is a specific claim about the way an idea should be treated for the purposes of the discussion. To say "This story is counterfactual" is to say "We can all agree this story didn't happen". Which is clearly not the case.

Carl Drews said:
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: How much energy do you think it would take to bring someone back from the dead after three days? This would surely leave a mark, no?
There is a peculiar detail included with Jesus' miracle of changing water into wine: John 2:1-11
6 Nearby stood six stone water jars, the kind used by the Jews for ceremonial washing, each holding from twenty to thirty gallons.
Why does John include the number of water jars and their capacity? Does John think that turning more water into wine is harder than transmuting just one cup of water? Are supernatural miracles made harder, or more impressive, by the amount of mass involved? There is a glimmer of scientific curiosity in the account, somewhat similar to the original poster's question.

Interesting. I remember Bible Bowl, back when I was in middle school; these numbers were all once- or twice-used words in the text. Perhaps he is trying to specify these details in order to make it clear that this is an actual event, rather than a fable? Or perhaps it is a fable, but the numbers have a numerological significance?

Rolf said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Indeed. And this was, let's see...three centuries after the birth of Christ? Yeah. I'm not sure why we should be surprised that mystery cults co-opted the story from the gospels.
Aha, so the Pagans co-opted the date January 6th from the Christians?

No, January 6th wasn't part of the story in the gospels. Why is it difficult to imagine a mystery cult borrowing themes from Christianity and then adding their own embellishments?

callahanpb said:
david.starling.macmillan said: I consider myself a firm Slytherin, though I have strong Ravenclaw tendencies.
Interesting. I would have thought of Hufflepuff as the most Christ-like of houses. Gryffindor also exhibits a lot of virtue. I'm surprised to hear anyone actually admitting an affinity with Slytherin. I'm not sure where I would fit. It seems pretentious to claim to be brave enough for Gryffindor or smart enough for Ravenclaw.

I tend to be very calculated and a little overly selfish at times. I have been known to let the ends justify the means -- just look at my time as a creationist -- and I can be very resourceful and not a little ambitious. I tend to assume that people will use leverage wherever they can to achieve their purposes. Not a fan of the blood purity business, though.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Whatever, we aren't discussing anything real - so who cares?

Oh, but we are discussing something real. We're discussing archeological evidence, or the lack thereof. You implied that we can use the real lack of large energy deposits in Judaea to refute miracle claims, because "miracles would take energy." That's quite real.

phhht · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: To say "This story is counterfactual" is to say "We can all agree this story didn't happen".

You're free to devise your own idiosyncratic definition of counterfactual, of course, but that is not what I mean. I mean what I said.

david.starling.macmillan · 15 July 2014

I maintain that your usage -- rather consistent usage, at that -- is consistent with the definition I've provided.

I still cannot seem to see how your use of the term is intended to accomplish anything. If "it's counterfactual" is just a fancy way of saying "I don't think it happened", what good is that?

phhht · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: I maintain that your usage -- rather consistent usage, at that -- is consistent with the definition I've provided.

There is no implication of universal agreement in my usage. That is your own interpretation, and I do not intend it.

david.starling.macmillan · 15 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: I maintain that your usage -- rather consistent usage, at that -- is consistent with the definition I've provided.
There is no implication of universal agreement in my usage. That is your own interpretation, and I do not intend it.

Then what is your purpose in using the term? You've asked repeatedly, "What reason do you have for believing in something that is counterfactual?" If that is simply your opinion, I don't see why you would expect it to apply to me.

phhht · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: I maintain that your usage -- rather consistent usage, at that -- is consistent with the definition I've provided.
There is no implication of universal agreement in my usage. That is your own interpretation, and I do not intend it.
Then what is your purpose in using the term? You've asked repeatedly, "What reason do you have for believing in something that is counterfactual?" If that is simply your opinion, I don't see why you would expect it to apply to me.

My purpose is to exercise my vocabulary. I find pleasure in saying exactly what I mean. I regret that you stubbornly refuse to understand me. But I have no intention whatsoever of modifying my usage in response to your objections.

Carl Drews · 15 July 2014

Helena Constantine said: The attestation for Jesus is remarkably good compared to most other ancient figures. . . . It makes one think that there is some special motivation in Atheists wanting to doubt the historicity of Jesus.

The argument that "there never was any such person" reminds me of creationists doubting the historicity of evolution. Helena, thanks for a refreshing summary of the historical evidence.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 15 July 2014

Wait a minute David, where in most of those stories does God come in? I went back and read about several miracles and Jesus talks directly to storms and demons and fig trees. etc. etc. - where is God and God's will? Forgive me, but I see magic even by your definition.

xubist · 15 July 2014

Some replies to points raised in the comments on the OP, without any attempt to specifically respond to individual comments…

IMAO, the main problem with the notion of "supernatural" is that it simply isn't a well-defined concept. The word "supernatural" is, as best I can tell, a meaningless noise; when I try to reverse-engineer a meaning for the word that's compatible with the ways in which real people use it, "supernatural" appears to mean something in the ballpark of "I don't understand this", generally with supplementary clauses of "nobody else understands this, either" and/or "what's more, nobody else ever will understand this".

If I drop a pen, it's going to fall to the floor. Happens every time. Would anybody claim that the pen's drop is a "supernatural" event? Doubtful at best. But why not? Why isn't the pen's drop a "supernatural" event? What are the distinctive characteristics of a "supernatural" event, that would allow one to determine whether or not a pen's drop actually is, or actually is not, "supernatural"? Nobody knows, and nobody can tell you. But a pen's drop is a boring, mundane, everyday event which 'everybody understands', so of course it's not 'supernatural', now is it?

The concept of 'magic', like the concept of 'supernatural', is equally ill-defined. Yes, if you know what side-effects are to be expected from the performance of a given Act Of Magic, then you know what sort of physical evidence to look for in order to confirm or deny the occurrence of that particular Act Of Magic. Great! Just one thing:

What are the side-effects to be expected from the occurrence of a given Act of Magic?

Nobody knows—certainly, nobody who argues you only deny the existence of magic 'cuz you're just that closed-minded knows. Because this 'magic' concept just isn't well-defined. Heck, how can you tell whether or not a pen's drop qualifies as 'magic'? Answer: You can't.

When it comes to 'magic', 'supernatural', and all things related, including the 'supernatural' elements of religious belief, I say it's spinach and I say the hell with it. As best I can tell, all religious belief is founded on fallacies, most prominently "assuming one's conclusion" and "wishful thinking".

phhht · 15 July 2014

xubist said: IMAO, the main problem with the notion of "supernatural" is that it simply isn't a well-defined concept.

Vagueness is one of the great bulwarks of religious belief.

Henry J · 15 July 2014

IMAO, the main problem with the notion of “supernatural” is that it simply isn’t a well-defined concept.

Yeah, "supernatural" is sometimes defined as "that which is not natural", but that just moves the question to the word "natural", which isn't well defined either. In practice, "natural" seems to mean stuff that is regarded as explainable in terms of things seen on a routine basis by everybody who looks. But, it includes concepts that are inferred from scientific principles, including quantum mechanics and relativity, so there might be a lot of steps leading to explanation of some concept (e.g., electrons, quarks, black holes, dark matter, dark energy). One problem with that as a definition, though, is that it is, so to speak, a moving goalpost - it changes with advances in science and technology. --- Now as for whether a "miracle" would obey scientific principles such as conservation of momentum or energy, well, if when something is levitated something else is pushed the other way, that takes care of net momentum. If the energy is somehow extracted from someplace else, that might be accounted for as well. So overall conservation laws aren't necessarily a problem for that. But on the other hand, finding a mechanism to move that momentum and energy around on demand, on the other hand, that is a problem. But anyway, if such things actually existed, it would just mean that our current descriptions of physics are incomplete (I think that's already been pointed out above). Somehow I doubt that there would be any sharp dividing line between "natural" and "existing but not natural"; it's more likely that any division between them is due to lack of knowledge (esp. empirical knowledge). Henry

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 15 July 2014

What I find intriguing is the claim that Jesus was just a man, the loaves and fishes event involved Jesus praying and God "choosing" to feed the multitudes, and that God would have done so without Jesus' prayer. Given that thousands were there to hear Jesus preach and were sleeping rough with no food, I can imagine that just about everyone was praying to God for food - manna in the desert so to speak. Now, why is this a Jesus miracle and not a God miracle? In the scenario above, Jesus is impotent at best. God could have been answering some old lady's prayer instead or God could have done it without the prayers at all. Not the Jesus I grew up with, that Jesus could do things I couldn't do (like magic and not stage magic either).

TomS · 15 July 2014

I wonder whether the world of mathematics is natural. I would never consider it to be supernatural.

Helena Constantine · 15 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: I just went to the Magritte exhibition at the Art Institute in Chicago - much less surreal than anything in the comments here..... Normal humans turn water into wine, walk on water, bring people back from the dead, drive demons into pigs, wither trees with their voice, multiply loaves and fishes - I rest my case.

No serious person thinks anyone ever did any of those things (Dionysus, who is not a person, however turned the water in all of his temple's fountains into wine on his birthday (just happens to be the feast of the Epiphany) every year--well attested, seen and tasted by thousands, plenty of good literary sources from eye-witnesses).

callahanpb · 15 July 2014

TomS said: I wonder whether the world of mathematics is natural. I would never consider it to be supernatural.

Mathematical concepts can have a distinct meaning without having any physical existence. I can say "the primes numbers in increasing order" and refer to an infinite list 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, and so on. Eventually one of the numbers on this list will be too large to have any physical significance and is not part of the natural universe. And I agree it is not "supernatural." It is just an abstract concept. Mathematics can also propose fundamentally different assumptions, such as geometries with or without the parallel postulate. These geometries cannot all describe the natural universe, but each is meaningful in a mathematical sense, and theorems can be proved in each. The goal of natural science (e.g. physics, chemistry, biology) is not just to determine truth about abstract systems (like mathematics) but to identify whether such a system describes any part of the natural universe and in that sense "exists." I've often wondered what it is for a mathematical system to "exist". E.g., if the brain can be defined by a mathematical system and my brain experiences consciousness, then how about a system that could potentially experience consciousness but is not "realized" in the physical universe? Does that system experience conscious just on the basis of being a mathematically well-defined system (a Platonic notion) or only if it exists in the physical universe. Of course, I believe you need an actual brain, not just the concept of a brain to be conscious, but it's not obvious to me what is special about a system having a physical realization. This is sort of crazy talk to me, but some mathematicians have been Platonists. I am mostly satisfied with the notion that there is significance to a system being realized physically as opposed to merely being well-defined and consistent mathematically, but I don't understand in any satisfying philosophical sense what that significance is.

Helena Constantine · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
Henry J said:
So how many gods are there, then, if more than One God? Three? Four? Thousands?
Seven billion and something. ;)
I like this.
Rolf said:
It’s not ideas that I have so much as an understanding of the evidence and historical background.
Relaxing criteria for counting as evidence for evolution to that level we might as well abandon ship. If there actually had been evidence of the quality that such astounding events would leave there should not have been such dearth of incontrovertible evidence. They didn't even manage to create credible evidence.
Right, absence of evidence is evidence of absence. As usual, though -- why? Which extant extrabiblical sources would you have expected to mention (or have more mention) of Jesus and the events described in the Gospels?

Here is what Gibbon thought: But how shall we excuse the supine inattention of the Pagan and philosophic world, to those evidences which were represented by the hand of Omnipotence, not to their reason, but to their senses? During the age of Christ, of his apostles, and of their first disciples, the doctrine which they preached was confirmed by innumerable prodigies. The lame walked, the blind saw, the sick were healed, the dead were raised, daemons were expelled, and the laws of Nature were frequently suspended for the benefit of the church. But the sages of Greece and Rome turned aside from the awful spectacle, and, pursuing the ordinary occupations of life and study, appeared unconscious of any alterations in the moral or physical government of the world. Under the reign of Tiberius, the whole earth, or at least a celebrated province of the Roman empire, was involved in a preternatural darkness of three hours. Even this miraculous event, which ought to have excited the wonder, the curiosity, and the devotion of mankind, passed without notice in an age of science and history. It happened during the lifetime of Seneca and the elder Pliny, who must have experienced the immediate effects, or received the earliest intelligence, of the prodigy. Each of these philosophers, in a laborious work, has recorded all the great phenomena of Nature, earthquakes, meteors comets, and eclipses, which his indefatigable curiosity could collect. Both the one and the other have omitted to mention the greatest phenomenon to which the mortal eye has been witness since the creation of the globe. A distinct chapter of Pliny is designed for eclipses of an extraordinary nature and unusual duration; but he contents himself with describing the singular defect of light which followed the murder of Caesar, when, during the greatest part of a year, the orb of the sun appeared pale and without splendor. The season of obscurity, which cannot surely be compared with the preternatural darkness of the Passion, had been already celebrated by most of the poets and historians of that memorable age.

Henry J · 15 July 2014

TomS said: I wonder whether the world of mathematics is natural. I would never consider it to be supernatural.

I'm not sure if the "natural" or not distinction is relevant for mathematics, seeing as it's independent of physical evidence. Or at least pure mathematics is. Each mathematical system depends only on its axioms, and the only part of a system that is experimental is figuring out what the axioms should be. (I recall reading that transfinite set theory had to go back to the drawing board because its axioms weren't adequate.) Course, if somebody then goes and disagrees with one of the axioms, you get a schism, and three kinds of geometry, one of which considers parallel lines to be heresy. Henry

Helena Constantine · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: But there's a simple reason why "magic" is not the usual term used in reference to miracles. Most of the time, magic is used to refer to "natural" abilities that are possessed either by specific individuals or specifically trained individuals. The use of magic is portrayed as the use of abilities which arise as part of the properties of the universe, not abilities which arise from a transcendent entity. ---Dude, you don't know how many times I've wanted my tap water to turn into beer, but it never does at my command. The person who can do that is not "just a man." But if you prayed that your tap water turned into beer, and a supernatural entity granted your request, you would still be a man.--- In other words, even orthodox Christianity will typically admit that Jesus was depending on the Spirit to work miracles; he wasn't doing them himself.

What century are you living in? The only definition of magic that makes any sense in the Roman world is: "What I do is religion; what my enemies do is magic." Since we are no longer part of that world most scholars don't use the term magic at all (or become all contorted about it), but since we are not partisans of any faction form Roman times, we have to view all the various claims objectively. What Jesus and Dionysus did are equally magical in any more conventional sense (rather like the technical and common use of the word 'theory'). As for the faucet running with beer, see my post just above. Dionysos seems like the god for you. If Jesus didn't do his miracles himself, how do explain his statement when a woman was accidentally healed by bumping into him in a crowd: "But Jesus said, "Someone touched me; I know that power has gone out from me." (Lk 8:46) Sorry the quotes got messed up.

phhht · 15 July 2014

Henry J said:
TomS said: I wonder whether the world of mathematics is natural. I would never consider it to be supernatural.
I'm not sure if the "natural" or not distinction is relevant for mathematics, seeing as it's independent of physical evidence. Or at least pure mathematics is. Each mathematical system depends only on its axioms, and the only part of a system that is experimental is figuring out what the axioms should be. (I recall reading that transfinite set theory had to go back to the drawing board because its axioms weren't adequate.) Course, if somebody then goes and disagrees with one of the axioms, you get a schism, and three kinds of geometry, one of which considers parallel lines to be heresy. Henry

Have you read Where Mathematics Comes From: How the embodied mind brings mathematics into being? The title sounds like woo, but it's not. It's far from perfect, but it's interesting in that it argues that mathematics is fundamentally based on embodied cognition.

Helena Constantine · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: ...This is an excellent point, and a clear foil to Masked's line of reasoning. Magic, as it is typically depicted in culture, follows reproducible rules that can be systematically studied and manipulated. In this sense, it is little more than a new layer of science. That is conceptually distinct from the proposition that a transcendent deity can alter the state of physical systems via nonphysical means. If magic did exist, divine miracles would still be something quite different...

SO you're not familiar with any scholarship on the subject since Frazer?

callahanpb · 15 July 2014

Henry J said: Now as for whether a "miracle" would obey scientific principles such as conservation of momentum or energy, well, if when something is levitated something else is pushed the other way, that takes care of net momentum. If the energy is somehow extracted from someplace else, that might be accounted for as well. So overall conservation laws aren't necessarily a problem for that. But on the other hand, finding a mechanism to move that momentum and energy around on demand, on the other hand, that is a problem.

The reason I lose patience with this whole line of reasoning is that it ignores the existence of distinct belief systems. One is the empirical assumption that any claim about reality (not just abstractions about what could be, such as mathematical formalisms) must in principle be falsifiable by some experimental means. I say "reality" rather than "nature" or "the universe" because the claims in these discussions are generally broader (with nature and the universe often accepted as the domain of empirical standards by all parties to the discussion). The empirical basis of truth is a totally reasonable assumption. It's my basis of belief for all practical purposes, and even my preferred philosophical stance. For one thing, if you accept any non-falsifiable claim, it seems like you can accept any, and I don't see the grounds for preferring one. And for another, it has been the most successful program in human history for generating widely agreed upon claims about reality. But clearly, the above is not everyone's assumption. So you basically have one side saying "Empiricism is the only valid basis of belief" and another side saying "No, I have other good reasons for believing stuff." And the argument can go on endlessly with lots of colorful metaphors, hypothetical scenarios, word-play, invective, and so forth, but it really boils down to "Yes it is. No it isn't. Yes it is. No it isn't." I think it helps to have some awareness when the discussion has taken this turn and just cut to the chase, which is to "agree to disagree." The thing is that not everyone on the planet is on board with empiricism. Maybe they ought to be but arguments drawn from empiricism are not going to be any more convincing than "Yes it is. No it isn't"." Note that problem with creationism itself is worse, because it is obviously inconsistent with empirical evidence, but its supporters go to strenuous lengths to pretend to show otherwise. I can accept nearly any philosophical stance stated with honesty and followed consistently, but creationism is neither.

callahanpb · 15 July 2014

Helena Constantine said: As for the faucet running with beer,

I've seen these myself. Also bottles filled with the stuff if absolutely necessary. What a wonderful, magical world we live in!

callahanpb · 15 July 2014

Henry J said: I'm not sure if the "natural" or not distinction is relevant for mathematics, seeing as it's independent of physical evidence.

I am sure the distinction is not relevant, for just that reason: it is independent of physical evidence. Mathematics is a useful tool for modeling the natural world, but the existence of a consistent mathematical model is insufficient grounds to conclude anything about nature.

Helena Constantine · 15 July 2014

Is it really so difficult to understand? Magic: Taking certain physical actions which predictably and deterministically lead to desired physical effects through the action of impersonal forces not described by the Standard Model of physics. Miracle: Changes in the state of physical systems brought about by nonphysical causes through the willful actions of transcendent personal entities; these actions need not be in response to any action or petition by any person. Do you see the difference? Magic, as it is defined in common parlance, is deterministic. Magic is your control and manipulation of reality through predictable forces. A miracle, on the other hand, is not deterministic. It is something that may or may not happen, dependent solely on the choice of a nonphysical entity.

So let's get this strait. Suppose I write a letter on a lead tablet and drop it down a well, signing my name as Hermes. The letter instructs any ghost who finds it to find the sumo wrestler Ōsuna-arashi and fill him with insatiable lust for me, not to let him sleep or eat until he comes to me...the usual thing. The ghost, believing the letter contains instructions from Hermes, will carry my orders out by effecting "Changes in the state of physical systems brought about by nonphysical causes through the willful actions of transcendent personal entities [e.g. the ghost]." In this case the miracle may happen in response to my petition, "dependent solely on the choice of a nonphysical entity," i.e. the ghost, to believe that he received instructions from Hermes. And if this happens, its not magic; it meets all your criteria for being a miracle, right? In that case, what exactly would be an example of magic?

phhht · 15 July 2014

callahanpb said: The empirical basis of truth is a totally reasonable assumption. It's my basis of belief for all practical purposes, and even my preferred philosophical stance.

Hear, hear. In fact, for me, to say that a thing is real is to say that there is empirical evidence for it. Reality is chock full of empirically supported entities, from apples to zebras, from gravity to electromagnetism. I cannot off hand name a thing I consider real which is not so supported.

Helena Constantine · 15 July 2014

Carl Drews said:
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: How much energy do you think it would take to bring someone back from the dead after three days? This would surely leave a mark, no?
There is a peculiar detail included with Jesus' miracle of changing water into wine: John 2:1-11
6 Nearby stood six stone water jars, the kind used by the Jews for ceremonial washing, each holding from twenty to thirty gallons.
Why does John include the number of water jars and their capacity? Does John think that turning more water into wine is harder than transmuting just one cup of water? Are supernatural miracles made harder, or more impressive, by the amount of mass involved? There is a glimmer of scientific curiosity in the account, somewhat similar to the original poster's question.

Pick me! Pick me! I know the answer! There was an actual trick where you could turn water purple by surreptitiously pouring dye into it(recorded in the second century BC by the alchemist Bolos of Mendes; in the early second century BC a Christian priest, accused of heresy by Irenaeus, made a fortune doing it. The huge volume of wine is used to prove that Jesus isn't using that trick. When the the priests of Dionyosos used the special plumbing arrangements (alluded to above) to dump hunbreds of gallons of wine into their fountains, they naturally used the cheapest kind; the other strange detail in John, that the wine was of best quality, was added to defend Jesus against the charge of using that trick.

callahanpb · 15 July 2014

Helena Constantine said: the other strange detail in John, that the wine was of best quality, was added to defend Jesus against the charge of using that trick.

I never found this detail strange (just viewing it as a narrative) but your explanation is interesting and sounds plausible.

eric · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: I disagree. By stating that they are counterfactual, you are stating that they should be treated as nonevents for the purposes of this discussion. In other words, you're telling us what we ought to assume about them.

I have no idea where you get that from. Phht's use of 'counterfactual' is pretty clear: it means its inconsistent with the facts he observes. And that statement could easily be a normal knowledge statement, with no implied claim of 'absolute philosophical certainty' involved. I think you are reading waaaay more certainty into atheistic statements than what the words actually say. And, to repeat, I think this is exceptional treatment, because if we were talking about black swans or goblins or fairys, you wouldn't be requiring anyone to put "I believe" or "as I understand it" in front of the exact same claims. And the use of black swan is intentional, because philosophers used to use that example in parallel with 'married bachelor.' IOW it wasn't some regular knowledge claim, it was used in a stronger sense that black swans were an example of something that could not possibly exist. They were wrong about this very strong, philosophically certain claim. Faced with evidence, they changed their mind. The moral of the story is that even stronger-than-normal claims are typically not claims of absolute philosophical certainty - and so, again, my rule of thumb is that you should not take atheistic claims to be uber-strong knowledge claims, because it's extraordinarily rare that anyone makes a claim like that. Imputing such philosophical certainty is a form of strawmanning your opponent: you are arguing against a type of knowledge claim they aren't actually making, because it is easier to address than the one they are making.

The difference is that counterfactuality is a specific claim about the way an idea should be treated for the purposes of the discussion. To say "This story is counterfactual" is to say "We can all agree this story didn't happen". Which is clearly not the case.

Coun·ter·fac·tu·al ˌkountərˈfakCHo͞oəl/ Philosophy adjective adjective: counterfactual; adjective: counter-factual 1. relating to or expressing what has not happened or is not the case. *** Nope, there is absolutely nothing in there that says that when Phht calls a claim 'counterfactual,' that means he is saying everyone must agree with him.

Helena Constantine · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: No, January 6th wasn't part of the story in the gospels. Why is it difficult to imagine a mystery cult borrowing themes from Christianity and then adding their own embellishments?

Are you veering into FL territory now? Pliny mentions that the priests of Dionysos gave out the date of their god's birth as January 6th citing Hellenistic sources, written hundreds of years before Jesus existed. I suppose you will next claim that demons gave them the date so as to try to descredit Christianity beforehand?

Helena Constantine · 15 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Look at the feeding of the five thousand. "He directed the people to sit down on the grass. Taking the five loaves and the two fish and looking up to heaven, he gave thanks and broke the loaves. Then he gave them to the disciples, and the disciples gave them to the people. 20 They all ate and were satisfied, and the disciples picked up twelve basketfuls of broken pieces that were left over." That's not magic. That's a miracle. Jesus prays and a miracle happens. I'd argue that this is the mechanism implied by the text for all of Jesus's miracles...and, in fact, for all the miracles recorded in the Bible.

That's not a miracle. Its magic. Jesus gives a pre-arranged signal to his daimonic assistant he had earlier acquired during his baptism by John (the magician's supernatural helper often took the form of a bird, like the dove that hovered over Jesus on that occasion), and which he controlled using the magical tattoo on his thigh (Rev 19:16), and a magical spell is cast multiplying the food. You know that right in the first spell of the Greek Magical Papyri, one of the powers attributed to the daimonic assistant is the ability to supply unlimited amounts of food, right?

callahanpb · 15 July 2014

Are you sure he didn't do this with Helga Hufflepuff's cup? Before it was turned into a horcrux, naturally. This is Jesus we're talking about.

Scott F · 15 July 2014

It's just a matter of definition. A "miracle" is "defined" to be an act of the will of "God". (Pick your favorite "God".) "Magic" is "defined" the application or invocation of certain (currently) undefined "forces" obeying certain (currently) undefined "rules". Of course, if you can either 1) detect a distinction between the two, or 2) discern that they are the same, then you're a better magician than I am. At this point, you're simply arguing definitions. Then of course there is Clarke's Third Law

3. Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.

eric · 16 July 2014

Scott F said: It's just a matter of definition. A "miracle" is "defined" to be an act of the will of "God". (Pick your favorite "God".) "Magic" is "defined" the application or invocation of certain (currently) undefined "forces" obeying certain (currently) undefined "rules".

If I were to Venn diagram it, my personal choice would be to put the "miracle" circle inside the "magic" circle. Its an invocation of a supernatural entity to work a magical effect. The magical rule being used to produce the effect is that the human must fulfill certain conditions (some type of worship or connection to the entity in question) before the entity will act on his/her behalf.

Rolf · 16 July 2014

I wonder if David may be in a state of "The song is ended but the melody lingers on" (Duke Ellington, - a beautiful tune.)

mattdance18 · 16 July 2014

phhht said:
Henry J said:
TomS said: I wonder whether the world of mathematics is natural. I would never consider it to be supernatural.
I'm not sure if the "natural" or not distinction is relevant for mathematics, seeing as it's independent of physical evidence. Or at least pure mathematics is. Each mathematical system depends only on its axioms, and the only part of a system that is experimental is figuring out what the axioms should be. (I recall reading that transfinite set theory had to go back to the drawing board because its axioms weren't adequate.) Course, if somebody then goes and disagrees with one of the axioms, you get a schism, and three kinds of geometry, one of which considers parallel lines to be heresy. Henry
Have you read Where Mathematics Comes From: How the embodied mind brings mathematics into being? The title sounds like woo, but it's not. It's far from perfect, but it's interesting in that it argues that mathematics is fundamentally based on embodied cognition.

I'm going to have to read that book. I've heard that there have been some promising recent developments in broadly "empirical" or "naturalistic" approaches to mathematics, but I haven't followed any of it closely as philosophy of mathematics is not really my field. Sounds interesting, though, to connect it up to the brain -- and that takes me a bit closer to my own working interests, anyway. (The title doesn't sound like woo to me, but then I am a philosopher, so our woo-meters are probably calibrated rather differently.)

Carl Drews · 16 July 2014

Helena Constantine said: SO you're not familiar with any scholarship on the subject since Frazer?

Helena - Since there are readers at Panda's Thumb with vastly different backgrounds, can you give links or extended citations when you cite a source by name only, like "Frazer"?

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 16 July 2014

What century are you living in? The only definition of magic that makes any sense in the Roman world is: “What I do is religion; what my enemies do is magic.”

Spot on. I could see David going down this road and was just trying to see how far he would go before realizing he missed the "no outlet" sign. One can't live comfortably straddling the modern and biblical worlds and you can see why the Bible as a historical record would be viewed with increasing skepticism by scholars. And phht's use of counterfactual is also spot on. Gods and miracles remain possible, but in my experience I have run across neither. In fact, if miracles do occur as David wants, then science is always suspect. We could never know if an event were due to natural or supernatural causes.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 16 July 2014

Also Frazer is James George Frazer who wrote The Golden Bough in 1890.

Henry J · 16 July 2014

We could never know if an event were due to natural or supernatural causes.

Or how about due to known or unknown causes, as there could always be causes that aren't known.

callahanpb · 16 July 2014

mattdance18 said: (The title doesn't sound like woo to me, but then I am a philosopher, so our woo-meters are probably calibrated rather differently.)

It sounds like woo to me because I don't think mind brings mathematics into existence. It exists already (as a concept) by virtue of its logical self-consistency, and the human mind is one particular embodiment of it. I.e., there is no embodiment of a mind relative to which first order logic would cease to exist as a concept. This probably makes me a Platonist after all. Hmm, though, maybe it does get at the question I alluded to earlier. Assume the human mind can be described as a mathematical system (not necessarily Turing-equivalent BTW, since it could involve infinities and continuous math--not that I think it does). As far as I can tell, I experience consciousness by virtue of having such a mathematical system realized within the natural universe. I can conceptualize other systems (e.g., a dove-tailing Turing machine that enumerates the set of halting Turing-machine programs) that solve problems beyond what is calculable in a feasible amount of time. I can even conceptualize such a system that stops when it finds a program that satisfies some testable conditions for artificial intelligence and then begins running this program (though it would not be worth implementing under realistic assumptions of available time). But I don't associate physical existence or consciousness with an unrealized system. So what's the distinction here? I believe there is a distinction, but given that my consciousness is I'm embedded in a particular natural system, the question is unfalsifiable and not really relevant to science. So in brief, I think consciousness arises from the combination of a self-referential mathematical system and its embedding in some physical universe. These might not be exhaustive requirements, but I think both are necessary. Note that because I don't see any scientific resolution, the whole issue interests me only briefly as a thought experiment. E.g., one could postulate an infinity of worlds that embodied any concept but if their existence is untestable within this natural universe, there is not much you can do with this. I'm sure I'm attacking this from a very naive perspective philosophically, but I do still have a general nagging feeling about what is the difference between actually existing and just being conceptualized, and why am I so sure there is a difference?

Helena Constantine · 16 July 2014

Carl Drews said:
Helena Constantine said: SO you're not familiar with any scholarship on the subject since Frazer?
Helena - Since there are readers at Panda's Thumb with vastly different backgrounds, can you give links or extended citations when you cite a source by name only, like "Frazer"?

As the Masked Panda pointed out, he is James Frazer of Golden Bough fame (the multi-volume work actually wasn't finished until 1922). He had various theories about magic based on his reading of classical sources and anthropological literature, including that Catholic ritualism represented a debased practice identifiable as magic as opposed to the good religious prayer of the Protestants, as well as that science was a sort of failed attempt to create science. His work is largely of historical interest now. It looked very odd to see Macmillan referring to his work (without even naming him) as though it represented some consensus understanding of magic. Probably it did in 1930, but not since.

david.starling.macmillan · 16 July 2014

On the topic of mathematics vs worlds...there's a neat paradox, a chicken-or-the-egg problem. What is primary, mathematics or the universe described by mathematics? On the one hand, we can conceive mathematics for which no universe exists, so mathematics must be primary. On the other hand, we cannot conceive that mathematics without being in a universe, so the universe must be primary.

A Masked Panda (ds_Q) said: Wait a minute David, where in most of those stories does God come in? I went back and read about several miracles and Jesus talks directly to storms and demons and fig trees. etc. etc. - where is God and God's will?

I didn't say it was explicit in every case. In the Feeding of the Five Thousand and in other notable cases, it's pretty explicit that Jesus is asking the Father to do a miracle rather than Jesus doing some magic trick. Consider Matthew 26 -- "Do you think I cannot now ask my Father, and he will not send twelve legions of angels?" Whenever Jesus talks about miracles, he is always clear that he is asking his Father and his Father is intervening. I'm saying that even though this isn't explicitly depicted in every instance, all miracles claimed in the Bible can be understood as specific cases of this framework.

xubist said: IMAO, the main problem with the notion of "supernatural" is that it simply isn't a well-defined concept. The word "supernatural" is, as best I can tell, a meaningless noise; when I try to reverse-engineer a meaning for the word that's compatible with the ways in which real people use it, "supernatural" appears to mean something in the ballpark of "I don't understand this", generally with supplementary clauses of "nobody else understands this, either" and/or "what's more, nobody else ever will understand this".

Just because the definition process can be screwy doesn't mean we can't try to nail one down. In normative usage, "supernatural" typically describes a supervening natural order within which physics and natural law in general is a subset. Sounds overly technical, I know, but I think it's accurate. "Supernatural" events (magical or miraculous) are "going above" the laws of physics and using other forces which operate outside normal physical bounds, but still follow rules or systems of some sort. Seems simple enough to me.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: What I find intriguing is the claim that Jesus was just a man, the loaves and fishes event involved Jesus praying and the Father~~God~~ "choosing" to feed the multitudes, and that the Father~~God~~ would have done so without Jesus' prayer.

Corrected that for you. Anyway, I think that description overreaches. I'm not saying the miracle would have happened without Jesus's prayer. The whole picture of Jesus's ministry is one where Jesus, despite having given up his divine attributes, was still so perfectly in touch with the Father that he would not ask anything the Father would not do. That's where the command to be Christlike comes into: we aren't supposed to learn magic; we're supposed to learn to follow God. Magic is when saying a particular phrase in a particular way triggers a supernatural response no matter what. A miracle is conceptually different because you can't force the system; you can ask, but what God does or doesn't do in response is up to God.

Not the Jesus I grew up with, that Jesus could do things I couldn't do (like magic and not stage magic either).

The Magician Jesus view is actually pretty common in evangelicalism. Holdover from Gnosticism and docetic heresy.

Helena Constantine said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Which extant extrabiblical sources would you have expected to mention (or have more mention) of Jesus and the events described in the Gospels?
Under the reign of Tiberius, the whole earth, or at least a celebrated province of the Roman empire, was involved in a preternatural darkness of three hours. Even this miraculous event, which ought to have excited the wonder, the curiosity, and the devotion of mankind, passed without notice in an age of science and history. It happened during the lifetime of Seneca and the elder Pliny, who must have experienced the immediate effects, or received the earliest intelligence, of the prodigy.

An excellent argument. I would, of course, question "the whole earth" approach; Matthew's "over all the land" need not refer to anything outside the general region. It could, of course, but we have no reason to think that. If such an event actually took place, then it would indeed be rather notable. About as notable as your average solar eclipse. So, how probable is it that a solar eclipse would be noted in extant texts from this period? As it turns out, this can be determined statistically. There were 251 solar eclipses in the century before the birth of Christ and 248 solar eclpises in the century following the birth of Christ, for a total of 499 eclipses. During this period, the Roman Empire covered approximately 20% of the Earth's latitudes, meaning around 100 of these eclipses should have been visible from Roman provinces. I don't know off the top of my head how many eclipses were noted in antiquity between 100 BCE and 100 CE, but if we did, then we could determine the probability that one in Judaea in 30 CE would have been missed in surviving sources.

If Jesus didn't do his miracles himself, how do explain his statement when a woman was accidentally healed by bumping into him in a crowd: "But Jesus said, "Someone touched me; I know that power has gone out from me." (Lk 8:46)

An excellent question. Of course, it wasn't an accidental bump; it was quite deliberate on her part. I'd note that Jesus subsequently told the woman "your faith has made you whole", seemingly implying that he didn't actually have anything to do with it and that the Father had healed her in response to her faith. Though I don't know entirely how to interpret his initial comment.

Helena Constantine said:
Magic: Taking certain physical actions which predictably and deterministically lead to desired physical effects through the action of impersonal forces not described by the Standard Model of physics. Miracle: Changes in the state of physical systems brought about by nonphysical causes through the willful actions of transcendent personal entities; these actions need not be in response to any action or petition by any person. Do you see the difference? Magic, as it is defined in common parlance, is deterministic. Magic is your control and manipulation of reality through predictable forces. A miracle, on the other hand, is not deterministic. It is something that may or may not happen, dependent solely on the choice of a nonphysical entity.
Suppose I write a letter on a lead tablet and drop it down a well, signing my name as Hermes. The letter instructs any ghost who finds it to find the sumo wrestler Ōsuna-arashi and fill him with insatiable lust for me, not to let him sleep or eat until he comes to me...the usual thing. The ghost, believing the letter contains instructions from Hermes, will carry my orders out by effecting "Changes in the state of physical systems brought about by nonphysical causes through the willful actions of transcendent personal entities [e.g. the ghost]." In this case the miracle may happen in response to my petition, "dependent solely on the choice of a nonphysical entity," i.e. the ghost, to believe that he received instructions from Hermes. And if this happens, its not magic; it meets all your criteria for being a miracle, right? In that case, what exactly would be an example of magic?

Well, the typical approach to magic/witchcraft among fundamentalist Christians (at least nowadays) is that anything resembling magic in effect is actually miracles worked by demons in a way that tricks the user into thinking they have magical powers. So the user thinks they're controlling magic, but in reality the "magic" is being used to control them. Of course, this presupposes that witchcraft and magic are actual things. I don't think they are.

phhht said:
callahanpb said: The empirical basis of truth is a totally reasonable assumption. It's my basis of belief for all practical purposes, and even my preferred philosophical stance.
Hear, hear. In fact, for me, to say that a thing is real is to say that there is empirical evidence for it. Reality is chock full of empirically supported entities, from apples to zebras, from gravity to electromagnetism. I cannot off hand name a thing I consider real which is not so supported.

Uhm...history?

Helena Constantine said:
david.starling.macmillan said: No, January 6th wasn't part of the story in the gospels. Why is it difficult to imagine a mystery cult borrowing themes from Christianity and then adding their own embellishments?
Are you veering into FL territory now? Pliny mentions that the priests of Dionysos gave out the date of their god's birth as January 6th citing Hellenistic sources, written hundreds of years before Jesus existed. I suppose you will next claim that demons gave them the date so as to try to descredit Christianity beforehand?

Good god no. I don't much care whether the priests of the mysteries were embellishing an established mythos with borrowed Christian themes or embellishing borrowed Christian themes with new details. Doesn't make a difference either way. There is obviously tons and tons of trading and borrowing going back and forth in both directions. I'm simply inclined to question the assumption that the Gospels themselves were borrowing from the various Mystery cults.

Helena Constantine said: Jesus gives a pre-arranged signal to his daimonic assistant he had earlier acquired during his baptism by John (the magician's supernatural helper often took the form of a bird, like the dove that hovered over Jesus on that occasion), and which he controlled using the magical tattoo on his thigh (Rev 19:16), and a magical spell is cast multiplying the food. You know that right in the first spell of the Greek Magical Papyri, one of the powers attributed to the daimonic assistant is the ability to supply unlimited amounts of food, right?

An intriguing hypothesis. I'll have to look into it further.

Helena Constantine said: As the Masked Panda pointed out, he is James Frazer of Golden Bough fame (the multi-volume work actually wasn't finished until 1922). He had various theories about magic based on his reading of classical sources and anthropological literature, including that Catholic ritualism represented a debased practice identifiable as magic as opposed to the good religious prayer of the Protestants, as well as that science was a sort of failed attempt to create science. His work is largely of historical interest now. It looked very odd to see Macmillan referring to his work (without even naming him) as though it represented some consensus understanding of magic.

Referring to his work? I've never heard of the fellow.

callahanpb · 16 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Gods and miracles remain possible, but in my experience I have run across neither.

I don't mean this as a nitpick (I understand if you see it as one) but this use of the word "possible" seems problematic. Could you also say "Science has ruled out the possibility of Gods and miracles due to the complete lack of evidence."? (phhht? anyone?) Does it remain possible that my uncle Charlie lives under my bed given my lack of evidence for having either an uncle named Charlie or anyone living under my bed? But tomorrow morning I might look under my bed and discover that he's there after all. Not to put words in anyone's mouth, but I think a big part of the disagreement between phhht and David is whether "Gods and miracles remain possible."

In fact, if miracles do occur as David wants, then science is always suspect. We could never know if an event were due to natural or supernatural causes.

Science is always suspect in the sense that any scientific assertion can later be overturned by new evidence. That's a feature, not a bug. Notwithstanding that, it is still worthwhile to be selective about what you include in the "possible" or else it becomes the universal set, removing much of the value of having a word like "possible".

phhht · 16 July 2014

phhht said:
callahanpb said: The empirical basis of truth is a totally reasonable assumption. It's my basis of belief for all practical purposes, and even my preferred philosophical stance.
Hear, hear. In fact, for me, to say that a thing is real is to say that there is empirical evidence for it. Reality is chock full of empirically supported entities, from apples to zebras, from gravity to electromagnetism. I cannot off hand name a thing I consider real which is not so supported.
Uhm...history?

The study of history is highly empirical. Empiricism is how we know David Barton, for example, is a charlatan.

callahanpb · 16 July 2014

I too glibly wrote: Science is always suspect in the sense that any scientific assertion can later be overturned by new evidence.

But actually a more important point is that science remains useful whether or not it provides a perfect description of reality. Newtonian physics remains the most useful way of understanding motion and forces within a very wide range of parameters. The periodic table still gives insight into the chemical properties of elements even though you can't just expect elements in the same group to behave the same. If (counterfactually speaking) miracles occurred sometimes but remained rare, this would not be devastating to science. It would still be the most effective way of understanding the natural universe.

david.starling.macmillan · 16 July 2014

phhht said:

phhht said:
callahanpb said: The empirical basis of truth is a totally reasonable assumption. It's my basis of belief for all practical purposes, and even my preferred philosophical stance.
Hear, hear. In fact, for me, to say that a thing is real is to say that there is empirical evidence for it. Reality is chock full of empirically supported entities, from apples to zebras, from gravity to electromagnetism. I cannot off hand name a thing I consider real which is not so supported.
Uhm...history?
The study of history is highly empirical. Empiricism is how we know David Barton, for example, is a charlatan.

For some very interesting definition of "empirical", I'm sure.

callahanpb said: If (counterfactually speaking) miracles occurred sometimes but remained rare, this would not be devastating to science. It would still be the most effective way of understanding the natural universe.

Couldn't have put it better myself.

callahanpb · 16 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: On the topic of mathematics vs worlds...there's a neat paradox, a chicken-or-the-egg problem. What is primary, mathematics or the universe described by mathematics? On the one hand, we can conceive mathematics for which no universe exists, so mathematics must be primary. On the other hand, we cannot conceive that mathematics without being in a universe, so the universe must be primary.

This seems obvious to me. Mathematics exists whether there is a conscious being to conceive it or not. Since mathematical truth is independent of any particulars of the natural universe, it is primary. By "obvious" I just mean that I (with my admittedly finite and error-ridden human noggin) personally attach more certainty to that assertion than nearly anything else I can think of. I'm reminded of the statement by mathematician Paul Erdős: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proofs_from_THE_BOOK

[Erdős] often referred to "The Book" in which God keeps the most elegant proof of each mathematical theorem. During a lecture in 1985, Erdős said, "You don't have to believe in God, but you should believe in The Book."

I don't exactly agree with Erdős, since there may be different proofs that satisfy different kinds of elegance (and accessibility to a particular mode of thought) but it is certainly hard for me to imagine doing mathematics without believing in mathematical truth as superseding everything else.

https://me.yahoo.com/a/JxVN0eQFqtmgoY7wC1cZM44ET_iAanxHQmLgYgX_Zhn8#57cad · 16 July 2014

You mean fact based, data based?

What is more empirical than history?

Naturally, the data of history are subject to dispute and re-evaluation, given our distance from events and frequent inability to go back and find more data to clear up matters. But history is especially empirical, especially since there aren’t the sorts of constraints that exist in physical models, such as in evolution.

Constraints come into play, of course, but confounding possibilities often exist.

Glen Davidson

phhht · 16 July 2014

callahanpb said: If (counterfactually speaking) miracles occurred sometimes but remained rare, this would not be devastating to science. It would still be the most effective way of understanding the natural universe.

In fact, many christians maintain that one counterfactual miracle, namely the Eucharist, occurs very frequently indeed. But they are, of course, mistaken (to put it kindly). Bread and wine do not change into flesh and blood, not here in reality. That claim is counterfactual: it simply is not true.

https://me.yahoo.com/a/JxVN0eQFqtmgoY7wC1cZM44ET_iAanxHQmLgYgX_Zhn8#57cad · 16 July 2014

The software really screwed things up in my last post (or maybe I saved the preview when signing in). Trying again:

The study of history is highly empirical. Empiricism is how we know David Barton, for example, is a charlatan.
For some very interesting definition of “empirical”, I’m sure.

You mean fact based, data based? What is more empirical than history? Naturally, the data of history are subject to dispute and re-evaluation, given our distance from events and frequent inability to go back and find more data to clear up matters. But history is especially empirical, especially since there aren’t the sorts of constraints that exist in physical models, such as in evolution. However, the disputes are about the data and likelihoods, and about almost nothing else. Constraints come into play in history, of course, but confounding possibilities often exist. Glen Davidson

david.starling.macmillan · 16 July 2014

https://me.yahoo.com/a/JxVN0eQFqtmgoY7wC1cZM44ET_iAanxHQmLgYgX_Zhn8#57cad said: You mean fact based, data based? What is more empirical than history? Naturally, the data of history are subject to dispute and re-evaluation, given our distance from events and frequent inability to go back and find more data to clear up matters. But history is especially empirical, especially since there aren’t the sorts of constraints that exist in physical models, such as in evolution. Constraints come into play, of course, but confounding possibilities often exist. Glen Davidson

phhht has consistently used "empirical" in conjunction with demands that entities or processes be measurable, testable, and repeatable. But events in history do not fit this. We may, on occasion, have enough physical evidence to allow for a fairly accurate reconstruction of events without reference to any accountings...but this is the exception rather than the norm. Most of the time, we must piece together models from various testimony and accounts and then test our conglomerate model for consistency against whatever evidence we have. The process of testing for consistency often involves empirical evidence, but the pursuit of knowledge concerning historical events relies too heavily on testimony and account to fit phhht's usage of "empirical".

phhht said: In fact, many christians maintain that one counterfactual miracle, namely the Eucharist, occurs very frequently indeed. But they are, of course, mistaken (to put it kindly). Bread and wine do not change into flesh and blood, not here in reality. That claim is counterfactual: it simply is not true.

I'm still really curious as to why you insist on redundant language. Why say "Their claim is counterfactual: it simply is not true" at all? We know you don't accept transubstantiation. We know that Catholics do accept transubstantiation. What does repeating your beliefs -- twice -- accomplish?

https://me.yahoo.com/a/JxVN0eQFqtmgoY7wC1cZM44ET_iAanxHQmLgYgX_Zhn8#57cad · 16 July 2014

However, the disputes are about the data and likelihoods, and about almost nothing else.

This, by the way, is a big reason why miracles and/or "magic" really won't do in history, any more than anywhere else. Sure, they might happen rarely, but if that's what you're counting on, any and every fictional logical possibility might come into play, including, say, trickster gods playing with your mind. One is allowed anything one desires in one's own understanding of history. However, once someone is telling us that a specific miracle embedded in some religious tradition is "possible," well, that's wild speculation at best. It doesn't fit into any sort of knowledge category. Glen Davidson

phhht · 16 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Most of the time, we must piece together models from various testimony and accounts and then test our conglomerate model for consistency against whatever evidence we have. The process of testing for consistency often involves empirical evidence, but the pursuit of knowledge concerning historical events relies too heavily on testimony and account to fit phhht's usage of "empirical".

No, it doesn't.

phhht said: In fact, many christians maintain that one counterfactual miracle, namely the Eucharist, occurs very frequently indeed. But they are, of course, mistaken (to put it kindly). Bread and wine do not change into flesh and blood, not here in reality. That claim is counterfactual: it simply is not true.

David dodges the substance of my post with his obsession over my use of counterfactual. Why not address the meat of the assertion, David? Transubstantiation is fictional. It does not occur. Never. To maintain otherwise is to take a position opposed to reality, a position expressing what has not happened or is not the case.

https://me.yahoo.com/a/JxVN0eQFqtmgoY7wC1cZM44ET_iAanxHQmLgYgX_Zhn8#57cad · 16 July 2014

The process of testing for consistency often involves empirical evidence, but the pursuit of knowledge concerning historical events relies too heavily on testimony and account to fit phhht’s usage of “empirical”.

I don't think so, because reliability of testimony depends upon what is known to exist. Evaluating empirical data depends upon whether one testifies of the involvement of phenomena that have never been reliably shown to exist. So, if testimony involves elves or gods we really have to consider whether this is pure fabrication, part of the witness's worldview, hallucination, or, most unlikely, that elves or gods were involved. Basically, we're not going to consider that elves or gods were involved with reality, unless some impressive physical evidence for such entities is brought to our attention. Much of what Herodotus wrote is more or less accepted, basically, none of the magic/miracles tales are, unless as possible hoaxes. Glen Davidson

eric · 16 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: In the Feeding of the Five Thousand and in other notable cases, it's pretty explicit that Jesus is asking the Father to do a miracle rather than Jesus doing some magic trick.

So, in the Aladdin tale, neither the actions associated with the ring djinn nor the lamp djinn are - for you - examples of magic; you'd classify them as miracles, right? Because it's pretty explicit that Aladdin is asking the djinni to do stuff rather than Aladdin doing some magic trick.

Well, the typical approach to magic/witchcraft among fundamentalist Christians (at least nowadays) is that anything resembling magic in effect is actually miracles worked by demons in a way that tricks the user into thinking they have magical powers. So the user thinks they're controlling magic, but in reality the "magic" is being used to control them.

I can see that. However, it kinda renders this whole discussion moot; if the point is to distinguish between what's magic and what's miracle, and you say that evangelicals don't distinguish - everything to them is miracles - then what's the point?

david.starling.macmillan · 16 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Most of the time, we must piece together models from various testimony and accounts and then test our conglomerate model for consistency against whatever evidence we have. The process of testing for consistency often involves empirical evidence, but the pursuit of knowledge concerning historical events relies too heavily on testimony and account to fit phhht's usage of "empirical".
No, it doesn't.

My assessment, both of history and of your usage, is that it does.

phhht said: In fact, many christians maintain that one counterfactual miracle, namely the Eucharist, occurs very frequently indeed. But they are, of course, mistaken (to put it kindly). Bread and wine do not change into flesh and blood, not here in reality. That claim is counterfactual: it simply is not true.

Why not address the meat of the assertion, David? Transubstantiation is fictional. It does not occur. Never. To maintain otherwise is to take a position opposed to reality, a position expressing what has not happened or is not the case.

To be clear, I don't think transubstantiation happens either. But I'm curious to know how you propose to demonstrate its counterfactuality. Is there a particular empirical test you have in mind to show that the Eucharist does not possess unmeasurable spiritual qualities?

https://me.yahoo.com/a/JxVN0eQFqtmgoY7wC1cZM44ET_iAanxHQmLgYgX_Zhn8#57cad said:
The process of testing for consistency often involves empirical evidence, but the pursuit of knowledge concerning historical events relies too heavily on testimony and account to fit phhht’s usage of “empirical”.
I don't think so, because reliability of testimony depends upon what is known to exist. Evaluating empirical data depends upon whether one testifies of the involvement of phenomena that have never been reliably shown to exist.

I'm not talking about supernatural claims in history. I'm talking about ordinary, mundane events in history. They (usually) aren't empirically verifiable.

callahanpb · 16 July 2014

phhht said: The study of history is highly empirical.

FWIW (not too much) I'll cast a vote for history as an empirical field (particularly as practiced today). Nobody expects absolute certainty about past events, but the basis for evaluating claims is to look at evidence. If the evidence isn't there, it's possible to speculate within reasonable bounds, which are also determined by evidence, but not to insist on one particular speculation as definitive. Speaking of history, did you know that Napoleon had powers similar to Green Lantern, and his ultimate defeat was purely due to a lack of imagination? What, you don't believe me? What's your basis for not believing me? History is not conventionally considered science either, but there is certainly an application of forensic science to some historical evidence, and (analogous to David's point about evolution) this science can make falsifiable predictions about what evidence there is to discover even if the evidence deals with past events.

david.starling.macmillan · 16 July 2014

eric said:
david.starling.macmillan said: In the Feeding of the Five Thousand and in other notable cases, it's pretty explicit that Jesus is asking the Father to do a miracle rather than Jesus doing some magic trick.
So, in the Aladdin tale, neither the actions associated with the ring djinn nor the lamp djinn are - for you - examples of magic; you'd classify them as miracles, right? Because it's pretty explicit that Aladdin is asking the djinni to do stuff rather than Aladdin doing some magic trick.

Well, in that particular case, that still falls under magic, because the djinn is bound by magical forces to carry out Aladdin's wishes. Aladdin's wishes deterministically lead to the desired effects. At the same time, no one would suggest that Aladdin thus possesses "magical powers". His use of the ring and lamp don't break any laws of physics; it is the ring, the lamp, and the djinni which are operating according to magical laws rather than physical ones.

Well, the typical approach to magic/witchcraft among fundamentalist Christians (at least nowadays) is that anything resembling magic in effect is actually miracles worked by demons in a way that tricks the user into thinking they have magical powers. So the user thinks they're controlling magic, but in reality the "magic" is being used to control them.
I can see that. However, it kinda renders this whole discussion moot; if the point is to distinguish between what's magic and what's miracle, and you say that evangelicals don't distinguish - everything to them is miracles - then what's the point?

Well, we're still talking about "magic" as it is used in fiction, and whether that understanding can be applied to miracle claims.

callahanpb said: FWIW (not too much) I'll cast a vote for history as an empirical field (particularly as practiced today). Nobody expects absolute certainty about past events, but the basis for evaluating claims is to look at evidence. If the evidence isn't there, it's possible to speculate within reasonable bounds, which are also determined by evidence, but not to insist on one particular speculation as definitive.

We can evaluate speculative explanations for their consistency with the evidence, sure.

History is not conventionally considered science either, but there is certainly an application of forensic science to some historical evidence, and (analogous to David's point about evolution) this science can make falsifiable predictions about what evidence there is to discover even if the evidence deals with past events.

Indeed it can. This is how hypotheses about history are confirmed or disconfirmed.

callahanpb · 16 July 2014

phhht said: But they are, of course, mistaken (to put it kindly). Bread and wine do not change into flesh and blood, not here in reality. That claim is counterfactual: it simply is not true.

At least in Catholic doctrine, the claim is unfalsifiable by design and can be ignored for purposes of doing science. So to rephrase slightly: If empirically detectable miracles occurred sometimes but remained rare, this would not be devastating to science, which remains the most effective way of understanding the natural universe.

callahanpb · 16 July 2014

I feel pretty confident in stating that any distinction between "magic" and "miracle" is not very relevant from an empirical standpoint. Both permit the formulation of unfalsifiable assertions.

david.starling.macmillan · 16 July 2014

callahanpb said: I feel pretty confident in stating that any distinction between "magic" and "miracle" is not very relevant from an empirical standpoint. Both permit the formulation of unfalsifiable assertions.

IIRC, this whole discussions started when Masked asked how one could possibly justify labeling the Bible's miracle claims as anything other than "magic" akin to fairies, djinni, and Harry Potter.

eric · 16 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: phhht has consistently used "empirical" in conjunction with demands that entities or processes be measurable, testable, and repeatable. But events in history do not fit this. We may, on occasion, have enough physical evidence to allow for a fairly accurate reconstruction of events without reference to any accountings...but this is the exception rather than the norm.

This is, IMO, baloney. Or at least misses the point. It is the nature of induction that we assess claims about places and times we don't have access to using our understanding of the places and times we do have access to. We can say the Jesus ressurection claim or Jesus loaves and fishes claim is counterfactual in the same way we can say that a claim that there are perpetual motion machines orbiting Kepler-11 is counterfactual. I don't need to visit Kepler-11 before I can legitimately say that. And (drumroll, please...) since Kepler-11 is 2,000 ly away, my conclusion of "counterfactual" in the Kepler-11 case is based on [understanding of physics] + [very limited observational data on events that happened 2,000 years in the past], exactly like the case of Jesus.

The process of testing for consistency often involves empirical evidence, but the pursuit of knowledge concerning historical events relies too heavily on testimony and account to fit phhht's usage of "empirical".

The inductive conclusion that the laws of physics operated 2,000 years ago everywhere in the universe exactly as they do here and now does not rely at all on testimony and account. It is the best empirical conclusion of the evidence we collect every day. Thus, its perfectly reasonable to label 'conterfactual' any claim which purports some past break in those laws. A claim that a break happened 2,000 years ago in Galilee is no different than a break that it's happening "now" on Kepler-11, where "now" means as viewed in telescopes today.

phhht · 16 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said: In fact, many christians maintain that one counterfactual miracle, namely the Eucharist, occurs very frequently indeed. But they are, of course, mistaken (to put it kindly). Bread and wine do not change into flesh and blood, not here in reality. That claim is counterfactual: it simply is not true.

Why not address the meat of the assertion, David? Transubstantiation is fictional. It does not occur. Never. To maintain otherwise is to take a position opposed to reality, a position expressing what has not happened or is not the case.
To be clear, I don't think transubstantiation happens either. But I'm curious to know how you propose to demonstrate its counterfactuality. Is there a particular empirical test you have in mind to show that the Eucharist does not possess unmeasurable spiritual qualities?

I'm surprised at you, David, resorting to that favorite dodge of FL and his ilk, namely trying to shift the burden of proof away from those who assert a position opposed to reality, a position expressing what has not happened or is not the case, onto one who denies the purported miracle. It is the christians who make the fantastic claim; it is up to them to demonstrate its truth, not up to me to demonstrate its falsehood. So how do you distinguish which alleged miracles you believe are real (e.g. water into wine, resurrection, fetal implantation ex nihilo, etc.) from those you believe are not (transubstantiation)? Why don't you believe in the reality of transubstantiation?

eric · 16 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Well, in that particular case, that still falls under magic, because the djinn is bound by magical forces to carry out Aladdin's wishes. Aladdin's wishes deterministically lead to the desired effects.

No, classicly the djinn must carry out the command, not what Aladdin wishes. You don't always get what you want. Now, the bible says that all prayers will be answered, but maybe not in the way you expect. Seems to me that the situations are almost exactly parallel; rub the lamp and the djinni must listen to your command and respond to it...but maybe not in the way you desire. Say a prayer and the yahweh must listen to your prayer and respond to it...but maybe not in the way you desire.

At the same time, no one would suggest that Aladdin thus possesses "magical powers". His use of the ring and lamp don't break any laws of physics; it is the ring, the lamp, and the djinni which are operating according to magical laws rather than physical ones.

Well, they are analagous to God. So you're okay with saying that God operates according to magical laws rather than physical ones?

Well, we're still talking about "magic" as it is used in fiction, and whether that understanding can be applied to miracle claims.

Myth and fiction is full of invocation magic, where supernatural creatures are begged, requested, or commanded to do things. A prayer is an invocation where a supernatural creature is begged or requested to do things.

david.starling.macmillan · 16 July 2014

eric said: The inductive conclusion that the laws of physics operated 2,000 years ago everywhere in the universe exactly as they do here and now does not rely at all on testimony and account. It is the best empirical conclusion of the evidence we collect every day. Thus, its perfectly reasonable to label 'conterfactual' any claim which purports some past break in those laws. A claim that a break happened 2,000 years ago in Galilee is no different than a break that it's happening "now" on Kepler-11, where "now" means as viewed in telescopes today.

This is the part that always bugs me. Why is it supposed that a miracle would change the laws of physics? As callahanpb has pointed out several times now, physics would still be the best way of describing the universe even if miracles did happen rarely but regularly.

phhht said: It is the christians who make the fantastic claim; it is up to them to demonstrate its truth, not up to me to demonstrate its falsehood.

I'm not asking you to disprove their claim that it happens; I'm asking you to prove your claim that it is counterfactual.

So how do you distinguish which alleged miracles you believe are real (e.g. water into wine, resurrection, fetal implantation ex nihilo, etc.) from those you believe are not (transubstantiation)? Why don't you believe in the reality of transubstantiation?

Doesn't seem necessary.

phhht · 16 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said: It is the christians who make the fantastic claim; it is up to them to demonstrate its truth, not up to me to demonstrate its falsehood.
I'm not asking you to disprove their claim that it happens; I'm asking you to prove your claim that it is counterfactual.

That is what we call a squirm, when FL tries it.

david.starling.macmillan · 16 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said: It is the christians who make the fantastic claim; it is up to them to demonstrate its truth, not up to me to demonstrate its falsehood.
I'm not asking you to disprove their claim that it happens; I'm asking you to prove your claim that it is counterfactual.
That is what we call a squirm, when FL tries it.

You're denying that you're making a positive claim, then?

phhht · 16 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said: It is the christians who make the fantastic claim; it is up to them to demonstrate its truth, not up to me to demonstrate its falsehood.
I'm not asking you to disprove their claim that it happens; I'm asking you to prove your claim that it is counterfactual.
That is what we call a squirm, when FL tries it.
You're denying that you're making a positive claim, then?

It is the christians who make the fantastic claim; it is up to them to demonstrate its truth, not up to me to demonstrate its falsehood.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 16 July 2014

Miracle claims aren't fiction? or let me modify that to help some of our discussants from becoming confused: miracle claims are in every practical sense fiction, but still might be logically possible and even if they were to occur they would be rare, so we can still trust science to answer questions and make predictions, in case we were worried that supernatural forces would be interfering in the universe and even though miracles can't be that rare because look how many there were in the Gospels in the three short years of Jesus' ministry and those are only the ones recorded - who knows how many times God actually intervened raising the dead which of course can be done by God without any need for things like energy and matter, but ex nihilo as they say - phewwww - did I cover it all? No I forgot empirical doesn't mean verified by observation and experience, but actually means science which is not history in case of course you didn't know that they were different, but only similar in some ways, but not every way because "were you there?"

phhht · 16 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
So how do you distinguish which alleged miracles you believe are real (e.g. water into wine, resurrection, fetal implantation ex nihilo, etc.) from those you believe are not (transubstantiation)? Why don't you believe in the reality of transubstantiation?
Doesn't seem necessary.

What makes it necessary to believe in the reality of water into wine, resurrection, fetal implantation ex nihilo, etc., but not transubstantiation? Sounds arbitrary and indefensible to me.

david.starling.macmillan · 16 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said: It is the christians who make the fantastic claim; it is up to them to demonstrate its truth, not up to me to demonstrate its falsehood.
I'm not asking you to disprove their claim that it happens; I'm asking you to prove your claim that it is counterfactual.
That is what we call a squirm, when FL tries it.
You're denying that you're making a positive claim, then?

It is the christians who make the fantastic claim; it is up to them to demonstrate its truth, not up to me to demonstrate its falsehood.

So the claim that transubstantiation is counterfactual is not a claim. Got it.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Miracle claims aren't fiction? or let me modify that to help some of our discussants from becoming confused: miracle claims are in every practical sense fiction, but still might be logically possible and even if they were to occur they would be rare, so we can still trust science to answer questions and make predictions, in case we were worried that supernatural forces would be interfering in the universe and even though miracles can't be that rare because look how many there were in the Gospels in the three short years of Jesus' ministry and those are only the ones recorded - who knows how many times God actually intervened raising the dead which of course can be done by God without any need for things like energy and matter, but ex nihilo as they say - phewwww - did I cover it all? No I forgot empirical doesn't mean verified by observation and experience, but actually means science which is not history in case of course you didn't know that they were different, but only similar in some ways, but not every way because "were you there?"

I'm really struggling to understand what it is you're trying to prove here.

eric · 16 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: This is the part that always bugs me. Why is it supposed that a miracle would change the laws of physics? As callahanpb has pointed out several times now, physics would still be the best way of describing the universe even if miracles did happen rarely but regularly.

I didn't say change, I said break. The ressurection miracle is a break. The loaves and fishes miracle is a break. A claim that on Kepler-11 "now," there is a 10g rock that is in the process of multiplying into 5,000 10g rocks contra the laws of physics, that's also a break. Now, you can say none of them are counterfactual - but that sounds really odd to say about the Kepler-11 case, doesn't it? Of course spontaneously generating rocks are counterfactual! But your only other choice is to say all of them are counterfactual. So which is it going to be?

eric · 16 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: I'm not asking you to disprove their claim that it happens; I'm asking you to prove your claim that it is counterfactual.

If we get away from personal religious beliefs, it seems perfectly normal to say that a claim that some law of physics has been broken in an unseen or unobserved time or place is counterfactual, because the "facts" that we consider also include the laws of physics as we understand them. Those laws are part of the knowledge base we use to determine whether some claim is consistent with our understanding of the world, or inconsistent with it. So, if I claim that there's a box on my desk, and in it, H2O is spontaneously transmuting into ethanol, you can legitimately and very reasonably call that claim counterfactual from where you sit right now, whithout ever having to investigate my desk...and I will agree; that claim is counterfactual. It runs counter to the facts I know about physics and chemistry, such as how nuclear reactions work. We will probably all agree that that claim is counterfactual. Now, locate that box 2,000 years in the past, or 2,000 lightyears away, and the same logic holds. And if calling the first counterfactual doesn't make you squirm, but calling the second counterfactual does, that squirmy feeling is your religious bias. Try to ignore it as best you can.

david.starling.macmillan · 16 July 2014

eric said: ...if I claim that there’s a box on my desk, and in it, H2O is spontaneously transmuting into ethanol, you can legitimately and very reasonably call that claim counterfactual from where you sit right now, whithout ever having to investigate my desk…and I will agree; that claim is counterfactual. It runs counter to the facts I know about physics and chemistry, such as how nuclear reactions work. We will probably all agree that that claim is counterfactual. Now, locate that box 2,000 years in the past, or 2,000 lightyears away, and the same logic holds. And if calling the first counterfactual doesn’t make you squirm, but calling the second counterfactual does, that squirmy feeling is your religious bias. Try to ignore it as best you can.

Don't worry; none of those make me squirm. I guess the part that puzzles me is whether you see a distinction between: A) Claiming that the laws of physics do not operate the same way in certain physical systems, and B) Claiming that effects not predicted by physics can come from nonphysical causes. Do you see any qualitative distinction here?

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 16 July 2014

I’m really struggling to understand what it is you’re trying to prove here.

Forgot your sarcasm detector at home? Come on, there are so many caveats from you and callahan that it is verging on shear amusement. Let's put the number of recorded "miracles" for Jesus at 37 and his ministry at 1000 days give or take. That is one per month, hardly rare. But then, we have this from John:

And there are also many other things which Jesus did, the which, if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written.

Which means what one a week, a day, two, three, four a day? Looks like "miracles" were coming fast and furious during that time. Was it an anomaly and science is reliable again?

david.starling.macmillan · 16 July 2014

A Masked Panda (ds_Q) said: Come on, there are so many caveats from you and callahan that it is verging on shear amusement. Let's put the number of recorded "miracles" for Jesus at 37 and his ministry at 1000 days give or take. That is one per month, hardly rare. But then, we have this from John:
And there are also many other things which Jesus did, the which, if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written.
Which means what one a week, a day, two, three, four a day? Looks like "miracles" were coming fast and furious during that time. Was it an anomaly and science is reliable again?

Hyperbole aside, you still seem to be missing the point. A miracle, in typical religious usage, does not involve any changes or insufficiencies in the laws of physics or the process of science. Even if a supernatural being miraculously turned a cup of water into wine every hour on the hour in the middle of Times Square, without fail, science would still provide an accurate means of describing the universe.

phhht · 16 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said: It is the christians who make the fantastic claim; it is up to them to demonstrate its truth, not up to me to demonstrate its falsehood.
I'm not asking you to disprove their claim that it happens; I'm asking you to prove your claim that it is counterfactual.
That is what we call a squirm, when FL tries it.
You're denying that you're making a positive claim, then?

It is the christians who make the fantastic claim; it is up to them to demonstrate its truth, not up to me to demonstrate its falsehood.

So the claim that transubstantiation is counterfactual is not a claim. Got it.

You really should have more self-respect, David, if not respect for me. Let the christians (that would be you, David) demonstrate the truth of their preposterous claims. There is no need for me to be involved beyond pointing out that the claims are false. My part is over. The rest is up to you. So how come it's necessary to believe in a zombie god and an alien embryo and all the rest of that crap, but not necessary to believe in transubstantiation?

phhht · 16 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Even if a supernatural being miraculously turned a cup of water into wine every hour on the hour in the middle of Times Square, without fail, science would still provide an accurate means of describing the universe.

Would that include a scientific, organic-chemistry-based paper explaining exactly how the water turned into wine? Nope, because water does not turn into wine. It doesn't happen. It never happened, and as Yogi Berra said, it still hasn't. Why should anyone believe otherwise? Why do you?

david.starling.macmillan · 16 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: So the claim that transubstantiation is counterfactual is not a claim. Got it.
You really should have more self-respect, David, if not respect for me.

You're the one consistently claiming X Belief or Y Belief or Z Belief is "counterfactual" and then backing away when asked to define or defend that claim.

There is no need for me to be involved beyond pointing out that the claims are false.

Here we go again. "Point out that the claims are false." How is this anything other than question-begging?

how come it's...not necessary to believe in transubstantiation?

Because I don't think transubstantiation is a valid part of Christianity. I choose to believe in (a limited) Christianity because I have found it to be broadly consistent with the evidence and I find it to be a more useful, more complete understanding of reality. For me. Personally.

https://me.yahoo.com/a/JxVN0eQFqtmgoY7wC1cZM44ET_iAanxHQmLgYgX_Zhn8#57cad · 16 July 2014

Even if a supernatural being miraculously turned a cup of water into wine every hour on the hour in the middle of Times Square, without fail, science would still provide an accurate means of describing the universe.

The transformation of hydrogen and/or oxygen into carbon and assorted other elements is thought to be detectable, even without scientific instruments. I suppose one could put enough ad hoc assumptions into a miracle to make it fit into the limits of science (invisibility cloaks to cover up the nuclear transformations while the energy is shot into space, for instance), but few want to go there. Otherwise, well, turning water into wine is contrary to observation and theory based upon those observations. Glen Davidson

andrewdburnett · 16 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said: So how many gods is that, three or one? Can't be both, not unless you assert the counterfactual.
Depends on your definition of God. If you're defining "God" as a divine person, there are three gods. If you're defining "God" as transcendent divinity, there is one. When the term you're using has no simple, singular, agreed definition, you can't pin something like that down. It's like asking "Is there one physics or many physics"? Well, there are many different physical forces, and we currently understand there to be at least two separate sources of those forces, and we don't know whether they will be unified, but we accept that whatever model we arrive at is still "physics".
So you've got the father god. That's one god, right? You've got the demigod, and the ghost god. That's two more gods, to make three gods, not one god. Right?
You have evidently defined "God" as "a divine person". Under that definition, you are correct: there are three gods.
And there are no other divine persons (i.e. gods) under discussion here, are there? There is no fourth god, somehow the mystical fusion or union or magical uniting of the other three gods? See David, in the case of the trinity, the miracle disappears entirely when you banish the vagueness. You cling to your assertion that the answer of whether there are three gods or one god depends on what you mean by god. I have tried to banish that imprecision. I bet it didn't work with you, did it?

The Trinity is an interesting case. It is something that is inferred from the Bible but not very explicitly spelled out. The final and irreparable split between the Greek Orthodox and Latin Churches actually happened over a disagreement about the nature of the Trinity. Originally the Holy Spirit was said to proceed "from the Father" but the Latin West insisted on adding "from the Father and the Son." From my understanding (which is certainly not extensive) the Orthodox Church was furious with this elevating of the Son to the same status as the Father (as well as with the idea that the Latins could come up with their own separate versions of the creeds thereby asserting a separate authority). Notice that neither group held the Spirit to be at the same level as the Father. I think this is a fairly different understanding than really any protestant Americans now hold. The Trinity has been especially problematic for the Latin Western churches over the centuries because they have tried to make it fit into a logical framework. The theologians who came up with the major ideas about the Trinity were themselves Greek Orthodox and created the concept to be by nature illogical (or perhaps non-logical). Meditating on the Trinity was supposed to perform a function along the lines of contemplating questions such as "If a tree falls in the forest does it still make a sound?" This had a high value in Greek culture and mysticism but never resonated very well in the Latin West. I've always found conversations about the Trinity in the West to be fairly pointless and unsatisfactory even when I was a practicing and believing Christian). Trying to discuss a non-logical concept using logic is just not very useful. Karen Armstrong argues that the insistence by Western Christianity that it is logically consistent makes it particularly untenable as far as modern religious systems go. As an aside concerning the major conversation in this thread I think it is equally problematic to try and think about miracles rationally. If thinking about miracles helps you have a non-rational God experience (in other words help you to transcend your "self") then I can perhaps see some value in that. However, arguing about the rational possibility of miracles seems fruitless to me.

david.starling.macmillan · 16 July 2014

A Masked Panda (ds_Q) said:
Even if a supernatural being miraculously turned a cup of water into wine every hour on the hour in the middle of Times Square, without fail, science would still provide an accurate means of describing the universe.
The transformation of hydrogen and/or oxygen into carbon and assorted other elements is thought to be detectable, even without scientific instruments.

And, puzzling again. We're presupposing that the transformation is being done via supernatural means. Not by inertial confinement fusion. Why do you insist that supernatural beings, if they existed, would be required to perform their miracles via inertial confinement fusion? Why couldn't they simply adjust probabilities and let everything quantum-tunnel its way into the desired state?

phhht · 16 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Because I don't think transubstantiation is a valid part of Christianity.

Why not? Certainly millions of other christians, and a good number of theologians and other religious authorities, disagree. How can you tell that you're correct and they are wrong? And why reject one more miracle when you already accept so many others?

I choose to believe in (a limited) Christianity because I have found it to be broadly consistent with the evidence and I find it to be a more useful, more complete understanding of reality. For me. Personally.

But a zombie god and an embryo ex nihilo and so on are consistent with evidence? What evidence (non-fictional, please)? I'm partucularly interested to hear about evidence for the implanted embryo claim. That one reeks of a fabrication in service of a bigger lie. It seems that you believe in those counterfactual claims just because you want to. Have I understood you correctly?

phhht · 16 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: We're presupposing that the transformation is being done via supernatural means. Not by inertial confinement fusion. Why do you insist that supernatural beings, if they existed, would be required to perform their miracles via inertial confinement fusion? Why couldn't they simply adjust probabilities and let everything quantum-tunnel its way into the desired state?

Indeed, anything is possible - in fiction.

david.starling.macmillan · 16 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Because I don't think transubstantiation is a valid part of Christianity.
Why not? Certainly millions of other christians, and a good number of theologians and other religious authorities, disagree. How can you tell that you're correct and they are wrong?

My understanding of history and literary criticism would lead me to the conclusion that transubstantiation is, more likely than not, not a valid part of Christianity. But of course I could be wrong.

And why reject one more miracle when you already accept so many others?

Because I don't think it's consistent with Christianity. I think we've been over this.

a zombie god and an embryo ex nihilo and so on are consistent with evidence? What evidence (non-fictional, please)? I'm partucularly interested to hear about evidence for the implanted embryo claim.

I am going to provide two statements. A) The claim is consistent with evidence. B) The claim is supported by evidence. Do you recognize the qualitative distinction between these two statements? Because you just conflated them.

It seems that you believe in those counterfactual claims just because you want to.

I do not find them to be counterfactual, and I'm not sure why you would think I do.

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: We're presupposing that the transformation is being done via supernatural means. Not by inertial confinement fusion. Why do you insist that supernatural beings, if they existed, would be required to perform their miracles via inertial confinement fusion? Why couldn't they simply adjust probabilities and let everything quantum-tunnel its way into the desired state?
Indeed, anything is possible - in fiction.

Which is exactly why Masked's continued insistence that fictional events must follow a particular set of rules is so very puzzling, wouldn't you agree?

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 16 July 2014

If all of those miracles were occurring all the time, why would any one ever think up science as a means of understanding the universe, it would never have occurred to them. (putting words in bold or capitalizing them doesn't make them more true).

david.starling.macmillan · 16 July 2014

There are something like 10⁸⁰ particles in the observable universe. Supposing that 0.00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001% of those particles could undergo nonphysical transformations every 1,603,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 Planck time units hardly seems the destruction of all physics.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 16 July 2014

Clueless as usual David - or do you believe the Bible to be fiction?

david.starling.macmillan · 16 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Clueless as usual David - or do you believe the Bible to be fiction?

It contains fiction, yes. Though, in this case, the operative point is that you believe all miracle accounts to be fictional or falsehood, and thus your insistence on how magic ought to work in what you believe to be fiction is puzzling.

callahanpb · 16 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: There are something like 10⁸⁰ particles in the observable universe. Supposing that 0.00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001% of those particles could undergo nonphysical transformations every 1,603,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 Planck time units hardly seems the destruction of all physics.

This isn't completely fair. Say I have a 1000 page proof of a mathematical theorem (since a 10^80 page proof would be completely silly). If one line on one page asserts 2+2=5, then the rest of the proof really does fall apart, because that could be used to deduce that 0=1 and literally anything else that I might care to conclude. Reality check: almost no mathematical proofs are 1000 pages long, and even reasonable-size proofs contain some errors. So even in mathematics, having one thing wrong doesn't invalidate a published result. But I would argue that this is because the readers use the paper to construct their own proof to their own satisfaction, fixing small errors as they go and only doubting the result if the errors are unfixable. At the end of the day, nobody publishes a mathematical proof, they just convince other mathematicians that a proof exists if someone was willing to nail down all the particulars. Second reality check: experimental science is not like formal logic. It admits exceptions, though usually not of the magical kind. For me, the key issue is the goal of science. If you're content to say that your goal is to understand your world in order to predict reasonably well how it will behave next, then it is fine to have things occasionally not work out as predicted for unknown reasons. If you really think that science is the "search for truth" then I admit it's a more difficult problem. Another point is that a miracle or otherwise magical event that affects even 1/10^80 particles is significant in that it attacks the underpinnings of naturalistic assumptions the way a more neutral anomaly would not. This would indeed give philosophers reason to see empiricism in a different light, but it would not make science less useful. My inability to trust my own reasoning fully is sufficient to dismiss any possibility of actually knowing what is "true" so I find the question of truth mostly uninteresting. I do find experimental science interesting because it gives me more insight into the natural world than I would have without it.

phhht · 16 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
a zombie god and an embryo ex nihilo and so on are consistent with evidence? What evidence (non-fictional, please)? I'm partucularly interested to hear about evidence for the implanted embryo claim.
I am going to provide two statements. A) The claim is consistent with evidence. B) The claim is supported by evidence. Do you recognize the qualitative distinction between these two statements? Because you just conflated them.

Ah, you fooled me there, David. I thought you meant that being consistent with evidence meant being supported by evidence. I should have known better, because none of those alleged miracles are supported by evidence, not even in the looser sense of historical evidence. Your invocation of evidence was just a red herring. To be consistent with the evidence of reality is a quality I strive for in my own fiction. None of the events I describe there are real, and some of them are pure fantasy, yet one can read the story and, with suspension of disbelief, enjoy it as narrative. It's the same with religious fiction.

It seems that you believe in those counterfactual claims just because you want to.
I do not find them to be counterfactual, and I'm not sure why you would think I do.

I have to take you at your word, no matter how it makes you look. You believe that zombie gods and the embryo implantation and so on actually happened, in reality, just like apples and zebras. You can't offer any compelling reason to believe that, but you do anyway. In particular, you cannot offer empirical evidence to support your beliefs, even though apples and zebras (and everything else real) have that, in spades. Still, you believe.

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: We're presupposing that the transformation is being done via supernatural means. Not by inertial confinement fusion. Why do you insist that supernatural beings, if they existed, would be required to perform their miracles via inertial confinement fusion? Why couldn't they simply adjust probabilities and let everything quantum-tunnel its way into the desired state?
Indeed, anything is possible - in fiction.
Which is exactly why Masked's continued insistence that fictional events must follow a particular set of rules is so very puzzling, wouldn't you agree?

Perhaps Masked's fiction strives for consistency with reality.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 16 July 2014

Sigh, think for 1 second please.
If you lived in the Biblical world that you believe to be true with miracles performed hourly, daily - water turned to wine, food multiplied ad lib, people raised from the dead, sicknesses cured by command and on and on, you would never ever work out things like conservation of energy or matter, germ theory of disease, and the like because there would be no predictable pattern to look for. You do understand that science requires predictability, no? If the world weren't predictable then science would be anon-starter. In a world of miracles, no one would ever fathom that the world was predictable. Hence, Biblical miracles = counterfactual.

Helena Constantine · 16 July 2014

Intersting that the Starling left out the very portion of the Gibbon quote that addressed his objection.

In regards to the definition, at least he is retreating by shifting the goal posts and changed his definition to magic. Why doesn't he just say "What Jesus did was a miracle" anyone else is practicing magic," i.e. implicate himself in Gager's definition I suggested earlier?

SO you admit that you no knowledge of the anthropological or historical study of magic and know the Frazerian definition of magic you used earlier from some tertiary source on the web? If so, how can you possibly think you can determine that a difference exists between magic and miracle? I could cut and paste several pages of bibliography on that specific subject in relation to the NT, but I guess, like some of the other posters here you don't need to read that scholarship to arrive at a truer opinion than is offered in all that scribbling.

Sylvilagus · 16 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Even if a supernatural being miraculously turned a cup of water into wine every hour on the hour in the middle of Times Square, without fail, science would still provide an accurate means of describing the universe.
Would that include a scientific, organic-chemistry-based paper explaining exactly how the water turned into wine? Nope, because water does not turn into wine. It doesn't happen. It never happened, and as Yogi Berra said, it still hasn't. Why should anyone believe otherwise? Why do you?

I don't think that you understand what transubstantiation is claimed to be. Not that I believe in it. But it doesn't involve any change in the physical or chemical make up of the bread and wine.

andrewdburnett · 16 July 2014

callahanpb said: If one line on one page asserts 2+2=5, then the rest of the proof really does fall apart, because that could be used to deduce that 0=1 and literally anything else that I might care to conclude.

Off-topic but this reminds me of my favorite Biblical literalists: those who say that if the Bible said that 2+2=5 then, well, they would have to believe it.

andrewdburnett · 16 July 2014

Sylvilagus said: I don't think that you understand what transubstantiation is claimed to be. Not that I believe in it. But it doesn't involve any change in the physical or chemical make up of the bread and wine.

I believe that for much of history it did... and still does for many.

callahanpb · 16 July 2014

First off (repeating myself) the distinction between "magic" and "miracle" is irrelevant for discussing the question of empirical evidence for supernatural claims, which I agree is wholly lacking as far as I'm aware. This applies equally to magic and miracles, no matter how you define them. But...

Helena Constantine said: SO you admit that you no knowledge of the anthropological or historical study of magic and know the Frazerian definition of magic you used earlier from some tertiary source on the web?

Is it acceptable to go with a current dictionary definition without inquiring into the full history of a term? David's use actually matches what I find in the online Merriam Webster dictionary reasonably well. I did not cherrypick to get these, and I'm going with the first definitions on the list:

magic - a power that allows people (such as witches and wizards) to do impossible things by saying special words or performing special actions

[note that this is a bad definition since by definition one cannot do "impossible" things, but this is what I get without cherrypicking; I read this as "impossible by natural means"]

miracle - an unusual or wonderful event that is believed to be caused by the power of God

The same entry for "magic" gives another definition (2a):

an extraordinary power or influence seemingly from a supernatural source

This supports the suggestion (a previous comment, I don't remember who, but I agree) that miracles could be considered a subset of magic with the supernatural source being God. It's interesting to me that even an ordinary definition of "magic" from a general-purpose dictionary supports David's claims about it arising from particular actions. I had never really given it this level of thought. The other thing to consider is that David may be drawing on a distinction that is part of his religious upbringing and it is valid for him to say "This is what I and members of my religion mean when we use these words." It's intriguing if these meanings--either in David's religion or in the Merriam Webster--derive from some obsolete scholarship connected to Frazer's The Golden Bough but I don't see why it makes any difference. All I would say is that by convention I would not use the term "magic" for Biblical miracles, but I never received any strong prohibition about it. The issue just never came up.

callahanpb · 16 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: If you lived in the Biblical world that you believe to be true with miracles performed hourly, daily - water turned to wine, food multiplied ad lib, people raised from the dead, sicknesses cured by command and on and on, you would never ever work out things like conservation of energy or matter, germ theory of disease, and the like because there would be no predictable pattern to look for.

Has anyone suggested that we live in such a world or ever lived in such a world? If so, I missed it. Even relative to the time period of the gospel, and supposing that the events occurred as recorded, people would have mostly got by with assumptions of predictability. Owners of fig orchards would have tended their trees the same way as their parents without fearing the wrath of some itinerant preacher. Most blind people remained blind. Wedding planners would have gone to a vintner, not the town well to supply themselves with wine. Today, when many people (even if religious) would deny that miracles occur at all, there are still large numbers of people who act as if superstitions are effective, e.g. turning their baseball cap inside out as if it could change the outcome of a game. Do they really believe it? Mostly not, but some might. If they behave as if they do, what am I supposed to assume. The same people take their car to an auto mechanic and not a priest. So even superstition is consistent with the default assumption of predictability. When Walt Whitman wrote "I am large, I contain multitudes." he may have meant something more exalted, but in truth the human mind is large and it contains multitudes. Reason and superstition coexist at some level in nearly everyone's mind, and it does not render reason ineffective.

phhht · 16 July 2014

callahanpb said:
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: If you lived in the Biblical world that you believe to be true with miracles performed hourly, daily - water turned to wine, food multiplied ad lib, people raised from the dead, sicknesses cured by command and on and on, you would never ever work out things like conservation of energy or matter, germ theory of disease, and the like because there would be no predictable pattern to look for.
Has anyone suggested that we live in such a world or ever lived in such a world? If so, I missed it. Even relative to the time period of the gospel, and supposing that the events occurred as recorded, people would have mostly got by with assumptions of predictability. Owners of fig orchards would have tended their trees the same way as their parents without fearing the wrath of some itinerant preacher. Most blind people remained blind. Wedding planners would have gone to a vintner, not the town well to supply themselves with wine. Today, when many people (even if religious) would deny that miracles occur at all, there are still large numbers of people who act as if superstitions are effective, e.g. turning their baseball cap inside out as if it could change the outcome of a game. Do they really believe it? Mostly not, but some might. If they behave as if they do, what am I supposed to assume. The same people take their car to an auto mechanic and not a priest. So even superstition is consistent with the default assumption of predictability. When Walt Whitman wrote "I am large, I contain multitudes." he may have meant something more exalted, but in truth the human mind is large and it contains multitudes. Reason and superstition coexist at some level in nearly everyone's mind, and it does not render reason ineffective.

A visitor to Neils Bohr's country cottage teased him about a horseshoe hanging on the wall. "Can it be that you, of all people, believe it will bring you good luck?" "Of course not," replied Bohr, "but I understand it brings you luck whether you believe or not."

eric · 16 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Don't worry; none of those make me squirm.

Well then, can you tell me whether you'd classify them all as counterfactual, or none of them counterfactual?

I guess the part that puzzles me is whether you see a distinction between: A) Claiming that the laws of physics do not operate the same way in certain physical systems, and B) Claiming that effects not predicted by physics can come from nonphysical causes.

(A) is counterfactual because it is counter to the observational fact that the laws of physics appear to be the same everywhere, at all times. Unless you're talking about something trivial, like saying the approximation PV = nRT is violated for non-point particles. (B) is a strange goose. As a speculation or theoretical, academic question, it's not counterfactual. It's "if X existed, could it do Y?" when we have no evidence X exists. However, when anyone starts claiming that X exists - i.e., that there are nonphysical causes - it becomes counterfactual. Because such a claim is counter to the observational facts that all tests of the hypothesis that there are nonphysical causes have undermined that hypothesis. Every time the question has been put - "physical cause, or nonphysical cause?" the answer has been the former. Expecting the answer to be different for some cause-unknown case goes against inductive reasoning. I have in the past likened the situation to a horse race. You've got the "there's a physical explanation" horse and the "there's a supernatural explanation" horse. We've run millions of races, and the "physical" horse has won them all. Under all conditions. Now, the "supernatural" horse might win the next unexplained phenomena race. But at this point the "physical" horse is the clear favorite. It would be insane to claim it's not the favorite. And in terms of counterfactualness, saying the "physical" horse is waaaay favored is equivalent to saying the "supernatural" horse is counter to what we understand about the world.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 16 July 2014

Has anyone suggested that we live in such a world or ever lived in such a world?

I think you lack imagination - an ability think what a world where the supernatural is taken for granted everyday would be like - it is easy in our compartmented age and amongst the educated where religion is religion and science is science, but that was not the case. In fact science didn't exist as we know it. Of course, common sense things were predictable - the moon, the sun, and such, but look at health as related in the Bible. Jesus didn't use science he used something totally unscientific. Read those stories - think about sick people with no hope hearing of a miracle worker - it is a extremely foreign world to me.

callahanpb · 16 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said:
Has anyone suggested that we live in such a world or ever lived in such a world?
I think you lack imagination - an ability think what a world where the supernatural is taken for granted everyday would be like - it is easy in our compartmented age and amongst the educated where religion is religion and science is science, but that was not the case. In fact science didn't exist as we know it.

I agree that people attributed a lot more to magic in the past, and may have routinely accused each other of witchcraft, etc. I also agree--for instance--that if you think your neighbor is casting spells to curdle your milk, you're less likely to be motivated to discover microbiology, and far more likely to become an expert in whatever connivance is needed to get your neighbor in trouble with the village authorities. But you can definitely do science while believing some supernatural events are occurring regularly. In fact, most scientists carried out their business under such assumptions until fairly recently in historical terms. Whether they shared the assumptions is unclear, though some (e.g. Newton) seem to have believed in the supernatural while carrying out the best actual science of the day. I think your scenario really doesn't apply to the beliefs of anyone commenting here in the year 2014, though, which is why it strikes me as a strawman.

Sylvilagus · 16 July 2014

andrewdburnett said:
Sylvilagus said: I don't think that you understand what transubstantiation is claimed to be. Not that I believe in it. But it doesn't involve any change in the physical or chemical make up of the bread and wine.
I believe that for much of history it did... and still does for many.

There is much confusion on this issue. Protestants by and large do not accept transubstantiation at all. The term is essentially Catholic and refers not to a chemical change, but to a spiritual change... The bread in its "essence" becomes the flesh of Christ but in its "species" in its physical, non spiritual form retains the form of bread. This is based on Aristotelian metaphysics and has been the Catholic position explicitly for about the last thousand years. Even before that, before the term "transubstantiation" came into existence, the "bread become flesh" clearly involved more of a spiritual transformation than a physical one. While they did not believe it to be simply a symbol of Christs blood, they did not generally think it was literal blood in its physical form. When Jesus says "this is my flesh" even if taken as more than figurative cannot refer to the flesh of his physical body, which did not suddenly show missing chunks of flesh. More to the point, No communicant could seriously not tell the difference between drinking wine and drinking blood. Regardless of what we might think of these beliefs, they are clearly more complicated than the notion of physical flesh and blood. Not that I believe any of this mind you. But I do think it important not to construct straw man arguments. Phhht seems to be relying on a rather pedestrian misunderstanding of the theology.

phhht · 16 July 2014

Sylvilagus said:
andrewdburnett said:
Sylvilagus said: I don't think that you understand what transubstantiation is claimed to be. Not that I believe in it. But it doesn't involve any change in the physical or chemical make up of the bread and wine.
I believe that for much of history it did... and still does for many.
There is much confusion on this issue. Protestants by and large do not accept transubstantiation at all. The term is essentially Catholic and refers not to a chemical change, but to a spiritual change... The bread in its "essence" becomes the flesh of Christ but in its "species" in its physical, non spiritual form retains the form of bread. This is based on Aristotelian metaphysics and has been the Catholic position explicitly for about the last thousand years. Even before that, before the term "transubstantiation" came into existence, the "bread become flesh" clearly involved more of a spiritual transformation than a physical one. While they did not believe it to be simply a symbol of Christs blood, they did not generally think it was literal blood in its physical form. When Jesus says "this is my flesh" even if taken as more than figurative cannot refer to the flesh of his physical body, which did not suddenly show missing chunks of flesh. More to the point, No communicant could seriously not tell the difference between drinking wine and drinking blood. Regardless of what we might think of these beliefs, they are clearly more complicated than the notion of physical flesh and blood. Not that I believe any of this mind you. But I do think it important not to construct straw man arguments. Phhht seems to be relying on a rather pedestrian misunderstanding of the theology.

So they're just pretending to drink blood and eat flesh, right? I can certainly see why they would deny what appears to be the literal case. But even today, when nobody's theology is pedestrian any more, people get really upset if you nail a wafer to the floor. But not because they really really believe it's the flesh of Jesus. No, no. Maybe Jesus was an instant healer, did you ever think of that? Maybe he ripped big gobbets of bloody flesh off his body and regrew them instantly. After all, that supposition is consistent with factual reality, if not exactly supported by it. You're no doubt correct about my theology. I despise theology in general, and sophisticated, apologetic theology in particular. Fortunately I have you to help me with that.

eric · 17 July 2014

Sylvilagus said: When Jesus says "this is my flesh" even if taken as more than figurative cannot refer to the flesh of his physical body, which did not suddenly show missing chunks of flesh.

Just a nitpick, but sure it can. Loaves, fishes, body - same miracle.

Regardless of what we might think of these beliefs, they are clearly more complicated than the notion of physical flesh and blood.

It could be complicated. Or it could just be confused and vague. AIUI the RCC version says that the empirical appearance won't change. To all senses (which I will take to include 'all detection instruments'), it's still bread and wine. But it also says that the change is more than just a spiritual change, its a "real" change in "substance." To science's way of thinking, this is contradictory - the observable empirical properties are the substance, is the reality. Now, maybe there's some deep solution to how those claims can be unified or made consistent. However, another possibility is that there is no answer, no "solution to the puzzle" of what it is; it could just be two reasonable-sounding statements combined to make nonsense. It's both real and not empirically detectable. It's three and it's one. Oh yeah? Well I have a bicycle that is not a bicycle, it's a fish. Does the fact that I can say the words mean that the referent must be possible, must be a meaningful concept? No. Its possible my fish-bicycle claim could have deep meaning...or it could just be a nonsense sentence.

Sylvilagus · 17 July 2014

phhht said:
Sylvilagus said:
andrewdburnett said:
Sylvilagus said: I don't think that you understand what transubstantiation is claimed to be. Not that I believe in it. But it doesn't involve any change in the physical or chemical make up of the bread and wine.
I believe that for much of history it did... and still does for many.
There is much confusion on this issue. Protestants by and large do not accept transubstantiation at all. The term is essentially Catholic and refers not to a chemical change, but to a spiritual change... The bread in its "essence" becomes the flesh of Christ but in its "species" in its physical, non spiritual form retains the form of bread. This is based on Aristotelian metaphysics and has been the Catholic position explicitly for about the last thousand years. Even before that, before the term "transubstantiation" came into existence, the "bread become flesh" clearly involved more of a spiritual transformation than a physical one. While they did not believe it to be simply a symbol of Christs blood, they did not generally think it was literal blood in its physical form. When Jesus says "this is my flesh" even if taken as more than figurative cannot refer to the flesh of his physical body, which did not suddenly show missing chunks of flesh. More to the point, No communicant could seriously not tell the difference between drinking wine and drinking blood. Regardless of what we might think of these beliefs, they are clearly more complicated than the notion of physical flesh and blood. Not that I believe any of this mind you. But I do think it important not to construct straw man arguments. Phhht seems to be relying on a rather pedestrian misunderstanding of the theology.
So they're just pretending to drink blood and eat flesh, right? I can certainly see why they would deny what appears to be the literal case. But even today, when nobody's theology is pedestrian any more, people get really upset if you nail a wafer to the floor. But not because they really really believe it's the flesh of Jesus. No, no. Maybe Jesus was an instant healer, did you ever think of that? Maybe he ripped big gobbets of bloody flesh off his body and regrew them instantly. After all, that supposition is consistent with factual reality, if not exactly supported by it. You're no doubt correct about my theology. I despise theology in general, and sophisticated, apologetic theology in particular. Fortunately I have you to help me with that.

For all the pride you place in your powers of logic and argumentation, you show surprisingly little interest in getting right the positions you think you are arguing against. I place no more value on theology than you do, but then I'm not the one introducing the theological concepts (transubstantiation) for discussion. You raised the topic of transubstantiation, with a misunderstanding of what it means, and then proceeded to shoot down that straw man. Then when I point out you have a misunderstanding, you become snarky and sarcastic, rather than demonstrate a desire to sharpen your argument. Same tactics and attitude displayed by the creationists here. Of course Catholics see the host as sacred and abhor mistreatment of it. And yes, they believe it is the flesh Christ, but not in the sense you suggested with your talk of chemical conversions etc. In Aristotelian metaphysics entities have an essence not accessible directly to physical senses, and an "outer" form that manifests physically. The Species (physical form) of the host is that of bread, but the Substance (the spiritual or metaphysical essence) is the flesh of Christ. Physical science detects Species, not Substance, of any object. That's transubstantiation in a nutshell... Not detectable or provable or disprovable by science because the transformation is only at the level of substance. Convenient, I know. And not convincing, nevertheless that's the actual Catholic belief. Other sects have their versions, but generally the Catholic is the closest to the physical flesh idea you are supposing, and even there it isn't really that. Caveat: I don't know anything about the various Orthodox Eastern/Greek traditions. Take this or leave it as you will. Hope it's helpful to you in some way. If not, I have no need for a snarkfest.

Sylvilagus · 17 July 2014

eric said:
Sylvilagus said: When Jesus says "this is my flesh" even if taken as more than figurative cannot refer to the flesh of his physical body, which did not suddenly show missing chunks of flesh.
Just a nitpick, but sure it can. Loaves, fishes, body - same miracle.
Regardless of what we might think of these beliefs, they are clearly more complicated than the notion of physical flesh and blood.
It could be complicated. Or it could just be confused and vague. AIUI the RCC version says that the empirical appearance won't change. To all senses (which I will take to include 'all detection instruments'), it's still bread and wine. But it also says that the change is more than just a spiritual change, its a "real" change in "substance." To science's way of thinking, this is contradictory - the observable empirical properties are the substance, is the reality. Now, maybe there's some deep solution to how those claims can be unified or made consistent. However, another possibility is that there is no answer, no "solution to the puzzle" of what it is; it could just be two reasonable-sounding statements combined to make nonsense. It's both real and not empirically detectable. It's three and it's one. Oh yeah? Well I have a bicycle that is not a bicycle, it's a fish. Does the fact that I can say the words mean that the referent must be possible, must be a meaningful concept? No. Its possible my fish-bicycle claim could have deep meaning...or it could just be a nonsense sentence.

Look I'm not trying to justify the Catholic belief. You're pushing the goalposts on me. All I was doing was correcting a common misunderstanding of the word transubstantiation as Phht was using it. And your claim that this was historically and is now for many the belief. Take my correction or leave it. The meaning of the word is more complicated than Phht was using it. That's what I meant. If you find the correct usage of the term and the beliefs it implies, no more convincing, neither do I. I just think we should take people for what they say, not for what we think they say. Now, as for the question of substance vs form, well that really is a lot more complicated. Even today philosophers continue to argue these points. Aristotle still has quite a few adherents in the universities among some quite sophisticated thinkers (grin), you can take it up with them I suppose, but the discussion has gone on for centuries and I doubt a few posters here at PT are going to take it down any time soon. And I doubt any philosopher would say that Aristotle is "contradictory" to science... Physics... Metaphysics... Perhaps outside science, after science, beyond science. Despite your claim that "To science's way of thinking, this is contradictory - the observable empirical properties are the substance, is the reality" even contemporary philosophy of science does not claim ontological value for scientific concepts, only phenomenological value. The electron is a model that accurately predicts phenomena.... That's all science needs to know (and can know) in order to operate successfully. What the electron is in "reality" doesn't matter, as long as the model works. So, all questions of religion and belief aside, these are pretty complicated issues, even in philosophy of science, issues no one has a real handle on yet, I think. In the context of our "discussions" with the creationists here that's like the distinction between methodological naturalism and ontological naturalism..... The creationists keep insisting that evolutionary science is committed to the latter, when in fact it only requires the former. On a side note, I'm not sure about your claim that they say it's not just a spiritual change. Usually, the distinction is between a symbolic change versus a change in substance. Yes, they claim a real change in substance, not just a symbolic change, but they don't mean by substance what you and Phht mean by it. The physical object is the "species" , the metaphysical essence is the substance, thus AIUI in Catholic teaching the substance is the spiritual, the metaphysical, following Aristotle, e.g. The soul would be the substance of the human, the body the physical species. Do you have a source/cite for your claim?

eric · 17 July 2014

Sylvilagus said: In Aristotelian metaphysics entities have an essence not accessible directly to physical senses, and an "outer" form that manifests physically.

That's twice you've banged on this point. I don't know how accurate it is on this subject, but Wikipedia tells me that the RCC position is specifically not based on Aristotelian metaphysics:

It [the Council of Trent, which defined Transubstantiation in 1551] did not however impose the Aristotelian theory of substance and accidents: it spoke only of the species (the appearances), not the philosophical term "accidents", and the word "substance" was in ecclesiastical use for many centuries before Aristotelian philosophy was adopted in the West,[22] as shown for instance by its use in the Nicene Creed which speaks of Christ having the same "οὐσία" (Greek) or "substantia" (Latin) as the Father."

So, you might want to stop banging that drum, or telling others they show "surprisingly little interest in getting right the positions."

eric · 17 July 2014

Sylvilagus said: ...even contemporary philosophy of science does not claim ontological value for scientific concepts, only phenomenological value. The electron is a model that accurately predicts phenomena.... That's all science needs to know (and can know) in order to operate successfully. What the electron is in "reality" doesn't matter, as long as the model works.

Once you completely disconnect the ontological and phenomenological, anything can be anything. (So I guess I should say: thank you for defending my fish bicycle as a deep and complicated philosophical concept!) Moreover, the context of this discussion is the believability or possibility of miracle claims. By separating the ontological from the phenomenological, you essentially scoop all the important things that believers want to say about most miracles out of the miracle. The vast majority of Christians don't want to say Jesus ontologically ressurected while his body lay mouldering in a grave; they want to say he phenomenologically resurrected. The water to wine miracle is a particularly good example: it makes absolutely no sense to interpret that bible passage as Jesus ontologically transforming the water while phenomenologically leaving it the same. That completely contradicts John 2:9-10, where the master tastes it and says it's wine. Now maybe the transubstantiation is an exception to that, and we are digressing. But in terms of general claims about miracles, I think both believers and atheists want to talk about the possibility and rationality of believing in miracles that are not 'merely ontological.'

Yes, they claim a real change in substance, not just a symbolic change, but they don't mean by substance what you and Phht mean by it. The physical object is the "species" , the metaphysical essence is the substance, thus AIUI in Catholic teaching the substance is the spiritual, the metaphysical, following Aristotle, e.g. The soul would be the substance of the human, the body the physical species. Do you have a source/cite for your claim?

I don't dispute they use these words. I dispute your argument that these words must imply some complicated but viable philosophical concept, which phht and I (and others) simply aren't getting. It might. But it might just be words strung together by people who want to defend a notion by making it seem deep and complicated, with no meaningful concept behind it. If we don't accept "the world's evil is moral/necessary, you just don't understand how" as a refutation of the theodicy problem, why should we accept "its bread and flesh, you just don't understand how" as a defense of transubstantiation? Here's a cite, though I admit there are probably many more with slightly different takes on the subject.

callahanpb · 17 July 2014

eric said:
Sylvilagus said: In Aristotelian metaphysics entities have an essence not accessible directly to physical senses, and an "outer" form that manifests physically.
That's twice you've banged on this point.

It's because the point is central to understanding the doctrine you're criticizing. Whether the doctrine is specifically based on Aristotle is besides the point, but the same Wikipedia page suggests that Aquinas and Luther both thought so:

It was only later in the 13th century that Aristotelian metaphysics was accepted and a philosophical elaboration in line with that metaphysics was developed, which found classic formulation in the teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas.

Luther:

Moreover, the Church had the true faith for more than twelve hundred years, during which time the holy Fathers never once mentioned this transubstantiation — certainly, a monstrous word for a monstrous idea — until the pseudo-philosophy of Aristotle became rampant in the Church these last three hundred years.

But actually whatever the origin, the modern view presented in Catholic catechisms is that the Eucharist undergoes a change in "substance" and it is clear that the change is not expected to be experimentally detectable. I don't know if the possibility of experimental detection is explicitly ruled out by the same doctrine, but I can state from firsthand experience, that as taught to kids as part of Catholic education, the whole idea of looking for a detectable change is discouraged. So non-falsifiability is part of the tradition association with this doctrine (or I conclude this from my admittedly limited data). It makes sense to view an unfalsifiable claim as meaningless, and that is an empiricist view. The problem is, how would you go about convincing someone who does not accept empiricism that it is the only reasonable basis for making true statements about reality? I don't have a good answer for this, but what I often see is people presupposing empiricism in the attempt to convince others that empiricism is valid. If a claim can be dismissed on the basis of being unfalsifiable, then why not just go ahead and dismiss it rather than "beating a drum" about the kind of evidence that should be there if the claim was supposed to have empirical support?

eric · 17 July 2014

callahanpb said: It makes sense to view an unfalsifiable claim as meaningless, and that is an empiricist view. The problem is, how would you go about convincing someone who does not accept empiricism that it is the only reasonable basis for making true statements about reality?

That is a problem. There are many tactics, but none of them are going to work all (or even most of) the time. I tend to think that we are all naturally empiricists, but that we all also suspend our empiricism occasionally - sometimes for good reason, but sometimes without warrant. So one approach I might offer is to first show them that they do accept empiricism, and then ask them to justify their exception. Especially on the internet - if they're responding to you, they clearly believe that typing on keys has the effect of sending a message to the other person. That's empiricism. If you claim you don't do it, you shouldn't even be typing a response, because the only justification for thinking typing on a computer will send a message to me is an empirical justification. Another approach is the Stephen Roberts one: point out that when other religionists use the logic they are using, they reject it as insufficient for rational belief. You (not you callahan, the rhetorical you) accept transubstantiation but not scientological 'going clear.' Okay, both involve a nonempirical, undetectable change in matter; can you tell me why belief in one is more justified than belief in the other? Can you tell me why one is ridiculous but the other isn't? Closely related, there's the "argument by upsetting analogy." Make an analogy they find upsetting and ask them to say why it's not a good analogy. God to fairy is popular.

I don't have a good answer for this, but what I often see is people presupposing empiricism in the attempt to convince others that empiricism is valid.

Sometimes you have to full Hume on someone. Forget formal validity - point out that on a practical level, they use it and can't do without it. Heck, you can't even do theology without empiricism because before discussing what some bible passage means, you have to first accept that there is this object called "bible" that your senses are giving a reasonably accurate depiction of to your brain. Maybe empiricism is unfalsifiable, but it's also true that arguments against empiricism almost always rely to some extent on empiricism to try and make their point. Which undermines their point.

If a claim can be dismissed on the basis of being unfalsifiable, then why not just go ahead and dismiss it rather than "beating a drum" about the kind of evidence that should be there if the claim was supposed to have empirical support?

Because we could be wrong about an idea being unfalsifiable; exploring what evidence it should produce etc... is a way of trying to test the hypothesis against some ground truth, rather than just testing it aganist what your mind sees as unassailable logic. Because, let's face it, our minds can often be wrong about it classifies as unassailable logic. Witness FL.

Sylvilagus · 17 July 2014

eric said:
Sylvilagus said: In Aristotelian metaphysics entities have an essence not accessible directly to physical senses, and an "outer" form that manifests physically.
That's twice you've banged on this point. I don't know how accurate it is on this subject, but Wikipedia tells me that the RCC position is specifically not based on Aristotelian metaphysics:
It [the Council of Trent, which defined Transubstantiation in 1551] did not however impose the Aristotelian theory of substance and accidents: it spoke only of the species (the appearances), not the philosophical term "accidents", and the word "substance" was in ecclesiastical use for many centuries before Aristotelian philosophy was adopted in the West,[22] as shown for instance by its use in the Nicene Creed which speaks of Christ having the same "οὐσία" (Greek) or "substantia" (Latin) as the Father."

I don't believe I ever said the doctrine was "based" on Aristotle. If I did, I mispoke. The concept of transubstantiation obviously predates widespread acceptance of Aristotlianism in the church. Rather, I was using Aristotle, as is commonly used today in Catholicism, to explain the doctrine. Furthermore, your quotation from Wiikipedia only says they did not "impose" Aristotle on the doctrine. In other words, the concepts were indigenous to Christian thought, not forced upon Christian thought from the outside. But the concepts are essentially the same, which is why Christian thinkers such as Aquinas employed Aristotle to explain the doctrine and why the later church came to widely embrace the Aristotlian approach. I used Aristotle because one can discuss his metaphysics without any religious connotations, even many non-religious philosophers find Aristotle and/or his derivatives worthy of interest and respect.

So, you might want to stop banging that drum, or telling others they show "surprisingly little interest in getting right the positions."

My comment about "surprisingly little interest" was based on the attitude and tone of the response I got from Phht, merely for offering a rather polite (I thought) and helpful (I hoped) correction of a common misunderstanding. It was in a response to him, did not involve you. And the accuracy or not of his position lor mine was not the issue in that remark. Personally, if I'm inaccurate or wrong, so be it. Show me how. I'm happy to learn.

callahanpb · 17 July 2014

eric said: I don't dispute they use these words. I dispute your argument that these words must imply some complicated but viable philosophical concept, which phht and I (and others) simply aren't getting.

BTW, speaking only for myself, I would never claim that the "substance" and "accident" distinction is a "viable" philosophical concept. In fact, it looks like blatant sophistry concocted by someone who had painted themselves into a corner. It's also not essential to understand any concept fully to criticize parts of it, but it is essential not to replace it with a different concept and criticize that (i.e. a strawman). In general, unfalsifiable claims suffer from the big problem that no simple criteria (such as Occam's razor) is given for preferring one claim over another. To me, that's a reasonable argument for empiricism. I can even accept merely repeating the assertion that it is self-evident that truth requires evidence. As in mathematics, you need some axiomatic starting point. Let that be the starting point. Where I draw the line is attempting to argue in favor of empiricism on grounds that presuppose that everyone already accepts empiricism, and this is where I place arguments that require specific kinds of evidence to be produced for a religious claim. Someone who thinks like an experimental scientist may fall into this line of argument naturally, but it actually adds nothing beyond reasserting the self-evident need for empirical evidence, which is actually the issue of contention.

callahanpb · 17 July 2014

eric said: Sometimes you have to full Hume on someone. Forget formal validity - point out that on a practical level, they use it and can't do without it. Heck, you can't even do theology without empiricism because before discussing what some bible passage means, you have to first accept that there is this object called "bible" that your senses are giving a reasonably accurate depiction of to your brain.

I think that would demonstrate that empirical belief is necessary, but not that it is complete. Maybe Hume had a stronger case. I'm not a philosopher. I'm also think that the entire goal of having a sound basis for belief is unrealistic. The fact that science seems to work best in practice is sufficient reason for me to take it more seriously than other approaches.

Sylvilagus · 17 July 2014

eric said:
Once you completely disconnect the ontological and phenomenological, anything can be anything.
Yes, I suppose that's true, on the two different levels. Your bicycle might be a bicycle on the level of form, but a fish on the level of metaphysical substance, for all I know. The electron is a model of certain phenomena and works fine at that level. What it is ontologically, I don't know. This is not a radical position in philosophy of science. epecially when trying to interpret phenomena at the extremes of physics. Not saying its correct. Nor even helpful or useful. But limiting scientific knowledge to a positivist/phenomenological truth is widely argued in philosophy of science.
Moreover, the context of this discussion is the believability or possibility of miracle claims. By separating the ontological from the phenomenological, you essentially scoop all the important things that believers want to say about most miracles out of the miracle. The vast majority of Christians don't want to say Jesus ontologically ressurected while his body lay mouldering in a grave; they want to say he phenomenologically resurrected. The water to wine miracle is a particularly good example: it makes absolutely no sense to interpret that bible passage as Jesus ontologically transforming the water while phenomenologically leaving it the same. That completely contradicts John 2:9-10, where the master tastes it and says it's wine.
I agree.
Now maybe the transubstantiation is an exception to that, and we are digressing.
I'm not sure about the word "exception" necessarily, but yes, the doctrine of transubstantiation does assert something different from the other miracles you mention above. That was the small point of my original post.
But in terms of general claims about miracles, I think both believers and atheists want to talk about the possibility and rationality of believing in miracles that are not 'merely ontological.'
Makes sense. I'm not sure why you think I feel otherwise. My post did not address in any way whether miracles occur or not, was not even an effort to participate in the debate, OTHER than to offer a simple correction on a misunderstood concept. Nothing more.
I don't dispute they use these words. I dispute your argument that these words must imply some complicated but viable philosophical concept, which phht and I (and others) simply aren't getting.
My argument was simple: Phht asserted/implied that transubstnatiation involved physical/chemical change. I asserted that the doctrine does not actually teach such a change occurs on the level he speaks of, but on another metaphysical level. By my reckoning, a view of reality with two levels of existence is more complex than a view of reality with a single level. That's what I meant by more complex, nothing more. Occam's Razor would agree and therefore prefer the single levedl view. As for "viable," I'm not sure what you mean exactly. I do not hold the doctrine to be true, as I have said. The division between phenomenology and ontology is "viable" enough for philosophers of many ilks to find it useful and worthy of discussion/debate. Which of course says nothing about the "viability" of transubstnatiation other than that something like the division it relies on is widely discussed in a variety of non-religiuous contexts. As for you "not getting it"... I don't know about that. All I have said is that Phht's comments were based on a common misunderstnading of the term.
It might. But it might just be words strung together by people who want to defend a notion by making it seem deep and complicated, with no meaningful concept behind it.
Yes, it certainly could be. That's why philosophers have debated Aristotle and other metaphysicians for centuries, and continue today.
If we don't accept "the world's evil is moral/necessary, you just don't understand how" as a refutation of the theodicy problem, why should we accept "its bread and flesh, you just don't understand how" as a defense of transubstantiation?
I don't think you should. I don't.
Here's a cite, though I admit there are probably many more with slightly different takes on the subject.
Strange, as far as I can tell, your cite supports everything I have said all along. I see nothing that supports your claim. Perhaps I am missing something you could point out to me. Oops. And I think I have messed up the quoting system somehow. I hope it can still be followed. If its even worth it at this point. I have to say I'm really rather taken aback by the level of response I am getting for trying to offer a simple corrective of a concept.

david.starling.macmillan · 17 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: I am going to provide two statements. A) The claim is consistent with evidence. B) The claim is supported by evidence. Do you recognize the qualitative distinction between these two statements?
Ah, you fooled me there, David. I thought you meant that being consistent with evidence meant being supported by evidence.

Well, believe me when I tell you that there was absolutely no intent to fool you. The distinction between "consistent with" and "supported by" seems rather obvious to me. I was taking pains to use the former rather than the latter.

It seems that you believe in those counterfactual claims just because you want to.
I do not find them to be counterfactual, and I'm not sure why you would think I do.
I have to take you at your word, no matter how it makes you look.

Take me at my word -- that I believe in things you don't believe in? I think that's been well-established. Again, I don't see how your use of "counterfactual" (if indeed it simply means "didn't happen") is adding anything to this discussion other than subtle question-begging.

You believe that zombie gods and the embryo implantation and so on actually happened, in reality, just like apples and zebras.

I think the narrative in which these humorously-described events happened is consistent with reality, and while I don't know whether the narrative is true, I choose to accept it because I think it explains reality better than alternatives.

Helena Constantine said: Intersting that the Starling left out the very portion of the Gibbon quote that addressed his objection.

You mean this?

Each of these philosophers, in a laborious work, has recorded all the great phenomena of Nature, earthquakes, meteors comets, and eclipses, which his indefatigable curiosity could collect. Both the one and the other have omitted to mention the greatest phenomenon to which the mortal eye has been witness since the creation of the globe.

But Gibbon begs the question. DID these natural philosophers successfully record all 100 eclipses which they could possibly have heard witness of between 100 BCE and 100 CE? And WOULD the preternatural darkness described in the Gospels have been any greater a phenomenon to observers than the average solar eclipse? Before we go any further down this rabbit-trail, let me hasten to point out that I have no particular emotional or religious attachment to the description of crucifixion darkness in Matthew. It could easily be an added embellishment, and it wouldn't bother me one bit. So don't think I'm clinging to this or anything like that.

Why doesn't he just say "What Jesus did was a miracle" anyone else is practicing magic," i.e. implicate himself in Gager's definition I suggested earlier? SO you admit that you no knowledge of the anthropological or historical study of magic and know the Frazerian definition of magic you used earlier from some tertiary source on the web? If so, how can you possibly think you can determine that a difference exists between magic and miracle?

Because I didn't take my definition from "some tertiary source on the web". I didn't take my definition from anywhere. I'm not trying to cite an authoritative definition at all; I'm offering a definition based on my understanding of common usage because I think Masked's definition clashes with common usage. I don't much care what definitions are or aren't considered authoritative. I simply object to the equivocation implicit in Masked's departure from common usage of these terms.

eric said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
eric said: if I claim that there’s a box on my desk, and in it, H2O is spontaneously transmuting into ethanol, you can legitimately and very reasonably call that claim counterfactual from where you sit right now, whithout ever having to investigate my desk…and I will agree; that claim is counterfactual. It runs counter to the facts I know about physics and chemistry, such as how nuclear reactions work. We will probably all agree that that claim is counterfactual. Now, locate that box 2,000 years in the past, or 2,000 lightyears away, and the same logic holds.
Don't worry; none of those make me squirm.
Well then, can you tell me whether you'd classify them all as counterfactual, or none of them counterfactual?

They're all equally counterfactual. More importantly, though, they are physical impossibilities, because the laws of physics do not allow the spontaneous transmutation of water into ethanol by normal physical processes. Physics won't allow it on your desk, won't allow it 2000 years ago, won't allow it 2000 lightyears away.

I guess the part that puzzles me is whether you see a distinction between: A) Claiming that the laws of physics do not operate the same way in certain physical systems, and B) Claiming that effects not predicted by physics can come from nonphysical causes.
(A) is counterfactual because it is counter to the observational fact that the laws of physics appear to be the same everywhere, at all times. (B) is a strange goose. As a speculation or theoretical, academic question, it's not counterfactual. It's "if X existed, could it do Y?" when we have no evidence X exists.

Exactly. But in a case where X is not directly observable, the first reasonable step in establishing whether X exists may indeed be to establish whether Y happened. This whole line of reasoning skirts the point, I think. Obviously it is counterfactual to assert that certain events happen spontaneously in violation of physical laws. But that's not what a miracle claim is. A miracle claim is that the directed action of a nonphysical entity can produce effects outside of the predictions of physics. That's not even close to the same as proposing that the laws of physics simply "stop working" spontaneously.

callahanpb said:
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: It is easy in our compartmented age and amongst the educated where religion is religion and science is science, but that was not the case. In fact science didn't exist as we know it.
I agree that people attributed a lot more to magic in the past, and may have routinely accused each other of witchcraft, etc. I also agree--for instance--that if you think your neighbor is casting spells to curdle your milk, you're less likely to be motivated to discover microbiology, and far more likely to become an expert in whatever connivance is needed to get your neighbor in trouble with the village authorities. But you can definitely do science while believing some supernatural events are occurring regularly.

The entire history of scientific inquiry refutes Masked's views. While some of the Greek philosophers may have been something like atheists, the majority undertook their investigation of nature while actively laboring under the delusion that gods and demigods could regularly interfere with natural processes. They reasonably assumed that any such interference would at best be an outlier, and so the normal workings of nature would still be visible. Science marched forward.

Sylvilagus said: Protestants by and large do not accept transubstantiation at all. The term is essentially Catholic and refers not to a chemical change, but to a spiritual change... The bread in its "essence" becomes the flesh of Christ but in its "species" in its physical, non spiritual form retains the form of bread.

Exactly. The very term itself -- transubstantiation rather than transmutation -- evinces this distinction. It is the "substance" which is changed...but "substance" as defined in a particular metaphysical philosophy, not "substance" as defined by empirical naturalism. Catholics agree that the mass, density, and chemical makeup -- the "substance" as defined by science -- remains the same. It is a demonstrable mistake to suppose that the claim of transubstantiation is a claim about a change in the mass, density, or chemical makeup of the Eucharist. That supposition is flatly incorrect. Transubstantiation depends on a philosophical framework of substance dualism. I am not a substance dualist, therefore I would not be expected to entertain transubstantiation.

eric said: The context of this discussion is the believability or possibility of miracle claims. By separating the ontological from the phenomenological, you essentially scoop all the important things that believers want to say about most miracles out of the miracle. The vast majority of Christians don't want to say Jesus ontologically ressurected while his body lay mouldering in a grave; they want to say he phenomenologically resurrected.

Which is exactly why it was a mistake of the first order for phhht to cite transubstantiation as a counterfactual miracle.

callahanpb said: It makes sense to view an unfalsifiable claim as meaningless, and that is an empiricist view. The problem is, how would you go about convincing someone who does not accept empiricism that it is the only reasonable basis for making true statements about reality?

Or, more simply, you can point out that a substance dualist may accept empiricism for the investigation of phenomenological matters while believing in essential substances outside the detection magisterial of empirical methods.

callahanpb · 17 July 2014

eric said: I tend to think that we are all naturally empiricists, but that we all also suspend our empiricism occasionally - sometimes for good reason, but sometimes without warrant.

I've often thought along these lines. That without formal education, most people have a reasonable level of common sense and expect cause and effect to apply in a straightforward way. But in the course of education, we're exposed to things that are counterintuitive and seemingly paradoxical. Certain things are counterintuitive and yet true (e.g. objects are subject to the same gravitational acceleration regardless of mass). But it's possible (and common) to get so enthralled with the counterintuitive that we forget that something is not true merely by virtue of being the opposite of what you expect it to be. The emphasis on the counterintuitive is only to distinguish it from the 90% of other things that actually turn out the way you would expect them too. Of course, contrarian "science" news is always popular (scientists prove your socks actually smell better after you've worn them for 10 days straight -- it sounds so wrong, it has to be true). It takes a different level of "post-sophistication" to realize that the simple ideas are the best ones to start with unless you have some good evidence to reject them. Of course, if you have the evidence, then you must reject them (and a scientific paper that is correct but goes against "common sense" really is more interesting than one that just confirms the obvious). I've been trying to work this one in for a few days, from the 1967 Donovan song:

First there is a mountain, then there is no mountain, then there is.

So... I have been trying to introduce my kids as I drive them around (and myself to some extent) to an eclecticly chosen set of pop music artists, and my son and I were listening to this. We agreed that it sounded kind of pointless, and couldn't agree on the meaning. It is catchy, though (well, I think so) and it kept going through my head as I drove to work. I looked it up, and found this on Wikipedia:

The lyrics refer to a Buddhist saying originally formulated by Qingyuan Weixin, later translated by D.T. Suzuki in his Essays in Zen Buddhism, one of the first books to popularize Buddhism in Europe and the US. Qingyuan writes Before I had studied Chan (Zen) for thirty years, I saw mountains as mountains, and rivers as rivers. When I arrived at a more intimate knowledge, I came to the point where I saw that mountains are not mountains, and rivers are not rivers. But now that I have got its very substance I am at rest. For it's just that I see mountains once again as mountains, and rivers once again as rivers.

And maybe just because I had been thinking along these lines--not about Zen Buddhism of course, but it struck me that this sums up a certain process in education. It's good to learn that things might not they way be they seem at first, and to develop the skills to delve deeper. On the other hand, you also need to learn when to stop and just accept that most often, the obvious is true after all. That's what makes it obvious. This isn't new to me, but I guess it's new that I can stay aware of it by keeping a seven-second tape loop of Donovan singing in my head. (As always, YMMV.)

mattdance18 · 17 July 2014

Sylvilagus said: Regardless of what we might think of these beliefs, they are clearly more complicated than the notion of physical flesh and blood. Not that I believe any of this mind you. But I do think it important not to construct straw man arguments.

Hear, hear. If there's anything about which people are worse-informed than evolution, it's religion (and that certainly applies to most religious laypeople themselves).

andrewdburnett · 17 July 2014

callahanpb said:
eric said: I tend to think that we are all naturally empiricists, but that we all also suspend our empiricism occasionally - sometimes for good reason, but sometimes without warrant.
I've often thought along these lines. That without formal education, most people have a reasonable level of common sense and expect cause and effect to apply in a straightforward way. But in the course of education, we're exposed to things that are counterintuitive and seemingly paradoxical. Certain things are counterintuitive and yet true (e.g. objects are subject to the same gravitational acceleration regardless of mass). But it's possible (and common) to get so enthralled with the counterintuitive that we forget that something is not true merely by virtue of being the opposite of what you expect it to be. The emphasis on the counterintuitive is only to distinguish it from the 90% of other things that actually turn out the way you would expect them too. Of course, contrarian "science" news is always popular (scientists prove your socks actually smell better after you've worn them for 10 days straight -- it sounds so wrong, it has to be true). It takes a different level of "post-sophistication" to realize that the simple ideas are the best ones to start with unless you have some good evidence to reject them. Of course, if you have the evidence, then you must reject them (and a scientific paper that is correct but goes against "common sense" really is more interesting than one that just confirms the obvious). I've been trying to work this one in for a few days, from the 1967 Donovan song:
First there is a mountain, then there is no mountain, then there is.
So... I have been trying to introduce my kids as I drive them around (and myself to some extent) to an eclecticly chosen set of pop music artists, and my son and I were listening to this. We agreed that it sounded kind of pointless, and couldn't agree on the meaning. It is catchy, though (well, I think so) and it kept going through my head as I drove to work. I looked it up, and found this on Wikipedia:
The lyrics refer to a Buddhist saying originally formulated by Qingyuan Weixin, later translated by D.T. Suzuki in his Essays in Zen Buddhism, one of the first books to popularize Buddhism in Europe and the US. Qingyuan writes Before I had studied Chan (Zen) for thirty years, I saw mountains as mountains, and rivers as rivers. When I arrived at a more intimate knowledge, I came to the point where I saw that mountains are not mountains, and rivers are not rivers. But now that I have got its very substance I am at rest. For it's just that I see mountains once again as mountains, and rivers once again as rivers.
And maybe just because I had been thinking along these lines--not about Zen Buddhism of course, but it struck me that this sums up a certain process in education. It's good to learn that things might not they way be they seem at first, and to develop the skills to delve deeper. On the other hand, you also need to learn when to stop and just accept that most often, the obvious is true after all. That's what makes it obvious. This isn't new to me, but I guess it's new that I can stay aware of it by keeping a seven-second tape loop of Donovan singing in my head. (As always, YMMV.)

I think that this is largely true but I also see the opposite fairly often. For many people who embrace pseudo-science it is because it offers easier and more "common-sense" answers. Most creationists use reason and logic in their arguments (shoddy and invalid logic but still logic). What they don't use is empiricism. The other day my dad said that he doesn't see how evolution could work because "was the first human a baby or an adult? How could the adult just come into being? And how could a baby take care of itself?" I tried to explain how this is rather an easy obstacle for evolution to explain but he just can't accept it and still thinks that it is a logical inconsistency. To him this is "common sense" (a term that means wildly different things to different people so I just tend to avoid using it). Creationists are far from the only culprits, however. A couple of days ago I was listening to a left-wing radio show and the host was bemoaning the fact that we are a culture of experts as if it is a bad thing. Given the heavy wave of anti-intellectualism in this country I don't even agree. But to her it is obvious that cell phones cause brain cancer and vaccines cause autism. She claims that the studies prove it (which as far as I know they do not) and acts as though her arguments are from evidence. Both of these are "logical" assumptions, however, and not based in empiricism. Having a foreign substance injected into your body seems like it could cause problems. But there just isn't the kind of evidence that they say there is... they just only look at the evidence that supports their "common sense" and "logical" position.

mattdance18 · 17 July 2014

eric said:
Sylvilagus said: In Aristotelian metaphysics entities have an essence not accessible directly to physical senses, and an "outer" form that manifests physically.
That's twice you've banged on this point. I don't know how accurate it is on this subject, but Wikipedia tells me that the RCC position is specifically not based on Aristotelian metaphysics:
It [the Council of Trent, which defined Transubstantiation in 1551] did not however impose the Aristotelian theory of substance and accidents: it spoke only of the species (the appearances), not the philosophical term "accidents", and the word "substance" was in ecclesiastical use for many centuries before Aristotelian philosophy was adopted in the West,[22] as shown for instance by its use in the Nicene Creed which speaks of Christ having the same "οὐσία" (Greek) or "substantia" (Latin) as the Father."
So, you might want to stop banging that drum, or telling others they show "surprisingly little interest in getting right the positions."

With all due respect, the terms "ousia" had already been in use in Greco-Roman philosophy ever since Aristotle, and "substantia" was just the Latin translation of the term. These ideas influenced various of the "church fathers" and thereby affected ecclesiastical usage for a couple of centuries before the Nicene creed. Aristotle's own works were lost to the Latin West sometime thereafter, though they returned via Islamic Arab thinkers as a result of the Crusades. Maybe we shouldn't cite Wikipedia as the authority on the matter.

andrewdburnett · 17 July 2014

callahanpb said:
eric said: Sometimes you have to full Hume on someone. Forget formal validity - point out that on a practical level, they use it and can't do without it. Heck, you can't even do theology without empiricism because before discussing what some bible passage means, you have to first accept that there is this object called "bible" that your senses are giving a reasonably accurate depiction of to your brain.
I think that would demonstrate that empirical belief is necessary, but not that it is complete. Maybe Hume had a stronger case. I'm not a philosopher. I'm also think that the entire goal of having a sound basis for belief is unrealistic. The fact that science seems to work best in practice is sufficient reason for me to take it more seriously than other approaches.

I can say from my own experience that using empiricism in other areas of life can eventually make a difference. For me it was actually baseball that made me realize the value of empiricism. Baseball has been undergoing something of an empiricist revolution over the last couple of decades under the name of sabermetrics. The sport is still to this day a bastion of un-scientific thinking. You commonly hear phrases such as "He just knows how to win" and other stupid and unsubstantiated claims along those lines. Most of the traditional baseball stats also give very little information about actual player skill due to luck and variation, etc. New analysis has now become more effective at isolating certain skills and understanding player values. It has quickly become apparent that this new way of looking at things has been leading to more success. This is pretty much what the movie Moneyball was about. Most front-offices are now basing more and more of their decisions on this kind of data. However, most fans hate the new stats and many deride those who use them as "nerds who live in their mom's basement." It's a very emotional reaction and not just from fans but from most of the sports media and most of the players. Most people are much more convinced by any argument from "authority" (such as a media personality) than an argument from evidence. I started seeing how similar this response was to the way creationists responded to evidence for evolution. I could see how ridiculous the baseball fans were being and I didn't want to act the same way in any area of my life, even religion. I don't know if there are any useful takeaways from that other than you never know what will have an impact on someone. I just try to use empiricism in most aspects of my life and hope that the results speak for themselves as they have in baseball.

mattdance18 · 17 July 2014

callahanpb said: It makes sense to view an unfalsifiable claim as meaningless, and that is an empiricist view. The problem is, how would you go about convincing someone who does not accept empiricism that it is the only reasonable basis for making true statements about reality?

Can I make a nitpicky point? Strictly speaking, empiricism only holds that an unfalsifiable claim is cognitively meaningless: we cannot know whether they are true or false. But there are other forms of meaning than cognitive meaning, and in fact, an unfalsifiable claim might even be true, though its truth would be unknown to us. Carry on.

callahanpb · 17 July 2014

andrewdburnett said: I think that this is largely true but I also see the opposite fairly often. For many people who embrace pseudo-science it is because it offers easier and more "common-sense" answers. Most creationists use reason and logic in their arguments (shoddy and invalid logic but still logic). What they don't use is empiricism.

I agree that you can get stuck at any point along the way (I don't mean to suggest there are just three steps either), and that many people use "common sense" as a way to avoid any kind of curiosity or challenges to their thinking. By definition, most people are not contrarian. From my perspective, though, it’s just more interesting to try to understand how Ken Miller manages to hold onto his religion than why Ken Ham believes in YEC. In Miller's case, I can see how a certain kind of Catholic education would make it possible, but I have no direct experience with fundamentalism and have to view Ham from outside. For that matter, I am often skeptical that anyone really believes anything like what they claim to believe (the men in suits with MacBooks holding the wooden hammers around Ham's "Ark" -- seriously?), but if I don't take people's word for it, what better source of information do I have?

david.starling.macmillan · 17 July 2014

callahanpb said: I am often skeptical that anyone really believes anything like what they claim to believe (the men in suits with MacBooks holding the wooden hammers around Ham's "Ark" -- seriously?), but if I don't take people's word for it, what better source of information do I have?

Hard to believe, isn't it? But they do. 'Cause some guy with letters after his name said it sounded plausible to him! And otherwise, there's no God and everything is meaningless. And there must be a God, because I believe in him and look how great my white male upper-middle-class life turned out!

mattdance18 · 17 July 2014

callahanpb said: BTW, speaking only for myself, I would never claim that the "substance" and "accident" distinction is a "viable" philosophical concept. In fact, it looks like blatant sophistry concocted by someone who had painted themselves into a corner.

Jack is human. Jack loses his right arm. Is Jack still a man? Yes. Is Jack still Jack? Yes. He just happens to have no right arm. He is the same substance as before (human). He is the same individual instantiation of that substance (Jack). It is accidental to any of this that he no longer has his right arm. That's the idea in a nutshell. When Aristotle first developed the idea, it was an attempt at explaining (among a few other things) how objects maintain identity over time, even as they undergo numerous changes. Prior to Plato, many thinkers denied either identity or change: Heraclitus, all is flux, and stable identity is an illusion; Parmenides, all is eternal, and change is the illusion. Some attempted to reconcile these without success, and Plato's own attempt to reconcile them was (Aristotle thought) on the right track but insufficient and ill-explained. The substance-accident ontology was a significant part of Aristotle's solution. It was a solution that has had its own problems, to be sure, and it is not widely accepted today. That said, it was enormously successful at the time, influencing later thought right through even the early days of the scientific revolution. Blatant sophistry? Really? -sigh-

andrewdburnett · 17 July 2014

callahanpb said:
andrewdburnett said: I think that this is largely true but I also see the opposite fairly often. For many people who embrace pseudo-science it is because it offers easier and more "common-sense" answers. Most creationists use reason and logic in their arguments (shoddy and invalid logic but still logic). What they don't use is empiricism.
I agree that you can get stuck at any point along the way (I don't mean to suggest there are just three steps either), and that many people use "common sense" as a way to avoid any kind of curiosity or challenges to their thinking. By definition, most people are not contrarian. From my perspective, though, it’s just more interesting to try to understand how Ken Miller manages to hold onto his religion than why Ken Ham believes in YEC. In Miller's case, I can see how a certain kind of Catholic education would make it possible, but I have no direct experience with fundamentalism and have to view Ham from outside. For that matter, I am often skeptical that anyone really believes anything like what they claim to believe (the men in suits with MacBooks holding the wooden hammers around Ham's "Ark" -- seriously?), but if I don't take people's word for it, what better source of information do I have?

Havinf come from the inside they absolutely do believe it. I think most are very genuine. And they have "evidence" to fit with all their beliefs! I think that the key element that is missing for many of these people is the ability to critically discern between different pieces of evidence. When you critically examine evidence some falls apart and some has staying power. For the most part, this does not happen. I see my dad do this when he rejects evolution, when my sisters refuse to give their kids vaccines, and when my brother refuses to take seriously institutional racism. They all think that their own anecdotal experiences and the evidence that fits their preconceived notions to be more convincing than what experts in the field have to say.

callahanpb · 17 July 2014

mattdance18 said: Blatant sophistry? Really? -sigh-

Using it to explain transubstantiation looks like sophistry to me (and I leave open that I'm wrong and gave up on my Catholic education too soon). I do follow the argument as you presented it, but it seems qualitatively different to apply the same reasoning to an occurrence that most non-believers would not accept as any sort of occurrence at all (unlike a person losing an arm, an event that would be almost universally recognized as such).

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 17 July 2014

The entire history of scientific inquiry refutes Masked’s views.

Fact: science developed over the course of human history and works for making predictions. Science we also must remember is a human affair - it is a tool used by humans to understand and explain - it is not something objectively existing independent of humans. David’s claim is that the frequency of miracles would have no effect on the whether science would develop and its ability to make predictions. My claim is that it would. Who is correct? The fact that science works is irrelevant to answering the question. What we would need is a variable miracle frequency - something we don’t have. I would contend that the miracle frequency is most likely zero and that is why science developed. My point has always been that the Bible assumes something very different. This doesn’t mean the Bible is correct. But if we assume that it were, it would entail a frequency different than zero. Is this frequency, if true, enough to derail predictability? Hard to know. Perhaps we could run a computer simulation to test predictability under different miracle frequencies. My contention is, and of course I could be wrong, that living in the world of the Gospels with miracle men wandering around exorcising demons, healing the sick, reviving the dead, walking on water, calming storms and the like would make the development of science much less likely and in fact might never happen at all. This of course says nothing about whether that world were ever a true world - only a world recorded as if it were true and one that some still believe to be true. I understand that these are local effects, but it is not how the world actually works, but how we humans perceive it to work. Miracles would change our perception.

eric · 17 July 2014

callahanpb said: BTW, speaking only for myself, I would never claim that the "substance" and "accident" distinction is a "viable" philosophical concept. In fact, it looks like blatant sophistry concocted by someone who had painted themselves into a corner.

We have now reached agreement. :)

In general, unfalsifiable claims suffer from the big problem that no simple criteria (such as Occam's razor) is given for preferring one claim over another. To me, that's a reasonable argument for empiricism.

I agree, though what you're talking about is lack of data to support a decision. That is a problem, but I think a bigger problem is that their alternative methodologies can be used to reach near-infinite numbers of equally justified, contradictory conclusions. If your method does that, it's worthless - and worse, if it does that and yet you favor one of those conclusions over the others, you probably don't have a method at all so much as an ad hoc justification for your own bias. Revelation (as a method) and Pascal's Wager (as an argument) both suffer from this: they can be used to reach an infinite number of contradictory conclusions, while very often the users of these two things prefer one of those conclusions over all the others.

Where I draw the line is attempting to argue in favor of empiricism on grounds that presuppose that everyone already accepts empiricism,

Well, like I said - if you want to respond to this (my) post, and you do so by typing on your keyboard instead of doing some other ritual (standing on your head, hopping three times, baking a cake, telepathically beaming me your thoughts, praying that I get the message, and so on...), it's because you already accept empiricism. At least for many things, if not all of them. Someone who sincerely rejected empiricism would be stuck in a form of perpetual philosophical paralysis, because they would reject the notion that something they saw or experienced in the past could be used to inform what they do in the future. I'm not even sure math is immune. I'm currently raising a 3-year-old, and I can tell you from personal experience (empiricism! heh) that even operations like 2+2=4 are not intuited by humans, they are learned via empirical experience. He counts things and concludes that 2 and 2 equal 4 only after he observes that they do. It's the experience of literally pointing to one object at a time and assigning them whole numbers that convinces him of the conclusion, not any non-empirical understanding of logic. Adults don't need to do that, of course, but think about why: we don't do that because past empiricism has convinced us that abstract math works, that it accurately reflects the reality of counting objects (and other empirical things). We accept it based on our experience.

mattdance18 · 17 July 2014

callahanpb said:
mattdance18 said: Blatant sophistry? Really? -sigh-
Using it to explain transubstantiation looks like sophistry to me (and I leave open that I'm wrong and gave up on my Catholic education too soon). I do follow the argument as you presented it, but it seems qualitatively different to apply the same reasoning to an occurrence that most non-believers would not accept as any sort of occurrence at all (unlike a person losing an arm, an event that would be almost universally recognized as such).

But why would a Catholic philosopher care what non-believers think about the metaphysics of transubstantiation? The point isn't "proof," of a sort that any rational person ought to accept independently of what metaphysical beliefs he holds, but "explanation," within a metaphysical framework that Catholics have already accepted, doctrinally speaking. If one doesn't accept the underlying ontology, well, fine -- I sure don't, and there are plenty of arguments to make for why one shouldn't. But that's a different argument entirely. Concept A is explainable only if one accepts ontology A, but not if one accepts ontology B. If one wants to argue against ontology A directly, and prove that ontology B is better, great. But it makes little sense to criticize concept A as sophistry from the perspective of ontology B, because only if one accepts ontology A would concept A come up for discussion in the first place. And it also wouldn't make sense to criticize ontology A because it enables the explanation of concept A. Perhaps the foregoing paragraph was a bit murky, but it seems like the argument is, "Catholic ontology can explain the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, therefore Catholic ontology is wrong." Catholic ontology might well be wrong -- and to reiterate, I think so -- but if it's wrong, it's not going to be because were one to accept, one would be able to explain various other points of Catholic doctrine. We need to show where the ontology fails on its own terms, and saying that it fails because, if true, it would allow us to explain things that are otherwise inexplicable, is hardly going to cut it. Does that make sense?

david.starling.macmillan · 17 July 2014

A Masked Panda (ds_Q) said:
The entire history of scientific inquiry refutes Masked’s views.
Fact: science developed over the course of human history and works for making predictions. Science we also must remember is a human affair - it is a tool used by humans to understand and explain - it is not something objectively existing independent of humans. David’s claim is that the frequency of miracles would have no effect on the whether science would develop and its ability to make predictions. My claim is that it would. Who is correct? The fact that science works is irrelevant to answering the question. What we would need is a variable miracle frequency - something we don’t have.

Ah, but the actual miracle frequency is irrelevant. What matters is whether the would-be scientists believe miracles happen. Your claim has to do with the behavior of human beings; their behavior depends on their beliefs, not on whether those beliefs are true.

My contention is, and of course I could be wrong, that living in the world of the Gospels with miracle men wandering around exorcising demons, healing the sick, reviving the dead, walking on water, calming storms and the like would make the development of science much less likely and in fact might never happen at all.

Only, science developed in a world where these sorts of things were widely believed to be true (whether they were in fact true or not). Which refutes your claim. The affect of a particular belief on the action or inaction of an individual is independent of that belief's veracity. If I believe that the unmarked glass jar in the back of my fridge holds smallpox, I will refrain from opening that jar regardless of whether it actually truly contains smallpox. If I believe that the world is full of miracles, my attitude toward scientific inquiry will be the same regardless of whether the world is, in fact, full of miracles.

eric · 17 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
(B) is a strange goose. As a speculation or theoretical, academic question, it's not counterfactual. It's "if X existed, could it do Y?" when we have no evidence X exists.
Exactly. But in a case where X is not directly observable, the first reasonable step in establishing whether X exists may indeed be to establish whether Y happened.

If only! I think the vast majority of nonbelievers would be very happy if nobody discussed the existence of the Christian God until after someone had demonstrated credible empirical evidence for Jesus' resurrection. Unfortunately, nobody has ever been able to establish that Y happened and yet they continue to claim X exists.

This whole line of reasoning skirts the point, I think. Obviously it is counterfactual to assert that certain events happen spontaneously in violation of physical laws. But that's not what a miracle claim is. A miracle claim is that the directed action of a nonphysical entity can produce effects outside of the predictions of physics. That's not even close to the same as proposing that the laws of physics simply "stop working" spontaneously.

Please tell me the empirical difference - the difference a bystander would perceive - between a spontaneous violation and a violation directed by a nonphysical entity. Time traveller eric is in Cana with his trusty tricorder. I'm watching 3H2O -> C2H5OH via the transmutation of two Oxygens into two Carbons (plus the chemical bond rearrangement). How does Jesus' miracle look different from a spontaneous transmutation to me?

Or, more simply, you can point out that a substance dualist may accept empiricism for the investigation of phenomenological matters while believing in essential substances outside the detection magisterial of empirical methods.

Seems like blatant exceptionalism to me. For a Catholic, it's not out of the magisteria of science to dispute the existence of chi or ka, only souls and eucharist and stuff like that. And vice versa for other believers. For believers in multiple magisteria, the magisteria of science rarely stops at the borders of all supernatural claims, it just stops at the border of their claims.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 17 July 2014

So if the world were totally unpredictable, then science would still develop? How?

Henry J · 17 July 2014

What if the C2H5OH is being teleported from somewhere else instead of produced via transformations?

(With a similar mass of H2O teleported back the other way to avoid buffer overflow.)

Would that help, or would it make it worse?

david.starling.macmillan · 17 July 2014

eric said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
(B) is a strange goose. As a speculation or theoretical, academic question, it's not counterfactual. It's "if X existed, could it do Y?" when we have no evidence X exists.
Exactly. But in a case where X is not directly observable, the first reasonable step in establishing whether X exists may indeed be to establish whether Y happened.
If only! I think the vast majority of nonbelievers would be very happy if nobody discussed the existence of the Christian God until after someone had demonstrated credible empirical evidence for Jesus' resurrection. Unfortunately, nobody has ever been able to establish that Y happened....

To be fair, much of the difficulty in even asking the question of whether Y happened comes from protests of "But you can't ask that question, because Y can't happen without X, and you haven't shown that X exists!"

Please tell me the empirical difference - the difference a bystander would perceive - between a spontaneous violation and a violation directed by a nonphysical entity. Time traveller eric is in Cana with his trusty tricorder. I'm watching 3H2O -> C2H5OH via the transmutation of two Oxygens into two Carbons (plus the chemical bond rearrangement). How does Jesus' miracle look different from a spontaneous transmutation to me?

There may be no detectable difference, but I'm not sure what the significance of this is. But because you'd know you were watching something which is not permitted by the laws of physics as we understand them, it would be reasonable to begin questioning whether your understanding of physics was wrong or whether your understanding of reality was incomplete. Because it has to be one or the other.

Or, more simply, you can point out that a substance dualist may accept empiricism for the investigation of phenomenological matters while believing in essential substances outside the detection magisterial of empirical methods.
Seems like blatant exceptionalism to me. For a Catholic, it's not out of the magisteria of science to dispute the existence of chi or ka, only souls and eucharist and stuff like that. And vice versa for other believers. For believers in multiple magisteria, the magisteria of science rarely stops at the borders of all supernatural claims, it just stops at the border of their claims.

Not really. This is a common mistake skeptics make. The Catholics accept that the magisteria of science may not be able to dispute the existence of chi or auras or whatever other unfalsifiable woo is out there. They reject such woo on the basis that it is inconsistent with the metaphysical framework of Catholicism and thus can be discarded. If they were convinced that the metaphysical framework of Catholicism were false, they would be more open to various woo.

A Masked Panda (ds_Q) said: So if the world were totally unpredictable, then science would still develop? How?

Now surely even you can see that this is equivocation. A world in which miracles are believed to happen -- even often -- is not a world which is totally unpredictable. And we know that science developed in a world where miracles were believed to happen quite often.

callahanpb · 17 July 2014

mattdance18 said: Perhaps the foregoing paragraph was a bit murky, but it seems like the argument is, "Catholic ontology can explain the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, therefore Catholic ontology is wrong."

I wasn't really making a strong claim. Perhaps I could rephrase my reply to Eric as: You don't have to consider the distinction "viable" on philosophical grounds, but don't misrepresent it as something it isn't. I think I had a passable primary and secondary Catholic education and retain a mostly reliable sense of what Catholics are supposed to believe, but we never got into anything as detailed as Thomas Aquinas. I also never studied any philosophy. The closest I have come is a introductory mathematical logic. So my referring to substance/accident as sophistry may have been the moral equivalent of hippie-kicking (i.e. to assert credibility in this forum). I withdraw the comment (though I guess it means withdrawing Eric's enthusiastic agreement). I am not prepared to defend or refute it. I am only in favor of not having it misrepresented.

Henry J · 17 July 2014

On the miracle frequency thing, it would matter if the miracles disrupted the patterns that would otherwise be observed in the subject area that the scientist is trying to study. (So distribution of the miracles could matter as much as frequency.)

After all, science depends on consistently observed patterns across the relevant data; hypotheses are then thought up to explain the observed patterns, by describing mechanisms that, if present, would be expected to generate the observed patterns, and if not present, those patterns wouldn't be expected, at least not in the observed combination.

(For evolution, the relevant patterns would of course include nested hierarchies, geographic clustering of relatives, and several others.)

Henry J · 17 July 2014

Oh, and it isn't whether lots of people believe that miracles happen that would handicap attempts at research, it's whether they do happen.

phhht · 17 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: A world in which miracles are believed to happen -- even often -- is not a world which is totally unpredictable. And we know that science developed in a world where miracles were believed to happen quite often.

Sure it is. A world in which miracles happen is totally unpredictable, because it is a fictional world, and anything can happen in fiction. Miracles are not real. Nobody can demonstrate one. All anyone can do is to say that he believes miracles are real, despite the universal failure to provide any empirical evidence for a miracle, despite the inability to provide any plausible mechanism for a miracle, despite the absence of any rationale at all for believing miracles to be anything other than stories, stories where anything can happen. Fantasy stories, like so many others.

david.starling.macmillan · 17 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: A world in which miracles are believed to happen -- even often -- is not a world which is totally unpredictable. And we know that science developed in a world where miracles were believed to happen quite often.
Sure it is. A world in which miracles happen is totally unpredictable, because it is a fictional world, and anything can happen in fiction.

Do you not see how this is question-begging?

Henry J said: Oh, and it isn't whether lots of people believe that miracles happen that would handicap attempts at research, it's whether they do happen.

Only if the miracles disrupted patterns. If the miracles did not disrupt the patterns being studied, they would not prevent the development of science. And clearly belief in miracles does not stop people from wanting to study science, as Masked seems to think. History is proof of that.

phhht · 17 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: A world in which miracles are believed to happen -- even often -- is not a world which is totally unpredictable. And we know that science developed in a world where miracles were believed to happen quite often.
Sure it is. A world in which miracles happen is totally unpredictable, because it is a fictional world, and anything can happen in fiction.
Do you not see how this is question-begging?

Yes, you're quite correct David, my rhetoric was question-begging, and you, of course, used your trivial quibble to avoid comment on the meat of my post. Let me try again.

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: A world in which miracles are believed to happen -- even often -- is not a world which is totally unpredictable. And we know that science developed in a world where miracles were believed to happen quite often.
~~Sure it is. A world in which miracles happen is totally unpredictable, because it is a fictional world, and anything can happen in fiction.~~ Miracles are not real. Nobody can demonstrate one. All anyone can do is to say that he believes miracles are real, despite the universal failure to provide any empirical evidence for a miracle, despite the inability to provide any plausible mechanism for a miracle, despite the absence of any rationale at all for believing miracles to be anything other than stories, stories where anything can happen. Fantasy stories, like so many others.

https://me.yahoo.com/a/JxVN0eQFqtmgoY7wC1cZM44ET_iAanxHQmLgYgX_Zhn8#57cad · 17 July 2014

Henry J said: On the miracle frequency thing, it would matter if the miracles disrupted the patterns that would otherwise be observed in the subject area that the scientist is trying to study. (So distribution of the miracles could matter as much as frequency.) After all, science depends on consistently observed patterns across the relevant data; hypotheses are then thought up to explain the observed patterns, by describing mechanisms that, if present, would be expected to generate the observed patterns, and if not present, those patterns wouldn't be expected, at least not in the observed combination. (For evolution, the relevant patterns would of course include nested hierarchies, geographic clustering of relatives, and several others.)

Of course frequency would matter, complicating science, but it wouldn't prevent science if the "physical" pattern dominates everywhere. After all, that's how psychic research operates, it looks for deviations from the expected pattern, or non-pattern. If ESP slightly changes (above the noise level) a set of otherwise (expected) chance pattern, you should be able to detect it. Alternate possibilities exist, of course, since science could also detect patterns in miracles if the patterns do exist. Indeed, how would one test for a Xian miracle without such patterns existing? If amputees who prayed to Jesus ended up with whole, working limbs again, something odd is happening, quite possibly miracles (hardly the only possibility). Indeed, theology could presumably become a statistical science, were patterned interventions discovered to be fairly common. Which gets back to the fact that "natural" and "supernatural" have no obvious relation to science, unless these are tied to meaningful empiricism. Indeed, what have we learned from ID? That God's will is that everything should be as if evolution had occurred without intervention, like parasites, predators, and competition for resources and sex. No, wait, that just indicates that life did evolve, and any Designer a trickster at best (surely possible, but how would we determine this to be the case for a supernaturally powerful and intelligent being?). But if we found that life deviates meaningfully from evolutionary patterns, it might or might not be "supernaturalism" intervening, and we should be able to discern whether or not said intervention is like design, or if it is something else. Sadly, we have no real-world examples to say what a science of the supernatural would be like. Glen Davidson

callahanpb · 17 July 2014

phhht said: A world in which miracles happen is totally unpredictable, because it is a fictional world, and anything can happen in fiction.

It's interesting that you're doing almost exactly what I said (much earlier) that you would not do (by convention anyway) with a counterfactual assumption about history:

What you generally can’t do with a counterfactual is simply say “I know ‘A’ to be true. Therefore ‘not A’ contradicts ‘A’ and by deductive logic, this implies the truth of any other assertion.”

This is logically valid, but it just goes against the spirit of this kind of thought experiment (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterfactual_history) E.g., say you ask a question like "How would the Peloponnesian have turned out if there was no plague in Athens." An answer like "That's just stupid. We know there was a plague." or "A plague would be inevitable in a city under siege at that time." aren't really playing along. You're supposed to work the hypothetical into the situation leaving all other things equal, and then follow through with the rest of the analysis assuming ordinary cause and effect. Obviously, this is going far afield of science (or history) and into very speculative thought experiments, and won't result in a definitive conclusion. But just saying that the premise is stupid isn't really answering the question being asked.

phhht · 17 July 2014

callahanpb said:
phhht said: A world in which miracles happen is totally unpredictable, because it is a fictional world, and anything can happen in fiction.
It's interesting that you're doing almost exactly what I said (much earlier) that you would not do (by convention anyway) with a counterfactual assumption about history:
What you generally can’t do with a counterfactual is simply say “I know ‘A’ to be true. Therefore ‘not A’ contradicts ‘A’ and by deductive logic, this implies the truth of any other assertion.”
This is logically valid, but it just goes against the spirit of this kind of thought experiment (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counterfactual_history) E.g., say you ask a question like "How would the Peloponnesian have turned out if there was no plague in Athens." An answer like "That's just stupid. We know there was a plague." or "A plague would be inevitable in a city under siege at that time." aren't really playing along. You're supposed to work the hypothetical into the situation leaving all other things equal, and then follow through with the rest of the analysis assuming ordinary cause and effect. Obviously, this is going far afield of science (or history) and into very speculative thought experiments, and won't result in a definitive conclusion. But just saying that the premise is stupid isn't really answering the question being asked.

See my retraction here.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 17 July 2014

If the miracles did not disrupt the patterns being studied, they would not prevent the development of science.

That is incredibly profound David and totally useless. Talk about missing the point. If a boulder is not blocking the road, I can drive down the road. Wow - give me the Nobel Prize! It doesn't make a rat's ass bit of difference what one believes, it is what happens. Why do you insist on looking at this the wrong way round? If I believe the world is predictable, but it isn't, no matter how many predictions I make, they ain't going to work. You seem to think that you can believe in miracles without any consequences. Why would that be? - that a world with miracles is exactly the same as one without. What is the point of miracles if they don't change anything? It is as if they don't exist at all. You really should take a course in reading comprehension so you are able to accurately restate an argument.

callahanpb · 17 July 2014

Sorry. I caught your update after I posted.

eric · 17 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
eric said: If only! I think the vast majority of nonbelievers would be very happy if nobody discussed the existence of the Christian God until after someone had demonstrated credible empirical evidence for Jesus' resurrection. Unfortunately, nobody has ever been able to establish that Y happened....
To be fair, much of the difficulty in even asking the question of whether Y happened comes from protests of "But you can't ask that question, because Y can't happen without X, and you haven't shown that X exists!"

I've never heard that protest, but you're the ex-fundie, so I accept that you might have. In any event, I stand by my comment; I think folks like me, phhht, etc. would be ecstatic if believers decided they would not discuss God with anyone until after they had found strong, empirically and generally acceptable evidence of Jesus' resurrection.

Please tell me the empirical difference - the difference a bystander would perceive - between a spontaneous violation and a violation directed by a nonphysical entity. Time traveller eric is in Cana with his trusty tricorder. I'm watching 3H2O -> C2H5OH via the transmutation of two Oxygens into two Carbons (plus the chemical bond rearrangement). How does Jesus' miracle look different from a spontaneous transmutation to me?
There may be no detectable difference, but I'm not sure what the significance of this is.

If there is no detectable difference then "counterfactual" becomes a meaningless term, because anyone can claim "its not counterfactual" by merely providing any theoretical mechanism, no matter how unsubstantiated or ridiculous. In fact, the only counterfactual claims become those that propose a known and understood mechanism that we have evidence doesn't work that way. Which is somewhat ironic, in that the way you judge it, known mechanisms operating in an unexpected way become more counterfactual than completely baseless claims. Consider, if there is no detectable difference and yet "water turned wine because God directed it" is not counterfactual, then all of these variants are 'not counterfactual' too: 1. Water turned wine because God directed it. 2. Water turned wine because Thor directed it. 3. Water turned wine because Bob directed it. 4. Water turned wine because My Magic Pony shat rainbows. 4. Water turned wine because the slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe. 5. Water turned wine because aggle flaggle kablabble. None of those are counterfactual the way you use the term, because hey, we've never definitively disproved any of those, and according to you, a mere break in natural law does not imply counterfactualness. I would argue, in contrast, that merely proposing some hypothetically possible mechanism (like "...because God directed it") does not save a claim from being counterfactual. At a bare minimum, the facts we have collected and agree on must support the existence of that mechanism. No support for even its existence, and the claim is counterfactual.

eric · 17 July 2014

Slight modification: at a bare minimum, the facts must support not only the existence of some mechanism,then but that it is capable of creating the break it's claimed to have done. Barring that, any claim of a break is counterfactual, because the facts right now support "no breaks."

callahanpb · 17 July 2014

eric said: I think folks like me, phhht, etc. would be ecstatic if believers decided they would not discuss God with anyone until after they had found strong, empirically and generally acceptable evidence of Jesus' resurrection.

Maybe this is where we differ, because I'm honestly curious why people think stuff. Whether I agree with someone or not, it doesn't do me any harm to hear them out. Obviously, there is a point where my time constraints make it impossible to listen to everyone, but I don't see why talking about your belief in Jesus is any worse than talking about your top 50 films of the 20th century or whatever else you might feel strongly about. Specific religious beliefs might not make any sense, but they're proxies for values, and for many people, it may be the only readily available language in which they express their values. What can I determine, for instance, by reading the gospel? One could imagine a very different gospel in which a wise teacher went around professing all the same values we associate with Christianity, but instead of working miracles, would explain to the blind and lame that they just need to come to terms with reality and accept their suffering. That might be a very interesting story and would have its own virtues, but it would be a different story. I don't see why any of these things are off the table for discussion. If you mean that you don't want to be coerced into believing, I'm with you on that, but we're all grown-ups and I hope that's not a major concern.

eric · 18 July 2014

callahanpb said: Maybe this is where we differ, because I'm honestly curious why people think stuff.

Fair enough. Let's say I'd be happy if, absent evidence of the resurrection, believers waited to be approached. I.e., the faith went non-evangelistic. And in the modern world, blogs and sites written by Christians for Christians are to be expected even amongst non-evangelists (equivalent to a "here's my top 50 movies" page). And I absolutely support everyone's right to publish, purchase, and read bibles, of course. I am fully supportive of the free speech rights of evangelists, too, what we are talking about here is what David said, that the first step people sometimes do (or should) take towards showing god exists is to first show miracle Y happened.

I don't see why any of these things are off the table for discussion.

They aren't. I think you took my comment to be more censorious and less "Christian approach to evangelism" than was intended.

Rolf · 18 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: There are something like 10⁸⁰ particles in the observable universe. Supposing that 0.00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001% of those particles could undergo nonphysical transformations every 1,603,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 Planck time units hardly seems the destruction of all physics.

I understand why it so important to keep a door open to magic. IMHO, because like FL, IDiots and various fundamentalist Christians, they sincerely and firmly believe that without magic their religion will evaporate. Indeed it will and does, but that's because what they've got is wrong. That was a huge problem for the early fundies, like Tertullian declaring there was and only could be exactly four Gospels because of the four corners of the word and the "four principal winds." But the holy Inquisition paid up to their charter with as fine a job as could be wished for to put an end to the dispute.

mattdance18 · 18 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: If I believe the world is predictable, but it isn't, no matter how many predictions I make, they ain't going to work.

When will the next earthquake strike central California? Who will win the SuperBowl in 2015? I am not being facetious. The world in which we actually live has plenty of unpredictability, even with regard to phenomena like earthquakes that are reasonably well-understood by science. This is mainly because, for all that science has been able to learn, we will never realistically be able to know all the relevant initial conditions preceding all events. If the world were entirely unpredictable, then that would be a problem for science. But it isn't entirely unpredictable, anymore than it's entirely predictable. The only difference I can see with miracles is, they wouldn't just be unknowable in practice, like initial material conditions, but unknowable in principle. That may be a problematic notion in its own right, but as long as miracles are sufficiently rare, it still doesn't seem like their mere occurrence would in itself wreck the scientific enterprise.

david.starling.macmillan · 18 July 2014

phhht said: Let me try again. Miracles are not real. Nobody can demonstrate one.

I recognize that you do not believe miracles are real, actual, possible, or some combination thereof. I recognize that no one has demonstrated the existence of a miraculous event to your satisfaction. I do not dispute either of these things. Rather, I would tentatively suggest that your personal metric for establishing reasonable belief is unnecessarily narrow, functionally inconsistent, or both.

A Masked Panda (ds_Q) said: Of course frequency would matter, complicating science, but it wouldn't prevent science if the "physical" pattern dominates everywhere. After all, that's how psychic research operates, it looks for deviations from the expected pattern, or non-pattern. If ESP slightly changes (above the noise level) a set of otherwise (expected) chance pattern, you should be able to detect it. Alternate possibilities exist, of course, since science could also detect patterns in miracles if the patterns do exist. Indeed, how would one test for a Xian miracle without such patterns existing? If amputees who prayed to Jesus ended up with whole, working limbs again, something odd is happening, quite possibly miracles (hardly the only possibility).

Indeed. We would be able to test for the existence of miracles in the exact same way we could test for the action of an artificially intelligent supercomputer which monitored the brainwaves of particular people and used as-yet-undiscovered particles to alter barriers in quantum systems to answer those people's "prayers". The question of natural vs supernatural is irrelevant.

A Masked Panda (ds_Q) said:
If the miracles did not disrupt the patterns being studied, they would not prevent the development of science.
That is incredibly profound David and totally useless. Talk about missing the point. If a boulder is not blocking the road, I can drive down the road. Wow - give me the Nobel Prize!

You seem to insist that for any miracles to have ever happened, there would have to be such a huge glut of materials, affecting every possible field of study, that no science would be possible. This seems patently ridiculous to me.

eric said: If there is no detectable difference then "counterfactual" becomes a meaningless term, because anyone can claim "its not counterfactual" by merely providing any theoretical mechanism, no matter how unsubstantiated or ridiculous.

The whole point of a counterfactual is to establish what would have been, given a state of affairs which is universally agreed to have not happened. So it doesn't exactly apply. If someone is genuinely advancing the existence of Thor, then the claim that a physically disallowed event was caused by Thor is not a counterfactual for the purposes of that discussion. This is true even if the physically disallowed event was indistinguishable from one which all parties agree is spontaneously impossible (and would thus be considered a valid counterfactual).

callahanpb · 18 July 2014

mattdance18 said: I am not being facetious. The world in which we actually live has plenty of unpredictability, even with regard to phenomena like earthquakes that are reasonably well-understood by science.

I agree, and had considered starting a similar reply, but I was worried about things heading off in the wrong direction about ultimate limits of understanding, like Gödel's Theorem or thoughts about quantum uncertainty (which miss the point that even with determinism it is still impossible to predict everything). Ever since I read the statement "all models are wrong, but some are useful" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_E._P._Box) I have kind of accepted it as the standard that I will try to attain in my brief time on earth. I know I won't understand everything, but I hope to come up with useful ways of thinking about things that will give me (and hopefully others) better insight about the world around them.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 18 July 2014

Here is the argument in a nutshell:
A world with miracles is the same as one without miracles (this what everyone is saying), is the same as one without an interventionist god, is the same as one without any god.

You can add all the miracles and gods you want and it won't change one thing, so why bother?

callahanpb · 18 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Here is the argument in a nutshell: A world with miracles is the same as one without miracles (this what everyone is saying), is the same as one without an interventionist god, is the same as one without any god.

No. What "everyone" is saying, or at least what I am saying is that a world with miracles would definitely put empiricism in a different light philosophically, but would not stop people from doing science. And in fact, a lot of groundbreaking science was done historically during time periods when most people, including great thinkers, did not dispute the existence of magic or miracles. The fact that miracles weren't actually happening--and did not affect experimental outcomes--is significant, but the fact that scientists could not rule out the action of miracles should still have had a detrimental affect on their work, but apparently did not put a crashing halt on it. But no, it is not "the same" just not different in the way that you insist it would be.

phhht · 18 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said: Let me try again. Miracles are not real. Nobody can demonstrate one.
I recognize that you do not believe miracles are real, actual, possible, or some combination thereof. I recognize that no one has demonstrated the existence of a miraculous event to your satisfaction. I do not dispute either of these things. Rather, I would tentatively suggest that your personal metric for establishing reasonable belief is unnecessarily narrow, functionally inconsistent, or both.

How then can we determine who is correct? If it does not suffice to appeal to the real world, to empirical evidence, then miracles have the same status as leprechauns. In addition, you continue to ignore the alternative (and striking) explanation that miracles are not real but fiction. We know of tremendous volumes of counterfactual fiction, everything from Harry Potter to The Walking Dead (resurrection is a miracle, right?). What is it about the miracle fiction of christianity that makes you think it is real rather than just another fantasy story? Of course, if you reject my appeal to objective reality, if you refuse to accept that near-universal standard for what is real and what is not, you are faced with the unpleasant necessity of defending the indefensible.

david.starling.macmillan · 18 July 2014

phhht said: If it does not suffice to appeal to the real world, to empirical evidence, then miracles have the same status as leprechauns. In addition, you continue to ignore the alternative (and striking) explanation that miracles are not real but fiction. We know of tremendous volumes of counterfactual fiction, everything from Harry Potter to The Walking Dead (resurrection is a miracle, right?). What is it about the miracle fiction of christianity that makes you think it is real rather than just another fantasy story? Of course, if you reject my appeal to objective reality, if you refuse to accept that near-universal standard for what is real and what is not, you are faced with the unpleasant necessity of defending the indefensible.

Let me suggest something, then. One need not treat religious historiographies any differently from secular historiographies in determining what is fact and what is myth. Discuss.

Just Bob · 18 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said: If it does not suffice to appeal to the real world, to empirical evidence, then miracles have the same status as leprechauns. In addition, you continue to ignore the alternative (and striking) explanation that miracles are not real but fiction. We know of tremendous volumes of counterfactual fiction, everything from Harry Potter to The Walking Dead (resurrection is a miracle, right?). What is it about the miracle fiction of christianity that makes you think it is real rather than just another fantasy story? Of course, if you reject my appeal to objective reality, if you refuse to accept that near-universal standard for what is real and what is not, you are faced with the unpleasant necessity of defending the indefensible.
Let me suggest something, then. One need not treat religious historiographies any differently from secular historiographies in determining what is fact and what is myth. Discuss.

I would suggest that it's not that they're religious that induces skepticism. A religious text, for instance, that records a list of rulers or high priests over several centuries, or the dimensions of a temple, would not likely be doubted, unless there are obvious exaggerations or differing accounts of the same period. One that contains alleged miracles, however, like the sun going backwards in the sky or a talking donkey -- events which no one can witness or duplicate nowadays -- must be viewed with the greatest skepticism. But then a 'secular' account might also incorporate fantastic elements (IIRC, the Iliad, besides all the gods, includes magical cures and talking horses). So, no, I would not treat them any differently. 'Religious' ain't the problem: it's the stuff we know ain't so.

david.starling.macmillan · 18 July 2014

Just Bob said: I would suggest that it's not that they're religious that induces skepticism. A religious text, for instance, that records a list of rulers or high priests over several centuries, or the dimensions of a temple, would not likely be doubted, unless there are obvious exaggerations or differing accounts of the same period. One that contains alleged miracles, however, like the sun going backwards in the sky or a talking donkey -- events which no one can witness or duplicate nowadays -- must be viewed with the greatest skepticism. But then a 'secular' account might also incorporate fantastic elements (IIRC, the Iliad, besides all the gods, includes magical cures and talking horses). So, no, I would not treat them any differently. 'Religious' ain't the problem: it's the stuff we know ain't so.

Here's the question, though. What if, just for the sake of argument, we didn't treat fantastic/magical/miraculous elements any differently than mundane elements for the purposes of establishing historicity? Is it possible that we would still be able to impeach 99.9% of fantastic/magical/miraculous events based simply on good principles of historical analysis and criticism?

callahanpb · 18 July 2014

Just Bob said: or differing accounts of the same period.

This is sort of a nitpick that I have no particular goal in mentioning, but given that we know that multiple accounts from the same period often differ, then having a single account (others unknown or not extant) is no better than having multiple differing accounts. That is, the lack of any contradictory document is not strong evidence for the truth of a document. On the other hand, multiple independent claims that agree would be positive evidence, and this is what you would need to begin to take historicity seriously.

david.starling.macmillan · 18 July 2014

callahanpb said:
Just Bob said: or differing accounts of the same period.
This is sort of a nitpick that I have no particular goal in mentioning, but given that we know that multiple accounts from the same period often differ, then having a single account (others unknown or not extant) is no better than having multiple differing accounts. That is, the lack of any contradictory document is not strong evidence for the truth of a document. On the other hand, multiple independent claims that agree would be positive evidence, and this is what you would need to begin to take historicity seriously.

And phylogenetic algorithms can be put to great use in figuring out what the original form of an account was, assuming that all divergent accounts originally came from the same textual or oral source.

Malcolm · 18 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: A world in which miracles are believed to happen -- even often -- is not a world which is totally unpredictable. And we know that science developed in a world where miracles were believed to happen quite often.
Sure it is. A world in which miracles happen is totally unpredictable, because it is a fictional world, and anything can happen in fiction.
Do you not see how this is question-begging?
Henry J said: Oh, and it isn't whether lots of people believe that miracles happen that would handicap attempts at research, it's whether they do happen.
Only if the miracles disrupted patterns. If the miracles did not disrupt the patterns being studied, they would not prevent the development of science. And clearly belief in miracles does not stop people from wanting to study science, as Masked seems to think. History is proof of that.

I'm going in to work now to perform a routine bacterial transformation. I will use a no antibiotic plate as a control to check to my cells are viable, and a no plasmid control to check that my antibiotic is working. What would you suggest as a no miracle control? That is why science couldn't develop in a world of magic/miracles.

callahanpb · 18 July 2014

Malcolm said: I will use a no antibiotic plate as a control to check to my cells are viable, and a no plasmid control to check that my antibiotic is working. What would you suggest as a no miracle control?

There isn't one, but your result has to be repeatable. If you came up with a very surprising result that happened to be due to a miracle, you would probably want to make sure the result was correct before publishing, so you would do the experiment again. Other researchers would also try to repeat it rather than just taking your word for it. If the result was actually due to a miracle, the result would not be repeatable.

That is why science couldn't develop in a world of magic/miracles.

Reproducibility is already how science works in a world without miracles. Explain to me why it doesn't work in a world with miracles? If the miracle itself was reproducible, then it would cease to be a miracle, and would be a scientific fact. Note that you already don't have a control for a rival who sneaks in at night and tampers with your experiment intentionally. This is an event of very low probability, but if miracles occur with still lower (non-zero) probability your experimental protocol should still be good.

Just Bob · 18 July 2014

No, no, the Great Miracle Guy could make it work 100 times in a row, or 10,000, then quit miraclizing, for some inscrutable Miracle Guy reason, on the 10,001st trial.

That's why science won't work -- or at least can't be trusted -- in a world with miracles: You could NEVER be sure whether ANY particular thing was a miracle or not, regardless of how many times something happens the same way.

Malcolm · 18 July 2014

callahanpb said:
Malcolm said: I will use a no antibiotic plate as a control to check to my cells are viable, and a no plasmid control to check that my antibiotic is working. What would you suggest as a no miracle control?
There isn't one, but your result has to be repeatable. If you came up with a very surprising result that happened to be due to a miracle, you would probably want to make sure the result was correct before publishing, so you would do the experiment again. Other researchers would also try to repeat it rather than just taking your word for it. If the result was actually due to a miracle, the result would not be repeatable.
That is why science couldn't develop in a world of magic/miracles.
Reproducibility is already how science works in a world without miracles. Explain to me why it doesn't work in a world with miracles? If the miracle itself was reproducible, then it would cease to be a miracle, and would be a scientific fact. Note that you already don't have a control for a rival who sneaks in at night and tampers with your experiment intentionally. This is an event of very low probability, but if miracles occur with still lower (non-zero) probability your experimental protocol should still be good.

When I go to submit my findings to Nature, I doubt that any of the reviewers will ask for a control for sneaky rivals, but you can guarantee they would ask for a no magic control.

eric · 18 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: If someone is genuinely advancing the existence of Thor, then the claim that a physically disallowed event was caused by Thor is not a counterfactual for the purposes of that discussion.

So then, you have successfully kept Christian miracles in the "not counterfactual" category by allowing any miracle claim, not matter how absurd, count as "not counterfactual" if the person sincerely advances a cause for it, no matter how absurd that cause. You realize that this lets a lot of pseudoscience in the door as "not counterfactual," right? Chakras and chi and ka and Uri Geller's claims of telekinesis all count as "not counterfactual." John Edward's claims to talk to the dead are "not counterfactual" on your definition. Any medium claiming some spirit guide lets them tell the future (your future, for the low low price of $19.95) - their claims are now "not counterfactual." Two thoughts on this. First, I think you are getting a bit humpty dumpty here David. I do not think your definition of counterfactual is even close to what most people would consider it to be. More on that in a minute. Second, it seems a very high price to pay, just to prevent your beliefs from being called counterfactual. Very similar to Behe trying to broaden the definition of "science" so that ID counts, eh? Why not just bite the bullet and go Todd Woods on this? Accept that you hold some currently-counterfactual beliefs, but say that your faith leads you to believe they really happened. So what do I think the regular meaning of counterfactual is? Something more akin to counter to a broad notion of facts, that includes well-accepted theories of science that technically arent' facts, but which most people treat as such. A claim to have broken the laws of conservation fits, IMO, the standard usage of the term 'counterfactual,' because most people consider things like laws of conservation to be so well established that they might as well count as facts. And under that definition, pretty much all miracle claims will initially be seen as counterfactual, however, this is of course tentative and subject to revision should new evidence support the observation of that miracle, because then we would have to revise the laws of physics and that miracle would no longer be counterfactual.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 18 July 2014

If I pray for rain and it rains it is a miracle.
If I don't pray for rain and it rains then it is a meteorological event.
If I pray for a safe trip and I have a safe trip it is a miracle.
This is so easy - no wonder there are so many miracles.
If I just don't think about them or investigate why they happen - they are miracles.

Is this why they aren't counterfactual because you prayed for it?

Henry J · 18 July 2014

This exchange has become counterproductive. ;)

callahanpb · 18 July 2014

Malcolm said: When I go to submit my findings to Nature, I doubt that any of the reviewers will ask for a control for sneaky rivals, but you can guarantee they would ask for a no magic control.

Now you're just changing the subject. There's nothing wrong with saying that miracles should be dismissed as a possibility by reasonable people due to the lack of evidence for them. But I don't understand why you (and ds_Q) are so insistent that any miracle would completely invalidate the usefulness of the scientific method ("That is why science couldn’t develop in a world of magic/miracles.") This claim is nearly impossible to prove either way, since there is no way to test "a world of magic/miracles" experimentally. I'm not even sure what you mean by such a claim, since you have to assign particular properties to miracles while simultaneously stating that they don't happen. (I'm not saying the claim can't be made rigorous, but as stated, it's ill-defined.) It is clear that science can develop in a world where most people (including scientists) believe in magic and miracles, because that's the world in which it developed. Even during a time of common belief in magic, even the most uneducated magic-believing people still accepted empirical arguments most of the time. If you saw me stealing your chickens at night, my ability to construct an unfalsifiable explanation involving my evil twin probably wouldn't hold much weight. So sound empirical thinking and superstition have coexisted for most of human history. Why do you need to make the demonstrably false claim that a miracle would invalidate science in some way, when you can just settle on "Miracles don't actually happen and have not happened in the past"?

callahanpb · 18 July 2014

Just Bob said: No, no, the Great Miracle Guy could make it work 100 times in a row, or 10,000, then quit miraclizing, for some inscrutable Miracle Guy reason, on the 10,001st trial. That's why science won't work -- or at least can't be trusted -- in a world with miracles: You could NEVER be sure whether ANY particular thing was a miracle or not, regardless of how many times something happens the same way.

Yes, there are particular scenarios in which the presence of high frequency or adversarial miracles would make scientific reasoning impossible. However, what I thought I was refuting was the claim that any scenario involving any miracles would make the scientific method useful, and this is incorrect. Actually, I'm not sure if it's just that you and others want a strong claim to go against David's view or if there is something deeper. In the former case, my point is that you should go with the strongest claim that is actually defensible. You can defend the position that miracles do not happen and have not happened. You cannot defend the position that any level of magical or miraculous activity would send science to a screeching halt. In fact, this must be a very modern viewpoint, because science has done well without that assumption in the past, and even today some scientists function without it. It could be a new thing and still correct. I would just need to see a better argument for its correctness. It may depend on your definition of being about to "trust" scientific results. So, in a deeper sense, I wonder if the real division is that you see science as potentially providing you with a completely sound epistemic basis for your belief, and I think this is a completely hopeless idea. I don't need to resort to miracles to see the impossibility of ever being certain, just the imperfection of the human brain. Ultimately, I can't trust my own reasoning. At the extreme case, I think 2+2=4 but maybe I'm barking mad to think that, and everyone else thinks 2+2=5 but in my madness I don't hear them. I would assign a low likelihood to this possibility, but there is certainly a significant likelihood of being wrong in some part of my reasoning, and a non-negligible possibility of being far out of touch with reality on particular things. There are schizophrenics who have nonetheless produced sound work in particular domains and particular times (the mathematician John Nash, famously portrayed in a movie, and I actually knew of a mathematician at my own university who struggled with mental health issues while being acknowledged as a brilliant thinker and inspiring teacher). So I feel very comfortable in saying that empiricism can coexist with a uncertainty. Miracles, cosmic rays, and the possibility that I am unhinged can all be considered as sources of experimental error. I don't think there is much need to consider miracles in this light, but it just seems disingenuous to claim that miracles or magic provide insurmountable challenges to empirical reasoning. Expecting 100% validity provides an insurmountable challenge to begin with, and once you accept imperfect validity of your empirical claims, this scientific method is robust to a wide range of conditions.

callahanpb · 18 July 2014

Correction: Yes, there are particular scenarios in which the presence of high frequency or adversarial miracles would make scientific reasoning impossible. However, what I thought I was refuting was the claim that any scenario involving any miracles would make the scientific method ~~useful~~ useless, and this is incorrect.

Malcolm · 19 July 2014

callahanpb said:
Malcolm said: When I go to submit my findings to Nature, I doubt that any of the reviewers will ask for a control for sneaky rivals, but you can guarantee they would ask for a no magic control.
Now you're just changing the subject. There's nothing wrong with saying that miracles should be dismissed as a possibility by reasonable people due to the lack of evidence for them. But I don't understand why you (and ds_Q) are so insistent that any miracle would completely invalidate the usefulness of the scientific method ("That is why science couldn’t develop in a world of magic/miracles.") This claim is nearly impossible to prove either way, since there is no way to test "a world of magic/miracles" experimentally. I'm not even sure what you mean by such a claim, since you have to assign particular properties to miracles while simultaneously stating that they don't happen. (I'm not saying the claim can't be made rigorous, but as stated, it's ill-defined.) It is clear that science can develop in a world where most people (including scientists) believe in magic and miracles, because that's the world in which it developed. Even during a time of common belief in magic, even the most uneducated magic-believing people still accepted empirical arguments most of the time. If you saw me stealing your chickens at night, my ability to construct an unfalsifiable explanation involving my evil twin probably wouldn't hold much weight. So sound empirical thinking and superstition have coexisted for most of human history. Why do you need to make the demonstrably false claim that a miracle would invalidate science in some way, when you can just settle on "Miracles don't actually happen and have not happened in the past"?

I wasn't changing the subject. The scientific method relies on publication of data. To produce data you need adequate controls.

david.starling.macmillan · 19 July 2014

I don't think anyone has yet addressed this question, and I think it's important for the purposes of any discussion about the historicity of Jesus, the gospels, and so forth. What if, just for the sake of argument, we didn’t treat fantastic/magical/miraculous elements any differently than mundane elements for the purposes of establishing historicity? Is it possible that we would still be able to impeach 99.9% of fantastic/magical/miraculous events based simply on good principles of historical analysis and textual criticism? Interested to hear what people think.

Just Bob said: No, no, the Great Miracle Guy could make it work 100 times in a row, or 10,000, then quit miraclizing, for some inscrutable Miracle Guy reason, on the 10,001st trial.

Which is why science has to be equally reproducible regardless of where and when you perform experiments. There can always be confounding variables that you didn't anticipate. They don't have to be miraculous. If you're trying to reproduce the Cavendish experiment but a cement truck is parked just outside the room you're using, it'll mess up your numbers, and you'll only find out when you move to another place or someone else tries it later on. But the remote possibility of confounding variables does not make science impossible. Science is designed to root out and eliminate confounding variables. If you need miracles to be absolutely impossible simply because you're worried that some gremlin is going to take a personal interest in messing with your experiment...well, that seems a little paranoid to me.

eric said:
david.starling.macmillan said: If someone is genuinely advancing the existence of Thor, then the claim that a physically disallowed event was caused by Thor is not a counterfactual for the purposes of that discussion.
So then, you have successfully kept Christian miracles in the "not counterfactual" category by allowing any miracle claim, not matter how absurd, count as "not counterfactual" if the person sincerely advances a cause for it, no matter how absurd that cause. You realize that this lets a lot of pseudoscience in the door as "not counterfactual," right? Chakras and chi and ka and Uri Geller's claims of telekinesis all count as "not counterfactual." John Edward's claims to talk to the dead are "not counterfactual" on your definition. Any medium claiming some spirit guide lets them tell the future (your future, for the low low price of $19.95) - their claims are now "not counterfactual." So what do I think the regular meaning of counterfactual is? Something more akin to counter to a broad notion of facts, that includes well-accepted theories of science that technically arent' facts, but which most people treat as such.

And under that definition, I totally see where you're coming from, and your arguments are accurate. Only, I don't think that's the typical usage of "counterfactual". Not even slightly. And it's certainly not the definition I've been operating under. Have you ever watched The Big Bang Theory? In Season 4, Sheldon and Amy play a game they've invented called...Counterfactuals. They take turns asking each other questions based on counterfactual hypotheticals, like "If the world was ruled by a giant intelligent beaver, what popular food wouldn't exist?" This is a better example of how "counterfactual" is typically used: as a hypothetical which all parties to the conversation agree is false. A counterfactual is so termed not because it's more or less impossible, but because the parties are using it as a hypothetical. It's a property of the conversation. For example, we could speculate, "If the Holocaust had never happened, would Israel have gotten statehood?" This would be a counterfactual. But if a Holocaust denier were to show up, it would cease to be a valid counterfactual, because we would no longer all be able to universally agree on it as a hypothetical. This has no bearing on actual truth value, only on how we as a group choose to make use of the idea. It makes no sense to use the term unless the person you're talking to agrees that a given idea is categorically untrue and is being considered only as a hypothetical. Now, if you're using "counterfactual" to mean something like "contrary to the established consensus of scholarship", then we have another topic to discuss. But that's not, in my understanding, the typical usage. I think there's more going on behind the scenes, though. Unless I miss my guess, at least some of us seem to hold the belief that the evidence we have today is substantively and demonstrably different than what we would expect to find if any of the major events described in the Gospels had taken place. I don't necessarily agree with that belief.

callahanpb · 19 July 2014

Malcolm said: To produce data you need adequate controls.

Yes, and you still have adequate controls without controlling for either miracles or tampering by sneaky rivals, because both of these events are considered unlikely enough not to require any explicit controls, even though there are no pure philosophical grounds for ruling out tampering. The latter actually could happen, but we make the simplifying assumption that it does not.

Scott F · 19 July 2014

callahanpb said:
Malcolm said: I will use a no antibiotic plate as a control to check to my cells are viable, and a no plasmid control to check that my antibiotic is working. What would you suggest as a no miracle control?
There isn't one, but your result has to be repeatable. If you came up with a very surprising result that happened to be due to a miracle, you would probably want to make sure the result was correct before publishing, so you would do the experiment again. Other researchers would also try to repeat it rather than just taking your word for it. If the result was actually due to a miracle, the result would not be repeatable.
That is why science couldn't develop in a world of magic/miracles.
Reproducibility is already how science works in a world without miracles. Explain to me why it doesn't work in a world with miracles? If the miracle itself was reproducible, then it would cease to be a miracle, and would be a scientific fact. Note that you already don't have a control for a rival who sneaks in at night and tampers with your experiment intentionally. This is an event of very low probability, but if miracles occur with still lower (non-zero) probability your experimental protocol should still be good.

Don't forget Clarke's third law. My understanding is that "magic" and "miracle" are two different kinds of things. "Magic" is something that people can do (witness Harry Potter), while a "miracle" is something that a god wills. Assuming this distinction to be valid for the purposes of this discussion, it would appear that "miracle" is not something that is "reproducible" in an experimental sense. However, it appears that the notion of "magic" (as distinct from other "magical" things like "miracles") assumes some sort of repeatability and predictability. Hence (for example) an actual "school" of "magic", like Hogwarts, where one can actually learn and practice what is and is not predictable. Presumably, a world in which a predictable kind of "magic" existed would still be amenable to the Scientific Method. As long as the "magic" is predictable and reproducible, what difference does it make whether it conforms to our current knowledge? Why would it not be amenable to the Scientific Method? How were X-Rays discovered before we knew what they were? Radioactive decay? Dark Matter? The "unknown" is hardly a barrier to the Scientific Method. Heck, our current PhD's wear funny robes and funny hats, just like the magicians at Hogwarts. Give a PhD a magic wand, and no one could tell the difference.

Matt Young · 19 July 2014

For example, we could speculate, “If the Holocaust had never happened, would Israel have gotten statehood?” This would be a counterfactual.

Yes, historians use "counterfactual" in that way -- a statement that is contrary to accepted or known fact, not something that seems impossible or that you do not believe. Here is an interesting counterfactual: What if Darwin had fallen off the Beagle and drowned? What would have been the course of evolutionary biology? I don't know, but I've got the book.

eric · 19 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: What if, just for the sake of argument, we didn’t treat fantastic/magical/miraculous elements any differently than mundane elements for the purposes of establishing historicity?

I think you're getting the order in which things happen wrong. First, there are claims. They are evaluated against what we know of history, science, etc. The label "fantastical" (or magical or miraculous) is an outcome of that evaluation. So, I would argue that all claims are treated equally. Your statement seems to imply that we first pigeonhole claims based on some set of premises, then evaluate them differently (and unfairly) based on which pigeonhole we've stuck them into. But there is no such pigeonholing (except in rare cases where the speaker has been previously assessed to be untrustworthy: I think if a televangelist said the sky was blue, I would look up before I accepted it). You are mistaking a conclusion of empiricism for a non-empirical premise. In a way, you're asking us to give special treatment to certain claims. Every "normal" claim gets evaluated and it if fails, c'est la vie. But when 'water to wine' gets evaluated and fails miserably, you ask: "well, let's say it didn't fail - let's suspend that judgement, and consider it viable or nonfantastical anyway." What rational reason do we have for doing that?

Have you ever watched The Big Bang Theory? In Season 4, Sheldon and Amy play a game they've invented called...Counterfactuals. They take turns asking each other questions based on counterfactual hypotheticals, like "If the world was ruled by a giant intelligent beaver, what popular food wouldn't exist?" This is a better example of how "counterfactual" is typically used: as a hypothetical which all parties to the conversation agree is false.

That has the exact same problem. If you're in a conversation with Uri Geller or John Edwards, their claims of special powers suddenly become not counterfactual under your logic. If I'm in a conversation with FL, suddenly all of FL's claims become not counterfactual. If I'm in a conversation with a geocentrist or flat earther, geocentrism of flat earthism become non-counterfactual. Is this the form of "not counterfactual" your miracle beliefs are, David? Seems pretty weak. Yes, I will fully agree that your claims are no more counterfactual than FL's, or a flat earther's, or John Edward's. Is that satisfactory? If not - if you want to keep the term "counterfactual" from being watered down to practically nothing - then I think you're going to have to go to exactly the place you don't want to go, some place like (your words) "contrary to the established consensus of scholarship."

at least some of us seem to hold the belief that the evidence we have today is substantively and demonstrably different than what we would expect to find if any of the major events described in the Gospels had taken place. I don't necessarily agree with that belief.

I'm sure you mean any of the miraculous events. Well, none of our physical laws have a "god's hand" term in them, or maybe you can say that they do and that term has a proportionality constant of 0. And that WOULD have to change, because these laws aren't supposed to be unchangeable or what happens merely most of the time; they are supposed to be the most accurate representation of what we think happens in this universe. If God intervenes, then, we need to change them to account for that intervention. That would be the 'good science' thing to do: revise our model based on new evidence. So, if people can pray to God and walk on water, we'd need F=ma+k(God's hand), where k is now considered nonzero. And so yes, I think acceptance of Gospel miracles would have to change science. The option you seem to want us to take - accept that they happened, but not modify our laws to account for them - is sort of cheating. It's being untrue to the scientific method. It's, again, carving out exceptional treatment for your preferred miracles.

Scott F · 19 July 2014

[ Sorry, I'm coming a bit late to the party here. ]

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
a zombie god and an embryo ex nihilo and so on are consistent with evidence? What evidence (non-fictional, please)? I'm partucularly interested to hear about evidence for the implanted embryo claim.
I am going to provide two statements. A) The claim is consistent with evidence. B) The claim is supported by evidence. Do you recognize the qualitative distinction between these two statements? Because you just conflated them.
Ah, you fooled me there, David. I thought you meant that being consistent with evidence meant being supported by evidence. I should have known better, because none of those alleged miracles are supported by evidence, not even in the looser sense of historical evidence. Your invocation of evidence was just a red herring.

I believe that this is the (potential) distinction between the miracles in Genesis, and the miracles in the Gospels. The "global" miracles (the ex nihilo miracles, etc) in Genesis are not "supported" by the physical evidence, nor are they "consistent" with the physical evidence that we have available to us. (Unless, of course, one is willing to postulate a Deceiver God (light created on it's way to the Earth; glaciers with soot layers; sediments with varves; etc), in which case we're back to Last Thursdayism, and (almost) no one is claiming anything of the sort.) The overwhelming evidence against such miracles makes believing them perverse. However, the "minor" (what I think of as "local" miracles), while not "supported" by the evidence, are not "inconsistent" with the evidence. Why? Because at this remove, we simply have no physical evidence (beyond the text in the Bible) for any of these "local" miracles. Water into wine? No evidence. Show me the amphora, and maybe we can talk evidence. Raised from the dead? No evidence. Even Doubting Thomas needed something. But at this remove, such CSI is simply impossible. Unless there is some actual "evidence", there cannot possibly be any evidence for the alleged miracle to be inconsistent with. Yes, yes of course any such miracle (getting tired of scare quotes) is contraindicated by all the known laws of physics, etc, etc. But that's not the point. Yes, by definition a miracle is going to contravene the laws of physics. That's what makes it miraculous in the first place. The point is that, in the absence of evidence it is possible to claim that the local miracles are at at least consistent with the evidence that is available.

phhht · 19 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Only, I don't think that's the typical usage of "counterfactual". Not even slightly. And it's certainly not the definition I've been operating under.

Certainly the usage you cite - in a conditional - is one way to employ the counterfactual. But it is not the only way. No conditional - no "if" - is required in order to employ the concept. The OED, for example, gives that usage as second to the definition available from Google. Perhaps your judgment is parochial?

Just Bob · 19 July 2014

People keep making these unwarranted assumptions:

Magic would be reproducible, predictable, controllable, amenable to scientific study. Why would it be? Even in Harry Potter it doesn't always work or work right. Where is the rule that says that a magic-wielder has to be able to produce the same effect regularly, at will?

Miracles must be so rare as to be inaccessible to scientific inquiry (and probably don't happen anymore, anyway). Why? If we allow the possibility of miracles, then how can we be sure that anything in the world is NOT miraculous? Can we be sure that earthquakes and volcanic eruptions are not ordained and arranged by a god to occur in exactly those places, at exactly those times? Can we be certain that universal gravity is not an ongoing miracle, sustained by a god, which could be switched off or altered at a whim?

If there could be magic or miracles or both, whence cometh these rules by which some seem to think they're circumscribed? It seems to me (neither a scientist nor a philosopher) that once the possibility of magic or miracles is allowed, then all science must be tentative: this effect that happens every time could be magic or miracle every time -- which allows the possibility that this might be the last time it works. Even the most basic structure of the universe, C for instance, might change at any moment, with all the consequent results. Unless the god responsible doesn't want those results.

callahanpb · 19 July 2014

Just Bob said: People keep making these unwarranted assumptions: Magic would be reproducible, predictable, controllable, amenable to scientific study. Miracles must be so rare as to be inaccessible to scientific inquiry (and probably don't happen anymore, anyway).

Not sure which people, but I have not made either assumption. What I sort of think I'm seeing is a difficulty to distinguish between universal and existential quantifiers. Let's forget about supernatural issues and start with something simple. "Fire in my house would kill me and destroy my house." The problem with this statement is that it is not written carefully enough to be unambiguously true or false. To me, it seems obviously untrue, and I would point this out by saying. "I could light the candles on a birthday cake in my house." It would not kill me or destroy my house (I've done it in fact). But how about the counterargument: "Why do you make the unwarranted assumption that the fire would only be as small as the candles on a birthday cake? What if the whole house was on fire? That could definitely kill you and destroy the house." So which do I mean: (A) "For all cases of fire in my house, the fire will kill me and destroy my house." (B) "There exist cases of fire in my house such that the fire will kill me and destroy my house." Now I hope I can get agreement that (A) is false, as the birthday cake counterexample shows, and (B) is true, as the example of a large conflagration shows. Getting back to the subject of the supernatural, I agree that there exist hypothetical counterfactual conditions of widescale unpredictable magic or capricious and/or malicious actions of deities that would render the scientific method useless or nearly so. The one claim I disagree with is that any amount of magic at all would cause us not to "trust" empirical reasoning and therefore throw the entire possibility of scientific progress into peril. I mean, beg pardon if that characterization is a strawman. In fact, this is the first place I've ever heard it suggested, but several commenters seem quite insistent on it. If I'm just misunderstanding, let me know. I also don't think there is any particular reason to expect "magic" to be predictable, but given that I don't think it exists at all, I don't feel much need to dwell on its putative properties. Given that it's a little silly to think very hard about how science would work if there was magic, it occurs to me that something analogous might be found in considering whether an individual can carry out the scientific method usefully if they sometimes experience hallucinations. It's not equivalent in any deep sense, but it carries similar problems with it, and has the advantage (in contrast with magic) that it can happen, and probably has. There are multiple examples of mathematicians with schizophrenia who can still produce results in their field, but pure mathematics isn't empirical, and I don't know how it is with experimental scientists. I think the fact that multiple people collaborate and try to reproduce results would make it unlikely for the result of a hallucination to be accepted as a result, but it could affect the work of an individual adversely. There's also a continuum between ordinary fallible observation and severe, unmitigated schizophrenia. E.g., I see someone who sort of looks like someone I know. It turns out they weren't, but maybe my belief was reinforced by other circumstances. I'm certain I was snubbed or otherwise offended by the person I know when in fact it was a case of mistaken identity. I ask later and get confused protests, which I mistake for denials. My behavior based on this belief turns it into a self-fulfilling prophecy. No deity need be invoked, yet Eris herself might have showed up and thrown the apple of discord for all that has ensued. Now assume I'm mentally healthy (at least for purposes of argument). I made a mistake and paid for it. I can't always trust my perception or my reasoning, and sometimes I'm not even aware when it is untrustworthy. Does this throw out all hope of applying empirical reasoning in a useful way in other domains, most of the time? Can I just say that on balance, my observation and reasoning progresses are useful? At another end of the continuum, if I was truly subject to severe hallucinations, I might not be able to take care of myself in the most basic manner, let alone develop a clear understanding of the world. And a magic-filled world would indeed sort of be like the material manifestation of schizophrenia, the only distinguishing factor being (possibly) agreement between people about the nature of the hallucinations (but not necessarily that either). My preferred resolution is that I don't "trust" empirical evidence perfectly, but I don't know of any substitute that I would trust more. The scientific method does seem to be the most effective tool available for studying reality. But I don't expect it to lead to my being able to say "I know the the truth" in some absolute sense, because my own fallible reasoning makes it impossible to trust how I reached my conclusion.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 20 July 2014

callahan, if you truly believe that to be a fair representation of the opposing view, then no wonder this post is now up 430 comment. No one has said that any amount of magic or miracles would interrupt scientific progress - blatant misrepresentation.

callahanpb · 20 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: callahan, if you truly believe that to be a fair representation of the opposing view, then no wonder this post is now up 430 comment. No one has said that any amount of magic or miracles would interrupt scientific progress - blatant misrepresentation.

OK, thanks. I read statements like "That is why science couldn’t develop in a world of magic/miracles." and try to understand what a "world of magic/miracles" means exactly. It could mean a world sufficiently unpredictable that science would lose utility, but then the assertion is a mere tautology. I can assign other meanings to "world of magic/miracles" that makes the statement either true or false (as I explained with the fire analogy) and the one that makes it false strikes me as reasonable. To be honest, I don't really understand the point. If it takes a certain amount discussion to get a clear meaning out of the assertion, well, nobody else has to play along (plus I am not the only one driving up the comment #). Empirical evidence suggests that magic and miracles don't actually happen, and that's good enough for me. I thought someone was attempting a philosophical argument to claim that the whole idea of magic and miracles was inconsistent on deeper grounds. I'll desist from further entries on this thread.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 20 July 2014

To be honest, I don’t really understand the point.

That is obvious.

Rolf · 21 July 2014

David MacMillan said:

If you need miracles to be absolutely impossible simply because you’re worried that some gremlin is going to take a personal interest in messing with your experiment…well, that seems a little paranoid to me.

I don't believe anyone is worried about gremlins - that's more like Murphy's law or "shit happens". What I am 'worried' about is people who for personal reasons insist on keeping a door open to miracles.

eric · 21 July 2014

Scott F said: Yes, yes of course any such miracle (getting tired of scare quotes) is contraindicated by all the known laws of physics, etc, etc. But that's not the point. Yes, by definition a miracle is going to contravene the laws of physics. That's what makes it miraculous in the first place. The point is that, in the absence of evidence it is possible to claim that the local miracles are at at least consistent with the evidence that is available.

I mildly disagree. I think "contraindicated by all known laws of physics" = "inconsistent with the evidence that is available." The evidence that is available leads to the conclusion that the laws of physics hold in all times and places. Miracles are inconsistent with that direct, albeit inductive, conclusion from the evidence. There's only two rational ways to reject that conclusion: reject the observations on which it's based, or reject induction as a valid method of reasoning. Now, philosophers often (pretend to) do the latter, but I feel safe in saying that any of us 'regular folk' who are doing the latter - for the case of religious claims - are carving out an exception for their religious beliefs; treating them differently than they treat other claims. If you accept induction in order to reject John Edwards' claims, but you don't accept it in order to accept a water-to-wine claim, you're showing bias. Such a person very clearly does accept, like me, that "contraindicated by all known laws of physics" = "inconsistent with the evidence that is available." The difference between them and me is that they carve out an exception from that general conlusion for their particular religious beliefs, and I don't.

eric · 21 July 2014

Rolf said: I don't believe anyone is worried about gremlins - that's more like Murphy's law or "shit happens". What I am 'worried' about is people who for personal reasons insist on keeping a door open to miracles.

IMO the scientific door is open. It's always been open and it will always be open. However, until confirmable repeatable observations gives us reason to think miracles happen, the empirical evidence we have leads directly (albeit inductively) to the conclusion that they don't. It also leads to the conclusion that past claims of miracles are no worthier of belief than current claims of miracles we can't directly observe or test. The problem here seems to be we have group of people that accept current empirical evidence, accept that induction works, and yet reject the conclusion of induction + evidence when and only when that conclusion runs counter to their particular religious beliefs.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 21 July 2014

Miracles are unexplained events ascribed to supernatural causes. Notice how this is no different than saying "we don't know why said event happened;" we don't know why gods do things.

The more unpredictable the outcome, the more likely gods become the explanation. Notice how we still have people arguing for gods in human consciousness.

We can see the change from gods to nature as causal in easily predicted events - like days and seasons. Few if any people hold celebrations on the winter solstice to get the sun back today. Yet unpredictable events like tornados or earthquakes evoke gods right and left. "I am alive because God has plans for me," which means God didn't have plans for people who were killed? This is no different than saying I have no idea why I survived and my neighbor was killed or why my home was saved and my neighbor's destroyed. Just because we can't predict an outcome doesn't make the outcome a miracle.

If we go back to the Gospels, where this argument started, we have lots of unexplained events explained by God and called miracles. What I ask is this a likely explanation?

mattdance18 · 21 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Here is the argument in a nutshell: A world with miracles is the same as one without miracles (this what everyone is saying), is the same as one without an interventionist god, is the same as one without any god. You can add all the miracles and gods you want and it won't change one thing, so why bother?

I don't think this is the view at all. The claim, from those who believe in miracles but who don't reject science, is that miracles would not necessarily be detectable by natural science. There are lots of ways that this undetectability might happen consistently with natural science. Perhaps miracles are singular events. Perhaps they aren't accomplished by suspending the laws of nature but through them, given some very unusual initial conditions in the particular case. Perhaps miracles are overdetermined: sufficient natural causes can be found by science for their occurrence, yet they are also caused by divine intentions that science doesn't even try to discern. So a world with miracles and a world without miracles would appear the same, but they would be very different. It's an epistemology/ontology, knowledge/being distinction. Now, if you think that, in any case where we cannot know the difference, there is no difference, that's fine -- but be advised, such a collapse of the epistemological and ontological sides of the question amounts to a form of metaphysical idealism, and it will quickly lead to a number of thorny problems.

Henry J · 21 July 2014

One might even say that resolving the dilemma would take... a miracle!

mattdance18 · 21 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Miracles are unexplained events ascribed to supernatural causes. Notice how this is no different than saying "we don't know why said event happened;" we don't know why gods do things. The more unpredictable the outcome, the more likely gods become the explanation. Notice how we still have people arguing for gods in human consciousness. We can see the change from gods to nature as causal in easily predicted events - like days and seasons. Few if any people hold celebrations on the winter solstice to get the sun back today. Yet unpredictable events like tornados or earthquakes evoke gods right and left. "I am alive because God has plans for me," which means God didn't have plans for people who were killed? This is no different than saying I have no idea why I survived and my neighbor was killed or why my home was saved and my neighbor's destroyed. Just because we can't predict an outcome doesn't make the outcome a miracle. If we go back to the Gospels, where this argument started, we have lots of unexplained events explained by God and called miracles. What I ask is this a likely explanation?

You're running together a lot of issues here, such as the God of the the gaps and the problem of evil and the nature of causation. Moreover, you're straw-manning theism. It's simply not the case that all forms of theism involve a God of the gaps (read the Thomist critique of intelligent design, for example), and any theist worth his salt would say that God's plans involve both those who survive (whose deaths were not planned to come yet, but will assuredly come eventually) and those who perish in natural disasters. I'm not saying this as a defense of theism. I am an atheist myself, and a naturalist. I think there are good reasons to criticize theism, and the whole idea that God "plans" for the deaths of those he "loves" is among them. (I've always thought that Nietzsche's moral repudiation of the Judeo-Christian God is far more on-target and far more effective than any attempt at metaphysical or scientific refutation.) But I don't think you're making an effective criticism, because I don't think you're accurately characterizing what you're trying to criticize.

eric · 21 July 2014

mattdance18 said: So a world with miracles and a world without miracles would appear the same, but they would be very different. It's an epistemology/ontology, knowledge/being distinction.

But the majority of miracle-defenders here are Christian, and they don't argue the world would appear the same. The miracles of Jesus converted people, which changed their lives, which changed western history. That is not "appear the same." You cannot simultaneously claim "that tree made no sound when it fell," yet also "the locals ran from the sound."* That makes no sense at all. Moreover, it runs counter to how we understand the would to even accept the first sentence; we should no more accept that miracles occasionally happen when science's modern instruments aren't looking, than we should accept the notion that trees occasionally don't make sounds when they fall when there's no human there to hear them. *Well, I guess you could argue "there was no real sound, but local thought they heard something and ran from what they thought they heard." But if you do that, you're basically calling all those miracle accounts fictional.

mattdance18 · 21 July 2014

eric said:
mattdance18 said: So a world with miracles and a world without miracles would appear the same, but they would be very different. It's an epistemology/ontology, knowledge/being distinction.
But the majority of miracle-defenders here are Christian, and they don't argue the world would appear the same.

If that's the case, then dsQ's point makes even less sense. He was claiming that the world with miracles and the world without miracles look the same. Who exactly was he arguing against? Himself?

The miracles of Jesus converted people, which changed their lives, which changed western history. That is not "appear the same."

The stories of Jesus' miracles certainly did, anyway.... If a miracle is an "event," then just as for any natural event, a world in which it occurs would be very different from a world in which it doesn't, simply in terms of event history. This is pretty straightforward. There were two main "big picture" questions that I thought people have been addressing. First, what exactly would "miracles" be, anyway? And second, however we conceive of them, what is the world like if these sorts of miraculous events do or don't occur? Is the kind of world in which a miraculous event could occur the same as or different from the kind of world in which it could not? DsQ's comments seemed to me to say that a world in which miracles occurred would be the same as a world in which they did not: "A world with miracles is the same as one without miracles...." It seemed to me that this was a serious misunderstanding of what was at issue. At the level of event history, it simply cannot be true. At the level of "what's the world like," it seemed to presuppose a notion that miracles would be undetectable, but then to conflate that epistemological constraint with an ontological point.

You cannot simultaneously claim "that tree made no sound when it fell," yet also "the locals ran from the sound."* That makes no sense at all. Moreover, it runs counter to how we understand the would to even accept the first sentence; we should no more accept that miracles occasionally happen when science's modern instruments aren't looking, than we should accept the notion that trees occasionally don't make sounds when they fall when there's no human there to hear them.

I'm really not sure what you're getting at here. I was trying to explain how someone might hold that miracles happen but are undetectable. Jack has cancer. Jack prays to be cured. Jack's treatments fail. And yet, to the amazement of his doctors, Jack's tumors seem to get smaller anyway when he gets his next screen. They can find no natural causal explanation for the reversal even when looking. Such events are rare -- and I think they are considerably rarer than most "mysterians" would like us to believe. But there are times when a scientific explanation for particular cases is not available. Now the question is, does this mean that anything supernatural occurred? Not necessarily. It may just be a vanishingly rare natural possibility. We may even understand it's natural causes, in a general way, even if we don't understand them in the particular case. And I would personally not buy the idea that anything other than natural causes were involved. But that's because of my own general position of metaphysical naturalism. If someone does not share my naturalism, however, I think a case could be made that either (a) there was a supernatural cause whose activity was not impeded by any natural cause in the case at hand, or (b) there was a supernatural cause, in addition to the sufficient natural causes for Jack to be cured, albeit we do not actually know those natural causes in the particular case. Both (a) and (b) would be miracles. Both would be consistent with the natural evidence. Neither would be detectable, even when looking. And either way, the world be quite different were this miracle to occur or not. This is obviously true at the level of event history: ask Jack. It's also true at the level of "what's the world like": my naturalistic ontology is wrong if these kinds of undetectable miracles occur. I'm not too worried, insofar as the miracles in question are ex hypothesi undetectable; my naturalism certainly isn't disproved. That said, my metaphysical naturalism is not itself so well-supported that no other metaphysical views are possibly true. Even theism and a belief in miracles is possible, and can be made consistent with the scientific evidence. Consistency is cheap, as Dennett says. But in matters of transcendent metaphysics, I think it's the best we can hope for. And so I tend not to think that people are being irrational simply for believing in miracles, so long as their understanding of miracles is indeed consistent, in the senses of both self-consistency and consistency with available scientific evidence. (Because in our knowledge of the natural world, we can obtain more than mere consistency.) Maybe that's overly long, but I think it pretty well explains where I'm coming from.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 21 July 2014

Now, if you think that, in any case where we cannot know the difference, there is no difference, that’s fine – but be advised, such a collapse of the epistemological and ontological sides of the question amounts to a form of metaphysical idealism, and it will quickly lead to a number of thorny problems.

And belief in miracles leads to no thorny problems?

Just Bob · 21 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said:
Now, if you think that, in any case where we cannot know the difference, there is no difference, that’s fine – but be advised, such a collapse of the epistemological and ontological sides of the question amounts to a form of metaphysical idealism, and it will quickly lead to a number of thorny problems.
And belief in miracles leads to no thorny problems?

Nope, not thorny: squirrely

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 21 July 2014

So a world with miracles and a world without miracles would appear the same, but they would be very different. It’s an epistemology/ontology, knowledge/being distinction.

Yes, this is a very subtle effect that I was trying to get across in a number of posts; you can't just interject miracles into the world without consequences. It affects both events and human perception of those events. Perhaps I wasn't able to reflect that nuance in my posts. In the tornado example, believing you were or were not saved by a miracle can change your outlook in many different ways. Speculating supernatural causes for unexplained events is circular at best - an unexplained cause for and unexplained event - saying I don't know is the only sensical answer.

mattdance18 · 21 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said:
Now, if you think that, in any case where we cannot know the difference, there is no difference, that’s fine – but be advised, such a collapse of the epistemological and ontological sides of the question amounts to a form of metaphysical idealism, and it will quickly lead to a number of thorny problems.
And belief in miracles leads to no thorny problems?

Not what I said. Ergo, not relevant. That belief in miracles poses thorny metaphysical problems (which it does) does not mean that collapsing epistemology and ontology poses no thorny problems itself, or that the problems of said collapse are any more acceptable.

mattdance18 · 21 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said:
So a world with miracles and a world without miracles would appear the same, but they would be very different. It’s an epistemology/ontology, knowledge/being distinction.
Yes, this is a very subtle effect that I was trying to get across in a number of posts; you can't just interject miracles into the world without consequences. It affects both events and human perception of those events. Perhaps I wasn't able to reflect that nuance in my posts.

Then perhaps our positions aren't that far apart. -- Though it does appear that you think miracles cannot be compatible with science, while I think -- despite the fact that I don't believe in miracles -- they could be, albeit not under just any understanding of what a "miracle" would be, or of how they would work.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 21 July 2014

I wouldn't say cannot because I don't have a clue if there is a supernatural and consequently don't have a clue how it would affect the world if it did exist.

As of now, I see now reason to even consider supernatural explanations.

Henry J · 21 July 2014

I reckon it would depend somewhat on whether those miracle violate any conservation laws, at least while anybody is looking...

prongs · 21 July 2014

mattdance18 said: -- despite the fact that I don't believe in miracles -- they could be, albeit not under just any understanding of what a "miracle" would be, or of how they would work.

Shoehorning "miracles" into the possibilities of Reality, with the use of scientific language, is the stock and trade of creationists. So it has been for many decades. FL rejoices to see it here on PT (not just on Unsolved Mysteries).

eric · 21 July 2014

mattdance18 said: There were two main "big picture" questions that I thought people have been addressing. First, what exactly would "miracles" be, anyway?

Yes, there are multiple conversations on this thread. That is the one I haven't been following. :) My discussion with David have been limited to the miracles that violate our understanding of physical laws (water to wine, etc.). We have not been discussing "Joe spontaneously recovered from cancer" types of miracles - improbable events happening fortuitously to a believer, or whose timing is incredibly fortuitous (for the believer). So you should take all my arguments as concerning the water-to-wine, walking-on-water, ressurrecting humans type.

DsQ's comments seemed to me to say that a world in which miracles occurred would be the same as a world in which they did not

For the types of miracles I'm considering, it wouldn't be (at least for scientists). If the community accepts that something like water-to-wine occurred, the only honest scientific thing to do is to propose new versions of our physical laws; revise them to account for this observation that is not explained under the old ones. The option that David seems to support - consider that the event happened, but don't consider it for theory purposes - is not really open to honest scientists. If it happened, it has to be considered. Anything less is what creationists do - cherry picking evidence to support a preconceived conclusion.

Jack has cancer. Jack prays to be cured. Jack's treatments fail. And yet, to the amazement of his doctors, Jack's tumors seem to get smaller anyway when he gets his next screen.

Its funny that you pick this as an example of an "undetectable" miracle, since this exact sort of miracle has been statistically tested, and would be detectable if it worked. Statistically, it doesn't work: there is no correlation between prayer and improved health. Unless you want to come up with some odd definition of "works," we can say 'it doesn't work' with reasonable confidence. So to the general "science - it works, bitches" statement maybe we need to add an addendum for the people proposing the 'rare, not physics-breaking' theory of miracles: "epidemiology - it works, bitches."

Both (a) and (b) would be miracles. Both would be consistent with the natural evidence. Neither would be detectable, even when looking.

They're only consistent and undetectable if they don't rise above the noise of non-miraculous unexpected recoveries. And if they don't do that, they don't happen any more often then chance, and they don't favor the people who believe or pray, they just shotgun across the population. There's no having your cake and eating it too here. If they are at all reliable, even in some small bit, then they'd be epidemiologically detectable. If they preferentially heal believers at all, even a small bit, they'd be epidemiologically detectable. And the only way to say they aren't detectable is if they are basically unreliable and arbitrary in who they heal. A more theological response is: how the frak do you get from what's in the bible to this view of miracles? It clearly isn't biblical. It relies on a very modern understanding of science, statistics, and limits of detection, and none of the Biblicly recorded miracles operate below the level of significant detection, below the level of reasonable doubt. So it seems more of an post hoc response to the absence of biblical-like miracles than it does an explanation of how God works miracles. This is not a theory in miracles grounded in theology; its a theory of miracles back-derived, postdicted from what we see in the world. It also seems (to me)profoundly immoral on God's part. So he heals N number of people, because he really loves us and wants us to be healthy, but he doesn't heal that Nth+1 person because that might make his trend statistically significant???? That's healing as much as is personally convenient, but no more. Classy move there.

david.starling.macmillan · 23 July 2014

eric said:
david.starling.macmillan said: What if, just for the sake of argument, we didn’t treat fantastic/magical/miraculous elements any differently than mundane elements for the purposes of establishing historicity?
I think you're getting the order in which things happen wrong. First, there are claims. They are evaluated against what we know of history, science, etc. The label "fantastical" (or magical or miraculous) is an outcome of that evaluation. So, I would argue that all claims are treated equally.

I'm not so sure that's the case. When I read an account in Tacitus of Emperor Vespasian healing a blind man by the divine power of the Caesars, I treat it with a particular sort of skepticism. I don't think the Caesars had divine power, so I immediately assume it is false, even if I have high regard for the rest of Tacitus. I think that's the usual way we look at specific accounts of miracles. But is my approach really necessary? If I didn't have that preconception, would I be forced to accept that Vespasian had divine powers? Maybe not. Maybe I would still be able to recognize that Tacitus is extra-cagey about his sources, that he describes it in a tongue-in-cheek fashion, and that the account fits all the features of the regnal-healing-miracle trope, and can thus be dismissed by the principles of historical criticism without needing to appeal to its content.

If you’re in a conversation with Uri Geller or John Edwards, their claims of special powers suddenly become not counterfactual under your logic. If I’m in a conversation with FL, suddenly all of FL’s claims become not counterfactual. If I’m in a conversation with a geocentrist or flat earther, geocentrism of flat earthism become non-counterfactual.

Of course. Because "counterfactual" is a property of the conversation. We can discuss creationism as a counterfactual, but not to FL, because it is not a counterfactual to FL. My objection was to phhht's insistence that miracle accounts are necessarily counterfactual for the purposes of our discussion. This is clearly not the case.

Scott F said: The point is that, in the absence of evidence it is possible to claim that the local miracles are at at least consistent with the evidence that is available.

And it's not as if there isn't evidence. There's the whole corpus of the history of religion. The rise of Christianity, the various feuds and rivalries. The way religion emerges in different cultures; the way it has evolved over the last four millennia. The types of rhetoric, the way the Bible was put together, the way it has been variously interpreted and applied and used and misused. All that "evidence" can be weighed together for consistency against any religion, any faith system, any worldview. Does the worldview explain it? Predict it? Or is there a complete disconnect? I think there's a conception of Christianity that fits the evidence. I don't know that. I certainly can't prove it. There's no individual piece of evidence that couldn't conceivably be explained in another way. But I don't need more than I have.

eric said: I think "contraindicated by all known laws of physics" = "inconsistent with the evidence that is available." The evidence that is available leads to the conclusion that the laws of physics hold in all times and places.

But what are the laws of physics? The laws of physics are the equations which say how particles and fields interact. A miracle claim is not a claim that particles and fields interact in a fashion different than equations predict. A miracle claim is a claim of an interaction from outside the universe, an interaction that involves something other than fields and particles alone. And while I'm as interested as you are in evidence for such a thing, it really doesn't have anything to do with "breaking" the laws of physics.

phhht · 23 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: My objection was to phhht's insistence that miracle accounts are necessarily counterfactual for the purposes of our discussion. This is clearly not the case.

Miracles do not happen and have not happened, and thus are not the case. They are counterfactual in that sense. If you can show otherwise, please do so.

Scott F said: The point is that, in the absence of evidence it is possible to claim that the local miracles are at at least consistent with the evidence that is available.
And it's not as if there isn't evidence. There's the whole corpus of the history of religion. The rise of Christianity, the various feuds and rivalries. The way religion emerges in different cultures; the way it has evolved over the last four millennia. The types of rhetoric, the way the Bible was put together, the way it has been variously interpreted and applied and used and misused. All that "evidence" can be weighed together for consistency against any religion, any faith system, any worldview. Does the worldview explain it? Predict it? Or is there a complete disconnect? I think there's a conception of Christianity that fits the evidence. I don't know that. I certainly can't prove it. There's no individual piece of evidence that couldn't conceivably be explained in another way. But I don't need more than I have.

What you have are anecdotes. Anecdotes are not evidence. Of course you may (and seemingly do) believe without evidence. But you cannot rationally defend your belief in the occurrence of miracles without testable evidence. It takes nothing but denial to refute you.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 23 July 2014

I still don't see how claiming a miracle gets you anywhere? Explaining an unexplained event using an unexplainable cause is no different than saying I don't know.

Doesn't it make much more sense to try to explain it without resorting to miracles.

Let's say someone is sick and is told there is no cure, but then recovers back to their pre-sickness state. Now you could claim it as a miracle and leave it at that, but wouldn't it be better to assume it had a natural cause and investigate how it happened? Perhaps it was misdiagnosed, perhaps a previous exposure to something else, perhaps a gazillion things. Why resort to a miracle before you exhaust every natural cause?

Then again, apologetics might be a reason.

Just Bob · 23 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Why resort to a miracle before you exhaust every natural cause?

It makes the 'recipient' feel good: God is taking care of ME! (But not all those other bums that didn't recover, or win the lottery, or walk away from the car wreck, or whatever.)

Just Bob · 23 July 2014

Or find the Virgin Mary burnt into their toast.

david.starling.macmillan · 24 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: My objection was to phhht's insistence that miracle accounts are necessarily counterfactual for the purposes of our discussion. This is clearly not the case.
Miracles do not happen and have not happened, and thus are not the case. They are counterfactual in that sense.

And while we are all fully and intimately aware that this is your opinion about the matter, this does not mean you can assert their counterfactuality for the purposes of a discussion in which not everyone shares your opinion. It would be like me trying to end an argument a scientologist by saying, "Engrams don't exist, therefore they are counterfactual, therefore they don't exist." It adds nothing to the discussion and smells suspiciously of question-begging.

And it's not as if there isn't evidence. There's the whole corpus of the history of religion. The rise of Christianity, the various feuds and rivalries. The way religion emerges in different cultures; the way it has evolved over the last four millennia. The types of rhetoric, the way the Bible was put together, the way it has been variously interpreted and applied and used and misused. All that "evidence" can be weighed together for consistency against any religion, any faith system, any worldview. Does the worldview explain it? Predict it? Or is there a complete disconnect? I think there's a conception of Christianity that fits the evidence. I don't know that. I certainly can't prove it. There's no individual piece of evidence that couldn't conceivably be explained in another way. But I don't need more than I have.
What you have are anecdotes. Anecdotes are not evidence.

The history of world religions is an anecdote? Good to know.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: I still don't see how claiming a miracle gets you anywhere?

To me, it's not so much about making a particular claim, but evaluating the claims that already exist.

eric · 24 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: I think there's a conception of Christianity that fits the evidence. I don't know that. I certainly can't prove it. There's no individual piece of evidence that couldn't conceivably be explained in another way. But I don't need more than I have.

Well IMO it's not so much a proof question as it is a definitional question. Jefferson famously (and literally, with a knife) cut out every miracle and most references to the supernatural in his bible. Was he Christian? If your answer to that is "yes," then I'd have to agree that yes, under the definition of Christian you seem to be using, there's a conception that fits the evidence. But if your answer to Jefferson's position is "no, he's a deist calling himself a Christian," then I'd have to say no, under the definition of Christian you seem to be using, there's no conception that fits the evidence. Things like science's conservation laws are what best fits the evidence we have available to us; miracles are inconsistent with them, therefore miracles are inconsistent with what best fits the evidence. Our theories could be wrong, sure, but one cannot accept them as the best fit to the evidence AND accept some claim contradictory to them also best fits the evidence. To me, that appears to be what you're trying to do: accept scientific theories as the most accurate and confident description of how the world works that we have, but also accept that water-to-wine happened. I don't see how that can be internally consistent. If water-to-wine happened, then our scientific theories are not the best fit to the evidence. If oxygen and hydrogen can transmute into carbon without high energy particle beams and gamma emissions, then our theories about nuclear physics are wrong; they do not fit this evidence. You can accept one of those things (nuclear physics rules, or transmutation that doesn't follow them) fits the evidence or the other, but not both.

david.starling.macmillan · 24 July 2014

eric said: Jefferson famously (and literally, with a knife) cut out every miracle and most references to the supernatural in his bible. Was he Christian? If your answer to that is "yes," then I'd have to agree that yes, under the definition of Christian you seem to be using, there's a conception that fits the evidence.

No, nothing like that. My conception of Christianity is not at all squeamish about the supernatural. I see no problem with the basic concepts. The idea that a transcendent creator exists, that the suffering and evil in the world is problem to be overcome, that Jesus was incarnated to bring about the end of evil by working through creation, that all creation will be reconciled through what Jesus did...I see no obvious defeaters to these concepts. Of course, there are plenty of common Christian tenets that I do see obvious defeaters to. But none of those are, I think, essential.

Things like science's conservation laws are what best fits the evidence we have available to us; miracles are inconsistent with them, therefore miracles are inconsistent with what best fits the evidence. Our theories could be wrong, sure, but one cannot accept them as the best fit to the evidence AND accept some claim contradictory to them also best fits the evidence.

Well, that's not entirely true. Maxwell's equations were the best fit to the observed behavior of electromagnetic waves, but scientists were able to accept that this "best fit" failed to accurately describe the photoelectric effect, necessitating photon theory. Newton's equations were the best fit in the realm of classical mechanics, but scientists were able to accept that large objects and high velocities didn't quite line up with those equations. That's not to say that the line between the natural and the supernatural is a matter of energy thresholds or of quantum behavior. But there's no contradiction in holding a theory as the "best fit" to a certain class of interactions while accepting that it may not be the ultimate descriptor of all phenomena.

If water-to-wine happened, then our scientific theories are not the best fit to the evidence. If oxygen and hydrogen can transmute into carbon without high energy particle beams and gamma emissions, then our theories about nuclear physics are wrong; they do not fit this evidence.

Our theories of nuclear physics describe and predict the interactions between particles and fields. A miracle, by common-usage definition, is not an interaction between particles and fields. Therefore, we would not expect it to be described by the theories of nuclear physics. No contradiction.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 24 July 2014

To me, it’s not so much about making a particular claim, but evaluating the claims that already exist.

And the difference is?

david.starling.macmillan · 24 July 2014

A Masked Panda (ds_Q) said:
To me, it’s not so much about making a particular claim, but evaluating the claims that already exist.
And the difference is?

An important one. :) If you're making claims from scratch, you can claim anything -- invisible pink unicorns did it, dammit! If you're evaluating a set of claims -- claims that already exist as part of history -- then you have to assess the claims you're presented with. Are they lies? Are they sincere falsehoods? Are they myths? Are they conspiracy theories? Do they contradict each other or complement each other? I don't have any way of proving the content of the claims, but I can at least attempt to evaluate them on the basis of their place in history.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 24 July 2014

So if someone claims like Oral Roberts did that an 800ft tall Jesus told him to build a medical school and hospital, then since it was written up in the newspaper, I shouldn't reject it out of hand? Is it more believable because he was a Christian faith healer that it was Jesus rather a pink unicorn? What would you expect him to say?

If the claims of Jesus' miracles came from a source other than the Bible I might take them a bit more seriously. Just like if claims of Caesar's miracles came from other than his court historian, one might give it a bit more credibility. I understand that if you saw and believed then you might be a follower and if you saw and didn't believe you wouldn't think twice about the incidence - so the recorders of said events would be believers. But then one would need to seriously consider the claims of Mormons who saw the golden plates or Muslims who saw Mohammed fly off into the sky. Why would one group be telling the truth and the others not? If sources in the Bagler Sagas claim Odin appeared 1000 years ago to guide an important military victory, then we should believe Odin exists?

phhht · 24 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: If you're making claims from scratch, you can claim anything -- invisible pink unicorns did it, dammit! If you're evaluating a set of claims -- claims that already exist as part of history -- then you have to assess the claims you're presented with.

Why are old dubious claims any more plausible than contemporary dubious claims? We know that no miracles occur today (in the same way we know there are no leprechauns). Why should the mists of the unknown obscuring the past be a pretext to believe that way back then, there were miracles? And then there is the virtually infinite population of fictional quasi-miraculous stories we see today: fairies, leprechauns, zombies, counterfactual events of every sort. Why should anyone think that old fiction is more plausible than current fiction? I see no reason at all to do so.

david.starling.macmillan · 24 July 2014

A Masked Panda (ds_Q) said: So if someone claims like Oral Roberts did that an 800ft tall Jesus told him to build a medical school and hospital, then since it was written up in the newspaper, I shouldn't reject it out of hand? Is it more believable because he was a Christian faith healer that it was Jesus rather a pink unicorn? What would you expect him to say? If the claims of Jesus' miracles came from a source other than the Bible I might take them a bit more seriously. Just like if claims of Caesar's miracles came from other than his court historian, one might give it a bit more credibility. I understand that if you saw and believed then you might be a follower and if you saw and didn't believe you wouldn't think twice about the incidence - so the recorders of said events would be believers. But then one would need to seriously consider the claims of Mormons who saw the golden plates or Muslims who saw Mohammed fly off into the sky.

There's no reason not to evaluate any of those claims. I, for one, would love to know why Oral Roberts would make such a claim, why Caesar's court historians wrote what they wrote, why the Mormons claimed they saw the golden plates. That's part of what makes history interesting.

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: If you're making claims from scratch, you can claim anything -- invisible pink unicorns did it, dammit! If you're evaluating a set of claims -- claims that already exist as part of history -- then you have to assess the claims you're presented with.
Why are old dubious claims any more plausible than contemporary dubious claims?

I didn't say they were. I'm still interested in understanding why certain claims are made, whether ancient or contemporary.

mattdance18 · 24 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: My conception of Christianity is not at all squeamish about the supernatural. I see no problem with the basic concepts. The idea that a transcendent creator exists, that the suffering and evil in the world is problem to be overcome, that Jesus was incarnated to bring about the end of evil by working through creation, that all creation will be reconciled through what Jesus did...I see no obvious defeaters to these concepts. Of course, there are plenty of common Christian tenets that I do see obvious defeaters to. But none of those are, I think, essential.

Have you read much of John Shelby Spong's work? He might be a little more squeamish about the supernatural than you, taking most accounts of miracles, even doctrines like the resurrection or the Trinity, more symbolically than literally. He even rejects the theistic understanding of God -- which is not as much of a contradiction in terms as it sounds, once one looks into the history involved here. Nonetheless, Spong certainly believes in something that is, by his lights, meaningfully and valuably called "divine"; that we can experience, albeit in a way that outstrips our capacities to express in fully coherent language and rationality; and that can transform our lives for the better, both personally and in our interactions with one another. And he argues that it was through the teachings of Jesus, through following his words and emulating his behavior, that some people in the first century gained access to the understanding and experience of God and thereby improve their lives, whence it made sense to become a Christian then, and even in his view makes sense today (though he by no means considers Christianity the sole path to all this). He considers the literalization and rigidification of various doctrines over the three or four centuries after Jesus' life to be an utter catastrophe that tragically cuts off many people, both Christian and non-Christian alike, from sharing in and benefitting from this powerful religious experience. Like I said, he may not be your particular cup of tea, but I suspect there's a lot you'd really like. Rescuing the Bible from Fundamentalism is a good place to start, though it's a bit dated and mostly critical. And more recently, God in Us: A Case for Christian Humanism and A New Christianity for a New World develop his affirmative ideas more fully. (And I apologize if I've been presumptuous and you're already familiar with his work.)

Rolf · 24 July 2014

I didn't know much more than his name about Spong before; he's quoted in the notes of The Jesus Mysteries (or maybe "Jesus and the Lost Goddess"). I'll have to get hold of one or more of his books; I'd like to know how he got his insight.

mattdance18 · 24 July 2014

Rolf said: I didn't know much more than his name about Spong before; he's quoted in the notes of The Jesus Mysteries (or maybe "Jesus and the Lost Goddess"). I'll have to get hold of one or more of his books; I'd like to know how he got his insight.

In part the liberal Christian tradition, like the Jesus Seminar, in part by "seeking the truth wherever it is found" and taking non-Christian work on and views of the Bible seriously, like atheist Bible scholar Michael Goulder and various Jewish scholars. Two of his most basic insights, which seem obvious (at least the first), but which very few laypeople integrate into their understanding of the religion: 1. Jesus was a Jew. 2. The Gospels were Jewish books. His work really is excellent, and its aimed at educated laity rather than academics. (He's a retired Episcopal Bishop, after all.)

phhht · 24 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
A Masked Panda (ds_Q) said: So if someone claims like Oral Roberts did that an 800ft tall Jesus told him to build a medical school and hospital, then since it was written up in the newspaper, I shouldn't reject it out of hand? Is it more believable because he was a Christian faith healer that it was Jesus rather a pink unicorn? What would you expect him to say? If the claims of Jesus' miracles came from a source other than the Bible I might take them a bit more seriously. Just like if claims of Caesar's miracles came from other than his court historian, one might give it a bit more credibility. I understand that if you saw and believed then you might be a follower and if you saw and didn't believe you wouldn't think twice about the incidence - so the recorders of said events would be believers. But then one would need to seriously consider the claims of Mormons who saw the golden plates or Muslims who saw Mohammed fly off into the sky.
There's no reason not to evaluate any of those claims. I, for one, would love to know why Oral Roberts would make such a claim, why Caesar's court historians wrote what they wrote, why the Mormons claimed they saw the golden plates. That's part of what makes history interesting.

Why not evaluate such claims as fiction? After all, we know that in the present, there are no miracles (in the same way we know there are no leprechauns). We know that in the present, people write such counterfactual fiction by the ton. Why assume such claims represent fact? Why not assume that the same motivation which drives people to invent UFO stories drove the invention of the tales of golden plates?

david.starling.macmillan said: If you're making claims from scratch, you can claim anything -- invisible pink unicorns did it, dammit! If you're evaluating a set of claims -- claims that already exist as part of history -- then you have to assess the claims you're presented with.
Why are old dubious claims any more plausible than contemporary dubious claims?

Perhaps you could clarify your distinction between contemporary dubious claims and old dubious claims.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 24 July 2014

Given that we know next to nothing about people who wrote the Gospels, we cannot say much about their motivations. Certainly when looking at the stories floating around Joseph Smith it might make one pause about the ahem "purity" of his motivations. Or consider L. Ron Hubbard or any other cult leader in recent times. Power, money, sex all strong motivators. Of course so called transcendent experiences - powerful too.

eric · 24 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
eric said: I think you're getting the order in which things happen wrong. First, there are claims. They are evaluated against what we know of history, science, etc. The label "fantastical" (or magical or miraculous) is an outcome of that evaluation. So, I would argue that all claims are treated equally.
I'm not so sure that's the case. When I read an account in Tacitus of Emperor Vespasian healing a blind man by the divine power of the Caesars, I treat it with a particular sort of skepticism.

Of course you do, and you should. But is that because of what you already know about the world and science? If so, you are not pigeonholing-then-evaluating, you're evaluating-then-pigeonholing. Pigeonholing-then-evaluating would look like this: I don't believe Tacitus, he confabulates. So when he says Vepasian went for a ride on a horse on a Tuesday and then healed the blind, I'm skeptical both of the ride and the healing. You are making the same argument FL often makes, that scientists assert as a premise or as a preconception that creationism (in your case: miracle accounts) is wrong. He thinks we assume its wrong and interpret any facts we collect through that lens. My response to you is the same as my response to FL: science does not premise or assume these accounts are wrong. It concludes they are wrong based on the best inductions we can make using the data we have available. As a premise, it might indeed be illegitimate. But as a conclusion, it is not. And just as one need not be a PhD in geology to legimiately conclude that the '6,000 year old earth' idea is almost certainly wrong - a decently informed layman's understanding of what science says about the issue will do - one also need not be a PhD in medicine or biology to legitimately conclude that a 'Vepasian faith healing' claim is almost certainly wrong.

If you’re in a conversation with Uri Geller or John Edwards, their claims of special powers suddenly become not counterfactual under your logic. If I’m in a conversation with FL, suddenly all of FL’s claims become not counterfactual. If I’m in a conversation with a geocentrist or flat earther, geocentrism of flat earthism become non-counterfactual.
Of course. Because "counterfactual" is a property of the conversation.

Wow okay, we are totally using the word differently then. You seem to be using it in an extremely subjective manner, to refer to "counter to what this individual speaker believes is fact." If that's the case, however, I think you've kicked the legs out from under your own stool. You can't claim that Phhht is wrong in labeling miracles counterfactual, because according to your definition, if you're in a conversation with him, they are counterfactual to him. In fact, you pretty much can't claim anyone is wrong, because you've made the term entirely personally subjective.

My objection was to phhht's insistence that miracle accounts are necessarily counterfactual for the purposes of our discussion. This is clearly not the case.

No, you can't say that using your definition, because according to your definition, phhht is perfectly justified in saying they are counterfactual to him. You can't say he's wrong unless you appeal to some common or external standard for counterfactual, and you've decided you don't want to appeal to those.

A miracle claim is not a claim that particles and fields interact in a fashion different than equations predict.

Hell yes it is. You may invoke some unknown force to make them interact differently, but you ARE saying they interact differently. With God's intervention, reactions that would not occur according to the equations of science, occur. The equations of science do not allow water to transmute into ethanol in a clay jar under STP. You need a flux of high energy particles, you need gamma decay products, etc... Look, you can think of God as a catalyst if you want; a catalyst does not violate physical laws when it causes reactions to occur. But catalysts do not violate physical law because they have properties which physical laws consider. They have mass, charge, energy, chemical potential, and so on. Our equations predict their interactions because a catalyst's effect is calculable. We plug the catalyst into the equation, and suddently the math gives the right (observed) answer. That is "consistent with" our equations. OTOH, your god is not calculable. He doesn't have properties that allow us to plug him in to the equations and calculate what will happen when he intervenes. So when he intervenes, it is very much true that particles and fields will interact in ways "different than the equations predict." And I will challenge you to refute me by example. Show me a nuclear reaction equation that predicts oxygen to carbon transmutation at STP and consistent with the Cana story (i.e., nobody dying of prompt gammas). Show me how this miracle is nuclei 'interacting in a way consistent with what our equations say,' by showing me the equation which is both consistent with the miracle and consistent with physics as it is currently understood. I'll even start you off. Here's a possibility, just figure out the stuff in [] brackets: 16O ([???],alpha) 12C [+ gammas?] [+ other products]. Just complete that reaction in a way that is consistent with nuclear physics and consistent with the fact that it was done in a clay jar, at STP, with no excess heat boiling off the wine, nobody dying of radiation poisoning, no high-energy particle beams blasting down from space, an so on.

it really doesn't have anything to do with "breaking" the laws of physics.

How do you know?

eric · 24 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: A miracle, by common-usage definition, is not an interaction between particles and fields. Therefore, we would not expect it to be described by the theories of nuclear physics. No contradiction.

Wine is composed of particles. Molecules. If there wasn't ethanol in that jar to begin with and there was afterwards, then there has been some interaction with particles. Heck even if you claim God made the ethanol out of ectoplasm and it was never real ethanol, the ectoplasm still has to mix with the water previously in the jar; that mixing is an interaction. And the servant at the party tasted the difference. There was an interaction between the stuff in those jars and his taste buds. Molecules locked onto receptors to give him the taste of wine. Unless you want to say the entire thing was some sort of mental illusion, you pretty much have to accept that this miracle involved particle interactions.

mattdance18 · 24 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Given that we know next to nothing about people who wrote the Gospels, we cannot say much about their motivations. Certainly when looking at the stories floating around Joseph Smith it might make one pause about the ahem "purity" of his motivations. Or consider L. Ron Hubbard or any other cult leader in recent times. Power, money, sex all strong motivators. Of course so called transcendent experiences - powerful too.

True enough on these more modern authors. And frankly, insofar as one accepts that human beings did indeed write the Gospels, true for them, too. The Gospels contain many passages attributable to human "impurity." But while it's true that we do not know much about the Gospel authors as individuals -- like their names or what they looked like -- there is a lot more known about them than it seems you realize. Luke, for example, was written by someone who was a Gentile convert to Judaism, and his audience was converts similar to himself; Matthew, by contrast, was written by someone steeped in Jewish tradition down to the minute details; the books play out very differently as a result. These are just two points, both well-evidenced and neither controversial. Or at least, it's not controversial among scholars or people who've studied the material. A lot of laypeople don't know much about this work, and that's in part because a whole lot of theologically conservative clergy wouldn't want them to know that such scholarship even exists, let alone to be swayed by it to the detriment of theological conservatism. Not that we know a lot, to be sure. I'll give you that. It's just that there are certain things known, and on matters relevant to the interpretation of the texts.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 24 July 2014

there is a lot more known about them than it seems you realize.

That's a whole bunch of condescending bullshit - please try to make a relevant point. Nothing you say in any way contradicts my comment. It is just a lame ploy to try to dismiss my argument from a position of pseudo-authority.

mattdance18 · 24 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said:
there is a lot more known about them than it seems you realize.
That's a whole bunch of condescending bullshit - please try to make a relevant point. Nothing you say in any way contradicts my comment. It is just a lame ploy to try to dismiss my argument from a position of pseudo-authority.

Gee, what a great argument. As if declarations that my comments were "a whole bunch of condescending bullshit" offered "from a position of pseudo-authority" were anything more than "a lame ploy to try to dismiss my argument." Pot, kettle, black. I made a specific point with regard to your specific post. Your post did not quote anyone and was not listed as a reply to anyone, but it did seem potentially related to what I had said about Spong. Perhaps I misunderstood your point, and if so, I apologize. But please spare me the personality inquisition just because I tried to explain why something you said didn't seem accurate to me.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 24 July 2014

You made no point - accuracy is not the issue. You just tried to pull a "I know more than you and therefore you are wrong" argument. Completely an argument from authority and nothing else.

mattdance18 · 24 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: You made no point - accuracy is not the issue. You just tried to pull a "I know more than you and therefore you are wrong" argument. Completely an argument from authority and nothing else.

Really? Is that what I tried to do? Invoke my own authority and give you the beat-down? It would be rather ironic, given your original claim about lacking evidence for the Gospel authors' motivations, if you now imputed certain motivations to me on insufficient evidence, yes? You claimed we knew next to nothing about the Gospel authors and hence could not know their motivations. I think that's an overstatement, especially in terms of trying to grasp certain motivations they had for writing what they did, and I explained why. Perhaps my own explanation was inaccurate or incomplete. Or perhaps I didn't understand to what you were responding, or I just plain missed the point you were trying to make in your post. If any of these is the case, would you mind explaining, instead of just hurling a bunch of ad hominems about my allegedly authoritarian motivations?

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 24 July 2014

How is what you claimed any more than "next to nothing" - not to mention that it is almost totally irrelevant to what their motivations were? You are naive if you think what you mentioned makes a rat's ass bit of difference in terms of motivation.

I could be a disgruntled Jewish academic, know everything about the religion and write a story to make my former colleagues look bad. I could be a grifter trying to take advantage of believers by gaining their trust. I could have seen miracles and truly believes Jesus is the Messiah. I could experience the lives of believers and believe they had discovered something life changing and want the same. But none of those things, either you or I know. So your comment is not worth the electrons you spent on it.

prongs · 24 July 2014

eric said:
david.starling.macmillan said: A miracle, by common-usage definition, is not an interaction between particles and fields. Therefore, we would not expect it to be described by the theories of nuclear physics. No contradiction.
Wine is composed of particles. Molecules. If there wasn't ethanol in that jar to begin with and there was afterwards, then there has been some interaction with particles. Heck even if you claim God made the ethanol out of ectoplasm and it was never real ethanol, the ectoplasm still has to mix with the water previously in the jar; that mixing is an interaction. And the servant at the party tasted the difference. There was an interaction between the stuff in those jars and his taste buds. Molecules locked onto receptors to give him the taste of wine. Unless you want to say the entire thing was some sort of mental illusion, you pretty much have to accept that this miracle involved particle interactions.

The amazing thing about imaginary deities is they can do impossible things. Particle interactions not required. (phhht reminds us of Harry Potter.) Shoehorning miracles into possibilities of reality is the stock and trade of creationists. FL rejoices to see it (think Unsolved Mysteries). So, if the "miracles" require particle interactions by their very description, are they imaginary, made up from whole cloth, or not? Inquiring minds want to know. eric and I in particluar.

phhht · 24 July 2014

prongs said: phhht reminds us of Harry Potter.

Thank you, but the resemblance is superficial. I can barely stay aboard a flying broomstick.

mattdance18 · 24 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said:

How is what you claimed any more than "next to nothing" - not to mention that it is almost totally irrelevant to what their motivations were? You are naive if you think what you mentioned makes a rat's ass bit of difference in terms of motivation.

Really? So you think that it makes no difference, when trying to understand the difference between Matthew and Luke, that one author was a Jew trying to convince other Jews, and the other a gentile convert trying to convince other gentile converts? Look, I already conceded your point that it's not a lot, right in my original reply. But what we know of them is more than nothing, and it is relevant to interpreting the texts.

I could be a disgruntled Jewish academic, know everything about the religion and write a story to make my former colleagues look bad. I could be a grifter trying to take advantage of believers by gaining their trust. I could have seen miracles and truly believes Jesus is the Messiah. I could experience the lives of believers and believe they had discovered something life changing and want the same. But none of those things, either you or I know.

Is your contention that each of these possibilities is equally likely? with each other and with every other possibility? Because I think, based on the evidence, that some of the possibilities are more likely than others.

So your comment is not worth the electrons you spent on it.

Really? Boy, talk about playing the authority card. Sorry I didn't ask your opinion of my post before posting, so I could know what lived up to the ds_Q criterion of value and what not. [genuflects]

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 24 July 2014

What were their motivations again? I seem to keep missing that in each of your comments. Is it is in secret code or do you just not know?

Matt Young · 24 July 2014

OK, further pointless bickering between mattdance and ds_Q may continue on the BW.

mattdance18 · 24 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: What were their motivations again? I seem to keep missing that in each of your comments. Is it is in secret code or do you just not know?

No code. Where the authors of Matthew and Luke are concerned, I've already mentioned how what we know of the authors and their circumstances indicates motivations helpful in interpreting the texts at least twice, including my immediately preceding post. So go back and reread that. I'm not trying to pull the wool over on anyone here. I'm certainly not a creationist, nor a Christian, nor even a theist. But I do think it interesting, both for the intrinsic interest of understanding the literature and for the sake of being able to combat Christian fundamentalism on its own turf, to consider how Biblical texts are to be interpreted. And if one is trying to interpret the Bible, I think that two things that must be taken into account are what we know of the various authors and what their motivations were, motivations that are discernible on the basis of what we know. Your original post, addressed to no one specifically as far as I could tell, asserted that we know next to nothing of these authors and that their motivations are beyond fathoming. I disputed these points. While I did not fully disagree with the first point, I certainly disagree with the second. Hence my contention -- using only the examples of Matthew and Luke, admittedly just two, and not fleshed out with detailed discussion of the evidence that I didn't think was really necessary to make the point at issue -- that we do know some things that are relevant. I am not trying to pick a fight, and I would like to let bygones be bygones here. Just please cut the ad hominems. Because I don't think you've understood where I was coming from. And I will repeat: if I misunderstood where you were coming from in that post to which I originally responded -- which seems entirely possible -- please let me know.

mattdance18 · 24 July 2014

Matt Young said: OK, further pointless bickering between mattdance and ds_Q may continue on the BW.

Sorry.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 24 July 2014

I don't think it was pointless - I guess I mainly objected to the tone of the first comment - insinuating that if I only knew as much as he I wouldn't say what I said. Call me cynical, but I don't think we can easily ascribe lofty motivations to founders of religions, but then again that is just an opinion.

Rolf · 25 July 2014

Gospel writers, of which there were a lot, as "founders of religions"?

mattdance18 · 25 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: I don't think it was pointless - I guess I mainly objected to the tone of the first comment - insinuating that if I only knew as much as he I wouldn't say what I said.

I apologize for that. I can see why, given what I wrote, it might have seemed that way. But it was not my intent. This is my least favorite thing about the internet. I've seen it happen before, and I've been on both sides of it. Again, I'm sorry.

Call me cynical, but I don't think we can easily ascribe lofty motivations to founders of religions, but then again that is just an opinion.

I agree with this in part. I would say that we cannot ascribe exclusively lofty motivations to founders of religions (using the idea of "founders" pretty broadly). I really do think that, in the cases of large-scale organized institutional religions founded well over a thousand years ago, the religious claims being made -- about God, morality, an afterlife, what have you -- are sincere. That said, they are also quite mundane, directed very much to earthly, temporal concerns. The book of John, for example, is both loaded with expressions of a mystical mindset and also laced with points about church politics, as schism with organized Judaism approaches, and further exhibits a concern for power politics, too, in addressing ongoing Roman persecution. And if we go back further, into something like early Mesopotamian religions, there is a total intertwinement of the religious with everything else. There is no separation of church and state, or of either and the economy. I don't think this means the religious components were insincere. It does mean, though, that for any religious idea you can imagine, there were both loftier, idealistic religious reasons it was held, and also quite mundane and frequently very self-interested reasons, too. So a certain amount of cynicism for us makes sense, since our more stratified society holds these different areas apart and tries to minimize their mutual interference. Back then, the idea that such areas were fully distinct "areas" in the first place didn't show up on the conceptual radar. Maybe that's the problem with so much of religion today. Rather than try to adapt to a more specialized social context, it keeps trying to fit the social context back into a pre-specialized way of thinking.

mattdance18 · 25 July 2014

Rolf said: Gospel writers, of which there were a lot, as "founders of religions"?

By the way, Rolf, speaking of Gospel writers (in the senses of the writers of the Gospels and of writers about the Gospels), I've now discovered that Spong has indeed written his take on John, which he dealt with only briefly in his earlier account of the synoptic Gospels. It's called The Fourth Gospel: Tales of a Jewish Mystic, and it was published in 2011. Guess I'm a little behind in keeping up with him! Another one to add to my reading list.

david.starling.macmillan · 25 July 2014

mattdance18 said: Have you read much of John Shelby Spong's work? He might be a little more squeamish about the supernatural than you, taking most accounts of miracles, even doctrines like the resurrection or the Trinity, more symbolically than literally. He even rejects the theistic understanding of God -- which is not as much of a contradiction in terms as it sounds, once one looks into the history involved here.

My only knowledge of Spong is what I remember being spewed about him in fundamentalist circles in days past, so I'd assume on that basis that he's excellent. Not sure how enthused I would be about the sort of quasi-panentheism you seem to be describing. It doesn't...to me...seem consistent with the world around me. Paradoxical as this might seem, the reconciliatory-justice model of Christianity holds more promise of consistency with the world. I'm sure I'd enjoy his work though.

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: There's no reason not to evaluate any of those claims. I, for one, would love to know why Oral Roberts would make such a claim, why Caesar's court historians wrote what they wrote, why the Mormons claimed they saw the golden plates.
Why not evaluate such claims as fiction?

That's one possibility. Were they written as fiction? Were they written as fable? Were they myths that a later editor historicized? Were they history that a later editor mythicized? These are all the questions you ask as part of normal historical literary criticism. Most importantly, all these questions can be asked and investigated independently of the content itself. I can recognize the "epic fictive poem set in history" genre in the Iliad without having to draw any conclusions from its preternatural content.

Why are old dubious claims any more plausible than contemporary dubious claims? Perhaps you could clarify your distinction between contemporary dubious claims and old dubious claims.

There's no material distinction. We can analyze the genesis of ancient claims in largely the same way we analyze the genesis of modern claims. In fact, our experience with modern claims can serve as a valuable jumping-off-place in our analysis of why the ancients made the claims they made. The practical distinction, of course, is that modern claims are more directly verifiable (or refutable) than ancient claims. We can't verify for ourselves the various descriptions of Nero's singing. Nero's voice is, for better or worse, lost to time. But we can contrast various accounts, look at different sources, and compare those sources to our present understanding of why people make different sorts of claims, and use that to get a better picture of the situation.

eric said:
david.starling.macmillan said: When I read an account in Tacitus of Emperor Vespasian healing a blind man by the divine power of the Caesars, I treat it with a particular sort of skepticism.
Of course you do, and you should. You are making the same argument FL often makes, that scientists assert as a premise or as a preconception that creationism (in your case: miracle accounts) is wrong.

You say I should. But should I really? I'm not so sure. There's a critical difference at play here. When we look at a creationist claim, we're rejecting it because it's demonstrably inconsistent with specific pieces of evidence from history. The geologic column is inconsistent with a global flood. A 6,000-year-old creation is inconsistent with radiometric dating and ice cores. We can refute these claims without saying anything about whether they could have happened, simply because we know from natural history that they didn't. If we have a claim that says "Jesus did miracles in Atlantis", we can rule it out without addressing the question of miracles because we know from history that Atlantis didn't exist. In contrast, the claim "Jesus did miracles at Cana in Galilee" is less simple. We have to fall back on "miracles don't happen under laboratory conditions", which is a different sort of argument altogether, and sounds suspiciously like "We know this account isn't evidence of a miracle because miracles don't happen, and we know miracles don't happen because we don't have any evidence they do." Not that you're saying that, but it's suspiciously similar. In the interest of learning as much as I can about history, I tend to avoid the latter as much as possible. "Miracles don't happen in a laboratory" is considerably weaker and less satisfactory than "That doesn't fit into what we already know from history". If I can rule something out based on historical criticism, I don't have to verge on question-begging at all.

..."counterfactual" is a property of the conversation.
Wow okay, we are totally using the word differently then. You seem to be using it in an extremely subjective manner, to refer to "counter to what this individual speaker believes is fact." If that's the case, however, I think you've kicked the legs out from under your own stool.

Nope, not quite. I'm using it in its most common sense, which is "counter to what the parties to the conversation collectively agree is fact." Everyone here can collectively agree that the Holocaust happened, so we can treat "what if the Holocaust didn't happen" as a counterfactual. It's a counterfactual because it is a useful hypothetical. If a Holocaust-denier were present, it would cease to be a useful hypothetical, and thus would cease to be a counterfactual to the conversation. Which is precisely what makes phhht's insistent usage of the term so pointless. Asserting "it's counterfactual" is useless when that's the specific thing being challenged.

A miracle claim is not a claim that particles and fields interact in a fashion different than equations predict.
Hell yes it is. You may invoke some unknown force to make them interact differently, but you ARE saying they interact differently.

Not really, no. The interactions between particles and fields are no different than physics would predict. The miracle is that wavefunctions change energy states without undergoing particle-field interactions.

With God's intervention, reactions that would not occur according to the equations of science, occur. Look, you can think of God as a catalyst if you want; a catalyst does not violate physical laws when it causes reactions to occur.

You're still overcomplicating things. I'm not saying that God acts as some quantum catalyst to change the laws of physics to alter particle-field interactions. Particle-field interactions, where they happen, still happen normally. I'm saying that the various constituent wavefunctions of the system simply change state apart from any physical interactions with neighboring wavefunctions. And obviously we would not expect to detect such changes unless we were actively observing a miracle taking place under laboratory conditions. Which, to my knowledge, has not yet been done.

eric said: And the servant at the party tasted the difference. There was an interaction between the stuff in those jars and his taste buds.

Of course. And there was nothing at all miraculous or nonphysical or unordinary about the interactions between the wine and his taste buds.

phhht · 25 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: We have to fall back on "miracles don't happen under laboratory conditions", which is a different sort of argument altogether, and sounds suspiciously like "We know this account isn't evidence of a miracle because miracles don't happen, and we know miracles don't happen because we don't have any evidence they do." Not that you're saying that, but it's suspiciously similar.

But we know that miracles do not happen (in the same way we know there are no leprechauns), neither in the laboratory nor in reality. Surely you're not arguing we should accept the reality of miracles because there is no evidence that they do not happen? If so, it's hello leprechauns and fairies and UFOs.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 25 July 2014

Thanks mattdance - I obviously over-reacted to your comment. My apologies.
I think most practitioners of religion are sincere. Looking at a dramatic change like the Reformation, one sees how complicated these things can be and motives vary across the map.

david.starling.macmillan · 25 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: We have to fall back on "miracles don't happen under laboratory conditions", which is a different sort of argument altogether, and sounds suspiciously like "We know this account isn't evidence of a miracle because miracles don't happen, and we know miracles don't happen because we don't have any evidence they do." Not that you're saying that, but it's suspiciously similar.
But we know that miracles do not happen (in the same way we know there are no leprechauns), neither in the laboratory nor in reality.

In exactly the same way that we know extraterrestrial intelligences do not exist, neither in our laboratories nor in the universe.

Surely you're not arguing we should accept the reality of miracles because there is no evidence that they do not happen?

And that's a lovely strawman. I'm saying it is premature to reject miracles for which no obvious defeaters exist. There are obvious defeaters to the existence of fairies and leprechauns, because if fairies and leprechauns had ever existed, we would have more empirical evidence of their existence than we do. There are no obvious defeaters to the miraclous creation of wine at the wedding at Cana in Galilee circa 29 CE, because there is no empirical evidence available today which we would expect such an event to produce.

david.starling.macmillan · 25 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: There are no obvious defeaters to the miraclous creation of wine at the wedding at Cana in Galilee circa 29 CE, because there is no empirical evidence available today which we would expect such an event to produce.

Clarification: We would not expect such an event to produce any empirical evidence which would be available today.

phhht · 25 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: There are obvious defeaters to the existence of fairies and leprechauns, because if fairies and leprechauns had ever existed, we would have more empirical evidence of their existence than we do.

But if miracles had ever existed (or exist today) we would have empirical evidence of their existence. Correct?

david.starling.macmillan · 25 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: There are obvious defeaters to the existence of fairies and leprechauns, because if fairies and leprechauns had ever existed, we would have more empirical evidence of their existence than we do.
But if miracles had ever existed (or exist today) we would have empirical evidence of their existence. Correct?

For some miracles, perhaps. But it would be difficult enough to detect most miracles in a laboratory to any appreciable level of confidence. Expecting sufficient evidence to last for twenty centuries is, I think, a little overly optimistic. Some miracles would certainly leave lasting empirical evidence. Like Allah splitting the moon in two? If that wasn't an illusion, then that would definitely leave lasting empirical evidence. A global flood? Yep, that would leave lasting empirical evidence. The transformation of water into wine at a wedding in Galilee 1,985 years ago? Sorry, not gonna leave much lasting empirical evidence. Is there any other particular miracle you think would have left empirical evidence lasting for two millennia? And again, I'm not saying that we accept something just because there's no evidence refuting it. I'm saying that it's premature to reject something if there's no evidence refuting it.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 25 July 2014

Another possibility is that these were all mental events. The wedding guests thought they saw, smelled, and tasted wine, but were really just drinking water. Power of suggestion, hypnotic states and the like.

phhht · 25 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: And again, I'm not saying that we accept something just because there's no evidence refuting it. I'm saying that it's premature to reject something if there's no evidence refuting it.

Like leprechauns?

david.starling.macmillan · 25 July 2014

A Masked Panda (ds_Q) said: Another possibility is that these were all mental events. The wedding guests thought they saw, smelled, and tasted wine, but were really just drinking water. Power of suggestion, hypnotic states and the like.

And unless someone was there with a breathalyzer, it wouldn't leave any more or less evidence than the alternative. I'm just pointing out that "miracles can't happen because we don't see miracles happening" isn't a very solid argument.

david.starling.macmillan · 25 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: And again, I'm not saying that we accept something just because there's no evidence refuting it. I'm saying that it's premature to reject something if there's no evidence refuting it.
Like leprechauns?

Tell me a little more about the leprechauns you're proposing, and I'll tell you whether there is evidence refuting their existence. For example, I'm sure there have been dwarves in Ireland at some point or another. They may have even worn green clothing and danced at festivals.

phhht · 25 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: And again, I'm not saying that we accept something just because there's no evidence refuting it. I'm saying that it's premature to reject something if there's no evidence refuting it.
Like leprechauns?
Tell me a little more about the leprechauns you're proposing, and I'll tell you whether there is evidence refuting their existence.

Leprechauns are fictional characters. I'm not proposing them; I'm rejecting them.

phhht · 25 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: And again, I'm not saying that we accept something just because there's no evidence refuting it. I'm saying that it's premature to reject something if there's no evidence refuting it.
Like leprechauns?
Tell me a little more about the leprechauns you're proposing, and I'll tell you whether there is evidence refuting their existence.
Leprechauns are fictional characters. I'm not proposing them; I'm rejecting them.

My argument is what you should answer, not the properties of imaginary beings (or events). Why should we reject the reality of leprechauns, for which there is not a shred of empirical evidence, yet refuse to reject the reality of miracles - for which there is not a shred of empirical evidence?

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 25 July 2014

And unless someone was there with a breathalyzer, it wouldn’t leave any more or less evidence than the alternative.

True, but there is plenty of evidence refuting it - like it is inconsistent with how we know the world to work. I can leave water in a jar, I can pray over it, I can chant spells, etc., but no matter how much I want wine or believe in a God, it doesn't turn into wine. That is damn good evidence in my book.

david.starling.macmillan · 25 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: And again, I'm not saying that we accept something just because there's no evidence refuting it. I'm saying that it's premature to reject something if there's no evidence refuting it.
Like leprechauns?
Tell me a little more about the leprechauns you're proposing, and I'll tell you whether there is evidence refuting their existence.
Leprechauns are fictional characters. I'm not proposing them; I'm rejecting them.

Well, an obvious defeater to the existence of leprechauns would therefore be that the leprechaun claims appear only in works which are known to be fictive, and thus no legitimate claim of their existence exists.

A Masked Panda (ds_Q) said:
And unless someone was there with a breathalyzer, it wouldn’t leave any more or less evidence than the alternative.
True, but there is plenty of evidence refuting it - like it is inconsistent with how we know the world to work. I can leave water in a jar, I can pray over it, I can chant spells, etc., but no matter how much I want wine or believe in a God, it doesn't turn into wine. That is damn good evidence in my book.

That is damn good evidence that you are incapable of triggering miracles.

phhht · 25 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: And again, I'm not saying that we accept something just because there's no evidence refuting it. I'm saying that it's premature to reject something if there's no evidence refuting it.
Like leprechauns?
Tell me a little more about the leprechauns you're proposing, and I'll tell you whether there is evidence refuting their existence.
Leprechauns are fictional characters. I'm not proposing them; I'm rejecting them.
Well, an obvious defeater to the existence of leprechauns would therefore be that the leprechaun claims appear only in works which are known to be fictive, and thus no legitimate claim of their existence exists.

But miracle claims appear only in works which are known to be fictive. Thus no legitimate claim of their existence exists.

david.starling.macmillan · 25 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Well, an obvious defeater to the existence of leprechauns would therefore be that the leprechaun claims appear only in works which are known to be fictive, and thus no legitimate claim of their existence exists.
But miracle claims appear only in works which are known to be fictive. Thus no legitimate claim of their existence exists.

And how do you know these works to be fictive? Let me guess: because they contain miracles, and miracles only occur in fictive works, right? Surely you can see the circularity there. This illustrates exactly what I've been talking about. We need to be able to establish whether a given text -- the gospels, Tacitus, whatever -- is fiction or fable or myth or historiography or poem or legend or propaganda or anything else -- independent of its contents.

phhht · 25 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Well, an obvious defeater to the existence of leprechauns would therefore be that the leprechaun claims appear only in works which are known to be fictive, and thus no legitimate claim of their existence exists.
But miracle claims appear only in works which are known to be fictive. Thus no legitimate claim of their existence exists.
And how do you know these works to be fictive? Let me guess: because they contain miracles, and miracles only occur in fictive works, right? Surely you can see the circularity there. This illustrates exactly what I've been talking about. We need to be able to establish whether a given text -- the gospels, Tacitus, whatever -- is fiction or fable or myth or historiography or poem or legend or propaganda or anything else -- independent of its contents.

But it's not only a matter of texts, is it? We know (in the same way we know about leprechauns) that miracles do not occur here in reality. It doesn't matter if a text describes a leprechaun. We know leprechauns are not real. Same with miracles.

mattdance18 · 25 July 2014

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said: Another possibility is that these were all mental events. The wedding guests thought they saw, smelled, and tasted wine, but were really just drinking water. Power of suggestion, hypnotic states and the like.

And still another possibility is that they're just stories. None of the Gospels were written by eyewitnesses to Jesus' life. The closest they come is Mark, whose author appears to have known Peter, who knew Jesus. So maybe we should just interpret the stories symbolically, as allegories with spiritual or ethical significance, and ditch the last vestiges of literalism entirely.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 25 July 2014

And still another possibility is that they’re just stories.

No problem there - like all good stories there is usually some truth to them. I read somewhere (no idea now) that one could view the loaves and fishes story as a communal potluck where everyone was encouraged to offer what they had. It would be consistent with other parts of the Gospel message. There are lots of reasons for the purported miracles not being miracles in the sense that David is defining the word.

david.starling.macmillan · 25 July 2014

phhht said: But it's not only a matter of texts, is it? We know (in the same way we know about leprechauns) that miracles do not occur here in reality. It doesn't matter if a text describes a leprechaun. We know leprechauns are not real. Same with miracles.

And when all else fails, pile some more question-begging on top!

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said:
And still another possibility is that they’re just stories.
No problem there - like all good stories there is usually some truth to them. I read somewhere (no idea now) that one could view the loaves and fishes story as a communal potluck where everyone was encouraged to offer what they had. It would be consistent with other parts of the Gospel message. There are lots of reasons for the purported miracles not being miracles in the sense that David is defining the word.

I'm sure that at least some of the miracles in the gospels fit either Masked's category or matt's. It's the whole Resurrection business I have trouble dismissing. I fully recognize that this just might be my preconceptions and background, but...it fits the story. It fits the story, and it fits the rest of the Bible. Really well. Too well, I believe, to have been the product of history mingling with myth and being edited into a coherent whole. Partly because it isn't always coherent. But the metanarrative is. Again, this could just be preconception and wishful thinking. And I'm not entirely sure how to control for that, but that's where I throw up my hands and give up on knowing everything.

phhht · 25 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said: But it's not only a matter of texts, is it? We know (in the same way we know about leprechauns) that miracles do not occur here in reality. It doesn't matter if a text describes a leprechaun. We know leprechauns are not real. Same with miracles.
And when all else fails, pile some more question-begging on top!

It's no use, David. Any argument that attacks the existence of leprechauns also attacks the existence of miracles. Any argument that supports the existence of miracles also supports the existence of leprechauns. Which do not exist. Leprechauns and miracles are etymological peers: neither is supported by the slightest whiff of empirical evidence. If that condition is not enough to say a thing does not exist, what else do you need?

phhht · 25 July 2014

^etymological^epistomological

Sorry.

Malcolm · 25 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Well, an obvious defeater to the existence of leprechauns would therefore be that the leprechaun claims appear only in works which are known to be fictive, and thus no legitimate claim of their existence exists.
But miracle claims appear only in works which are known to be fictive. Thus no legitimate claim of their existence exists.
And how do you know these works to be fictive?

I always found the talking snake to be a bit of a giveaway.

david.starling.macmillan · 25 July 2014

Malcolm said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Well, an obvious defeater to the existence of leprechauns would therefore be that the leprechaun claims appear only in works which are known to be fictive, and thus no legitimate claim of their existence exists.
But miracle claims appear only in works which are known to be fictive. Thus no legitimate claim of their existence exists.
And how do you know these works to be fictive?
I always found the talking snake to be a bit of a giveaway.

Genesis 3 is fable to be sure.

stevaroni · 26 July 2014

Malcolm said: I always found the talking snake to be a bit of a giveaway.

I just saw one of those on CNN last night. Oh... wait... maybe it was just a politician. Hard to tell.

Malcolm · 26 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
Malcolm said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Well, an obvious defeater to the existence of leprechauns would therefore be that the leprechaun claims appear only in works which are known to be fictive, and thus no legitimate claim of their existence exists.
But miracle claims appear only in works which are known to be fictive. Thus no legitimate claim of their existence exists.
And how do you know these works to be fictive?
I always found the talking snake to be a bit of a giveaway.
Genesis 3 is fable to be sure.

The talking snake is hardly an isolated case. I think a better question would have been, "And how do you know these works not to be fictive?"

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 26 July 2014

That is damn good evidence that you are incapable of triggering miracles.

Do you know anyone personally who can trigger miracles? Have you seen it done? Please describe method.

david.starling.macmillan · 26 July 2014

Malcolm said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
Malcolm said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Well, an obvious defeater to the existence of leprechauns would therefore be that the leprechaun claims appear only in works which are known to be fictive, and thus no legitimate claim of their existence exists.
But miracle claims appear only in works which are known to be fictive. Thus no legitimate claim of their existence exists.
And how do you know these works to be fictive?
I always found the talking snake to be a bit of a giveaway.
Genesis 3 is fable to be sure.
The talking snake is hardly an isolated case. I think a better question would have been, "And how do you know these works not to be fictive?"

Good question. You just fall back on the same modes of literary criticism we apply to any text of antiquity. Some portions are definitely fiction. Some portions are not definitely fiction. Some portions are definitely not fiction.

A Masked Panda (ds_Q) said:
That is damn good evidence that you are incapable of triggering miracles.
Do you know anyone personally who can trigger miracles? Have you seen it done? Please describe method.

Inductive fallacy. I've never seen aliens. Or black swans, for that matter.

https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q · 26 July 2014

Given that neither you nor I nor any of the many people you or I know can trigger miracles - I am not generalizing from one instance, but millions. I think I am on pretty good inductive ground here.

Malcolm · 27 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
Malcolm said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
Malcolm said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Well, an obvious defeater to the existence of leprechauns would therefore be that the leprechaun claims appear only in works which are known to be fictive, and thus no legitimate claim of their existence exists.
But miracle claims appear only in works which are known to be fictive. Thus no legitimate claim of their existence exists.
And how do you know these works to be fictive?
I always found the talking snake to be a bit of a giveaway.
Genesis 3 is fable to be sure.
The talking snake is hardly an isolated case. I think a better question would have been, "And how do you know these works not to be fictive?"
Good question. You just fall back on the same modes of literary criticism we apply to any text of antiquity. Some portions are definitely fiction. Some portions are not definitely fiction. Some portions are definitely not fiction.

So, like most Christians, you just pick the bits you like and leave out the unpleasant stuff. I have no problem with that. Just don't claim that your beliefs have an empirical basis. That gives empiricism a bad name.

mattdance18 · 28 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
https://www.google.com/accounts/o8/id?id=AItOawnKupVGX70N9ZsvLu8iScIzWpyVj8bds_Q said:
mattdance18 said:And still another possibility is that they’re just stories.
No problem there - like all good stories there is usually some truth to them. I read somewhere (no idea now) that one could view the loaves and fishes story as a communal potluck where everyone was encouraged to offer what they had. It would be consistent with other parts of the Gospel message. There are lots of reasons for the purported miracles not being miracles in the sense that David is defining the word.
It's the whole Resurrection business I have trouble dismissing. I fully recognize that this just might be my preconceptions and background, but...it fits the story. It fits the story, and it fits the rest of the Bible. Really well. Too well, I believe, to have been the product of history mingling with myth and being edited into a coherent whole. Partly because it isn't always coherent. But the metanarrative is.

I totally get that. The Resurrection is the central element of Christianity as such. Tinkering with it is something not many Christians are willing to do. Buuuuut.... I do have a couple questions about what you mean in this paragraph. When you say "it fits the story," what do you have in mind? Or what about "it fits the rest of the Bible?" What is the "coherent metanarrative," and how do we discern what it is? Because it seems to me that there are just too many discrepancies to reconcile here. The authentic Pauline Epistles are the oldest texts of the New Testament, and they insist on the importance of Christ rising (e.g. 1 Corinthians 15:17). But they neither characterize his resurrection in physical terms nor provide any narrative account of it, just a list (1 Corinthians 15:1-6) for which there is no corroboration elsewhere in any of the Gospels. The oldest of the Gospels themselves, Mark, "ends" with the empty tomb and an announcement, rather than any account of appearances. Mark 16:9-20, the so-called "longer ending of Mark, was a later addition, probably 50 years give or take after the original "shorter ending" version was written, and it conflicts with the other Gospel accounts. Taken together, Mark's longer ending and Matthew, Luke, and John give mutually inconsistent accounts of virtually every aspect of the resurrection: to whom Jesus appeared, and in what order; where various people were or to where they were traveling, and where exactly Jesus appeared to them; what exactly Jesus said and did in the various appearances; etc. And then there's the account in Acts (Ch. 9) of Paul's experience of the risen Christ, referring back to Paul's mention of it ("last to me") in 1 Corinthians 15. Aside from the fact that this account was not written by Paul himself (the author of Acts being the author of Luke), the experience is not portrayed as any kind of physical encounter: it's clearly a vision of some kind. Hence my earlier questions, and I hope I won't be misunderstood here. There is certainly plenty of evidence that there was a carpenter from Nazareth named Jesus, who became a traveling teacher in the tradition of the Jewish prophets, who aroused plenty of ire among Jewish religious authorities and Roman political authorities alike, and who was eventually crucified by the latter. All of this has independent, extra-Biblical corroboration. But the Biblical stories themselves, while they indicate the powerful influence of Jesus' ministry, and while they have their historical connections, are exactly what I would expect if they were, in fact, "history mingling with myth." The spiritual passion behind them, but also their mutual inconsistencies, and also a couple centuries of painstakingly compiled evidence for how they were composed -- all of this leads me to believe that the Gospels themselves, in their entirety, including the Easter story, are legends: powerful legends, inspiring legends, even legends that express, in the eyes of Christians now no less than then, spiritual or religious truths. But legends nonetheless -- and it isn't even clear that the authors themselves were writing them in order to be anything else, anyway. This doesn't mean denying the reality or the value of what Spong has called "the Easter experience." It just means that this experience must be understood in a way that doesn't rely on the historicity of mutually inconsistent, supernaturalist stories that weren't aiming to be modern-style biographical histories in the first place.

Again, this could just be preconception and wishful thinking. And I'm not entirely sure how to control for that, but that's where I throw up my hands and give up on knowing everything.

Right, I get that, too. But then, can I explain the worry that I have on this score? I can state it fairly straightforwardly: It seems to weaken the case against creationism. The strongest weapon in the counter-creationist arsenal is very simple: Nature just doesn't work that way. Your own series, in parts 2-6 especially, is basically an extended argument against various creationist misunderstandings of how nature works. If I may add in a couple more points, from a less biological perspective than you addressed here: A global flood would not leave fossils arranged in the layers that we can observe; fluid dynamics just doesn't work that way. The speed of light and radioactive decay rates do not observably vary, especially not on anything like the scale that creationists often claim; physics just does not work that way. Etc, etc. But then there's a definitely biological claim: organisms that die do not return to life. Sure organisms might resuscitate when near death, even to the point of seeming to be dead. Heck, some organisms can resuscitate under extraordinary conditions of what seem to be sci-fi suspended animation, like frogs or caterpillars that freeze completely solid to overwinter and then thaw out in the spring, no worse for wear. But none of these involve an organism that has actually died coming back to life. Because that's not how life works. ... Except in the case of Jesus. You can see the difficulty here. Again, I hope I will not be misunderstood. I certainly don't lump you in with creationists, by any stretch of the imagination. I believe that miracles are logically possible (albeit not physically so, of course). And I don't think that if an occasional miracle were indeed to happen (I don't believe they do, but if they were), this would render science impossible. But my worry is this. If we say, well, yes, this is not how life usually or ordinarily or normally or even naturally works, but it's how things happened in the singular case of Jesus -- how can we say to creationists, this is not how fluid dynamics or radioactivity or light work? They could just say, sure it's how fluid dynamics usually works, but when God flooded the whole world, ordinary fluid dynamics simply didn't apply, any more than ordinary biology and medicine applied to Jesus when he arose. There are plenty of theological and hermeneutical problems that arise from creationism, so even if this answer were viable, it might still fail. And I'm worried that my worry is basically a slippery slope argument, which is generally fallacious. That said, a slippery slope is not fallacious if the underlying logical or causal connection from one idea to the next can be made. And in this case, I think it's pretty tight. The difference between your position and the creationist position is very wide, to be sure, but it seems a difference of degree and not kind. It's a line-drawing problem: how often do miracles happen? what sorts do, and what sorts don't? which Biblical accounts of miracles are accurate, and which not? etc. Unfortunately, I'm not seeing much of a principled reason to draw the line any particular place, so it looks arbitrary. Does that make sense? Just some thoughts.

david.starling.macmillan · 28 July 2014

A Masked Panda (ds_Q) said: Given that neither you nor I nor any of the many people you or I know can trigger miracles - I am not generalizing from one instance, but millions. I think I am on pretty good inductive ground here.

One would think so. But if the same thing is an inductive fallacy when used to argue against the existence of aliens, it's an inductive fallacy here. The real problem is divine hiddenness. Which simply goes back to the problem of evil. Which is a philosophical objection, not an empirical one.

Malcolm said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
Malcolm said: "...how do you know these works not to be fictive?"
Good question. You just fall back on the same modes of literary criticism we apply to any text of antiquity. Some portions are definitely fiction. Some portions are not definitely fiction. Some portions are definitely not fiction.
So, like most Christians, you just pick the bits you like and leave out the unpleasant stuff.

Uhm, nope, that's decidedly not what I said at all. I said that historians can use the same modes of literary criticism applied to any other text of antiquity to determine which portions are definitely fiction, which portions are not definitely fiction, and which portions are definitely not fiction. Nothing to do with "likes" or "unlikes" at all.

mattdance18 said:
david.starling.macmillan said: It's the whole Resurrection business I have trouble dismissing. I fully recognize that this just might be my preconceptions and background, but...it fits the story. It fits the story, and it fits the rest of the Bible. Really well. Too well, I believe, to have been the product of history mingling with myth and being edited into a coherent whole. Partly because it isn't always coherent. But the metanarrative is.
I totally get that. The Resurrection is the central element of Christianity as such. Tinkering with it is something not many Christians are willing to do. Buuuuut.... I do have a couple questions about what you mean in this paragraph. When you say "it fits the story," what do you have in mind? Or what about "it fits the rest of the Bible?" What is the "coherent metanarrative," and how do we discern what it is?

All good questions. Over on the BW, I answered one of FL's questions with a fairly in-depth explanation of what the metanarrative is and how I think it fits together; I hope you check it out and find it interesting. Perhaps that's a completely ad-hoc model. A just-so story that appeals to me, that I and other Christians have constructed in piecemeal. Maybe that's all there is to it. But it does fit, and it's not inconsistent with reality or literary criticism or history. It complements our understanding of human nature, of religion, of sociology. And while it doesn't entirely answer the problem of evil, it's as good a solution as I can think of. Like you, I don't have any commitment to plenary inspiration or docetic inerrancy regarding the Gospels. I'm sure they contain the same exaggerations and hearsay as any other comparable texts of their time. But the story and the teachings seem to fit the metanarrative I've explained. What Jesus said, what he did, the resurrection, the whole leaving-for-a-few-dozen-centuries...it all works, and it works in a way that makes me doubtful it could have been edited into compliance. The material details in the gospels are too disparate for the texts to have been significantly edited. I don't really put much stock in the theory that Paul's Jesus was a spiritual Jesus with a spiritual life, death, and resurrection. I've heard various arguments for it, but I don't think they work. That's just my opinion, of course.

Again, this could just be preconception and wishful thinking. And I'm not entirely sure how to control for that, but that's where I throw up my hands and give up on knowing everything.
Right, I get that, too. But then, can I explain the worry that I have on this score? I can state it fairly straightforwardly: It seems to weaken the case against creationism. If we say, well, yes, this is not how life usually or ordinarily or normally or even naturally works, but it's how things happened in the singular case of Jesus -- how can we say to creationists, this is not how fluid dynamics or radioactivity or light work? They could just say, sure it's how fluid dynamics usually works, but when God flooded the whole world, ordinary fluid dynamics simply didn't apply, any more than ordinary biology and medicine applied to Jesus when he arose.

The difference, I think, is that creationists try to avoid Omphalism. They could certainly suggest that God supernaturally changed the fluid dynamics and the radioactivity and the genetics and the physics...but the evidence for common descent and deep time are so overwhelming that God would have had to consciously manufacture the millions of interlocking patterns. Embedding Milankovich cycles in ice cores and in benthic sediment and in dozens of other records; layering limestone on top of salt on top of limestone; sliding coal fly ash in between rock layers at just the right place to match fictitious evidence of lava trap flows; planting false flags in our DNA to match chimpanzees. No creationist is going to accept such monstrous manipulation of nature. And if they did, it would be immediately obvious to everyone how stupid it is. So it's not really something we should be concerned with, in my opinion. Creationists are going to argue that God only did the miracles necessary to effect desired outcomes. Which means that the after-effects of those miracles are supposed to be completely natural and physical. Which we can easily disprove.

It's a line-drawing problem: how often do miracles happen? what sorts do, and what sorts don't? which Biblical accounts of miracles are accurate, and which not? etc. Unfortunately, I'm not seeing much of a principled reason to draw the line any particular place, so it looks arbitrary. Does that make sense? Just some thoughts.

As long as all parties can agree on the presumption that there aren't miracles being done specifically to screw with us, I don't think it's a problem.

eric · 28 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: In contrast, the claim "Jesus did miracles at Cana in Galilee" is less simple. We have to fall back on "miracles don't happen under laboratory conditions"

Yes, we fall back on induction. Induction says they don't happen. You can say that induction is not proof, and this is true, but since we also know most 'facts' through induction, I think it's perfectly reasonable to say that if some claim runs counter to what we've learned through induction, it is counterfactual.

Everyone here can collectively agree that the Holocaust happened, so we can treat "what if the Holocaust didn't happen" as a counterfactual. It's a counterfactual because it is a useful hypothetical. If a Holocaust-denier were present, it would cease to be a useful hypothetical, and thus would cease to be a counterfactual to the conversation.

Oh I understand what you're saying. I just see it as diluting the term "counterfactual" down to meaninglessness. If you're saying that Jesus' miracles are "not counterfactual" when talking to you in the same way that Uri Geller's telekinesis is not counterfactual when talking to Uri, then I don't think the "not counterfactual" description means much. And I think my earlier comparison to Behe's redefinition of science is apt. Sure, you can define 'science' in a way that includes ID, just as you can define "not counterfactual" in a way that includes miracles. I just think that's a pyrrhic victory; anyone who understands what you're saying is not going to think much of your claim.

A miracle claim is not a claim that particles and fields interact in a fashion different than equations predict.
Hell yes it is. You may invoke some unknown force to make them interact differently, but you ARE saying they interact differently.
Not really, no. The interactions between particles and fields are no different than physics would predict. The miracle is that wavefunctions change energy states without undergoing particle-field interactions.

First, that IS 'behaving differently.' If some reaction typically would not occur without an external source of energy, and it occurs because God does it, then that system is behaving differently than what physics would predict. If I'm tossing a ball and instead of tracing a parabola it traces a right triangle - and there's no external force causing it to do so - then it's behaving differently. Saying God commanded it to trace a right triangle does no mean the system is behaving according to the laws of physics. Second, I do not think you understand nuclear physics and QM enough to say that there is no violation. In fact, I think you're handwaving. Wavefunction collapse cannot do everything. In this particular case, the impossibility of water-to-wine transmutation has nothing to do with wavefunction collapse, it has to do with the interaction of the laws of conservation of momentum and conservation of energy. Combined, these say that such a tranzmutation must produce about 7.1 MeV in energy and not all of it can be kinetic energy of the particles. So the excess must be emitted as gamma rays - likely enough to kill all the partygoers in Cana. If the reaction occurs without those gammas, then you have broken physical laws and no "wave function collapse" argument is going to fix it. Now, cold fusion nuts hypothesize unknown reactions that produce such transmutations without gammas. Are you placing yourself amongst them?

eric · 28 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: The transformation of water into wine at a wedding in Galilee 1,985 years ago? Sorry, not gonna leave much lasting empirical evidence.

The wedding-goers would've keeled over dead from the prompt gamma emssion. Funny, the story doesn't mention such a directly observable outcome.

And again, I'm not saying that we accept something just because there's no evidence refuting it. I'm saying that it's premature to reject something if there's no evidence refuting it.

My last couple of responses have focused on more 'light science' reasons for rejecting your position, but let me try the philosophical tack on this one: you seem to reject the miracles of other faiths when there's no "lasting empirical evidence" about them. Mohammed and the flying horse springs to mind. So how do you reject those miracles when your own line of reason would dictate that its premature to do so?

david.starling.macmillan · 28 July 2014

eric said:
david.starling.macmillan said: In contrast, the claim "Jesus did miracles at Cana in Galilee" is less simple. We have to fall back on "miracles don't happen under laboratory conditions"
Yes, we fall back on induction. Induction says they don't happen. You can say that induction is not proof, and this is true, but since we also know most 'facts' through induction, I think it's perfectly reasonable to say that if some claim runs counter to what we've learned through induction, it is counterfactual.

The argument from induction works best if you've tested something a bunch of times and it's always come up the same way. The more thoroughly you've looked for the black swan, the more certain you can be that all swans are white. We can use the argument from induction to rule out intelligent aliens in our solar system, because we've looked closely enough at all the planets to conclude that they aren't here. But trying to extend that argument to rule out intelligent aliens in our galaxy won't work. We have looked closely at about a half-dozen terrestrial worlds (counting various moons and so forth) when our galaxy likely contains billions of them. Not a good sample size at all. Do not pass Go, do not collect 200 Inductive Dollars. So the inductive argument against the existence of God is stronger or weaker depending on the God-proposition being tested. There are plenty of studies on the efficacy of prayer for healing diseases...there's a solid inductive argument against an actively-healing-the-devout god. All science experiments everywhere provide an excellent inductive argument against a screws-around-with-experiments-for-fun god. I'm sure you could think of a dozen other examples. But if divine hiddenness is accepted rather than denied, then we haven't really done nearly so much testing. At all. The inductive argument falls apart for lack of evidence -- zero valid tests of God's existence -- and we're left with the philosophical quandary of answering the problem of divine hiddenness. Which is still a challenge, of course, but not exactly an empirical one.

Oh I understand what you're saying. I just see it as diluting the term "counterfactual" down to meaninglessness. If you're saying that Jesus' miracles are "not counterfactual" when talking to you in the same way that Uri Geller's telekinesis is not counterfactual when talking to Uri, then I don't think the "not counterfactual" description means much. And I think my earlier comparison to Behe's redefinition of science is apt. Sure, you can define 'science' in a way that includes ID, just as you can define "not counterfactual" in a way that includes miracles. I just think that's a pyrrhic victory; anyone who understands what you're saying is not going to think much of your claim.

It's not my claim, really. And I don't think I'm redefining anything; that is the common usage. Phhht was the one insisting on using "counterfactual", and I was saying this was question-begging.

The miracle is that wavefunctions change energy states without undergoing particle-field interactions.
First, that IS 'behaving differently.' If some reaction typically would not occur without an external source of energy, and it occurs because God does it, then that system is behaving differently than what physics would predict.

You're still thinking in terms of physics alone. It's not a reaction; a reaction is an interaction.

Second, I do not think you understand nuclear physics and QM enough to say that there is no violation. In fact, I think you're handwaving. Wavefunction collapse cannot do everything.

I don't think I said wavefunction collapse did anything. I said that a miracle can be as simple as the energy states of various wavefunctions changing without undergoing any physical interactions.

...the impossibility of water-to-wine transmutation...has to do with the interaction of the laws of conservation of momentum and conservation of energy.

Both of which govern physical interactions. Which are not at issue in a miracle. Let's make it simple. Consider a single neutrino passing through space with an energy of 420 keV. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the space it is passing through is sufficiently devoid of matter as to reduce the chance of interaction with anything to zero (neutrinos don't exactly interact with much of anything anyway). A miracle, in this case, would be God changing the energy of that neutrino to 500 keV or 380 keV or 2 MeV or any other value. Not an interaction, not a self-interaction, not a wavefunction collapse. Just a change. Is conservation of energy violated? Well, if we were arguing that the neutrino's energy changed spontaneously, then yes, it would be. But we aren't. Miracles are not spontaneous events; they are directed events. They interact with physical systems in nonphysical ways. So it doesn't actually violate conservation of energy.

eric said:
And again, I'm not saying that we accept something just because there's no evidence refuting it. I'm saying that it's premature to reject something if there's no evidence refuting it.
My last couple of responses have focused on more 'light science' reasons for rejecting your position, but let me try the philosophical tack on this one: you seem to reject the miracles of other faiths when there's no "lasting empirical evidence" about them. Mohammed and the flying horse springs to mind. So how do you reject those miracles when your own line of reason would dictate that its premature to do so?

I don't reject them on the basis that miracles cannot happen. I most immediately reject them on the basis that Allah's existence, as described in Islam, is contradictory and dismissible. A nonexistent deity obviously cannot do any miracles.

phhht · 28 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: But if divine hiddenness is accepted rather than denied, then we haven't really done nearly so much testing. At all. The inductive argument falls apart for lack of evidence -- zero valid tests of God's existence -- and we're left with the philosophical quandary of answering the problem of divine hiddenness.

It seems to me that you propose two unsupported assertions: gods exist, and they are hidden. Do I understand you? If your gods are truly well-hidden - if they have no effects on reality - how do they differ from the nonexistent gods (and leprechauns) of fiction? Don't both assertions collapse into indefensibility in the absence of empirical evidence to support them? How do gods, hidden or not, differ from other fictional characters?

prongs · 28 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: But if divine hiddenness is accepted rather than denied, then we haven't really done nearly so much testing. At all. The inductive argument falls apart for lack of evidence -- zero valid tests of God's existence -- and we're left with the philosophical quandary of answering the problem of divine hiddenness.
It seems to me that you propose two unsupported assertions: gods exist, and they are hidden. Do I understand you? If your gods are truly well-hidden - if they have no effects on reality - how do they differ from the nonexistent gods (and leprechauns) of fiction? Don't both assertions collapse into indefensibility in the absence of empirical evidence to support them? How do gods, hidden or not, differ from other fictional characters?

As Dave Luckett has said before, "What if God will not be tested?" Add that to 'miracles are one-time events that are not repeatable', thus not subject to experimentation, and you have one last little cubbyhole for God to hide in. While my intellect sides with Luckett, my gut sides with phhht - in my life long experience I have seen absolutely no evidence of gods, despite a lifetime of searching. Like phhht I just don't see their possibility - it's time to stop pretending they might exist. Of course, I might be wrong (but I don't think so).

phhht · 28 July 2014

prongs said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: But if divine hiddenness is accepted rather than denied, then we haven't really done nearly so much testing. At all. The inductive argument falls apart for lack of evidence -- zero valid tests of God's existence -- and we're left with the philosophical quandary of answering the problem of divine hiddenness.
It seems to me that you propose two unsupported assertions: gods exist, and they are hidden. Do I understand you? If your gods are truly well-hidden - if they have no effects on reality - how do they differ from the nonexistent gods (and leprechauns) of fiction? Don't both assertions collapse into indefensibility in the absence of empirical evidence to support them? How do gods, hidden or not, differ from other fictional characters?
As Dave Luckett has said before, "What if God will not be tested?" Add that to 'miracles are one-time events that are not repeatable', thus not subject to experimentation, and you have one last little cubbyhole for God to hide in.

When you ask Dave Luckett's question, you tacitly beg the question of the reality of gods, while addressing none of the problems associated with hiddenness. Why assume gods exist in the first place? (Or, for that matter, miracles?) What is the difference between a well-hidden god and a fictional character? What is the difference between Yahweh and Xenu?

Mike Elzinga · 28 July 2014

There is probably a somewhat better argument based on thousands of conflicting sectarian claims about the nature of a deity.

If a deity really wants a bunch of devoted followers; then one might expect – as most sectarians assert - that the deity would reveal itself to humans and let them know what it expects and what it says about the history of the universe that it purportedly made.

So what do we have in the way of such “revealed” knowledge from a deity?

It appears to be no less than the claims of thousands of cock-sure sectarians who think the deity speaks to them and not to all those other thousands of cock-sure sectarians who disagree among themselves – often violently – about the nature of the deity and what the deity says. The worst among these are the ones who forego all education and read only one book literally as a child would read a fairy tale. And the numbers of conflicting claimants increase decade by decade.

In other words, it appears we are looking at pure noise and no signal; it averages out to nothing.

In this regard, fundamentalists are by far the biggest source of noise drowning out nearly everyone else with their meddling and in-fighting.

Insofar as various religions making similar statements about how people aught to behave toward each other; that is most easily explained as part of common human experience being incorporated into religions by the very same humans who created their deities by projecting themselves onto nature.

Until the sectarian noise dissipates – which is very unlikely, given the history of religion - nobody can “hear” a deity “speaking” through the noise.

Our only universally understood “signals” about ourselves and our universe come from using the template of science – which, by the way, is not a religion; contrary to the assertions of jealous sectarians who see only “other false religions” all around them.

In short; the existence of thousands of fundamentalist sectarians is the best argument against the existence of a deity – unless , of course, one wants to argue for the existence of a devil. But then, which sectarian fundamentalists are the devils?

It's all noise.

eric · 28 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: The argument from induction works best if you've tested something a bunch of times and it's always come up the same way. The more thoroughly you've looked for the black swan, the more certain you can be that all swans are white.

But we have lots of observations of purported miracle workers, and they all turn out to be fakes. And simultaneously claiming divine hiddenness and that there was a miracle worker that raised the dead, walked on water, produced food from nothing, transmuted water to wine is just crass exceptionalism. Why should we believe any claim that the Christian God is hidden when the bible is choc-o-block full of blatant, empirically observed divine presence?

we're left with the philosophical quandary of answering the problem of divine hiddenness. Which is still a challenge, of course, but not exactly an empirical one.

I've never thought it much of a quandary or challenge. Its okay if you're a deist, but its hard to see the Christian divine hiddenness claim as anything more than ad hoc justification considering that the bible is filled with God choosing not to be hidden.

The miracle is that wavefunctions change energy states without undergoing particle-field interactions.
First, that IS 'behaving differently.' If some reaction typically would not occur without an external source of energy, and it occurs because God does it, then that system is behaving differently than what physics would predict.
You're still thinking in terms of physics alone. It's not a reaction; a reaction is an interaction.

Hey, YOU brought up wavefunctions. That's physics, and wavefunction collapse is governed by the rules of QM. If you are thinking of some non-physics definition of "wavefunctions change energy states," (those are your words) please say so. But if not, then your claim about how this works is clearly physics.

Second, I do not think you understand nuclear physics and QM enough to say that there is no violation. In fact, I think you're handwaving. Wavefunction collapse cannot do everything.
I don't think I said wavefunction collapse did anything. I said that a miracle can be as simple as the energy states of various wavefunctions changing without undergoing any physical interactions. Consider a single neutrino passing through space with an energy of 420 keV. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the space it is passing through is sufficiently devoid of matter as to reduce the chance of interaction with anything to zero (neutrinos don't exactly interact with much of anything anyway). A miracle, in this case, would be God changing the energy of that neutrino to 500 keV or 380 keV or 2 MeV or any other value. Not an interaction, not a self-interaction, not a wavefunction collapse. Just a change. Is conservation of energy violated?

Yes. The system's energy has not been conserved. In order to say it's conserved you have to claim some source of energy (a empirically measurable 'thing') has entered it. But you're not saying that, you're saying it's only nonphysical. So I think you're stuck. You either have to say God does something measurable to the world, or you have to say physical law has been violated.

Well, if we were arguing that the neutrino's energy changed spontaneously, then yes, it would be. But we aren't. Miracles are not spontaneous events; they are directed events. They interact with physical systems in nonphysical ways. So it doesn't actually violate conservation of energy.

I do not think any physicist would agree with your last sentence re: your scenario. Maybe some other Pandas would like to weigh in on this? Mike?

I don't reject them on the basis that miracles cannot happen. I most immediately reject them on the basis that Allah's existence, as described in Islam, is contradictory and dismissible. A nonexistent deity obviously cannot do any miracles.

And now you know why nontheists reject the miracles of Yahweh, in any of his three parts. Surely you understand that the bible is full of contradictory claims about God.

eric · 28 July 2014

phhht said: It seems to me that you propose two unsupported assertions: gods exist, and they are hidden. Do I understand you?

David's God remains hidden now, but clearly was not hidden in the past. David also rejects Islam because its descriptions of Allah are contradictory. We have entered the theology zone [cue music].

david.starling.macmillan · 28 July 2014

phhht said: It seems to me that you propose two unsupported assertions: gods exist, and they are hidden. Do I understand you?

Not quite. I propose a premise which I am sure we can all agree on: if gods exist, they are immanently very well-hidden. No matter what FL and his Unsolved Mysteries would have us believe. You would agree, correct? Then the single suggestion of God's existence naturally implies hiddenness. So there is only one assertion in need of defense. And to be clear, we aren't talking about necessary or involuntary hiddenness; we're talking about immanent hiddenness. It is not that interaction with the physical realm is impossible or anything useless like that. I confess slight frustration when arguments from "empiricism" are proposed with great certainty, ignoring the fact that philosophers have long since accepted and moved past them.

Mike Elzinga said: There is probably a somewhat better argument based on thousands of conflicting sectarian claims about the nature of a deity. If a deity really wants a bunch of devoted followers....

Maybe that's the faulty assumption right there, ya think?

phhht · 28 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: I propose a premise which I am sure we can all agree on: if gods exist, they are immanently very well-hidden.

That's a counterfactual, right? Do you mean "eminently"? I can agree to that.

And to be clear, we aren't talking about necessary or involuntary hiddenness; we're talking about immanent hiddenness.

I don't know what you mean.

It is not that interaction with the physical realm is impossible or anything useless like that.

How about just nonexistent? Now that's hidden.

Scott F · 28 July 2014

I really don't see the point of trying to "reason" about "faith". Faith is belief in the absence of evidence. The problem with FL is that he feels the need to justify his faith, that his faith requires "reasons" and "evidence"; that he can prove his faith to others.

On the other hand, paradoxically, despite not being the raving ~~evangelical~~ lunatic that FL is, David has shown far more willingness to discuss his faith than FL ever has. David has been willing to put himself out there, where FL is terrified of venturing.

At least David has reasons. We may not agree with them, and he may still be exploring them himself, but at least he's thinking about them. All FL has is fear and dogma.

And, despite the sometimes heated discussion, (far less heated than it could be) I haven't seen any name calling on either side. FL probably won't notice, but it is entirely possible to have such a civil discussion without resorting to fear, imprecations, or ad hominems.

So, do carry on. The juxtaposition should be stark to the casual lurker.

Scott F · 28 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
Mike Elzinga said: There is probably a somewhat better argument based on thousands of conflicting sectarian claims about the nature of a deity. If a deity really wants a bunch of devoted followers....
Maybe that's the faulty assumption right there, ya think?

Perhaps, but I've seen very few religions where the deity does *not* require a bunch of devoted followers. That appears to be de rigueur for a deity: omnipotent, omniscient, and insecure. Thou shalt have no other gods before me, and all that. If you haven't, you really must read Terry Pratchett's Small Gods. He simply nails this whole discussion. His entire Disc World series is well worth your time.

stevaroni · 28 July 2014

Scott F said: The problem with FL is that he feels the need to justify his faith, that his faith requires "reasons" and "evidence"; that he can prove his faith to others.

No, the problem with FL is not that he prove his faith on others, it's that he insists on imposing his faith on others. It's not enough to satisfy him, or even enough to be acceptable, that people respect his right to pray to whatever god he sees fit in his own space, in his own time and on his own behalf. No, it's somehow "persecution" if his faith is not somehow privileged in the public forum. Especially over those who would shrug and say "Eh... whatever". The biggest issue with Fl and his ilk is that in his mind it's "persecution" to teach the simple, demonstrable, easy to understand way that the physical world actually works, rather than to pretend that there's a mysterious, undetectable, magical being that controls it all from behind the curtain.

david.starling.macmillan · 29 July 2014

eric said: ...simultaneously claiming divine hiddenness and that there was a miracle worker that raised the dead, walked on water, produced food from nothing, transmuted water to wine is just crass exceptionalism.

Hmm, odd. I don't really see it as "claiming" hiddenness. Hiddenness is obvious. I don't see God hanging out on the corner of First and Amistad. Either God is hidden, or God does not exist. Phhht didn't understand what I meant by immanent hiddenness. To be honest, I'm not sure whether immanent or imminent better describes it (though certainly not eminent). In any case, I simply mean that the lack of observable divine interaction is a property of our present observation. It doesn't imply anything one way or the other about the past or the future.

Why should we believe any claim that the Christian God is hidden when the bible is choc-o-block full of blatant, empirically observed divine presence? Its okay if you're a deist, but its hard to see the Christian divine hiddenness claim as anything more than ad hoc justification considering that the bible is filled with God choosing not to be hidden.

Because the Bible is the product of men? Hiddenness is wholly unmanageable for typical evangelical fundamentalism, I'll give you that. But I'm hardly typical, evangelical, or fundamentalist.

You're still thinking in terms of physics alone. It's not a reaction; a reaction is an interaction.
Hey, YOU brought up wavefunctions. That's physics, and wavefunction collapse is governed by the rules of QM.

And I wasn't talking about the collapse of wavefunctions; I was talking about changes in the energy of wavefunctions. Ground state, first excited state, second excited state, and so on.

Consider a single neutrino passing through space with an energy of 420 keV. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the space it is passing through is sufficiently devoid of matter as to reduce the chance of interaction with anything to zero (neutrinos don't exactly interact with much of anything anyway). A miracle, in this case, would be God changing the energy of that neutrino to 500 keV or 380 keV or 2 MeV or any other value. Not an interaction, not a self-interaction, not a wavefunction collapse. Just a change. Is conservation of energy violated?
In order to say it's conserved you have to claim some source of energy (a empirically measurable 'thing') has entered it. But you're not saying that, you're saying it's only nonphysical. So I think you're stuck. You either have to say God does something measurable to the world, or you have to say physical law has been violated.

Of course God does something measurable in this example! The neutrino has a measurably higher energy. Why wouldn't it be measurable? The cause of a miracle is nonphysical, but the result is most definitely physical and measurable.

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: I propose a premise which I am sure we can all agree on: if gods exist, they are immanently very well-hidden.
That's a counterfactual, right?

Nah. A good example of a useful counterfactual would be, "If God wasn't hidden and miracles happened all around us constantly, would we be able to expect science to work?"

Scott F said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
Mike Elzinga said: There is probably a somewhat better argument based on thousands of conflicting sectarian claims about the nature of a deity. If a deity really wants a bunch of devoted followers....
Maybe that's the faulty assumption right there, ya think?
Perhaps, but I've seen very few religions where the deity does *not* require a bunch of devoted followers. That appears to be de rigueur for a deity: omnipotent, omniscient, and insecure. Thou shalt have no other gods before me, and all that.

Go check out my longish comment from yesterday explaining penal-substitionary-atonement-free Christianity, and let me know if you think such a god fits into that.

If you haven't, you really must read Terry Pratchett's Small Gods. He simply nails this whole discussion. His entire Disc World series is well worth your time.

I can't remember which of Pratchett's books I've read. I should get into his stuff again.

Mike Elzinga · 29 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
Mike Elzinga said: There is probably a somewhat better argument based on thousands of conflicting sectarian claims about the nature of a deity. If a deity really wants a bunch of devoted followers....
Maybe that's the faulty assumption right there, ya think?

I certainly agree that is a faulty assumption; and it is not one that I make. It is what we hear all the time from sectarians that say that their deity wants people to follow it out of “love”. They say that Jesus wants people to come to him and that their deity mourns the loss of humans to “the devil.” And what does “Thou shall have no other gods before me.” mean? If deities didn’t care about human attention and behavior, why would a deity punish humans for not obeying the deity’s commands? Even their holy book says that their deity looked upon what it had created and regretted its work so much that it decided to destroy most of it in a flood; even the animals that had nothing to do with what humans had been deciding to do. Only a few humans “found favor” with the deity and were spared, along with a sample of the animals, which – if they could imagine what was going on – would be terribly confused as to why so many of their kind were being wiped out because of what the deity didn’t like about human behavior. Why are plants and animals caught up in the punishment being meted out by deities to “disobedient” humans? Genocide and scorched earth tactics are human traits. The deities of all religions have very human traits; including jealousy, a lust for vengeance, and a willingness to destroy other deities and humans who don’t behave they way they would like them to behave. However, if one puts aside such tales based on myths and human concoctions shrouded in history, and if one looks around at what we have learned about the universe, ourselves, and the history of religion, I think it would be fair to say that humans know very little about deities other than what they see of themselves reflected in the human traits they project onto those deities. It seems to me that those religions that put themselves out there for social justice and “stewardship” of the planet are the religions that have learned something about humans and human behavior that makes the followers of those religions better for having learned the lessons of history from their “prophets”; not from deities. On the other hand, those religions that nitpick endlessly over sectarian dogma - and over which dogma is favored by a deity - are essentially exclusive, personality cults that claim to have the corner on righteousness and morality. There isn’t any evidence for deities; but certainly any universe-creating deity would be nothing like what our religions say it is.

Mike Elzinga · 29 July 2014

eric said:
Well, if we were arguing that the neutrino's energy changed spontaneously, then yes, it would be. But we aren't. Miracles are not spontaneous events; they are directed events. They interact with physical systems in nonphysical ways. So it doesn't actually violate conservation of energy.
I do not think any physicist would agree with your last sentence re: your scenario. Maybe some other Pandas would like to weigh in on this? Mike?

I don’t know any physicist who would agree. I think David may be thinking more about being able to sort out the interaction of a deity from thousands of contingencies that affect the course of events; but that is why we do crosschecks with other experiments that take into account systematic effects and contingencies. We can detect “violations” of the laws of physics; and as the case of the neutrino illustrates, we find that apparent violations lead us to discover new particles or more complete theoretical frameworks. There has never been any reason to throw up our hands and say a deity must have messed with our experiments or intruded in the course of events. I suspect that placing the actions of a deity among thousands historical contingencies is another god-of-the-gaps strategy; not unlike hiding a deity among quantum uncertainties.

Malcolm · 29 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said(my bold):
eric said: ...simultaneously claiming divine hiddenness and that there was a miracle worker that raised the dead, walked on water, produced food from nothing, transmuted water to wine is just crass exceptionalism.
Hmm, odd. I don't really see it as "claiming" hiddenness. Hiddenness is obvious. I don't see God hanging out on the corner of First and Amistad. Either God is hidden, or God does not exist.

I believe that is the point that was being made. You can either have a hidden god, or a god that is a miracle worker that raised the dead, walked on water, produced food from nothing, transmuted water to wine. To claim both is just crass exceptionalism. Now do you get it?

eric · 29 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Hmm, odd. I don't really see it as "claiming" hiddenness. Hiddenness is obvious.

Hiddenness is not an obvious concept from the Bible. God talks to people. He works miracles in front of entire populations. He sends signs. His incarnation works miracles in front of people. There's nothing hidden about the biblical God. What you're trying to do is to explain the fact that there is no such signs or interference now, in the modern age. To do that, you appeal to the idea that God doesn't want people to empirically know of his existence. But that is not consistent with the God described in the bible, who seems to have no problem with people getting empirical evidence supporting his existence.

Its okay if you're a deist, but its hard to see the Christian divine hiddenness claim as anything more than ad hoc justification considering that the bible is filled with God choosing not to be hidden.
Because the Bible is the product of men? Hiddenness is wholly unmanageable for typical evangelical fundamentalism, I'll give you that. But I'm hardly typical, evangelical, or fundamentalist.

Forgive me if I mischaracterize you, but AIUI you do accept that a number of biblical miracles happened, at least the NT stuff. So let's limit the discussion to that: the New Testament is filled with God showing himself via miracles. Not just the 'secret communication to an individual' sort of reveal either; Jesus works miracles in front of entire crowds. This is not consistent with any claim that Yahweh is a hidden God, imminentely hidden God, or eminintly hidden God.

In order to say it's conserved you have to claim some source of energy (a empirically measurable 'thing') has entered it. But you're not saying that, you're saying it's only nonphysical. So I think you're stuck. You either have to say God does something measurable to the world, or you have to say physical law has been violated.
Of course God does something measurable in this example! The neutrino has a measurably higher energy. Why wouldn't it be measurable? The cause of a miracle is nonphysical, but the result is most definitely physical and measurable.

I'm sorry, I admit I was a bit unclear. In order for physical law not to appear to be violated, the source of the new energy must be observable. We must be able to understand how the new amount of excitation or kinetic energy got into that system. If we don't, then we say there has been an apparent violation. A non-Godly example would be a perpetual motion machine. If we can't figure out how the thing keeps running, then we call that an apparent violation of the laws of conservation. Maybe later we find it's been plugged into the wall or had a secret battery - and then, after we understand the source, we revise our conclusion and say that there was no apparent violation. But an increase in system energy with no observable cause or source counts as an apparent violation. I've said this before but I guess I wasn't clear: attaching "...and X entity caused it" to some miraculous event does not, on its own, shift that event from the 'violates known laws of physics' category to the 'conforms to known laws of physics' category. If that were true, there would be no religious claim that violated physics. You need more than just a claim of a source of the act to make it conform to physical laws.

david.starling.macmillan · 29 July 2014

Malcolm said: You can either have a hidden god, or a god that is a miracle worker that raised the dead, walked on water, produced food from nothing, transmuted water to wine. To claim both is just crass exceptionalism.

I differ. To claim a god that raises the dead, heals the sick, protects preferred political parties, helps you find your keys, etc. while simultaneously maintaining hiddenness and doing all those things in a way that's pristinely undetectable...that's exceptionalism. On the other hand, pointing out that whatever visible interactions a god may or may not have had with nature in the past, he clearly isn't visibly interacting at present...that's not really even a claim. That's just on observation, one I think we can all agree on. Now, if you want to use this to advance an argument against any interactions, that's on you.

Mike Elzinga said: It is what we hear all the time from sectarians that say that their deity wants people to follow it out of “love”. They say that Jesus wants people to come to him and that their deity mourns the loss of humans to “the devil.” And what does “Thou shall have no other gods before me.” mean? If deities didn’t care about human attention and behavior, why would a deity punish humans for not obeying the deity’s commands? The deities of all religions have very human traits; including jealousy, a lust for vengeance, and a willingness to destroy other deities and humans who don’t behave they way they would like them to behave.

Hmm...it's almost like the gods of religion are shaped according to the image and likeness of humans. Wonder what that says about humankind?

...if one puts aside such tales based on myths and human concoctions shrouded in history, and if one looks around at what we have learned about the universe, ourselves, and the history of religion, I think it would be fair to say that humans know very little about deities other than what they see of themselves reflected in the human traits they project onto those deities.

That's my basic idea, anyway. Even if God were to speak through prophets, it would inevitably be twisted up and shoved into the same sort of system. So the only way to get humanity to make a change would be to actually be that change. Enter Jesus.

Mike Elzinga said: I think David may be thinking more about being able to sort out the interaction of a deity from thousands of contingencies that affect the course of events; but that is why we do crosschecks with other experiments that take into account systematic effects and contingencies. We can detect “violations” of the laws of physics; and as the case of the neutrino illustrates, we find that apparent violations lead us to discover new particles or more complete theoretical frameworks. There has never been any reason to throw up our hands and say a deity must have messed with our experiments or intruded in the course of events.

Precisely. I'm certainly not suggesting that God is going around tinkering with the energy levels of neutrinos to screw with us. I'm pointing out that miracles themselves would certainly be detectable if we happened to have a detector in the right place at the right time, but they wouldn't change any of our understandings of physical interactions. At most, they would simply add an unknown constant, but one which would be typically dismissible.

eric said: What you're trying to do is to explain the fact that there is no such signs or interference now, in the modern age. To do that, you appeal to the idea that God doesn't want people to empirically know of his existence.

It's not an issue of want; it's an issue of need. My understanding of Christianity suggests that once the Incarnation and the Resurrection were accomplished, there was no further need of empirically-established god-belief. If God has no particular need for people to believe in him specifically for the sake of believing in him, then there’s no reason to expect anything different than what we see.

...the New Testament is filled with God showing himself via miracles. Not just the 'secret communication to an individual' sort of reveal either; Jesus works miracles in front of entire crowds. This is not consistent with any claim that Yahweh is a hidden God, imminentely hidden God, or eminintly hidden God.

Well, that would be the whole point of an Incarnation, wouldn’t it?

eric · 29 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: pointing out that whatever visible interactions a god may or may not have had with nature in the past, he clearly isn't visibly interacting at present...that's not really even a claim.

It very much is a claim. It's a claim that you know what happened in the past. Its also a claim that you know the nature of God at least partially - well enough that if there's a weeping statue in India tomorrow or if Jesus appears on someone's toast, you will say that this is not a God appearance because it is the nature of God not to do such appearences.

I'm pointing out that miracles themselves would certainly be detectable if we happened to have a detector in the right place at the right time, but they wouldn't change any of our understandings of physical interactions. At most, they would simply add an unknown constant, but one which would be typically dismissible.

I still disagree. I don't see how we could not change our understanding, if we get some credible observation of a violation. Perhaps we are differing on that "credible" issue? I have been assuming that when you talk about miracles, we are talking some credibly observed event; some observation that scientists would take seriously and not dismiss as a hoax or fraud or incomplete/bad data. If your point is that miracles will not come in 'credible events,' so we will have no good reason to alter our understanding of science, I guess I could see that. If this is the case though, your point seems like another waste of time to me, like your use of 'counterfactual.' There is very little point to discussing non-credible claims. And, I'd also point out, the idea that God works only through non-credible miracles is still inconsistent with both the NT and OT. Helena's informed, academic explanation (from a couple weeks ago) of the water-to-wine miracle was extremely relevant to this question: the language of the story was specifically chosen to refute common accusations of trickery that were circulating at the time. IOW, it sure looks like the gospel writers went out of their way to embed the subtext "see, it couldn't have been a trick or fraud" into the story. The Cana story's details are meant to lend credibility to the miracle. So if your point is to say that God would never perform a credible miracle, never leave evidence that scientists would be forced to take seriously, this seems to be refuted by at least one of the bible's miracle accounts.

It's not an issue of want; it's an issue of need. My understanding of Christianity suggests that once the Incarnation and the Resurrection were accomplished, there was no further need of empirically-established god-belief. If God has no particular need for people to believe in him specifically for the sake of believing in him, then there’s no reason to expect anything different than what we see.

Well first, the whole doubting Thomas thing occurred after the resurrection. I don't see why days after or centuries after should make a difference. If Jesus saw the value in helping Thomas through his disbelief, then I don't see why helping modern Thomas' through their disbelief would be any different. Second, IMO there is clearly a need...unless God is supremely callous and indifferent to people going to hell. You've got a lot of people here who would at least rethink the question of whether to accept Jesus if they got some credible empirical evidence that the biblical account was true. That's souls that can be saved from hell if God is willing to do a miracle or two. "No need" begs the question of what God wants to accomplish, and if "salvation of all humanity" is what he wants to accomplish, then I would say that the need - for at least some people - is very clear.

Jesus works miracles in front of entire crowds. This is not consistent with any claim that Yahweh is a hidden God, imminentely hidden God, or eminintly hidden God.
Well, that would be the whole point of an Incarnation, wouldn’t it?

That, my friend, is not any sort of answer. If incarnation is God's valid work-around for wanting to stay hidden WHILE showing his divine presence, then there's no reason he can't incarnate now. Its theological Price is Right - Jesus Christ, come on down!!!

david.starling.macmillan · 29 July 2014

eric said:
david.starling.macmillan said: pointing out that whatever visible interactions a god may or may not have had with nature in the past, he clearly isn't visibly interacting at present...that's not really even a claim.
It very much is a claim. It's a claim that you know what happened in the past.

Not at all. Like I said, whatever visible interactions a god may or may not have had in the past, we know there's no empirically-detectable evidence of divine action now. That's not a claim about the past at all. It's a claim about the present. Do you disagree? Do you think there is empirically-detectable evidence of God?

I'm pointing out that miracles themselves would certainly be detectable if we happened to have a detector in the right place at the right time, but they wouldn't change any of our understandings of physical interactions. At most, they would simply add an unknown constant, but one which would be typically dismissible.
I still disagree. I don't see how we could not change our understanding, if we get some credible observation of a violation.

I guess it depends on what you mean by a "change" to our understanding. If you're saying that the empirical observation of a miracle would force us to revise all our physics to add an unknown miracle-constant which will be assumed to be zero in 99.999999999% of all cases, then I suppose that's fine. But I don't see that as a change to our current equations; just an update. If F = ma + k where k is 0 in virtually every case, then F = ma isn't really wrong or useless or incorrect.

It's not an issue of want; it's an issue of need. My understanding of Christianity suggests that once the Incarnation and the Resurrection were accomplished, there was no further need of empirically-established god-belief. If God has no particular need for people to believe in him specifically for the sake of believing in him, then there’s no reason to expect anything different than what we see.
Well first, the whole doubting Thomas thing occurred after the resurrection.

But still during the Incarnation. And there can be exceptions in extraordinary circumstances, e.g. Paul (though you may or may not consider a vision to be a proper miracle).

Second, IMO there is clearly a need...unless God is supremely callous and indifferent to people going to hell.

Because hell is totally, like, a real place.

"No need" begs the question of what God wants to accomplish, and if "salvation of all humanity" is what he wants to accomplish, then I would say that the need - for at least some people - is very clear.

Well, I would say God wants to accomplish the salvation of humanity from humanity, not from his imagined temper tantrums over sin.

If incarnation is God's valid work-around for wanting to stay hidden WHILE showing his divine presence, then there's no reason he can't incarnate now.

Unless, of course, the first incarnation accomplished everything it was intended to. Which is the one thing that virtually every orthodox Christian agrees on. And hiddenness wasn't part of that. Hiddenness is an result, not a "need" in itself.

TomS · 29 July 2014

stevaroni said: The biggest issue with Fl and his ilk is that in his mind it's "persecution" to teach the simple, demonstrable, easy to understand way that the physical world actually works, rather than to pretend that there's a mysterious, undetectable, magical being that controls it all from behind the curtain.

What strikes me, moreover, is that (1) that the "mysterious" stance is supposed to be an "alternative", even though it does not make any gesture toward describing how the world is supposed to work (2) the "mysterious" is only invoked for evolution and a few other few other things (deep time, big bang, "historical science") and not for other things (procreation, heliocentrism, "remote science"), with no discernible reason for the different treatment.

eric · 29 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Not at all. Like I said, whatever visible interactions a god may or may not have had in the past, we know there's no empirically-detectable evidence of divine action now. That's not a claim about the past at all. It's a claim about the present. Do you disagree?

Hey now, first you said "its not even a claim." Now you say "its not even a claim about the past." Saying its a claim about the present is saying its a claim, yes?

Do you think there is empirically-detectable evidence of God?

Well, as I said, if H2O had transmuted to ethanol in a way that didn't violate the laws of physics, the guests at the wedding would've toppled over dead from prompt gamma irradiation. You seem to be trying to make the argument that the resurrection and other NT miracles would have left no detectable trace, no evidence that we can access currently that they occurred. But those NT miracles are just like FL's claims about OT miracles such as the flood, in that we can ask what evidence they would have left had they occurred, and see if the evidence we have is consistent with them. And in the case of water-to-wine, we can say that the account given is not consistent with a physics-obeying transmutation of elements. So you either give up that the transmutation happened, or give up that it was physics-obeying and go with a more omphalos-like view of miracles.

I guess it depends on what you mean by a "change" to our understanding. If you're saying that the empirical observation of a miracle would force us to revise all our physics to add an unknown miracle-constant which will be assumed to be zero in 99.999999999% of all cases, then I suppose that's fine. But I don't see that as a change to our current equations; just an update. If F = ma + k where k is 0 in virtually every case, then F = ma isn't really wrong or useless or incorrect.

I would agree that F=ma would still be a good and useful approximation of F=ma+k, given a rarely acting God. I disagree that this is not a change in our understanding. It is an enormous change in our understanding. You are telling me, essentially, 'evidential support for the existence of gods? Meh, nobody's going to change their worldview over that.' Really? I would also point out that k does not have to be large for the revision in our understanding to be enormous. QM has brought on an enormous change in our understanding of how the world works, and yet at the level of cannonball physics, if we were to parse it in terms of "what's it's k-value in F=ma+k?", the answer would be essentially zero.

Well first, the whole doubting Thomas thing occurred after the resurrection.
But still during the Incarnation. And there can be exceptions in extraordinary circumstances, e.g. Paul (though you may or may not consider a vision to be a proper miracle).

That fits the definition of exceptionalism. "Nobody gets evidence after the resurrection because nobody needs evidence after the resurrection...except the guys that the bible said received it." Next you'll be telling me that the free will of humans would fundamentally compromised if any of us saw evidence of God...well, except for the thousands to tens of thousands of people the bible says got that evidence. It didn't compromise their wills because...um...exception.

Second, IMO there is clearly a need...unless God is supremely callous and indifferent to people going to hell.
Because hell is totally, like, a real place.

So, if I understand your theology, the reason God doesn't give evidence is because we don't need evidence, because post-resurrection it makes no difference whether one believes or not? People who don't believe because they lack evidence don't suffer any harm for it that God would want fixed? That is certainly not out of the boundaries of some very liberal sects (UUs spring to mind), so just so you know, I'm asking real clarification questions. The above is not intended as a rhetorical/incredulous point.

david.starling.macmillan · 29 July 2014

eric said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Not at all. Like I said, whatever visible interactions a god may or may not have had in the past, we know there's no empirically-detectable evidence of divine action now. That's not a claim about the past at all. It's a claim about the present. Do you disagree?
Hey now, first you said "its not even a claim." Now you say "its not even a claim about the past." Saying its a claim about the present is saying its a claim, yes?

I'm just saying, I don't think we need to dispute the lack of empirical evidence for divine interaction at present. Do we? If we can agree, then that part isn't a claim per se, it's an agreed-upon observation.

Do you think there is empirically-detectable evidence of God?
Well, as I said, if H2O had transmuted to ethanol in a way that didn't violate the laws of physics, the guests at the wedding would've toppled over dead from prompt gamma irradiation.

H2O in earthenware jars doesn't spontaneously transmute to ethanol, with or without gamma radiation. That's the part of your argument I don't get. You already acknowledge that such a miracle would have to be triggered nonphysically; why is it so hard for you to accept that God wouldn't need to produce zillions of gamma rays in order to accomplish it?

So you either give up that the transmutation happened, or give up that it was physics-obeying and go with a more omphalos-like view of miracles.

Omphalos says that God created with a false history. That's different from saying God prevented gamma radiation from killing everyone present.

I would agree that F=ma would still be a good and useful approximation of F=ma+k, given a rarely acting God. I disagree that this is not a change in our understanding. It is an enormous change in our understanding. You are telling me, essentially, 'evidential support for the existence of gods? Meh, nobody's going to change their worldview over that.' Really?

Of course it would be a huge worldview change. But it wouldn't change anything about the way science works, as long as we can all agree that we won't expect God to screw around with our experiments just for the hell of it.

Next you'll be telling me that the free will of humans would fundamentally compromised if any of us saw evidence of God...well, except for the thousands to tens of thousands of people the bible says got that evidence. It didn't compromise their wills because...um...exception.

Has nothing to do with free will. That is and has always been a lousy, lousy argument.

...if I understand your theology, the reason God doesn't give evidence is because we don't need evidence, because post-resurrection it makes no difference whether one believes or not? People who don't believe because they lack evidence don't suffer any harm for it that God would want fixed? That is certainly not out of the boundaries of some very liberal sects (UUs spring to mind), so just so you know, I'm asking real clarification questions. The above is not intended as a rhetorical/incredulous point.

Sure, I understand. Yeah, that's about it. Like I said, please take a look at my BW comment to FL from Sunday to get a better idea of what I'm talking about; I think you'll find it interesting. Salvation isn't about saving us from God; it's about saving us from us. Even though the reconciliation of humanity centers around the person of Jesus, you don't have to be a theist to be part of it. Paul says as much -- that Jesus is the "savior of the whole world, and especially of us who believe."

Mike Elzinga · 29 July 2014

F = ma, except on rare occasions when no one is looking?

There are lots of times when nobody is paying attention and assuming that F = ma - or any other physical law - remains true. Contingencies intrude all the time in uncontrolled chains of events; but suggesting that some of those “contingencies” were really the interventions of a deity is what is called a god-of-the-gaps argument.

I don’t see why it would be more reasonable to conclude - based on our knowledge of contingencies from cases we have checked - that “a miracle occurred” rather than a contingency happened.

It seems to me that fitting miracles among contingencies is inconsistent with our knowledge of the regularities of physical law. We are saying, in effect, that contingencies follow physical law except when they don’t, especially during the times we aren’t looking; and doing this, no less, in order to preserve some form of a sectarian dogma.

david.starling.macmillan · 29 July 2014

Mike Elzinga said: F = ma, except on rare occasions when no one is looking? It seems to me that fitting miracles among contingencies is inconsistent with our knowledge of the regularities of physical law. We are saying, in effect, that contingencies follow physical law except when they don’t, especially during the times we aren’t looking....

No one said anything about looking or not looking. I'm saying that F = ma + k, with k equals zero unless God has a specific, immediate need for k to not equal zero in a particular system.

Henry J · 29 July 2014

Since F is the summation of all forces each of which would accelerate the mass if the other forces weren't there, why not just posit an additional force?

phhht · 29 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: I'm saying that F = ma + k, with k equals zero unless God has a specific, immediate need for k to not equal zero in a particular system.

But that is nothing more than fiction. There are no gods who have either needs or abilities to mess with Newton's second law of motion. In reality, k is always zero. Your assertion is a fantasy.

eric · 29 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: I'm just saying, I don't think we need to dispute the lack of empirical evidence for divine interaction at present. Do we? If we can agree, then that part isn't a claim per se, it's an agreed-upon observation.

Agreed. Let's end discussion on this point. It's one less thing to respond to.

Do you think there is empirically-detectable evidence of God?
Well, as I said, if H2O had transmuted to ethanol in a way that didn't violate the laws of physics, the guests at the wedding would've toppled over dead from prompt gamma irradiation.
H2O in earthenware jars doesn't spontaneously transmute to ethanol, with or without gamma radiation. That's the part of your argument I don't get. You already acknowledge that such a miracle would have to be triggered nonphysically; why is it so hard for you to accept that God wouldn't need to produce zillions of gamma rays in order to accomplish it?

I did not say "spontaneously." If there's a transmutation that doesn't realease gammas, that violates our current understanding of the laws of conservation of energy and momentum, regardless of the presence or absence of some nonphysical trigger.

So you either give up that the transmutation happened, or give up that it was physics-obeying and go with a more omphalos-like view of miracles.
Omphalos says that God created with a false history. That's different from saying God prevented gamma radiation from killing everyone present.

I disagree. In both cases what you have is an intervention that - in part - erases information that there was an intervention. The lack of emitted gammas is just like the lack of C14 or in the oldest carbon sinks (a problem for YECs); removing that carbon or those gammas creates a false history.

Of course it would be a huge worldview change. But it wouldn't change anything about the way science works, as long as we can all agree that we won't expect God to screw around with our experiments just for the hell of it.

I don't agree to that. I'm a scientist: if there is some entity out there that looks like it is a causal factor in my equations, it better show up in my equations. That is the intellectually honest thing to do. If I observe some photon suddenly gaining 2 MeV or a transmutation which should release gammas not releasing gammas, I'm going to scream it to the world, and if it leads to a modification of our equations, I'll be happy about that, not sad or upset. Pretending it didn't happen because I think God only occasionaly does such things is simply not in the cards.

Salvation isn't about saving us from God; it's about saving us from us. Even though the reconciliation of humanity centers around the person of Jesus, you don't have to be a theist to be part of it. Paul says as much -- that Jesus is the "savior of the whole world, and especially of us who believe."

Fair enough. If lack of belief doesn't cause some metaphysical harm that needs fixing, then (in that theology) it makes a bit more sense to say that God is not going to intervene to try and fix it.

Mike Elzinga · 29 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
Mike Elzinga said: F = ma, except on rare occasions when no one is looking? It seems to me that fitting miracles among contingencies is inconsistent with our knowledge of the regularities of physical law. We are saying, in effect, that contingencies follow physical law except when they don’t, especially during the times we aren’t looking....
No one said anything about looking or not looking. I'm saying that F = ma + k, with k equals zero unless God has a specific, immediate need for k to not equal zero in a particular system.

I guess I don’t know how that is any different than saying k usually represents a normal contingency, but it is occasionally replace by the supernatural intervention of a deity. If we happen to be looking, and it is a one-off event, how will we ever check that it is NOT a contingent force? Apparently deities, like ghosts, can decide in an instant NOT to be detected by any experiment we can think of to do. They can even slip in and do a one-off intervention to avoid detection even if we quickly do an experiment based on the outcome of a random toss of the dice. We try go back to check, and the deity is gone; so we decide it was a contingency (fluke) we didn’t get a chance to check. So how is that any different from no deities or ghosts at all? Why postulate conscious entities that always make themselves undetectable in principle when none of our experiences with physical law and physical contingencies call for them? And why would deities mess with our heads like that? That sounds too much like a Loki thing to do; and Loki is very much the embodiment of a human characteristic.

david.starling.macmillan · 29 July 2014

Henry J said: Since F is the summation of all forces each of which would accelerate the mass if the other forces weren't there, why not just posit an additional force?

It's just an example. F = ma is a stand-in for any conceivable equation which could accept a constant in that fashion.

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: I'm saying that F = ma + k, with k equals zero unless God has a specific, immediate need for k to not equal zero in a particular system.
But that is nothing more than fiction.

Question-begging.

eric said:
Omphalos says that God created with a false history. That's different from saying God prevented gamma radiation from killing everyone present.
I disagree. In both cases what you have is an intervention that - in part - erases information that there was an intervention.

But if God is already doing a miracle to replace the water in the jars with ethanol, what makes you think he needs to use nuclear physics and gamma radiation to do so? And what would be so weird about preventing the release of gamma radiation anyway? God would have no reason to produce fake carbon-14 results in fossils, but he would have a very good reason not to kill everyone present.

Of course it would be a huge worldview change. But it wouldn't change anything about the way science works, as long as we can all agree that we won't expect God to screw around with our experiments just for the hell of it.
If I observe some photon suddenly gaining 2 MeV or a transmutation which should release gammas not releasing gammas, I'm going to scream it to the world, and if it leads to a modification of our equations...

...then you will have discovered a new physical law. Not a miracle. A miracle, in essence, is the hidden "+k" in every equation...where k is assumed to be zero in any case not involving direct conscious divine action.

Salvation isn't about saving us from God; it's about saving us from us. Even though the reconciliation of humanity centers around the person of Jesus, you don't have to be a theist to be part of it. Paul says as much -- that Jesus is the "savior of the whole world, and especially of us who believe."
Fair enough. If lack of belief doesn't cause some metaphysical harm that needs fixing, then (in that theology) it makes a bit more sense to say that God is not going to intervene to try and fix it.

Glad we're agreed. ;)

Mike Elzinga said: Why postulate conscious entities that always make themselves undetectable in principle when none of our experiences with physical law and physical contingencies call for them?

I'm not postulating an entity that makes itself undetectable. I'm saying that a divine miracle, if one were to take place, would not render science unusable or incorrect; it would just be an exception to the rule.

phhht · 29 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: I'm saying that F = ma + k, with k equals zero unless God has a specific, immediate need for k to not equal zero in a particular system.
But that is nothing more than fiction.
Question-begging.

Fantasizing.

Mike Elzinga · 29 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: I'm not postulating an entity that makes itself undetectable. I'm saying that a divine miracle, if one were to take place, would not render science unusable or incorrect; it would just be an exception to the rule.

What would tell us that we are observing an exception to the rule instead of a contingency? How do we distinguish a “miracle” from an unanticipated contingency? In other words, what would make us conclude that we just detected an event orchestrated by a deity?

david.starling.macmillan · 29 July 2014

Mike Elzinga said:
david.starling.macmillan said: I'm not postulating an entity that makes itself undetectable. I'm saying that a divine miracle, if one were to take place, would not render science unusable or incorrect; it would just be an exception to the rule.
What would tell us that we are observing an exception to the rule instead of a contingency? How do we distinguish a “miracle” from an unanticipated contingency? In other words, what would make us conclude that we just detected an event orchestrated by a deity?

A deity taking credit, mostly. Case in point, "God raised him from the dead."

phhht · 29 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
Mike Elzinga said:
david.starling.macmillan said: I'm not postulating an entity that makes itself undetectable. I'm saying that a divine miracle, if one were to take place, would not render science unusable or incorrect; it would just be an exception to the rule.
What would tell us that we are observing an exception to the rule instead of a contingency? How do we distinguish a “miracle” from an unanticipated contingency? In other words, what would make us conclude that we just detected an event orchestrated by a deity?
A deity taking credit, mostly. Case in point, "God raised him from the dead."

That is no deity taking credit. That is a credulous believer attributing an event to a non-existent fictional character.

phhht · 29 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
Mike Elzinga said:
david.starling.macmillan said: I'm not postulating an entity that makes itself undetectable. I'm saying that a divine miracle, if one were to take place, would not render science unusable or incorrect; it would just be an exception to the rule.
What would tell us that we are observing an exception to the rule instead of a contingency? How do we distinguish a “miracle” from an unanticipated contingency? In other words, what would make us conclude that we just detected an event orchestrated by a deity?
A deity taking credit, mostly. Case in point, "God raised him from the dead."
That is no deity taking credit. That is a credulous believer attributing an event to a non-existent fictional character.

Like "The virus raised him from the dead."

david.starling.macmillan · 29 July 2014

Perhaps more to phhht's liking, then....

"Which is easier, to say to the paralytic, ‘Your sins are forgiven,’ or to say, ‘Rise, take up your bed and walk’? But that you may know that the Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins” — he turned to the paralytic — “I say to you, rise, pick up your bed, and go home.” And he rose and immediately picked up his bed and went out before them all.

That work better?

Mike Elzinga · 29 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
Mike Elzinga said:
david.starling.macmillan said: I'm not postulating an entity that makes itself undetectable. I'm saying that a divine miracle, if one were to take place, would not render science unusable or incorrect; it would just be an exception to the rule.
What would tell us that we are observing an exception to the rule instead of a contingency? How do we distinguish a “miracle” from an unanticipated contingency? In other words, what would make us conclude that we just detected an event orchestrated by a deity?
A deity taking credit, mostly. Case in point, "God raised him from the dead."

I have no idea what “A deity taking credit” even means. What would tell us that there is a “deity” that is taking credit for something? What are the physical manifestations of such an event? How would we check them, and how long would we be able to keep checking them until we have a decent chance of ruling out natural explanations? Here is where I am having trouble understanding what the distinguishing characteristics of a “miracle” would be. All of the purported “miracles” we have heard about have been stories passed around and picked up by writers in the distant past. Thus, we have only hearsay reports of “miracles” from the past coming to us via people we don’t know let alone have any assurances that they or their “sources” existed and were reliable reporters who knew how to check. If that is all we have, why are we obliged to believe that “miracles” happened even though we can’t check and we don’t have miracles today? The question then comes down to what would constitute the distinguishing characteristics of a “miracle” today. What is the process for verifying they actually happen? Anecdotal reports are, at best, a possible justification for starting an investigation; but such reports should not be taken at face value, even if many people claim to have seen something they think is a “miracle.” So in short: What is a miracle really? Did miracles actually happen in the past? How can we check? Do miracles happen today? How can we check? What would an investigation entail? Put in more terse scientific terms, what is the operational definition of a “miracle?”

david.starling.macmillan · 29 July 2014

For better or worse, I'm just going to go ahead and punt to Clarke's Third Law on this one. Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from ~~magic~~ [miracles]. So if one gets bogged down in figuring out the operational definition of a miracle, it's more useful to simply revise the question to a functionally equivalent but less philosophically problematic one, namely: what is the process for verifying whether an alien intelligence is using advanced technology to do apparent miracles, and what is a good basis for determining whether such an event took place at some point in history?

Not to say that Jesus was an alien or anything, mind you. My view of God is one that implies transcendence -- i.e., God can alter the physical universe as easily as the Matrix can be altered by the program running it. But for our purposes -- the purposes of investigation, detection, and so forth -- there's no need to split hairs; miracles are indistinguishable from sufficiently advanced technology.

I obviously don't think aliens have ever landed on Earth; I have no idea whether or not intelligent extraterrestrial life exists at all. But it's not impossible that first contact could have been made but simply been lost to history. An alien civilization a few dozen lightyears from here could have detected Jupiter from its tugging on Sol, trained its radiotelescopes on our solar system, and detected the signature of biomolecules in the atmosphere of Sol Planet 3 twenty million years ago. They could have put a single astronaut on board a ship, put him in cryogenic sleep, and sent him on an exploratory mission. Suppose his ship all but burned-up on entry and only his life support pod survived, crash-landing somewhere remote and nasty. He could have escaped with severe injuries but met up with a primitive tribe, done some "miracles", and lived long enough to vaguely communicate his origins...at which point he could have died, and the villagers burned him on a funeral pyre to honor him.

Unlikely, of course, but not outside the realm of possibility. Could we conclude that such an event had happened, based solely on oral or written accounts? Probably not, but if those accounts contained the right kind of information, then perhaps.

Under such circumstances, how could we know whether "miracles" supposedly performed by this character had actually happened? It would be a special case, and it would certainly tax the limits of historical inquiry, but we could at least draw some general conclusions.

Make sense?

phhht · 29 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Perhaps more to phhht's liking, then.... "Which is easier, to say to the paralytic, ‘Your sins are forgiven,’ or to say, ‘Rise, take up your bed and walk’? But that you may know that the Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins” — he turned to the paralytic — “I say to you, rise, pick up your bed, and go home.” And he rose and immediately picked up his bed and went out before them all. That work better?

You mean is it better fiction? Nah, it would be better if we have it so the god goes back in time to Set Right What Once Went Wrong so the guy never got paralyzed in the first place! Shazam!

phhht · 29 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: For better or worse, I'm just going to go ahead and punt to Clarke's Third Law on this one. Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from ~~magic~~ [miracles]. So if one gets bogged down in figuring out the operational definition of a miracle, it's more useful to simply revise the question to a functionally equivalent but less philosophically problematic one, namely: what is the process for verifying whether an alien intelligence is using advanced technology to do apparent miracles, and what is a good basis for determining whether such an event took place at some point in history? Not to say that Jesus was an alien or anything, mind you. My view of God is one that implies transcendence -- i.e., God can alter the physical universe as easily as the Matrix can be altered by the program running it. But for our purposes -- the purposes of investigation, detection, and so forth -- there's no need to split hairs; miracles are indistinguishable from sufficiently advanced technology. I obviously don't think aliens have ever landed on Earth; I have no idea whether or not intelligent extraterrestrial life exists at all. But it's not impossible that first contact could have been made but simply been lost to history. An alien civilization a few dozen lightyears from here could have detected Jupiter from its tugging on Sol, trained its radiotelescopes on our solar system, and detected the signature of biomolecules in the atmosphere of Sol Planet 3 twenty million years ago. They could have put a single astronaut on board a ship, put him in cryogenic sleep, and sent him on an exploratory mission. Suppose his ship all but burned-up on entry and only his life support pod survived, crash-landing somewhere remote and nasty. He could have escaped with severe injuries but met up with a primitive tribe, done some "miracles", and lived long enough to vaguely communicate his origins...at which point he could have died, and the villagers burned him on a funeral pyre to honor him. Unlikely, of course, but not outside the realm of possibility. Could we conclude that such an event had happened, based solely on oral or written accounts? Probably not, but if those accounts contained the right kind of information, then perhaps. Under such circumstances, how could we know whether "miracles" supposedly performed by this character had actually happened? It would be a special case, and it would certainly tax the limits of historical inquiry, but we could at least draw some general conclusions. Make sense?

Vagueness is the unconquerable bulwark of religious belief. It's a lot easier to defend a miracle if nobody knows what one is.

Mike Elzinga · 29 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: My view of God is one that implies transcendence -- i.e., God can alter the physical universe as easily as the Matrix can be altered by the program running it. But for our purposes -- the purposes of investigation, detection, and so forth -- there's no need to split hairs; miracles are indistinguishable from sufficiently advanced technology.

Well, I like science fiction also; good writers are fun to read; and we can be glad that there are talented individuals who can write good novels for our entertainment and imagination. As to “transcendent” beings that can alter the physical universe, I suppose thoughts of such beings can be some sort of spark to one’s imagination and sense of purpose. I don’t see it as being much different from the projections of early humans – or even today’s hunter/gatherers - of themselves onto their universe. It can be a form of self awareness and stimulating ideas of potentiality. And I don’t wish to criticize whatever modes of thought others engage in to give structure and meaning to their lives. We all begin in different circumstances; and most of us end up taking different paths along a journey we don’t get to complete before we die. It is an interesting question, however, why so many humans seem to feel deities are necessary. It may be our historical habits, yet unlearned without fear, or it may be “logical” extrapolations of our early childhood relationships with our parents and surroundings carried into our adult years. There seems to be a notion among many humans that deities, especially some specified deity, are necessary for a fulfilling life. Many, if not most humans, seem to be skeptical, if not fearful, of claims by others that rich, fulfilling lives can be had without deities. That notion seems to be a source of considerable conflict and tension among people; so it is quite reasonable to ask if learning to live without deities is even achievable in the vase majority of cases. The transition from something like YEC fundamentalism is difficult enough for most brought up in that milieu; but what makes possible the transition to a fulfilling life without deities possible in a world that seems to be suspicious of people without deities? It is one thing to let go of a particular sectarian dogma – difficult in itself; but it seems to be quite a different thing to let go of deities.

eric · 29 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: But if God is already doing a miracle to replace the water in the jars with ethanol, what makes you think he needs to use nuclear physics and gamma radiation to do so?

You misunderstand; the release of gammas is a necessary consequence of the laws of conservation of energy and momentum. Yes of course an omnipotent God could violate these laws, but you seem insistent on saying that his miracles don't violate physical laws. So no, in a general sense he doesn't have to let these emissions happen. But in YOUR sense, the sense you've been arguing He acts for the past several pages, he does.

If I observe some photon suddenly gaining 2 MeV or a transmutation which should release gammas not releasing gammas, I'm going to scream it to the world, and if it leads to a modification of our equations...
...then you will have discovered a new physical law. Not a miracle. A miracle, in essence, is the hidden "+k" in every equation...where k is assumed to be zero in any case not involving direct conscious divine action.

Then I simply don't understand how your miracles work. Let me try and simplify this: if it's hidden, it violates. Non-violation requires non-hiddenness, because for us to say some event is not an apparent violation of physical law, we must be able to observe the cause of the event and be able to calculate the energy (or momentum, or what have you) in and out. What you're doing is trying to have your cake and eat it too: allow a completely unobservable, uncalculable source to produce effects that appear to violate physical law, but at the same time say no physical law has apparently been violated.

I'm saying that a divine miracle, if one were to take place, would not render science unusable or incorrect; it would just be an exception to the rule.

As a scientist, I reject the notion of exceptions to the rules. We can certainly say that some approximations are better than others, and I will certainly accept revising the rules based on new evidence. But it is fundamentally counter to the methodology of science to ignore some event because you think it's God-driven and therefore very rare. NO David, we do not ignore rare occurrences. We put them in. They count. To not count them is to make the same mistake FL makes - to selectively count data that only supports ones' preconceptions. I will not do that. Neither should you. It would be very bad science and biased to do what you ask - to ignore some event because one thinks it is a rare or momentary exception to the rules.

Malcolm · 29 July 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: I'm saying that F = ma + k, with k equals zero unless God has a specific, immediate need for k to not equal zero in a particular system.
But that is nothing more than fiction.
Question-begging.
Fantasizing.

I was going to go with special pleading

eric · 30 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: For better or worse, I'm just going to go ahead and punt to Clarke's Third Law on this one. Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from ~~magic~~ [miracles]. So if one gets bogged down in figuring out the operational definition of a miracle, it's more useful to simply revise the question to a functionally equivalent but less philosophically problematic one, namely: what is the process for verifying whether an alien intelligence is using advanced technology to do apparent miracles, and what is a good basis for determining whether such an event took place at some point in history? ...Under such circumstances, how could we know whether "miracles" supposedly performed by this character had actually happened? It would be a special case, and it would certainly tax the limits of historical inquiry, but we could at least draw some general conclusions. Make sense?

No, it seems completely irrelevant to the point we're arguing, and if it supports either one of us at all, it supports me. First, without some confirming or credible evidence that such an alien visit scenario took place, we all seem very comfortable concluding that it didn't take place (with all the sciencey caveats in mind - this conclusion is tentative, yada yada). Yet, you resist the notion that we should conclude Jesus' miracles didn't take place. One cannot make a negative conclusion about the alien scenario and yet remain agnostic about the Jesus one, because it's the exact same thing. It's either agnostic about both or negative conclusion on both, and since we all feel very reasonable and comfortable reaching a negative conclusion about alien visitors, I submit to you that the only thing holding you back from reaching the negative conclusion about Jesus' miracles is a pre-existing theological bias or belief. You're shielding your belief from a train of logic you would otherwise use. Second, if some advanced alien remained hidden while performing what looked like a violation of physical law, we would call that an apparent violation of physical law. The mere possibility of a Clarke alien behind some miracle is insufficient reason to say such an event is consistent with the laws of physics as we know them. In such a case we would investigate, and if no physical cause consistent with our current laws could be found, we would start revising those laws. We would not ignore the event because it was rare, and we would not shrug it off as consistent-because-of-hidden-source. IOW, if you replace God's supernatural intervention with a Clarke alien, scientists would respond to the miracle event exactly the way I've been saying, and not the way you think we should. The very pithy point here is the one I've made several times now: positing some agent behind an apparent miracle does not move it from the "apparent violation" category to the "consistent with physics as we know it" category. You need more than just a possible, hypothetical agent to do that; you need observed mechanism. You need evidence of that agent and an understanding of its capabilities. Without those things, its an apparent violation. Many of the NT miracles are apparent violations of physics as we know it, and positing that an agent caused them (vs. a spontaneous event) does not change that. Saying "agent did it" is not a magical get-out-of-violation-free card.

david.starling.macmillan · 30 July 2014

if some advanced alien remained hidden while performing what looked like a violation of physical law

No one is saying God "remained hidden" while performing miracles.

eric · 31 July 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
if some advanced alien remained hidden while performing what looked like a violation of physical law
No one is saying God "remained hidden" while performing miracles.

Well, I think you've strongly implied that God remains hidden. Your (July 29th) 8:00am post implies that you think the whole point of the incarnation is to allow God (Jesus form) to work miracles while God (Yahweh form) stays hidden. Your 9:02am response to me says "Hiddenness is an result, not a “need” in itself." And in your 2:48pm reply to Mike you said "A miracle, in essence, is the hidden “+k” in every equation." To reiterate a broader point, I don't think scientists are going to accept the fact that we should ignore (credible observations of) god-produced miracles because they are rare or god-produced. If or when we observe them, we will seek to alter our laws to show how they are allowed. The course you lay out for how scientists should treat religious miracles is just not a course scienctists will methodologically accept. It would be ignoring data that runs counter to our conclusions, which (as I've said before) is something fundamentalists may be happy doing, but which most of us are loathe to do.

david.starling.macmillan · 31 July 2014

eric said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
if some advanced alien remained hidden while performing what looked like a violation of physical law
No one is saying God "remained hidden" while performing miracles.
Well, I think you've strongly implied that God remains hidden. Your (July 29th) 8:00am post implies that you think the whole point of the incarnation is to allow God (Jesus form) to work miracles while God (Yahweh form) stays hidden.

Ah, well, sorry about that. Didn't mean to imply that at all.

To reiterate a broader point, I don't think scientists are going to accept the fact that we should ignore (credible observations of) god-produced miracles because they are rare or god-produced. If or when we observe them, we will seek to alter our laws to show how they are allowed.

Good.

eric said: ...the release of gammas is a necessary consequence of the laws of conservation of energy and momentum. Yes of course an omnipotent God could violate these laws, but you seem insistent on saying that his miracles don't violate physical laws. So no, in a general sense he doesn't have to let these emissions happen. But in YOUR sense, the sense you've been arguing He acts for the past several pages, he does.

Maybe this is just a difference in terms, then. If you want to say miracles violate natural laws, that's fine. I don't think of an added mechanism "violating" existing laws any more than special relativity "violated" Newtonian mechanics; the observations of Newtonian mechanics were still correct within their original bounds. But this is probably just hair-splitting. What I have a problem with is making an absolutist inductive argument on this basis. "Miracles violate natural laws, and so the only way miracles could happen would be if all our observations were wrong." No, the existence of miracles would not require natural law to be thrown out any more than relativity required Newtonian mechanics to be thrown out. Newtonian mechanics is an accurate and useful description of reality for v << c; natural laws are an accurate and useful description of reality for k = 0. We can certainly agree that miracles haven't been observed under consistent laboratory conditions. There is no reason to add the "+ k" variable into our equations unless such an observation is made. But that's my point. Science still works just fine regardless of whether or not miracles could have happened at some point in history.

...without some confirming or credible evidence that such an alien visit scenario took place, we all seem very comfortable concluding that it didn’t take place (with all the sciencey caveats in mind - this conclusion is tentative, yada yada).

Of course. My question is, what would count as confirming-or-credible evidence? Or, better yet, is there a point at which we could say, "Wow. There's enough evidence here to suggest that an alien really could have visited. We have no way of knowing for sure, but it's enough to use as a basis for encouraging greater scrutiny of nearby star systems, even if we know it won't turn anything up within our lifetimes."?

eric · 1 August 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: If you want to say miracles violate natural laws, that's fine. I don't think of an added mechanism "violating" existing laws any more than special relativity "violated" Newtonian mechanics; the observations of Newtonian mechanics were still correct within their original bounds. But this is probably just hair-splitting.

We are indeed hair-splitting (or using terms differently), because to my way of thinking special relativity does violate Newton's laws. You accelerate something in a Newtonian framework, it doesn't gain mass. You accelerate something in a relativistic one, and it does. Newton did not put "bounds" on his laws. He didn't limit them to macroscopic objects or slow objects. We now say they work very well within a set of boundary conditions, but those boundary conditions are not something that comes out of Newton's laws; its not intrinsic to them. When Newton formulated them, he expected them to hold for all things at all times under all circumstances, and they don't. Some observations violate them.

the existence of miracles would not require natural law to be thrown out any more than relativity required Newtonian mechanics to be thrown out.

I think our disagreement may hinge on two different uses of "thrown out." There's the useful model meaning (throw out = we won't use it any more), and the representative model meaning (throw out = we don't think it represents reality any more). I think for most scientists, credibly observed miracles would cause us to throw out our physical laws in the second meaning. When I say we would be forced to revise (for purposes of this conversation, 'throw out') current physical laws, I mean it in the second way. But I agree with you, not in the first meaning. The physical laws that did not include miracle terms would become analogous to Newton's laws; used, but not considered to be the best or most accurate (most representative) model of how the universe works at a fundamental level.

...without some confirming or credible evidence that such an alien visit scenario took place, we all seem very comfortable concluding that it didn’t take place (with all the sciencey caveats in mind - this conclusion is tentative, yada yada).
Of course. My question is, what would count as confirming-or-credible evidence? Or, better yet, is there a point at which we could say, "Wow. There's enough evidence here to suggest that an alien really could have visited. We have no way of knowing for sure, but it's enough to use as a basis for encouraging greater scrutiny of nearby star systems, even if we know it won't turn anything up within our lifetimes."?

Yes, absolutely I think we could reach that point. And while the line between credible/confirming vs. not may be fuzzy and broad, I think a mention of aliens or miracles in an old book doesn't even come close to that line. As far as I can tell, you agree with me on that when it comes to aliens and most miracles, but disagree with that conclusion when it comes to some Christian miracles. How do you rationally justify that inconsistency?

david.starling.macmillan · 1 August 2014

eric said: ...to my way of thinking, special relativity does violate Newton's laws. You accelerate something in a Newtonian framework, it doesn't gain mass. You accelerate something in a relativistic one, and it does. Newton did not put "bounds" on his laws. He didn't limit them to macroscopic objects or slow objects. We now say they work very well within a set of boundary conditions, but those boundary conditions are not something that comes out of Newton's laws; its not intrinsic to them. When Newton formulated them, he expected them to hold for all things at all times under all circumstances, and they don't. Some observations violate them.

Perhaps one further caveat will help to clarify things. We don't typically factor in relativistic effects for any velocities lower than 5-15% of c, simply because it's negligible. But we know the effects are still there. What if, instead, the effects weren't there. What if relativistic effects actually had a physical threshold, where they were literally 0 up until 10% of c and then suddenly kicked in? If that was the case, then it would be more difficult to say that Newtonian mechanics was wrong, because Newtonian mechanics had simply never addressed anything above 10% of c. Sure, perhaps Newton had assumed that things would be the same regardless of speed, and yes, that assumption was wrong, but that assumption wasn't an essential part of his science. Or, let's use something even less ambiguous: chemistry and radioactivity. Chemistry didn't predict radioactive decay. Chemistry couldn't predict radioactive decay. But the discovery of radioactive decay didn't make chemistry wrong; it was just a separate phenomenon outside the scope of chemistry.

The physical laws that did not include miracle terms would become analogous to Newton's laws; used, but not considered to be the best or most accurate (most representative) model of how the universe works at a fundamental level.

Sure. However, I don't think you can take this and say, "Now, see, miracles can't happen because they contradict science" any more than a chemist could say "Now, see, radioactive decay can't happen because it contradicts chemistry."

My question is, what would count as confirming-or-credible evidence? Or, better yet, is there a point at which we could say, "Wow. There's enough evidence here to suggest that an alien really could have visited. We have no way of knowing for sure, but it's enough to use as a basis for encouraging greater scrutiny of nearby star systems, even if we know it won't turn anything up within our lifetimes."?
Yes, absolutely I think we could reach that point. And while the line between credible/confirming vs. not may be fuzzy and broad, I think a mention of aliens or miracles in an old book doesn't even come close to that line.

Not just a single mention of a "visitor from the sky", no. But I imagine there could be a threshold at which the "mentions" could become more compelling, even without any physical evidence. Suppose we discovered a temple hidden somewhere in a South American coastal jungle with tons and tons of drawings and explanations and descriptions. The story of a god-creature who fell from the sky in a box and worked miracles before dying. Representations of highly complex math, long lists of prime numbers, a star chart seemingly too accurate to have been constructed without modern instruments. Nothing that, on its own, couldn't be explained away. It would just ultimately come down to whether the story seemed compelling, believable, realistic. That's what it comes down to for me, with Christianity. There's no smoking gun, no piece of evidence that can't be explained away. But the whole story, the whole picture seems more believable if the historicity of the Resurrection is placed at the center of it.

Rolf · 2 August 2014

mattdance 18 said:

All of this has independent, extra-Biblical corroboration.

cite/quote(s)?

eric · 4 August 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: What if, instead, the effects weren't there. What if relativistic effects actually had a physical threshold, where they were literally 0 up until 10% of c and then suddenly kicked in? If that was the case, then it would be more difficult to say that Newtonian mechanics was wrong, because Newtonian mechanics had simply never addressed anything above 10% of c.

The tentative conclusion (made by the entire scientific community, from 1750s through about 1900) that Newton's mechanics addressed objects at all speeds would have been violated. Just as, if we somehow found out that QM worked everywhere except Alpha Centauri, that would be a violation of how we understand QM today. The fact that the equations don't mention Alpha Centauri does not mean we are neutral on the matter: we have very clear opinion on it, and the exception violates that opinion. Well, for 150 years science had a very clear opinion on the universality of Newton's laws, and relativity violated that universality. So, (just as a reminder of the topic), if you posit a nonzero +k(God) component that pops up sometimes, that's a violation of physical law as we currently understand it, and you haven't really said anything to convince me otherwise.

I don't think you can take this and say, "Now, see, miracles can't happen because they contradict science" any more than a chemist could say "Now, see, radioactive decay can't happen because it contradicts chemistry."

I'm not saying miracles can't happen. I'm saying they violate physical laws as we understand them; that it would take a modification of current physical laws to account for them.

[eric] Yes, absolutely I think we could reach that point. And while the line between credible/confirming vs. not may be fuzzy and broad, I think a mention of aliens or miracles in an old book doesn't even come close to that line.
Not just a single mention of a "visitor from the sky", no. But I imagine there could be a threshold at which the "mentions" could become more compelling, even without any physical evidence. Suppose we discovered a temple hidden somewhere in a South American coastal jungle with tons and tons of drawings and explanations and descriptions. The story of a god-creature who fell from the sky in a box and worked miracles before dying. Representations of highly complex math, long lists of prime numbers, a star chart seemingly too accurate to have been constructed without modern instruments.

I think the key things that would make an alien visitiation story credible are the things I've bolded - but those are the exact things missing from the biblical narrative. There is no biblical equivalent of them, no information contained within the bible that we would assess as indicating knowledge, intelligence, or engineering skills beyond what the story's contemporary humans would have. If Jesus had been quoted saying E=mc^2 or F=ma, you might have a point. But the biblical narrative contains nothing like that, no statements "seemingly too accurate to have been constructed without modern instruments."

That's what it comes down to for me, with Christianity. There's no smoking gun, no piece of evidence that can't be explained away. But the whole story, the whole picture seems more believable if the historicity of the Resurrection is placed at the center of it.

Well we obviously disagree on this point, but thank you for explaining your position on it.

david.starling.macmillan · 4 August 2014

eric said:
I don't think you can take this and say, "Now, see, miracles can't happen because they contradict science" any more than a chemist could say "Now, see, radioactive decay can't happen because it contradicts chemistry."
I'm not saying miracles can't happen. I'm saying they violate physical laws as we understand them; that it would take a modification of current physical laws to account for them.

I think this is what we keep coming back to. Sure, obviously we would have to modify our understanding of physical reality in order to accommodate the possibility of miracles. That's not in dispute. But this doesn't imply that science itself has somehow been wrong or mistaken about reality; science simply has not seen any observations which would lead to theory concerning miracles. We would certainly need to add to our understanding of science if miracles were shown to exist, but there is no body of evidence or theory which would need to be thrown out in order to accomplish this. In that sense, then, it's a mistake to say that miracles violate established science.

phhht · 4 August 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Suppose we discovered a temple hidden somewhere in a South American coastal jungle with tons and tons of drawings and explanations and descriptions. The story of a god-creature who fell from the sky in a box and worked miracles before dying. Representations of highly complex math, long lists of prime numbers, a star chart seemingly too accurate to have been constructed without modern instruments.

Can you cite comparable evidence for the resurrection? I think you cannot. As far as I know, there is no such evidence. There is nothing but an implausible, fact-free story.

But the whole story, the whole picture seems more believable if the historicity of the Resurrection is placed at the center of it.

The myth of a zombie god is so counterfactual, so evidence-free, that it serves as a paradigmatic example of the genre. There is no reason whatsoever to believe it to be true, and a million reasons to think that it is fiction. Unless, of course, you beg the question of the "historicity" of the purported event.

phhht · 4 August 2014

eric said: I'm not saying miracles can't happen.

What I say is that miracles don't happen. Ever.

david.starling.macmillan · 4 August 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Suppose we discovered a temple hidden somewhere in a South American coastal jungle with tons and tons of drawings and explanations and descriptions. The story of a god-creature who fell from the sky in a box and worked miracles before dying. Representations of highly complex math, long lists of prime numbers, a star chart seemingly too accurate to have been constructed without modern instruments.
Can you cite comparable evidence for the resurrection?

All the things I mentioned -- math, prime numbers, star charts -- are the sort of things we would think are consistent with an alien visitor. It's the stuff we would try to leave a record of if we were on a mission to another world. Yet the Gospels do not propose an alien visitor, but an incarnate Creator, which limits the bounds of our analogy. Unless he had an interest in proving his authenticity to 21st-century humanity (which obviously he cannot, as he hadn't shown up around here lately), math and science facts are hardly the sort of evidence we can expect. The purpose of the analogy is not to muse about a particular type of evidence, but to demonstrate a situation where an event in history leaving no tangible, empirical evidence could still leave enough testimonial evidence to make it a judgment call as to whether a particular Black Swan event happened. Not everything is clear in history; there is a gradient of evidential support between "not at all plausible" and "definitely the most probable explanation". What would we expect an incarnate creator to leave behind in terms of testimonial evidence? Well, that depends entirely on the nature of the creature as described in the claim, doesn't it?

The myth of a zombie god is so counterfactual, so evidence-free, that it serves as a paradigmatic example of the genre.

Again, stating that it is counterfactual is a specific positive claim. You can't say "It is counterfactual" and then back away and say "by which I mean you need to prove it to me." But I'm more interested in your positive claim that the "zombie god myth" is "a paradigmatic example of the genre". Perhaps you can defend this claim?

david.starling.macmillan · 4 August 2014

phhht said:
eric said: I'm not saying miracles can't happen.
What I say is that miracles don't happen. Ever.

What you mean is that you've never seen a miracle happen, ever, and that you don't personally believe anyone ever has.

phhht · 4 August 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Suppose we discovered a temple hidden somewhere in a South American coastal jungle with tons and tons of drawings and explanations and descriptions. The story of a god-creature who fell from the sky in a box and worked miracles before dying. Representations of highly complex math, long lists of prime numbers, a star chart seemingly too accurate to have been constructed without modern instruments.
Can you cite comparable evidence for the resurrection?
All the things I mentioned -- math, prime numbers, star charts -- are the sort of things we would think are consistent with an alien visitor. It's the stuff we would try to leave a record of if we were on a mission to another world. Yet the Gospels do not propose an alien visitor, but an incarnate Creator, which limits the bounds of our analogy. Unless he had an interest in proving his authenticity to 21st-century humanity (which obviously he cannot, as he hadn't shown up around here lately), math and science facts are hardly the sort of evidence we can expect.

In other words, no, you cannot cite any comparable evidence for the existence of the purported resurrection. Your examples are nothing more than smoke and mirrors, nothing more than an attempt to mislead, to suggest that yes, if cows could fly, we could put Paris in a bottle. There is no relevance at all of your examples to the myth of the resurrection.

What would we expect an incarnate creator to leave behind in terms of testimonial evidence?

You cannot even ask the question without begging the question of the existence of "an incarnate creator."

phhht · 4 August 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
eric said: I'm not saying miracles can't happen.
What I say is that miracles don't happen. Ever.
What you mean is that you've never seen a miracle happen, ever, and that you don't personally believe anyone ever has.

Indeed. I eagerly await correction.

david.starling.macmillan · 4 August 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: What would we expect an incarnate creator to leave behind in terms of testimonial evidence?
You cannot even ask the question without begging the question of the existence of "an incarnate creator."

Actually, no. That's not question-begging. Not in the slightest. It's a hypothetical. If a Creator existed and incarnated as the Gospels seem to claim, what testimonies would we have expected to arise concerning this incarnation? As stated, the answer depends on the nature and character of the creator being claimed. And I'd like to know if you intend on defending your claims about "paradigmatic examples" of the "zombie god" genre.

phhht · 4 August 2014

david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: What would we expect an incarnate creator to leave behind in terms of testimonial evidence?
You cannot even ask the question without begging the question of the existence of "an incarnate creator."
Actually, no. That's not question-begging. Not in the slightest. It's a hypothetical.

It's a counterfactual, in your preferred usage. There are no creator gods.

And I'd like to know if you intend on defending your claims about "paradigmatic examples" of the "zombie god" genre.

I'd like to know if you intend to justify the relevance of your list of evidence for an alien visitor to the resurrection myth.

david.starling.macmillan · 4 August 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said:
phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: What would we expect an incarnate creator to leave behind in terms of testimonial evidence?
You cannot even ask the question without begging the question of the existence of "an incarnate creator."
Actually, no. That's not question-begging. Not in the slightest. It's a hypothetical.
It's a counterfactual, in your preferred usage. There are no creator gods.

Since you and I do not agree on that point, it's not a shared counterfactual, only a hypothetical. Note that the existence of the creator is part of the "if" statement.

And I'd like to know if you intend on defending your claims about "paradigmatic examples" of the "zombie god" genre.
I'd like to know if you intend to justify the relevance of your list of evidence for an alien visitor to the resurrection myth.

So...you won't? As I explained, my list of evidence was to show an example of how testimonial evidence could provide varying levels of support for a Black Swan claim about history, such that acceptance of that claim came down to a judgment call. What is the purpose of your positive claim that the Gospels are a "paradigmatic example" of the "zombie god" genre, if you aren't going to defend it?

phhht · 4 August 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: What would we expect an incarnate creator to leave behind in terms of testimonial evidence?

What would we expect a fictional god to leave behind in terms of evidence? Why, nothing but stories. And indeed, that's all we've got. No star charts, no mathematics. Nothing but stories.

TomS · 4 August 2014

phhht said:
david.starling.macmillan said: What would we expect an incarnate creator to leave behind in terms of testimonial evidence?
What would we expect a fictional god to leave behind in terms of evidence? Why, nothing but stories. And indeed, that's all we've got. No star charts, no mathematics. Nothing but stories.

And there are those detailed plans for the temple, and concerns about skin diseases. Why not, rather, some simple ideas about preventing diseases: Boil your water before using it. The simple treatment for diarrhea. Be sure to get enough vitamin C. Maybe insist on a ritual inoculation with cowpox? Sleep under mosquito netting?

eric · 4 August 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Sure, obviously we would have to modify our understanding of physical reality in order to accommodate the possibility of miracles. That's not in dispute.

I thought it was - I thought that was your whole point. If you want to say that we could possibly be wrong on whether miracles can happen, then yeah, that's true. But you keep saying that miracles aren't counterfactual and don't violate physical laws, and that is our main point of disagreement. They do violate physical laws as we understand them. And while they aren't counterfactual in the way they use it, they certainly are counterfactual when we appeal to the general scientific community's standards of counterfactual.

science simply has not seen any observations which would lead to theory concerning miracles.

Untrue. Given that we've done many empirical investigations of miracle claims, and they keep turning up charlatans and the self-deluded, leads very clearly to the inductive conclusion that miracle claims are cons or self-delusions.

there is no body of evidence or theory which would need to be thrown out in order to accomplish this. In that sense, then, it's a mistake to say that miracles violate established science.

I think you're wrong in this, and I think your statement here contradict the first statement you made (see first quote in this post). The first time God is credibly observed to add energy to a closed system, we would need to throw out (my second meaning) the law of conservation of energy. In your words: we would have to modify our understanding of physical reality. True, the law of conservation of energy would still be useful for a large number of cases (like Newton's laws), but science would have to throw it out as an accurate description of how the universe really works at a fundamental level. Now for the record, that's perfectly okay to do. The issue in dispute (IMO) is that you keep saying miracles are consistent with our current laws of physics - that no modification would be needed - and I keep arguing that they aren't.

eric · 4 August 2014

david.starling.macmillan said: Unless he [God] had an interest in proving his authenticity to 21st-century humanity (which obviously he cannot, as he hadn't shown up around here lately),

What? He clearly could, he just chooses not to. And as countless atheists have asserted before an will continue to assert in the future, this choice not to intervene in an obvious manner is generally inconsistent with the concept of a tri-omni God.

The purpose of the analogy is not to muse about a particular type of evidence, but to demonstrate a situation where an event in history leaving no tangible, empirical evidence could still leave enough testimonial evidence to make it a judgment call as to whether a particular Black Swan event happened.

I do think that good testimonial evidence could be used to support a black swan event. The point I made by bolding part of your description is that the bible lacks the exact sort of testimonial evidence you need to support one. You list a bunch of things A-F, of which E and F are the strongest, most critical things. They are the things which will really link the testimony to a non-contemporary-human source, really nail it down. The uncontestable, even-the-naysayer-must-pay-attention sort of testemonial evidence. Then you talk about what the bible holds, and it's A-D but not E and F. You are missing precisely the sort of evidence you yourself say would be indicative of an extrahuman source.

What would we expect an incarnate creator to leave behind in terms of testimonial evidence? Well, that depends entirely on the nature of the creature as described in the claim, doesn't it?

Sure does. We would not expect much evidence of anythnig if God doesn't care about people believing in him, or in their progress, or their physical prosperity. But if he does care - if you posit a human-loving God - then having him show up and NOT say things like "disease is caused my microscopic critters living on your skin - wash your hands and instruments in alcohol or soap before you perform surgery, and oh by the way here's how you can make penicillin..." is pretty hard to explain.

david.starling.macmillan · 5 August 2014

TomS said:
phhht said: What would we expect a fictional god to leave behind in terms of evidence? Why, nothing but stories. And indeed, that's all we've got. No star charts, no mathematics. Nothing but stories.
And there are those detailed plans for the temple, and concerns about skin diseases. Why not, rather, some simple ideas about preventing diseases: Boil your water before using it. The simple treatment for diarrhea. Be sure to get enough vitamin C. Maybe insist on a ritual inoculation with cowpox? Sleep under mosquito netting?

Which would be an excellent argument against the proposition that the Torah was handed down from Sinai in one piece without edits, interpolations, or interpretations.

eric said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Sure, obviously we would have to modify our understanding of physical reality in order to accommodate the possibility of miracles. That's not in dispute.
I thought it was - I thought that was your whole point. If you want to say that we could possibly be wrong on whether miracles can happen, then yeah, that's true. But you keep saying that miracles aren't counterfactual and don't violate physical laws, and that is our main point of disagreement.

Let me ask this -- do you see a distinction between miracle claims and over-unity claims? When I think "violation of physics", I think over-unity. An over-unity claim must assert that all the careful and painstaking experiments rigorously verifying the theoretical basis of the laws of thermodynamics were systematically flawed, and energy can come from nothing via purely natural processes. Over-unity requires us to ignore our observations of thermodynamics and completely change our perception of how energy itself -- the ultimate subject of all study in physics -- functions. In contrast, we can say that miracles "violate" physics in the sense that they would require an addendum to physics, but they don't go against science in the same way as over-unity. Allowing the possibility of miracles doesn't require us to throw out observation and experiment in the same way that over-unity would. Does that distinction make sense?

science simply has not seen any observations which would lead to theory concerning miracles.
Untrue. Given that we've done many empirical investigations of miracle claims, and they keep turning up charlatans and the self-deluded, leads very clearly to the inductive conclusion that miracle claims are cons or self-delusions.

Oh, I'm totally in favor of developing theories concerning the basis of miracle claims. Just like we can develop theories concerning the basis of alien abduction claims without needing to comment on the possibility of extraterrestrial intelligence.

The first time God is credibly observed to add energy to a closed system, we would need to throw out (my second meaning) the law of conservation of energy.

Not at all, because if something is added to a system, it ceases to be a closed system.

eric said:
david.starling.macmillan said: Unless he [God] had an interest in proving his authenticity to 21st-century humanity (which obviously he cannot, as he hadn't shown up around here lately),
What? He clearly could, he just chooses not to.

Sorry, I wasn't clear -- I meant that he obviously cannot have an interest in proving his authenticity to 21st-century humanity, not that he obviously cannot prove his authenticity.

I do think that good testimonial evidence could be used to support a black swan event. You list a bunch of things A-F, of which E and F are the strongest, most critical things. They are the things which will really link the testimony to a non-contemporary-human source, really nail it down. The uncontestable, even-the-naysayer-must-pay-attention sort of testemonial evidence.

But as I said before, you don't need any single smoking gun. There are plenty of cultures that discovered prime numbers. There were plenty of cultures with highly precise star charts. There were plenty of cultures that independently discovered math. There were plenty that had stories of gods coming down from the heavens. It's the convergence of all these factors which would make it extraordinary. And since you can have more or less convergence, you can have an even gradient from "totally implausible" all the way up to "almost absolutely certain".

Rolf · 5 August 2014

The best thing we can do about the universe is to presume it is a closed system, with a door in it. The door is locked, and behind the door we find all our monsters: God and and all the other gods, Intelligent Designers, Bigfoot and all the rest.

Who's got the key?